it's kind of funny what odds and ends collect dust in the attic of our memory. When I was a kid I saw a science fiction novel on display in the window of a bookstore. I only saw it once. I didn't buy the book or read the book. But it had a catchy title and a catchy picture on the cover. Before the advent of CGI, publishers relied on graphic artists to create alien landscapes. Some of these were striking. Evocative.
Recently, out of curiosity, I decided to follow up on my memory. I typed in my recollection of the title. Turns out, there is, indeed, a science fiction novel by that title. And it's by a famous SF writer: Frank Herbert. Of course, some of you already knew that.
To judge by the synopsis, it's about an individual who acquires "godlike" paranormal powers. But I never read it.
Have you ever read the title of a book, then mentally sketched a story to go with the title? Created your own story, in your own imagination, to go with the title?
What struck me at the time when I saw it as a kid was the paradoxical connotations of the title. How can God have a maker if God is the Maker? The implication of the title is that there's something more ultimate than "God." Something that stands behind "God."
That's redefining "God." Perhaps, according to the story, "God" is the product of advanced alien technology. That's what I thought as I allowed my mind to roam free and toy with the possibilities suggested by the provocative title.
Which brings me to freewill theism. There's a sense in which, in freewill theism, human creatures are the Godmakers.
To begin with, in freewill theism, God didn't make us. God really isn't our Creator. In freewill theism, God never intended your existence, as the particular man or woman you are. God didn't decide if, when, or where you'd be born. Rather, individual humans exist because a human male choose to mate with a human female, or vice versa. And God does't determine that choice. That's an exercise of our libertarian freedom.
At most, God made humans with a natural capacity to reproduce. After that, it's out of his hands. If freewill theism is true, we really don't have much occasion to thank God for our individual existence. That wasn't up to him. We don't own it to him. (In Molinism, God merely ratifies our choice.)
In addition, freewill theists are adamant on the fact that we can influence God. They consider that a precondition of petitionary prayer.
On that view, either God hadn't decided what to do before we ask, or he was planning to do something else until we talked him out of it. We persuaded him to grant our request, or dissuaded him doing something else. Even on simple foreknowledge, his answer is the effect of our request.
On this view, we have the ability to change God. To change God's mind. Or give him a new sense of purpose.
On this view, the creative relation circles back around. God made humans with the ability to reproduce. But, for their part, humans can (and do) remake God. To influence God is to change God. We make God more like ourselves. In prayer, we bring him around to our own way of thinking. At least some of the time.
If freewill theism is true, then we are rather like the alien "Godmakers" who are more ultimate than God. A terrifying thought.
Some people find freewill theism liberating (pardon the pun). They feel emancipated from the "static" position of Calvinism or classical theism. Yet liberation movements have a way of starting optimistically, but ending nihilistically. Thrilling until the sun goes down and bandits roam the streets.
Good points.
ReplyDeleteI honestly find your point of view quite puzzling. I'm not the most familiar with Calvinist Christianity, but it seems to hold the view that the most desirable theology is one that ascribes as much power to God as possible, even if it annihilates human agency. For all the talk about substance dualism, it seems that on this view the soul is just some malaise that through which God's sovereignty is witnessed. You don't find this "terrifying"?
ReplyDeleteMoreover, I found some of your arguments confused. It seems your main contention is that if humans had the ability to influence God's actions through prayer, then humans would be "more ultimate than God". I think this is a bit dramatic. God's answer "may be the effect of our request", but its not like prayer changes God's nature or coerces him into doing something against his desire. God freely chooses to take the prayer into account and proceeds to answer. God's "ultimate" status isn't compromised.
On a more minor note, I think an individual would still have much occasion to thank God for his individual existence. First of all, he shouldn't sneeze at the fact that the entire universe's existence depends on God. Second, the act of reproduction may be a result of libertarian freedom, but few couples I know have determined which egg and sperm became conjoined. More importantly, the couple wouldn't be responsible for the endowment of the soul. Thus, God would still be responsible for the individual's existence.
Lastly, I don't understand why you believe freedom entails nihilism. Surely, the freedom to do right or wrong does not mean that there is no right or wrong! Moreover, don't you believe, on the Christian worldview, that the best of all possible worlds would be one in which all people freely chose to worship God and become saved? Wouldn't salvation mean more if people had the freedom to choose God instead of evil? I don't understand why you would detest such freedom.
@brownmamba
Delete"I'm not the most familiar with Calvinist Christianity"
This should be a contender for the understatement of the year award! Indeed, your comment is regrettably riddled with a poor understanding of Reformed theology, to put it mildly.
Check out this paper by Paul Manata. It should help clear up a lot of your (self-avowed) puzzlement.
"I honestly find your point of view quite puzzling."
DeleteIn my experience, when commenters preface their statement with "honestly," what follows is anything but.
"I'm not the most familiar with Calvinist Christianity, but it seems to hold the view that the most desirable theology is one that ascribes as much power to God as possible, even if it annihilates human agency. For all the talk about substance dualism, it seems that on this view the soul is just some malaise that through which God's sovereignty is witnessed. You don't find this 'terrifying'?"
