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Wednesday, October 22, 2014

Rainbows


Over at the Secular Outpost, atheist Jeff Lowder approvingly posted this abstract, with a link to the full article:

Abstract. Some people feel threatened by the thought that life might have arisen by chance. What is it about “chance” that some people find so threatening? If life originated by chance, this suggests that life was unintended and that it was not inevitable. It is ironic that people care about whether life in general was intended, but may not have ever wondered whether their own existence was intended by their parents. If it does not matter to us whether one’s own existence was intended, as will be hypothesized, then why should it matter whether there was some remote intent behind the creation of the first unicellular organism(s) billions of years ago? I will discuss three possible scenarios by which life might have originated. I will then argue that, in regard to whether one’s individual life can be meaningful, it does not matter whether life was intended or arose by chance. If complex life was unintended and is rare in this universe, this is not a reason to disparage life, but a reason to appreciate and value our existence. 
http://philpapers.org/archive/TRIIAU.pdf

It's unclear why Jeff finds that's impressive:

i) To begin with, chance really is threatening. In a chance universe, you can suddenly be wiped out for absolutely no good reason. And not just individuals, but the human race. A solar flare might incinerate life on earth. So there's reason to feel insecure. 

ii) However, Trisel seems to be focussed on chance in relation to human significance. He goes on to say: 

Your birth into this world was solely dependent on the actions of human beings (i.e., your parents). 

His analogy is shortsighted. Speaking as a Calvinist, although my parents did not intend my specific existence, God intended my specific existence. God used my parents as the means of creating me. And not just some human being. But the unique, particular human being who is me. And not just my existence, but what I'd do with my life. 

So my birth is not solely dependent on the actions of my parents. To the contrary, it's dependent on a long complex chain of events which God planned and providentially executed.  

Albert Einstein is often mentioned as someone who led a meaningful life. In judging whether his life was meaningful, no one would ever ask “Was his existence intended?” Whether or not a person’s existence was intended is irrelevant to whether this person’s life is meaningful.

To the contrary, if we're doomed to extinction by cosmic heat death, if there's no memory of our achievements or discoveries, then it's all ultimately meaningless. 

However, as I argue in a companion article in this issue, God has not clearly informed us of his purpose or our role in carrying out this purpose. 

i) To begin with, that's equivocal. My life can have a divine purpose even if I'm in the dark regarding my purpose in life. I can do God's will without knowing in advance what his will for my life is. Indeed, I discover God's plan for my life everyday. That's something I perceive in retrospect.

ii) Moreover, this life is not all there is. Some Christians may lead lives that seem to be pointless. They don't understand why certain tragedies befall them. It's only in the afterlife that they will learn how their life furthered God's plan.

We need not feel threatened if life arose by chance. There are many natural occurrences that people value, not because they were intended and it was inevitable that they would occur, but for the opposite reasons. They are valued, in part, because it was highly improbable that they would occur, which makes them special. One such occurrence that comes to mind is the natural emergence of rainbows.

i) In relation to Reformed theism, natural occurrences like rainbows are both divinely intended and inevitable. 

ii) Something can rare can still be inevitable. 

iii) Yes, an atheist may value rainbows. If, however, he asks himself why he values rainbows, that's because a blind physical determinism programmed him to value rainbows. 

1 comment:

  1. I think this post is a little muddled, Steve, in that you don't clearly distinguish between "thinking as a Christian" and "thinking as an atheist". I can't always tell in which bits you're granting the opposing position for the sake of argument and in which bits you're challenging the premises.

    That said, I think the atheist arguments present have a high likelihood of blowing up in his face if taken to their logical extreme.

    (1) Argument from subjective value:

    I make the claim that all value and morality is ultimately subjective. We assign a value to ourselves, which is only directly interesting to us, and third parties assign a value to us.

    If the most important of those third parties is God, then our subjective value can be treated as objective, because God is above existence and coherent and eternal.

    If not, then our value varies by who and what values us. If your parents die, then there are fewer people who value you than when they were alive, and thus you are less valued. To argue that less valued doesn't mean less valuable is to appeal to an objective standard, but I'm not convinced its possible to show any such standard exists (at least without appeal to a significant enough valuer, that imputes objective value by the act of valuing).

    We see the logical consequences of this playing out in the West in abortion and euthanasia, but history is rife with other expressions of this.

    (2) Argument from rarity

    I find this statistically bogus. Statistically speaking, a human is no more or less unique than a snowflake. Both are point-samplings that are unlikely ever to appear in exactly the same form again. The same might be said of cockroaches, or carrots. Can you imagine arguing that we should not eat carrots because each and every one of them is in a unique molecular configuration that may never happen again? In order for the uniqueness argument to get anywhere, you need to already have a concept of consequential and inconsequential differences, which begs the original question of where value comes from.

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