According to the freewill defense, God is not responsible or blameworthy for the harmful decisions that humans make. He doesn't "cause" their choices or "determine" their choices.
Suppose I have a college roommate who's a recovering alcoholic. Suppose I take him to a bar. I place him in a tempting situation. I know he has a weakness for alcohol, but I don't know if he will succumb to temptation. Suppose there's a 50/50 chance that he will either succumb or resist.
If he does give into temptation, it's not because I "determined" the outcome. And as freewill theists define causality, I didn't cause him to drink.
Was I blameworthy for exposing him to that gratuitous temptation? Even if, on this occasion, he overcomes the temptation to drink, was I blameworthy for putting him at risk? Was I acting in his best interests? Or was I playing to his weakness, thereby exposing my roommate to harm?
Is it not my duty, as a friend, to protect him? Even if I can't do that all time, isn't that something I could and should do in this situation?
And if he does give into temptation, am I not complicit in his downfall? Was I not instrumental in his downfall?
A Lutheran here,
ReplyDeleteYou have a point, as far as it goes, but we shouldn't be talking about a bar, we should be talking about the man's home. God created a nice home for us in the Earth and we trashed it and made it a den of temptation.
So, the better analogy would be if you are at fault for letting the man stay in his home instead of burning it down so he won't be tempted. God did contemplate burning down our home just before the flood.
That doesn't really engage my argument at any point. Since, moreover, classical Lutheranism isn't a species of freewill theism (that I'm aware of), I don't see how what I said is even at odds with Lutheranism.
DeleteAt the risk that we aren't using terms the same way, I would say yes, classical Lutheranism is definitely a species of freewill theism. Before the fall in the Garden of Eden Adam and Eve it was all freewill theism. After the fall we lost our freewill in terms of things above, but still hold it for things below. We cannot by our own reason or strength believe in Jesus Christ our Lord or come to him. But picking out our socks in the morning is a freewill choice and every choice to sin is a freewill choice.
DeleteAs far as your argument, I'm not at all certain that I follow your analogies. I reject the premise that God takes alcoholics to bars for example, if you are, in fact, making that premise.
i) From what I've read, classical Lutheran theology (e.g. Missouri Synod; Luther's Bondage of the Will) affirms unconditional election. That's predestinarian. That's something which freewill theism repudiates.
ReplyDeleteii) Apropos (i), if unconditional election is true, then how was it all freewill theism before the fall? Are you saying that God unconditionally chose who was going to be saved after the fall? In the nature of the case, predestination is eternal, not temporal or after the fact.
iii) What do you mean by freewill? Do you mean human choices are ultimately uncaused? What I choose is caused by my mental state at the time, but my mental state is uncaused?
If so, then human choices are purely random. Satan got lucky by tempting Adam and Eve on that particular day. Had he tempted them a day before or a day later, they might just as well have resisted, for their choices were random. Every choice is a roll of the dice. Roll the same dice twice and get two different outcomes.
If free choices are uncaused choices, then whether Adam and Eve resisted temptation or gave into temptation is the luck of the draw. If Satan asked the same question a day later, the outcome might have been the opposite.
If, on the other hand, you think our choices are ultimately caused by something, then you need to show how that's distinguishable from determinism.
iv) You're not tracking the analogy. As I said at the outset, I'm addressing the question of whether an agent (e.g. God) is blameless so long as he doesn't "cause" or "determine" the harmful decision of another agent. Freewill theists typically draw that (allegedly) exculpatory distinction.
I then cite a counterexample to challenge the principle. If I know that my roommate is a recovering alcoholic, and I take him to a bar, am I not responsible for putting him in at risk? I know that's his vulnerability.
If I leave him there, walk home, and find out the morning after that he was run over by a car when he was jaywalking because he vision and reflexes were impaired by inebriation, am I not blameworthy?
i) If unconditional election and "freewill theism" are mutually exclusive, I guess I am not a freewill theist.
ReplyDeleteii) Using "before" and "after" when it comes to God's actions is tricky. But basically, yes, God unconditionally chose who was going to be saved sort of "logically" after the fall, for lack of a better term, even if no actual time was involved.
iii) "Roll the same dice twice and get two different outcomes." - Absolutely. What is wrong with that? On any particular day I might pick a different pair of socks. To you it might seem random, but I am just exercising my will differently.
iv) I think I get it. Yes, you would have some level of blame. But I don't think the analogy quite applies to God. If you are talking about Adam and Eve, they were not alcoholics. They had zero innate inclination to sin. So putting them in the same garden with the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil was not the same thing as taking an alcoholic to a bar. If you are talking about me, I am a metaphorical "alcoholic" but in what sense does God metaphorically take me to a bar?
