I'll briefly comment on this post:
However, there’s no shortage of the passages more directly supporting middle knowledge – those passages showing that God’s knows what we would choose under different settings. It’s not as if scripture limits middle knowledge to the famous examples of David in Keilah or the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon.
Problem with Dan's list is that he tendentiously classifies these as prooftexts for middle knowledge, when–at best–they only bear witness to counterfactual knowledge. Although middle knowledge would be a type of counterfactual knowledge, counterfactual knowledge is not equivalent to middle knowledge. Even William Lane Craig candidly admits the distinction and concedes that you can only prooftext God's counterfactual knowledge from Scripture, not middle knowledge. So Dan is salting the mine.
God uses His middle knowledge to warn people. If you put yourself into a given circumstance, you will do this. God knew what would happen if the Israelites intermarried. He knew what the foreign wives would do and how the Israelites would respond. Sadly, Solomon didn’t listen.
On divine determinism, God’s foreknowledge is logically “too late” to serve as a warning. All (even the hypothetical – if you intermarry, you will fall away) is determined by God. So 1 Kings 11 turns into “I told you I determined you would fall” as opposed to “I told you you would fall”.
i) Notice how Dan abruptly shifts from middle knowledge to foreknowledge, as if these are interchangeable concepts.
ii) The providential inutility of simple foreknowledge is a problem for freewill theism. If God already knows what human agents will do in the future, then it's too late for God or the agents to change course. That's not a problem for Calvinism, since God doesn't and shouldn't change his mind. But that's an acute problem for freewill theism.
iii) The warning is only too late if it was God's intention to deter Solomon. But according to "divine determinism," that wasn't God's intention in the first place.
Deterrence is not the only purpose of a warning. Like other future-oriented discourse (e.g. prophecy), warnings can have a retrospective value. Some people learn the hard way. The fact that they were warned, then suffered the consequences of disregarding the admonition, can make them appreciative of God's prescient wisdom. Likewise, learning by experience, even–or especially–by painful experience, makes the lesson more real than abstract information.
Generally, those who reject middle knowledge providing two alternative views of these texts. The first grants that the passages teach what a person would do in various settings but denies we have libertarian free will. For biblical arguments we have libertarian free will see (link). Here’s an example from Steve Hays:
- God knows what might have happened because he knows how things would turn out had he decreed that alternative.
- And that’s also consistent with God as the final source of every alternate possibility. What’s possible is a measure of divine omnipotence. God knows what God is capable of doing. Divine omnipotence is the engine generating those possibilities. (link)
I don’t think omnipotence (i.e. God’s capabilities) is enough to account for these passages. Imaging [sic] God creates Santa (which of course He could do). God could have Santa deliver toys this year or He could have Santa occupy Wall Street instead. How does He know which would happen if Santa existed? God must not only be able to do either, but He must choose one.
God knows what would happen if Santa existed because he not only decrees Santa's bare existence, but he decrees what Santa will do. Yes, God must choose which possible outcome to instantiate. So what? That's perfectly consistent with a predestinarian model of divine counterfactual knowledge. God knows Santa will deliver toys this year if that's the timeline God decrees. Conversely, God knows Santa will occupy Wall Street if that's the timeline God decrees. God knows which outcome God decrees.
Dan's analysis is thoroughly confused.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteOn Calvinism God would also know the factors that would have shaped Santa's psychological make up (both in terms of historical nurture and genetic nature) On Calvinism counterfactuals don't spring up from nowhere, nor does their grounding exist independent of God (like Platonic forms/idea or something similar). On Calvinism God's necessary/natural knowledge would know all the possible Santas (plural) He (i.e. God) could logically instantiate in different timelines if He so chose.
ReplyDeleteOn Calvinism, God doesn't need, nor is it possible for God to have middle knowledge. In Calvinism, the concept of middle knowledge is both superfluous and endangers the doctrine of God's aseity (i.e. God's self-sufficiency, self-existence, sole-independence, sole-necessity, sole-eternality). In Calvinism the only limits on God's choice of which world(s) to instantiate would be His own power and that which is logically possible. But those two limits are both part of God's own nature.
By Calvinism I'm referring to historic Calvinism because there are some modern Calvinist theologians who entertain the possibility of media scientia.
ii. simply begs the question. You would need to give a non-circular argument that "x is determinate" implies "x is determined"
ReplyDeleteYour comment is irrelevant to what I actually said. Try again.
DeleteSteve,
ReplyDelete"God knows what would happen if Santa existed because he not only decrees Santa's bare existence, but he decrees what Santa will do. Yes, God must choose which possible outcome to instantiate. So what?"
What's the evidence (exegetical or theological) that God has decreed what Santa will do?
"The warning is only too late if it was God's intention to deter Solomon. But according to "divine determinism," that wasn't God's intention in the first place."
Statements like this seem to make God insincere. If I warned someone just to able to say "I told you so" later, I think the criticism of impure motives would be fair.
God be with you,
Dan
To begin with, you're changing the subject by raising new objections. I appreciate your tacit admission that your original argument failed. So we're making progress.
Deletei) I just did a lengthy post which, among other things, documents the universal scope of predestination.
ii) Your second objection begs the question. It would only be insincere if deterrence is the only function of a warning. Can you offer a reason that doesn't assume the very thing you need to prove?
Why is predicting the consequences of a given course of action insincere–much less "impurely motivated"?
iii) Finally, there's a type of second-order deterrence which presuppose disregard for the original warning. The fact that one person fails to heed a warning, with dire consequences, will serve as a warning to others. If people are warned not to swim in shark infested waters, a swimmer disregards the warning, and beachgoers watch a white shark eat him alive, that becomes a more persuasive warning than the merely verbal warning. It's "too late" to benefit the foolhardy swimmer, but other beachgoers benefit from his gruesome example. It's not "too late" for them.
Considering the fact that you're a 4-point Arminian (according to SEA's classification scheme) who affirms eternal security, you're in no position to parrot stock Wesleyan objections about the "insincerity" of warnings if it's impossible for born-again Christians to lose their salvation.
DeleteSteve,
ReplyDeleteAre you talking about this post or some other one? http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2014/06/having-mercy-on-whom-he-will-have-mercy.html
God be with you,
Dan
Found this one: http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2014/07/annotated-prooftexts.html It's more likely the one you had in mind.
DeleteGod be with you,
Dan