The high Calvinist doctrine of God's sovereignty including evil as part of God's plan, purpose, and determining power blatantly contradicts Scripture passages…[God] never tempts anyone (James 1:13). To be sure, Calvinists have clever but unconvincing explanations of these and numerous other passages of Scripture. R. Olson, Against Calvinism, 98-99.
Let's compare Jas 1:13 to another passage:
Then Jesus was led up by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil (Mt 4:1).
In this passage, Satan is the actual tempter. Yet his role is instrumental. Jesus is led by the Spirit of God in order to undergo temptation. So, indirectly, God is behind the temptation, as a part of his "plan and purpose."
The Lord's Prayer has the petition, "And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil" (Matt. 6:13). I take that to mean a request that God does not lead us into temptations/testings/trials that are too difficult for us believers/Christians to endure (in keeping with 1 Cor. 10:13). The underlying Greek words for "temptation" in Matt. 6:13 and "tempted" in James 1:13 are etymologically related and can mean "test" or "tempt."
ReplyDeleteIf God never tempts or tests then the petition in the Lord's Prayer doesn't make sense. Some argue that God tests but never tempts people like the devil does. The difference being the intention of the trial. The devil's intention is to entice people to sin in hopes that those people actually sin and will eventually be lost. While God's intention is to prove or refine someone's character similar to how gold or silver is "tested" by fire (cf. Job 23:10; Prov. 17:3). That interpretation makes some sense to me, but if compatibilism AND Calvinistic (rather than Arminian) reprobation is true, then it would seem that, of necessity, God does tempt the non-elect to sin. That is, given some Calvinistic understanding of providence, conservation of creation, and using the definition of "tempt" as was used above to refer to the devil's intention. Isn't that what happened when God sent a lying spirit to deceive Ahab (2 Chron. 18)? [BTW, I'm not dogmatic on compatibilism being true]
The book of James is wisdom literature written to Christians. So, the teaching is meant to be practical and applied to Christians. We might be making a mistake universalizing James 1:13 to include the non-elect. Also, being wisdom literature, it's not meant to teach philosophical issues regarding the metaphysics of temptation.
I understand that the Reformed tradition tries to deny an "Equal Ultimacy" regarding God's decrees or that God actively intervenes to work sin in the reprobate (cf. Sproul's article "Double" Predestination [here]). Some however (like Robert L. Reymond) are willing to affirm equal ultimacy in the decrees, even though he suggests that "we must not speak of an exact identity of divine causality behind both." At the very least, I agree that there's an added dimension in God's dealings with Christians in that God's grace may include an added "exertion" of power on God's part to sanctify the elect.
But in light of the fact that Scripture does teach that God sometimes deceives (Job 12:16; 2 Chron. 18; 2 Thess. 2:11-12) AND the fact that God hardens hearts (Exo. 4:21; 11:10; Deut. 2:30; Josh. 11:19-20; Rom. 9:17-23; cf. 1 Sam. 2:25; Rev. 17:17 etc.) , I lean away from the majority view among Reformed folk that denies God tempts (again cf. Sprould article [here). It seems to me that God does tempt the non-elect in the sense of having the intention of leading them to sin with the purpose of eventually leading to the result of their being lost. I say that even though I believe in Common Grace as well as being open to a sense in which God can be said to desire the salvation of the non-elect (which isn't necessary part of some definitions of Common Grace). I don't see a contradiction. Though, I'm open for correction in any area of theology.
Another difference between regenerate elect and non-elect persons is that the latter remain totally depraved, while regenerate elect persons are freed from the bondage of sin in addition to having God's redemptive grace working in their lives (as mentioned above).
DeleteAlso, another great verse showing how God uses trials to refine and purify Christians is 1 Pet. 1:6-7.
6 In this you rejoice, though now for a little while, if necessary, you have been grieved by various trials,7 so that the tested genuineness of your faith---more precious than gold that perishes though it is tested by fire---may be found to result in praise and glory and honor at the revelation of Jesus Christ.