"But basically, yes, God unconditionally chose who was going to be saved sort of 'logically' after the fall, for lack of a better term, even if no actual time was involved."
DeleteSo God was initially undecided about who to elect? He was waiting for the fall before he made up his mind or finalized the list?
"What is wrong with that?"
So the fall of mankind comes down to hard luck. Unlucky timing. If Satan had tempted Adam and Eve on a different day, you'd have a different outcome. No fall.
Likewise, if choices are ultimately uncaused, then whether or not you murder someone is just a matter of good luck or bad luck. A random choice. Sometimes the coin lands heads, sometimes tails.
"If you are talking about Adam and Eve, they were not alcoholics."
I wasn't. You were. That was your example, not mine.
"but in what sense does God metaphorically take me to a bar?"
By providentially putting humans in tempting situations–unless you're a Deist (rather than a Lutheran).
"So God was initially undecided about who to elect? He was waiting for the fall before he made up his mind or finalized the list?"
DeleteInitially there was nobody to elect because nobody was fallen. God did not create fallen people. You are demanding that the cart to go before the horse. I'm not saying he had to spend any actual time "waiting", but to use our language, yes he did have to "wait" for fallen people to exist before he could elect them.
"So the fall of mankind comes down to hard luck. Unlucky timing. If Satan had tempted Adam and Eve on a different day, you'd have a different outcome. No fall."
It might have happened differently on the same day. It is a very Lutheran thing to say that God did not create people with the intention that they would sin. It could have happened differently.
"Likewise, if choices are ultimately uncaused, then whether or not you murder someone is just a matter of good luck or bad luck. A random choice. Sometimes the coin lands heads, sometimes tails."
I thought you were exaggerating before about random choices. Why do you go straight to choices being uncaused? People cause their choices through their will.
I'm still not getting your point. It sounds like you are arguing from a position that God is blameworthy for taking alcoholics to a bar.
Jeff D
Delete"God did not create fallen people."
A red herring.
"You are demanding that the cart to go before the horse."
By definition, unconditional election is not contingent on what humans will do or would do. Otherwise, it would be conditional. Even if you claim everybody has libertarian freedom, their choices can't figure in God's choice.
"It might have happened differently on the same day."
So billions of people will go to hell because Satan got lucky. Had the same temptation taken place in the afternoon rather than the morning, or vice versa, the same people would be heavenbound instead of hellbound. Timing is everything.
You don't perceive how arbitrary that is? Like God rolling dice to decide who will be saved and who will be damned.
"I thought you were exaggerating before about random choices. Why do you go straight to choices being uncaused? People cause their choices through their will."
i) I initially asked you:
"What do you mean by freewill? Do you mean human choices are ultimately uncaused? What I choose is caused by my mental state at the time, but my mental state is uncaused?If so, then human choices are purely random."
You didn't challenge that.
ii) I didn't say choices are uncaused, but "ultimately uncaused." To say "people cause their choices through their will" simply pushes the question back a step. Is there anything that causes the will to choose A over B? Or is that a brute fact?
If choices are ultimately caused, then how do you distinguish that from determinism? An effect can't choose not to be caused. It's too late to turn the clock back.
iii) To say the will causes choices has no real explanatory power. Seems redundant–like saying volition causes volitions.
"It sounds like you are arguing from a position that God is blameworthy for taking alcoholics to a bar."
i) It's an analogy. Not God taking people to a bar but my taking a recovering alcoholic to a bar is analogous to God doing X.
ii) Once again, the question at issue is whether it is exculpatory to for anent to say he didn't cause or determine someone else to suffer harm or commit evil–a la the freewill defense.
I'm citing a counterexample. If I know that my roommate's history of alcoholism has lowered his resistance, and I take him to a bar, can I exonerate my conduct by saying I didn't cause or determine him to fall off the wagon? Or am I still culpable for putting him in a gratuitously hazardous situation, given his heightened susceptibility? Is that what a good friend would do?
By analogy, is it sufficient for a freewill theist to say God is blameless so long as he didn't cause or determine a tragic outcome? Is that an adequate theodicy?
