I generally avoid debates over apologetic method because they rarely get beyond methodology. Having worked out my own philosophy of apologetics years ago, I just do it. Since, however, I keep running into the same stale objections, it it's sometimes useful to revisit the issue. Here's a recent exchange I had. Facebook exchanges tend to be choppy, so I've rearranged the order of comments to tighten the flow of argument:
Jonathan
Here's a question: If it really is impossible to reason without assuming the Biblical worldview, is it possible to reason that it is impossible to reason without assuming the Biblical worldview? And is it possible to reason that it is impossible to reason that it is impossible to reason without assuming the Biblical worldview? And so on, ad infinitum.
Hays
There may be pop presuppositionalists to frame it that way, but that's not the real issue. The question at issue isn't the possibility of reasoning without assuming a biblical worldview, but the grounds or warrant. Here's an example of what happens when a secular philosopher attempts to be consistent with his secular assumptions:
Jonathan
In any case, the transcendental argument at best establishes that God exists -- not necessarily the Judeo-Christian God.
Hays
It's true that the transcendental argument may have that limitation, but that holds true for several other theistic proofs. Moreover, the transcendental argument can figure in a cumulative case.
Fraser
I might be mistaken, but I think what you call 'divorcing the central facts of the faith from their theological underpinning worldview' I would call simply avoiding a circular argument that you would have by assuming the truth of Christianity in order to prove it.
Hays
That's ambiguous. Who's assuming the truth of Christianity in order to prove it? Presumably, a Christian apologist assumes the truth of Christianity.
Perhaps you mean we don't require the unbeliever we're debating to assume the truth of Christianity. But that's ambiguous. One can assume the truth of X for the sake of argument, then consider the explanatory value of that operating assumption. That's not viciously circular. Both scientists and philosophers do that all the time.
Fraser
What I mean is that the demonstration of the truth of Christianity does not depend upon a prior assumption that it is true. I think what you're talking about is something like an inference to the best explanation, which I'm all in favor of and is consistent with evidentialism. But it requires the kind of "judging the evidence" approach that presuppositionalists typically find distasteful. And I agree that method is not viciously circular. That's why it beats presupposionalism hands-down.
Hays
You said that in response to my statement that "One can assume the truth of X for the sake of argument, then consider the explanatory value of that operating assumption. That's not viciously circular. Both scientists and philosophers do that all the time."
But that just is Van Til's method. He proposed a two-pronged approach in debating an unbeliever. Take an apologetic dialogue with an atheist. Van Til's strategy is that on the one hand the Christian apologist should grant atheism for the sake of argument, then carry that to a logical extreme. On the other hand, the atheist should grant Christian theism for the sake of argument, then carry that to a logical extreme.
You seem to agree with that, yet act as though that's something other than presuppositionalism and inimical to presuppositionalism.
Fraser
What you're describing is similar to what Francis Schaeffer called "taking the roof off". Sure, I think that can be effective."
Hays
Of course, Schaeffer was influenced by Van Til.
Fraser
So something in the neighborhood of presuppositionalism might be helpful as a negative apologetic, but evidentialism is the only way I see for a positive case - and certainly the biblical method."
Hays
How would a transcendental argument for the theistic foundations of modal realism and/or mathematical realism be a merely negative apologetic?
Fraser
Then you eliminate all the other possibilities by attempting to show that they are logically incoherent. But even if you show that all the other options on the table are logically incoherent, it doesn't prove that your option is true."
Hays
How does that follow? If there's a finite set of possible explanations, and you're able to take all the competing options off the table, then by process of elimination that proves the remaining explanation. Ironically, that's how evidentialists argue for the empty tomb. They rule out the naturalistic alternative explanations.
Fraser
The thing is, I've studied presuppositionalism and evidentialism both at the doctoral level, so I'm quite well familiar with the various nuances of them. I understand that some presuppositionalists try to make an allowance for the use of evidences, but when push comes to shove they don't actually do much of that. They typically give lip service to evidence, but when actually talking about the arguments they actually sound like the worst skeptics.