I make the following (minimum) distinction between god's causation and human temptation:
ReplyDelete(1) Necessarily, if God causes E, then E will occur.
(2) Possibly, if subject S is tempted to perform E, then S will perform non-E.
So, God's causality is efficacious whereas temptation is not necessarily efficacious. In which case, if God has determined something for someone, there is no possibility of that not coming to pass and is therefore not in the category of "temptation."
Wouldn't it be easier to say that if God was trying to "entice" someone to do something that may or may not come to fruition, then this would be an instance of God's "will of command" or "prescriptive will" which would not include evil? And yet, whatever decision is made by the recipient of the "enticement" can be determined and caused by God.
I don't think any of the texts you mentioned make it clear or would entail God being the tempting agent, regardless of God's causal activity at all times.
Assuming you're responding to me: As you probably know, there are numerous theories of divine causation (allegedly) compatible with Calvinism (some taking into consideration things like the A-theory vs. B-theory of time; Minkowski's "block universe" theory, God's timeless or temporal eternality, the possibility of occasionalism, compatibilism/semi-compatibilism, soft vs. hard determinism, and oddly some Calvinists appeal to middle knowledge; etc.).
DeleteWhen it comes to temptation, I think there are at least thee issues that need to be addressed, 1. the tempted person, 2. the temptation itself, and 3. any possible tempter. If George saw Elaine accidentally and unknowingly drop a $100 bill on the floor, I wouldn't say that Elaine was tempting George even though George might be tempted to take the money when no one was looking. Therefore, the relevant issue doesn't seem to be God's causation, but God's intention. Since even classical Arminians affirm God's providential control of all circumstances as well as God's exhaustive foreknowledge of the future. Arminians (as well as many Calvinists) nevertheless would argue that based on James 1:13, there is no evil in God whereby He might do anything with the intention of leading persons to sin (whether necessarily or contingently). I agree that there is no evil in God. But it does seem to me that God does providentially and intentionally lead (even causes?) both elect and non-elect into sin. Since all things work together for good to the elect, God's intention for leading (even causing?) the elect to sin (2 Sam. 24:1 cf. 1 Chron. 21:1) is for their ultimate benefit (Rom. 8:28; Ps. 138:8; 57:2). Often to teach Christians their own depravity, their dependence on God, etc (cf. Pink's statements HERE and HERE).
The greater problem seems to be God's possible temptation of the non-elect inexorably leading to their damnation since God's intention for them is malevolent and maleficent (instead of benevolent and beneficent as with the elect). So, your focus on God's causal distance/remoteness doesn't address the main charge that both Arminians and many Calvinists make against God's tempting people; which is rooted in defending God's goodness and lack of evil intention.
However, it seems to me that that charge which Arminians can make about God's intentions and temptation can also apply (to a greater degree) to the Calvinistic understanding of election, preterition, and reprobation. That's why I think Calvinists who deny that God can tempt (in any sense) are probably being inconsistent with their Calvinistic assumptions.
In the hypothetical I gave, Elaine caused something which became a temptation to George even though Elaine didn't intend to tempt George. That's why God's causation of a temptation doesn't address the real issue. What might be a temptation to one person might not be to another. To a baby, that $100 bill which God providentially caused to fall to the ground wouldn't be a temptation. Yet, God knows which things would or wouldn't tempt a person and He still nevertheless sovereignly governs all circumstances and situations. For example, George seeing the dropped $100 at a time when George earnestly wanted to purchase something worth $100 but didn't have the money to do so.
Delete(1) I only was focusing on a *minimal* understanding of temptation. Not a full blown theory. Minimally, temptation (or testing) implies possibility of failure. Does god "test" people? Sure. Does god "tempt" people to sin contrary to his revealed will? Well, if god is the one commanding or "enticing" someone to do something then it wouldn't be sin, would it?