I get the impression that you haven't studied philosophical discussions of libertarian freedom or the freewill defense. You seem to be operating with a seat-of-the-pants understanding of the issues. There's a disconnect between what you say and what I say because my arguments and responses are framed in reference to the philosophical literature.
In my observation, most Lutherans aren't into apologetics. J. W. Montgomery was an outstanding exception, but ironically, he was far more influential outside of Lutheran circles than inside Lutheran circles. And he's in his 80s. There's a sense in which Lutheran OT scholar Andrew Steinmann is doing apologetics, but not at a philosophical level.
It was not luck that decided billions would be damned. It was not God. It was not Satan. It was Adam. The point is thoroughly driven home in Romans 5. Sin came into the world through one man, and death through sin...many died through one man's trespass...for if, because of one man's trespass, death reigned through that one man...one trespass led to condemnation for all men...
ReplyDeleteiii) "To say the will causes choices has no real explanatory power."
So be it. It has no explanatory power. You can't necessarily explain why a will causes a choice. The chain of cause and effect ends at the will.
If I am walking through the woods with an ax and come upon a tree and chop it down, the ultimate cause of that tree's state of being chopped down is my will. There is nothing beyond that. I am speaking about ordinary circumstances absent a miraculous event or demon possession or something like that.
ii) "Is there anything that causes the will to choose A over B?"
No. Nothing. Not ordinarily.
"You seem to be operating with a seat-of-the-pants understanding of the issues."
That is probably fair. I'm not much into philosophical literature. My philosophical construct is based on certain things I believe from being Lutheran. Such as this precious gem from the Augsburg confession:
"Of the Cause of Sin they teach that, although God does create and preserve nature, yet the cause of sin is the will of the wicked, that is, of the devil and ungodly men; which will, unaided of God, turns itself from God, as Christ says John 8:44: When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own."
You probably didn't know Lutherans believed that.
Jeff D:
Delete"You probably didn't know Lutherans believed that."
Here's an example of what Lutherans believe:
According to Holy Scripture divine providence embraces not only the universe in general, Col. 1, 17, but also all creatures individually: a) plants, Matt. 6, 28 — 30; b) animals, Matt. 6, 26; c) men, Acts 17, 26; Ps. 33, 12 — 15. The special object of divine providence according to Scripture is the Christian Church, for whose sake all things exist and whose welfare all must serve, Rom. 8, 28; Heb. 1, 14; Matt. 16, 18. All objections raised against the Scriptural truth that divine providence embraces all things, even the least, Matt. 10, 30; Luke 21, 18; 12, 6, for example, that God would be too heavily burdened by caring for all things or that the small affairs of life in that case would receive undue emphasis in comparison with the important matters, must be rejected as perverse notions of the carnal and unbelieving heart, which destroy the very concept of God; for just because God is God, does He care for all things, Acts 17, 28.
https://archive.org/stream/Mueller/Mueller_djvu.txt
According to that, if sinners find themselves in a tempting situation, it's because God orchestrated the circumstances.
I can shoehorn that right into my post on the freewill defense.
Jeff D:
Delete"It was not luck that decided billions would be damned. It was not God. It was not Satan. It was Adam. The point is thoroughly driven home in Romans 5."
The question at issue isn't what Scripture teaches, but what logically follows from your definition of freewill. Quoting Scripture doesn't nullify the implications of your position on human freedom.
"You can't necessarily explain why a will causes a choice. The chain of cause and effect ends at the will."
In which case, Adam's sin was a random event. The fate of humanity is at the mercy of chance rather than grace and providence. A coin flip separates salvation from damnation.
If you think that's contrary to Scripture, then your concept of freewill is contrary to Scripture.
Why do you keep saying "random"? What are you talking about? You just wrote a response with 76 words in it. Did you pick those 76 words out of the air at random?
DeleteIf you want to explore what logically follows from my definition of freewill, that's fine. But let's try to explore my actual definition of freewill. If I choose ahead of time what shirts I am going to wear for the next five days, then the order of shirts is not random. It is the opposite of random. The order of shirts was determined. By me.
That is five decisions strung together in a row. Now consider just one decision. Adam made one decision. It was not random, but determined. By him.
What logically follows from that? Well, it means that sin came into the world through one man. Many died through one man's trespass. Etc. The logical consequences of my definition of freewill are exactly what is described in the bible.
