Freewill theists quote 1 Cor 10:13 as a prooftext for libertarian freedom (i.e. freedom to do otherwise). Cashing this out in PAP terms, there are possible worlds in which Christians resist said temptations and possible worlds in which Christians succumb to said temptations. And Christians have the metaphysical ability to access either alternative.
Moreover, in my experience, freewill theists say this refers, not to especially grievous sins, like apostasy or transgressions conducive to apostasy, but sinning in general.
Assuming that's an accurate exposition of their position, here's the rub:
According to Molinism, not all possible worlds are feasible worlds. Feasible worlds are a subset of possible worlds. God can only instantiate feasible worlds. And which possible worlds are feasible is beyond his control.
In that event, how can God make good on the universal promise to Christians in 1 Cor 10:13 to always provide an alternative to sinning? How can God ensure that for every temptation, a feasible world is always available where a Christian resists that particular temptation?
We're talking about all the daily temptations that every Christian past and future faces. There has to be a supply of feasible worlds to match that situation in each and every case, where the Christian does not give in to temptation.
Also, isn't this a general problem for the Molinist take on conditional and counterfactual statements in Scripture?
Perhaps a Molinist would stipulate that God got very lucky. But isn't that ad hoc?
When defending God's omnibenevolence, they say feasible worlds constrain what God is able to do.
When defending 1 Cor 10:13, are they allowed to make a U-turn?
Does the supply of feasible worlds expand or contract depending on the exigent needs of the Molinist theory at any given time?
Steve,
ReplyDelete1 Corinthians 10:13 says through God's help we can avoid temptation, not that we would or will avoid it, but that we can avoid it. So God does not need to ensure that for every temptation, a feasible world is always available where a Christian resists that particular temptation.
God be with you,
Dan
How *can* we avoid it if there's no feasible possible world where we avoid it, which God is able to instantiate? What corresponds to what we *can* avoid under that scenario–if not a feasible possible world? What makes the *can* viable alternative?
DeleteI didn't suggest that we will or would avoid it. My argument wasn't predicated on that assumption. Is there some reason you're attacking an argument I didn't use?
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DeleteSteve,
Delete“How *can* we avoid it if there's no feasible possible world where we avoid it, which God is able to instantiate?”
On a Molinist ordering of God’s omniscience, the issue of what we would do (i.e. feasibility) is logically “too late” to take into consideration of what we can do. In cases where we would sin, God knows that we can avoid temptation, but we would not use that ability to avoid the temptation.
“What corresponds to what we *can* avoid under that scenario–if not a feasible possible world?”
An infeasible possible world in which we avoid it. Perhaps you object to the idea of infeasable possible worlds, but if so, I think that would require a separate argument.
“What makes the *can* viable alternative?”
The abilities God gives us – not how we would or do use those abilities.
“I didn't suggest that we will or would avoid it.”
You had said: “There has to be a supply of feasible worlds to match that situation in each and every case, where the Christian does not give in to temptation.”
Given feasible worlds relate to what we would do, that’s like saying there has to be a supply of situations in which we would not sin.
God be with you,
Dan
Dan,
DeleteThis analysis of can seems to make "can-claims" useless. "Can" is equivalent to "logically possible" under this analysis, correct? So I can jump to the moon, I can sprout wings and fly, and I can choose not to sin. But for all we know, all of those things are equally infeasible.
"On a Molinist ordering of God’s omniscience, the issue of what we would do (i.e. feasibility) is logically 'too late' to take into consideration of what we can do."
Deletei) You're recasting this in terms of epistemology (middle knowledge) whereas I'm discussing ontology (possible worlds).
ii) You're recasting this in terms of what we "would" do, even though that's not how I framed the issue.
iii) "Too late" is generally discussed with respect to the providential uselessness of simple foreknowledge, not middle knowledge.
iv) Apropos (iii), how is it too late for the Molinist God to decide which feasible world to instantiate? Is he compelled to instantiate a particular feasible world? Is that necessitated?
"An infeasible possible world in which we avoid it."
i) Why must that be an infeasible world in which we avoid it rather than a feasible world?
ii) In addition, if the world in which we avoid it is infeasible, then that's not a live option, in which case we were never truly free to avoid it. We couldn't access that alternate possibility.
The freewill theist appeal to 1 Cor 10:13 presumes that both alternatives are in the cards.
"The abilities God gives us – not how we would or do use those abilities."
That's a shallow response. How do freewill theists unpack the notion of our ability to do otherwise? In terms of possible worlds.
If, however, avoidance is infeasible, then you don't have two comparable or equitable alternate possibilities. That sabotages the appeal to 1 Cor 10:13, which presumes that succumbing and resisting are symmetrical options. Unless the agent can access both possibilities, he lacks libertarian freedom.
"Given feasible worlds relate to what we would do, that’s like saying there has to be a supply of situations in which we would not sin."
You're failing to distinguish between merely possible worlds and an actual possible world.
There's a possible world in which you succumb, and another possible world in which you resist. It's only what you "would" do (but don't) in relation to the actual world. The actual world renders the alternative counterfactual.
Put another way, there's a possible world in which you did or will succumb (or resist). The tense depends on whether the action is past or future in that possible world. Is this before or after the choice/action in the possible world?
But that's different from what you will do in the actual world.