Hays
There's some truth to that, but it's not that simple:
i) To begin with, you need to distinguish between high-level thinkers and popularizers.
ii) In addition, presuppositionalists are apt to be trained in philosophy or some rather abstract discipline. So giving' "evidence" in the sense that Craig Evans, Richard Bauckham, or Kenneth Kitchen (to name a few) give evidence is outside their field of specialization. And it works in reverse. Bible scholars and archeologists aren't generally good at philosophical argumentation. And they may not be very good at fielding scientific challenges, viz. naturalistic evolution.
iii) When Westminster was founded, there was an informal division of labor. Van Til took a philosophical approach while his colleges in the OT and NT depts (Stonehouse, Young, Kline) provided "evidence," because different faculty members had different areas of expertise.
James Anderson has doctorates in computer science and philosophical theology. Frame is trained in philosophy. Poythress had a doctorate in mathematics, as well as training in linguistics.
They're not going to lay out the "evidence" in the way that a Bible scholar or archeologist will do for the simple reason that that's not their specialization.
Fraser
If presuppositionalism is a valid approach, I sure wonder why God bothered with miracles and prophecy, and all of those historical books. He could have just dropped a copy of the Transcendental Argument from the sky and been done."
Hays
But by that logic you seem to scorn philosophical and scientific arguments for Christianity or theism.
And as you well know, many unbelievers reject reported miracles for philosophical reasons. So bare appeal to miracles is insufficient if one can't rebut Humean skepticism.
Fraser
How so?"
Hays
Because you said "If presuppositionalism is a valid approach, I sure wonder why God bothered with miracles and prophecy, and all of those historical books."
So why wouldn't your strictures apply to philosophical and scientific arguments for God or Christian theism?
Fraser
Well, scientific arguments typically have the same or similar structure to evidentialist arguments, so that's no problem.
Hays
But but repeat, you said: "If presuppositionalism is a valid approach, I sure wonder why God bothered with miracles and prophecy, and all of those historical books. He could have just dropped a copy of the Transcendental Argument from the sky and been done."
So why can't we substitute, "Why did God bother with miracles and prophecy if the fine-tuning argument or Leibnizian cosmological argument is sound? He could have just dropped a copy of the fine-tuning argument or Leibnizian cosmological argument or Plantinga's modal ontological argument (or the argument from reason, or the argument from consciousness) from the sky and been done."
Fraser
You're confused, my friend. Evidentialism is a methodology which is more than able to accomodate miracles, prophecy, and natural theology."
Hays
i) Ironically, your comment is confused. I said nothing to suggest that evidentialism is unable to accommodate miracles, prophecy, and natural theology. By what process of valid inference did you draw that conclusion from my statements?
The question at issue was how you polarized the alternatives. If hypothetically, God could just drop a copy of the transcendental argument from the sky, then he could do the same for the McGrew's cumulative case argument for the Resurrection.
Moreover, there's an equivocation in your comparison because you're conflating events with arguments about events. God working a miracle is different than the argument from miracles.
ii) Finally, presuppositionalism can also accommodate miracles, prophecy, and natural theology. So you've erected a false antithesis.
Fraser
In theory, perhaps. In practice, not so much. But in any case the presuppositionalist approach is totally superfluous if you're using the others.
Hays
It would only be superfluous if other approaches incorporate transcendental arguments.
Fraser
No, because natural theology doesn't get you all the way to the Gospel and the truth of Christianity. It only gets you to theism. Miracles and prophecy authenticate the Christian message. You really don't understand that? I'm afraid you're missing some of the most basic concepts here."
Hays
I never suggested that natural theology can get a person all the way to Christian theism. By what process of valid inference did you draw that conclusion from my statements?
But by the same token, the argument from miracles won't get a person all the way to Christian theism. Take non-Christian miracles. So your comment is inconsistent.
Fraser
Er, the McGrews' argument depends upon the historicity of the events depicted in the NT. So if the argument dropped from the sky without those events, it wouldn't be a valid argument."
Hays
i) My statement didn't contain that false dichotomy. Is there some reason you're imputing to me things I didn't say or imply? Do you do that to attack a weaker target?
ii) Moreover, your response doesn't even work on its own terms. By comparison, theistic conceptual realism depends on truthmakers. So if the transcendental argument dropped from the sky without the reality of abstract objects to back it up, that wouldn't be a sound argument. It cuts both ways whether we're discussing evidentialism or presuppositionalism.
Fraser
The argument from miracles depends upon the historicity of the events in question. So what you are saying here is nonsense.