But thank God the story does not end there. Adam's trespass determined who would be condemned. (Everybody.) God's grace determines who will be saved. Salvation isn't random. God determines salvation.
That's the way the Bible works. God determines all the good stuff. Sinners and the devil determine all the bad stuff.
@Jeff D
Delete"Why do you keep saying 'random'? What are you talking about?...let's try to explore my actual definition of freewill. If I choose ahead of time what shirts I am going to wear for the next five days, then the order of shirts is not random. It is the opposite of random. The order of shirts was determined. By me."
If so, then this seems to suggest there's an uncaused mental state in you which casually causes you to choose to do this rather than that.
Moreover, are you suggesting you're your own "unmoved mover" or "first cause"?
In any case, how can anyone know in advance what you will do? How can anyone know what you will do until the very moment you choose?
By the way, although it's debatable, the scientific empirical evidence across various fields seems to suggest a stronger correlation with determinism rather than indeterminism.
"That's the way the Bible works. God determines all the good stuff. Sinners and the devil determine all the bad stuff."
I didn't know "sinners and the devil determine" earthquakes, tornadoes, certain cancers, and many other natural evils (since these would fit quite snugly under "bad stuff").
"If so, then this seems to suggest there's an uncaused mental state in you which casually causes you to choose to do this rather than that."
DeleteYou* are still trying to back up the ultimate cause past the person. The ultimate cause is a random-ish mental state that in turn causes someone to make a decision. Mental state is a factor in decision making. If someone is calm or agitated or tired it influences a decision but does not directly cause it. The person causes it.
"Moreover, are you suggesting you're your own "unmoved mover" or "first cause"?"
Yes, basically. But with obvious limitations. People can't move everything, just what they can manipulate with their physical bodies. That is what I think it means to be created in the image of God. I don't know if that part is explicitly Lutheran or not, but I think it is consistent.
"In any case, how can anyone know in advance what you will do? How can anyone know what you will do until the very moment you choose?"
To put it simply they can't. To put it more complicatedly, because God knows the future, he knows ahead of time what choices people will make, but he doesn't know "in advance" like a Molinist would say. A Molinist would say God knows that if he hypothetically put a person in situation "A" that person would make choice "X." I say that is impossible. For one thing, there is not just one choice "X" a person could make.
"By the way, although it's debatable, the scientific empirical evidence across various fields seems to suggest a stronger correlation with determinism rather than indeterminism."
I don't believe it is true. But if I were ever convinced of it scientifically, I think I would just give up on everything. I would be crushed. Even though, ironically, there would be no reason for me to be crushed. It would just be determined for me that I would be crushed. Or something.
"I didn't know "sinners and the devil determine" earthquakes, tornadoes, certain cancers, and many other natural evils (since these would fit quite snugly under "bad stuff")."
I should have known a hasty generalization would get me into trouble. I could make some comments about this. Natural evils aren't morally "bad." Natural evils entered the world because of sin, so sinners indirectly caused them. That kind of thing. But it is a little off topic.
*I realize you are a different person than steve. Hello there!
Jeff D:
Delete"It is a very Lutheran thing to say that God did not create people with the intention that they would sin."
That may be a very Lutheran thing to say, but it's not a very logical thing to say. If God foreknew that they would sin in case he made them, but he went ahead and made them, then how did he not intend the end-result of his own creative actions? It's not like accidentally knocking over a flower vase.
Jeff D
Delete"Why do you keep saying 'random'? What are you talking about?…If I choose ahead of time what shirts I am going to wear for the next five days, then the order of shirts is not random. It is the opposite of random. The order of shirts was determined. By me."
For some odd reason, you keep ignoring the adverb: "ultimately uncaused." You ignore the "ultimately" part.
You've said choices are caused by the agent, but nothing causes the agent to make those choices he. In that case, choices are the effect of an uncaused cause.
If you throw dice to pick which shirts to wear, although the dice determine which shirts you choose, you can't determine the how the dice will roll. Choosing shirts by throwing dice is a random selection process. Even though the dice determine which shirts to wear, you have no control over the outcome of each throw. It may be snake eyes one time, sixes the next, &c.
So the fact that you wore the beige shirt on Tuesday and the blue shirt on Wednesday is a matter of chance.
Likewise, if nothing causes the agent to choose A over B, then that's an uncaused event. And if there are uncaused events, then anything can happen.
Given causality, the nature of the cause determines the nature of the effect. But if there are uncaused events, then things happen out of the blue, for there's no underlying cause to give direction to the outcome.