No, I don't find your straw man terrifying. Scarecrows are for the birds.
"Moreover, I found some of your arguments confused. It seems your main contention is that if humans had the ability to influence God's actions through prayer, then humans would be 'more ultimate than God'. I think this is a bit dramatic. God's answer 'may be the effect of our request', but its not like prayer changes God's nature or coerces him into doing something against his desire."
How does prayer change God without changing his nature? Is God separate from his nature? If prayer influences God, then it changes what he thinks. We have that power over God (if freewill theism is true). Every time we pray, and God agrees, that changes God. Billions of cumulative changes to God.
"More importantly, the couple wouldn't be responsible for the endowment of the soul. Thus, God would still be responsible for the individual's existence."
You're assuming, without benefit of argument, that traducianism is false.
"Lastly, I don't understand why you believe freedom entails nihilism."
That simply begs the question by defining freedom in libertarian terms.
"Moreover, don't you believe, on the Christian worldview, that the best of all possible worlds would be one in which all people freely chose to worship God and become saved?"
That assumes there is one best possible world.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDelete"No, I don't find your straw man terrifying. Scarecrows are for the birds".
ReplyDeleteUsually when someone accuses someone of committing a straw man fallacy, they proceed to show where the fallacy lies. I guess you believe my distortion is self-evident, but I don't see how that is the case. My portrayal of your point of view was based on your own comparison of human agents to characters in a novel. In fact, in the post immediately proceeding this one you write, "A creaturely mode of existence is entirely derivative. God 'sees' in us what he puts in us–like a painter sees in a painting what he sees in his own mind and transfers to the canvass." If this is the case, then I think it's pretty clear that an individual soul has no agency independent of God's agency. In the same post, you literally wrote that the individual has whatever life experience God mentally supplies to him. Thus, it's no straw man to claim that on this view the soul merely serves as a witness to God's sovereignty.
"How does prayer change God without changing his nature? Is God separate from his nature? If prayer influences God, then it changes what he thinks. We have that power over God (if freewill theism is true). Every time we pray, and God agrees, that changes God. Billions of cumulative changes to God.".
God's essential properties, such as omnipotence, aren't compromised if God's reason for taking an action was a person's prayer. I'm also inclined to think that something is not identical to its properties/nature. I can conceive two simple substances, each identical in their properties (such as size,color, and shape), but are distinct from one another because one can exist without the other. My main point, however, is that God is still ultimate because he cannot be coerced. He freely chooses to answer prayers.
"You're assuming, without benefit of argument, that traducianism is false".
I must admit that I was not aware of this doctrine, but now that I briefly consulted Theopedia, I can now respond. First, for my argument to run through, it's only necessary that traducianism is POSSIBLY false. The possibility of traducianism being false means that "free-will theism" wouldn't necessarily entail that an individual has no occasion to thank God for his existence. Secondly, I think the burden of proof is on the defender of traducianism because of its prima facie absurdity. Lastly, if I interpret your "About Me" section correctly, you yourself deny traducianism, so why bring this up as an objection?
"That simply begs the question by defining freedom in libertarian terms".
Okay, then. But why does freedom "in libertarian terms" entail nihilism? I assure you my puzzlement is sincere.
brownmamba
Delete"If this is the case, then I think it's pretty clear that an individual soul has no agency independent of God's agency."
Which doesn't mean humans can't be genuine agents. Just that human agency is dependent on divine agency.
One problems is that you're failing to distinguish between God's abstract idea and the concrete instantiation of his idea in space and time. Our actual existence is objective to God, as conscious, dynamic beings. But that corresponds to God's complete concept of us.
"In the same post, you literally wrote that the individual has whatever life experience God mentally supplies to him. Thus, it's no straw man to claim that on this view the soul merely serves as a witness to God's sovereignty."
How is that "merely" the case? What's your justification of the pejorative adverb?
"God's essential properties, such as omnipotence, aren't compromised if God's reason for taking an action was a person's prayer."
You are bifurcating God into essential and inessential properties.
To influence God through prayer either means God was undecided before (or apart) from prayer, or that he was decided, but we changed his mind. In either case, prayer has the power to alter what God thinks. That's quite radical. Why do you suppose what God thinks is an inessential property to God?
God becomes a composite being with successive, shifting, oscillating states. A fluid, unstable entity.
"I'm also inclined to think that something is not identical to its properties/nature."
That would make God a property-instance of a generic nature over and above God.
"The possibility of traducianism being false means that 'free-will theism' wouldn't necessarily entail that an individual has no occasion to thank God for his existence."
And what about the possibility that traducianism is true? Your postulate cuts both ways.
"Secondly, I think the burden of proof is on the defender of traducianism because of its prima facie absurdity."
A tendentious assertion on your part.
"Lastly, if I interpret your 'About Me' section correctly, you yourself deny traducianism, so why bring this up as an objection?"
Actually, I think it's probably true.
But why does freedom 'in libertarian terms' entail nihilism?
If you destroy God, you destroy man.