Hays
And the argument for theistic foundations of abstract objects depends on the existence of the truthmakers in question. So what you are saying here is nonsense. Should I now sigh and exclaim you're actually doing a good job of reminding me why evidentialists are so tedious to dialogue with?
Fraser
Well, you were trying to suggest I was inconsistent in saying that God could have dropped the transcendental argument from the sky without also indicting evidentialism. However, if natural theology can't get all the way to Christian theism, then it wouldn't be enough to simply have the cosmological argument fall from the sky. Get it? Need me to give your quote back to you again?
Hays
And I've demonstrated the parallel. Get it?
Fraser
Please, stop with the 'gotcha' games, and the snarky little 'what process of valid inference did you draw that conclusion' business. It's really tedious."
Hays
You're the one who's littered our exchange with condescending remarks. And it's not just a "gotcha game" to assess the consistency of your statements or whether your assessment of presuppositionalism is uninformed.
Fraser
Of course, it would help if any presuppositionalist actually presented a fully-worked-out version of that argument instead of just making vague appeals to it.
Hays
Greg Welty and James Anderson have produced several detailed versions of the argument.
Fraser
Oh, really? That would be interesting to see
Hays
Fraser
It sure took presuppositionalists long enough to finally come up with it.
Hays
Well, I don't know about that. Anderson's "If Knowledge the God" was published in 2005. And their more recent articles on theistic conceptual realism draw heavily on Welty's 2000 MPhil thesis and 2006 DPhil dissertation.
Fraser
My issue with presuppositionalism isn't that it's philosophical, it's that it's a bad argument."
Hays
Are you saying there are no good theistic arguments for modal realism and mathematical realism?
Fraser
Are you asking if I think modal realism and mathematical realism make more sense in a theistic framework than any competing framework? I'm inclined to say yes to that. But I don't know how to prove either of those.
Hays
Yet in reference to presuppositionalism, you said "Besides, the philosophical arguments aren't any good, either." But that's the kind of thing Welty/Anderson argue for. So what does it mean to say you don't know how to prove either one of those?
Hays
But you admit that you haven't read Anderson and Welty.
Fraser
Correct. And sure, it might be theoretically possible that they could salvage presuppositionalism, but I would be highly dubious of that claim.
Hays
Do you think it's an intellectual virtue to be so prejudicial about arguments you haven't studied?
Fraser
I'm not sure how widely publicized these arguments from Anderson and Welty are. I don't know if they're very widely read outside of Westminster circles.
Hays
"The Lord of Non-Contradiction" was published in Philosophia Christi. "If Knowledge Then God" was published in Calvin Theological Journal. "In Defense of the Argument for God from Logic" is hosted at the Evangelical Philosophical Society. (The other three are at Anderson's personal site.)
For someone who says he's studied presuppositionalism at a doctoral level, don't you think you should be aware of this material?
Fraser
Are you doubting my claim or something? I studied apologetic methods under Habermas. So for presup we studied Bahnsen, Frame, and a little Van Til. I'm not doing a dissertation on it, so I haven't read every presupp out there. If Bahnsen couldn't convince me, why do you think these other guys would? Wasn't Bahnsen supposed to be a giant among presupps? Maybe you need to realize that most scholars don't read every minor author that comes out of Westminster.
Hays
What makes you classify Greg Welty and James Anderson as "minor" authors? And what makes you classify Anderson as somebody who "comes out of Westminster? He has two earned doctorates from the University of Edinburgh. He's a member of the Society of Christian Philosophers, the British Society for the Philosophy of Religion, and the Evangelical Philosophical Society. His doctoral thesis was published by Paternoster. He's published articles in Religions Studies and Philosophia Christi.
Welty majored in philosophy at UCLA, then received an MPhil and DPhil in philosophical theology from Oxford, with Richard Swinburne as his academic advisor.
For an aspiring scholar, you have a bad habit of winging it. You were the one who said you studied presuppositionalism at a doctoral level. Bahnsen died in 1995. Is it really asking too much that you should be conversant with developments in presuppositionalism, presented in contemporary literature, in standard academic periodicals?
Fraser got burned bad in this one. Rekt.
ReplyDeleteFor those who might not already be aware:
ReplyDelete"Comparative Apologetic Anatomy" by Steve Hays.