"That is five decisions strung together in a row."
A chain reaction where the end-result is the consequence of uncaused event that initiates the process is random. What makes it random is not what happens downstream, but what happens upstream. How it starts, not how it ends.
Take "the luck of the draw." You choose a card, but the card is chosen from a randomly shuffled deck. What card you draw is a matter of chance. You might get lucky or unlucky.
Jeff D:
Delete"because God knows the future, he knows ahead of time what choices people will make."
That's good theology, but bad philosophy–given your concept of freewill. If human choices are ultimately the result of uncaused events, then they are inherently unpredictable. The end-result can't be foresee unless and until the chain-reaction begins.
That's why so many philosophical freewill theists are open theists. They are consistent–to a fault.
Hi Jeff D,
DeleteThanks for your response. I appreciate it.
"You* are still trying to back up the ultimate cause past the person."
Actually, I wasn't trying to do this. Rather, my main objective was to ask you a couple of questions to see exactly where you stand.
"The ultimate cause is a random-ish mental state that in turn causes someone to make a decision. Mental state is a factor in decision making. If someone is calm or agitated or tired it influences a decision but does not directly cause it. The person causes it."
I think we're conceiving "mental state" differently. Be that as it may, if the sum is "the person causes it," and we can't further parse what we mean by "person," then we can still conclude the "person" would be the ultimate source of free will. The "person" would be the uncaused cause of his or her free will. Given this, what Steve has said would follow.
"Yes, basically. But with obvious limitations. People can't move everything, just what they can manipulate with their physical bodies."
This is a minor point, but by "unmoved mover" I'm referencing the argument for God on the Aristotelian-Aquinian tradition. I'm not referring to people literally and physically moving objects.
"To put it simply they can't. To put it more complicatedly, because God knows the future, he knows ahead of time what choices people will make, but he doesn't know 'in advance' like a Molinist would say."
I'll pass over Molinism, because you're not a Molinist, and we're not debating Molinism.
If one cannot know what you will do until the very moment you choose, then this reinforces Steve's point about the inherent unpredictability of your choices. Indeed, even you may not know what you will choose until the very moment you choose.
For instance, you could choose to wear a blue t-shirt at 12pm tomorrow. However, let's say we are able to replay all the events of the past leading up to 12pm tomorrow so that everything is absolutely identical to the other past where you chose to wear a blue t-shirt. But even though nothing has changed, you might choose to wear a red t-shirt instead. Thus, there are two scenarios, both identical to one another: in the first scenario you chose a blue t-shirt, while in the second scenario you chose a red t-shirt. But on what basis? None, as far as we can tell, since everything would've been identical. None, that is, except your own free will. As such, your choices are ultimately unpredictable.
"I don't believe it is true."
DeleteAs I said, it's debatable, but overall I think the scientific evidence across various fields from neuroscience to physics, among other fields, tends to favor determinism over indeterminism. However, I admit I'm a bit disinclined to head down this road right now since it could be pretty time-consuming for me to pull up the literature, etc. Maybe I'll do so in the future, time-permitting.
"But if I were ever convinced of it scientifically, I think I would just give up on everything. I would be crushed."
By "everything," I hope you don't mean Christianity - i.e. you'd give up on Christianity before you give up on indeterminism?
"I should have known a hasty generalization would get me into trouble."
Fair enough.
"Natural evils aren't morally 'bad.'"
I agree natural evils aren't necessarily "morally bad." Of course, they can be "morally bad" in the sense that humans can suffer and die, and suffering and death are presumably "morally bad." Take someone with cancer. Why isn't it "morally bad" for a human to have cancer, suffer, and die from it?
"Natural evils entered the world because of sin, so sinners indirectly caused them. That kind of thing. But it is a little off topic."
Of course, if you can say "sinners [presumably you mean humans and/or the devil and his ilk] indirectly caused" natural evils, then why couldn't one likewise say, God indirectly caused sinners to indirectly cause natural evils? It still could (indirectly) track back to God.
"If God foreknew that they would sin in case he made them, but he went ahead and made them, then how did he not intend the end-result of his own creative actions?"
ReplyDelete"Foreknew" is an inappropriate term there. It implies there is something to know. If we are talking about the "time" "before" God created man, they didn't exist. The sum total of all there is to know about man was the empty set. I deny God foreknew they would necessarily sin in the event that he would create them in fact. Of course I do. The idea that "God knew ahead of time that if he were to create man he would necessarily sin" is not an axiom I am obliged to believe. Since it conflicts with something I am obliged to believe, out it goes.
If it were true that God did not know ahead of time that man would sin, the Bible would read... just like it does now, telling me that God regretted making the earth and that man's wicked ways grieved him.
As for the random business, you could be easily be talking about God and the universe. Because God's actions are uncaused events, anything could have happened, and therefore the universe is random. It may be true in a sense, but using random that way isn't very useful.
"If human choices are ultimately the result of uncaused events, then they are inherently unpredictable."
Yes.
"The end-result can't be foresee unless and until the chain-reaction begins."
Yes and no. Yes they can be foreseen in time, like on the calendar. God knows on one date what will happen on a future date. No they can't be foreseen "out of time." Because, as you say, before chain reaction has begun with the actual creation of man, the chain reaction doesn't exist.
On a side note, I have to admit I haven't lurked long enough here to know much about you, steve, or this blog, really. I was assuming you are Calvinist of some kind. Is that right?
Jeff D:
Delete"It implies there is something to know."
So God creates in a vacuum? He doesn't know what will happen? He's like a kid playing with a chemistry set who mixes chemicals to find out what will happen? If God makes something, it's a wild guess how things will turn out?
"I deny God foreknew they would necessarily sin in the event that he would create them in fact. Of course I do. The idea that 'God knew ahead of time that if he were to create man he would necessarily sin' is not an axiom I am obliged to believe. Since it conflicts with something I am obliged to believe, out it goes."
i) So you're obliged to believe that God was ignorant of the consequences of his creative actions. He didn't realize that if he made Adam and Eve, they would sin.
ii) There's a confusion in how you frame the question. The question at issue is not whether he knew that they'd necessarily sin, but whether he necessarily knew that they would sin–in the event that he made them.
At the moment we're dealing with the epistemological issue of what God necessarily knew, not the ontological issue of whether they'd necessarily sin.
iii) There is, however, an entailment. If God knew that by creating them, they'd fall into sin, then by creating them their fall was inevitable–unless you think God is fallible.
"As for the random business, you could be easily be talking about God and the universe. Because God's actions are uncaused events, anything could have happened, and therefore the universe is random."
i) As one freewill theist defines it, "a choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do soothing. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do" (Robert Kane).
But that only applies to human choices, not divine choices. In orthodox theology, God was never undecided.
ii) In addition, unless you think God has no reason for his choices, it's misleading to say his choices are uncaused events. Nothing outside himself causes him to choose, but his reasons factor in his choices.
By contrast, human beings are contingent, derivative creatures with fluctuating mental states.
"God knows on one date what will happen on a future date."
Not if, by your own admission, they are inherently unpredictable.
Your theological commitments are at odds with your philosophical commitments.
Yes, I'm a Calvinist.
Jeff D:
Delete"As for the random business, you could be easily be talking about God and the universe."
If you say the human agent chose A instead of B because he had a reason for preferring A over B, then it's no longer clear how he was still free to choose B instead of A given his reason for preferring A over B.
And if you extend that model to God, what you'd have in both cases is compatiblism rather than libertarian freedom.
"It may be true in a sense, but using random that way isn't very useful."
You're moving the goal post. You previously said: "It is the opposite of random. The order of shirts was determined."
But when I show that what you said about randomness is demonstrably wrong, you switch to saying it "isn't very useful."
You seem to be making and remaking your argument on the fly. You affirm something. When that's refuted, you act like that doesn't matter. You deny something. When that's refuted, you act like that doesn't matter.
"So God creates in a vacuum? He doesn't know what will happen? He's like a kid playing with a chemistry set who mixes chemicals to find out what will happen? If God makes something, it's a wild guess how things will turn out?"
ReplyDeleteYes. He created, and it turned out bad, then he fixed it.
I understand where where you are coming from, that God is timelessly eternal and so the idea that God could find out what happened then react to it is nonsensical. If I was starting from that assumption I would probably think the same way. But I don't think the Bible teaches us about a timelessly eternal God.
I think you understand my position alright, even if my arguments weren't always neat and tidy. I don't have much to add about that. If you want you could tell me what is wrong with it. God was ignorant of the consequences of his creative actions. So what? One day God said “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. And let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over the livestock and over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.”
And he created him with ultimately uncaused freewill and gave him dominion over the earth. They might do "A" or they might do "B." He did this knowing they might sin or they might not. As it happened, he saw that the doings of man became very wicked, and the Lord regretted that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart.
Why can't he decide to create beings that will make decisions on their own accord, without him knowing before he brings them into being what they will choose?
You originally said you were Lutheran. Now you've shifted to open theism. Were you sailing under false colors the whole time. Or has our exchange suddenly pushed you into open theism?
DeleteI've done many posts critiquing open theism. I don't need to rehash all that.
I'd add that your initial comments accepted divine timelessness. Now, however, you suddenly ditch that.
DeleteWow, Jeff D has gone from Lutheran (indeed "classical" Lutheran) to open theist in very short order!
DeleteAlso, he apparently overvalues science, but undervalues philosophy:
"I don't believe it is true. But if I were ever convinced of it scientifically, I think I would just give up on everything. I would be crushed."
"I'm not much into philosophical literature. My philosophical construct is based on certain things I believe from being Lutheran."
I don't *think* I am open theist. I believe God knows everything there is to know.
DeleteHa! You might say. You don't believe God knows if a man would do "A" or "B" if God were to go ahead and create him.
Well, now we are talking about something that doesn't exist. The man doesn't exist. Nothing exists outside of God and God hasn't created him yet. So to require him to know what choices a non-existent entity will make is not fair. But, even then, God does know something about the nature of this yet-hypothetical being. He knows everything there is to know about the nature of this yet-hypothetical being. He knows that he is anticipating creating a creature in his own image with a freewill that may, once actually made manifest into existence, choose to do either "A" or "B."
Then, once the being actually exists for reals, God knows everything about him and all the choices he will make. There is no time where God does not know every fact there is to know about reality.
C.S. Lewis wrote about this. Miracles Appendix B if you have it handy. Especially the parts about black and red lines on a page. He comes at it from a completely different angle than I have been, but it is very close to what I believe. Was he an open theist?
Jeff D:
Delete"I don't *think* I am open theist. I believe God knows everything there is to know."
That's precisely how open theists define omniscience.
"Well, now we are talking about something that doesn't exist. The man doesn't exist. Nothing exists outside of God and God hasn't created him yet. So to require him to know what choices a non-existent entity will make is not fair."
i) The claim that God doesn't know the future because the future (or figure entities) doesn't exist is a standard open theist gambit.
Obviously, you don't know the first thing about open theism.
ii) According to the B-theory of time, the future does exist. You may reject the B-theory of time, but you need to acquaint yourself with the philosophy of time before you presume to make these cocksure claims.
iii) If God doesn't know the future, then God can't predict the future. So your position commits you to repudiating Bible prophecy.
iv) From a Reformed standpoint, God knows the future because he predestines the future. Even if the future doesn't exist, the blueprint for the future already exists in God's mind. Hence, God can know a nonexistent future.
"God knows everything about him and all the choices he will make."
You yourself admit that choices which are free in the libertarian sense are inherently unpredictable. Hence, that's not something God could know, given the condition you imposed. If the outcome could go either way right up until the moment it happens, it can't be known in advance. That's why many freewill theists are open theists.
"C.S. Lewis wrote about this. Miracles Appendix B if you have it handy."
i) Lewis was popularizing the Boethian solution to the freedom/foreknowledge dilemma.That presuppose a view of God's relation to time which you reject.
ii) Moreover, the solution is a failure even on its own terms:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/#2.2
This will be your last comment. You have a bad habit of supposing that you can wing it in these discussions without bothering to inform yourself regarding the issues you presume to opine about. You zigzag. That's a waste of my time.
That is more than fair. I'll take a guess that you meant this will be my last post and not that the last post will be my last.
DeleteYes, I believe the future exists and God knows all the choices I will ever make in actuality. We were talking about something different. We were talking about a sort of hypothetical where God asks himself if he knows what decision I will make in the event he were to put me in a certain situation.
I know a Calvinist would say that God knows the future because he predestines the future. I have tried to see things from that perspective, but I failed. I just can't get it to work properly. Maybe it is because CS Lewis was the first thing I picked up and it stuck.
Thanks for the info about the Boethian solution. I didn't know it had a name except for "Miracles appendix B." I am interested in checking out the refutation you posted.
Good day to you!
It's necessary to distinguish between divine foreknowledge and divine counterfactual knowledge. Scripture affirms both. Calvinism affirms both.
Delete