ReplyDelete(2) I don't think I mentioned anything about god's causation being "remote" or "distant". Nothing I said depends on that. I think I'm a good Calvinist and as for god's causal activity, I would say that I agree entirely with everything James Anderson said in his paper on "Calvinism and The First Sin."
(3) Considering these things and what I said before, in what sense is God doing something to the non-elect that leaves open a possibility of failure (assuming my basic distinction of "efficacious" vs. "non-efficacious")? I think if god has determined something for the reprobate, then it will happen. And it will happen by various decreed means which will include tempting agents and temptations. I think the distinction is as simple as god being able to non-sinfully cause sin. Similarly, god can non-temptingly cause a temptation event to occur.
(4) Lastly, you have tempted me to watch Seinfeld by means of your example with George and Elaine. It is very likely I will give in... key word - likely.
I only was focusing on a *minimal* understanding of temptation.
DeleteUnderstood.
Does god "tempt" people to sin contrary to his revealed will? Well, if god is the one commanding or "enticing" someone to do something then it wouldn't be sin, would it?
For various reasons I agree (e.g. definitional reasons; my holding to a form of Divine Command Essentialism where virtue flows from God's nature and our moral duties as His creatures flows from His commands [a kind of synthesis of divine essentialism & voluntarism]; and since I'm open to a form of simple divine voluntarism etc.). However, we can ask, could God command a catch 22 situation? Can God prescribe the following, "I command you to disobey me to your perdition!"? One would LITERALLY be "damned if he did, and damned if he didn't." I don't think God would do that on account of His virtue and goodness.
I agree entirely with everything James Anderson said in his paper on "Calvinism and The First Sin."
If you're referring to what I think, I've downloaded it (knowing he's taking it down once it's published), but I haven't read it yet. Here's a LINK to a talk he gave based on it at the 2014 GPTS Spring Conference.
(3) Considering these things and what I said before, in what sense is God doing something to the non-elect that leaves open a possibility of failure (assuming my basic distinction of "efficacious" vs. "non-efficacious")? I think if god has determined something for the reprobate, then it will happen. And it will happen by various decreed means which will include tempting agents and temptations. I think the distinction is as simple as god being able to non-sinfully cause sin.
AGREED.
Similarly, god can non-temptingly cause a temptation event to occur.
That would depend on one's definition of "temptation." I accept your minimal definition and how you use it. However, for many Christians (including some Calvinists) it probably wouldn't be enough to vindicate God in their understanding since it doesn't address God's intention. I have to wonder if by your definition of temptation, anyone can be tempted since God's decree cannot change, and since (given some Calvinistic conceptions of providence) no one actually can choose contrary to God's decree. Hence there are no other real alternative "possibilities." In which case, ISTM, Jesus was never truly tempted by Satan in the wilderness. Nor or any other Christian whenever he's faced with a choice to sin or not to sin, and it so happens it is decreed that he will not sin in that circumstance. I guess we'd have to delve into the senses in which we use the word "possibility". Are we referring to ontological possibility? Decretive? Counterfactual? From the perspective of God or of creatures? et cetera.
(4) Lastly, you have tempted me to watch Seinfeld by means of your example with George and Elaine. It is very likely I will give in... key word - likely.
That WAS/IS my intention. *G*
Thinking about it further, your definition of "temptation" might result in no one being tempted regardless of whether the person is decreed to choose to not sin OR to sin.
DeleteIn other words, your definition of temptation would seem to depend on the truth of libertarian free will. Assuming that libertarian free will in creatures doesn't exist, then that means no one is ever really tempted. Yet, the Bible does speak of the reality of temptation.
DeleteThat God *determines* that S be tempted by X does not entail that *God* *tempts* S by X.
ReplyDeleteSecond, that God *intentionally* leads S into a tempting situation does not entail that God *intended* S to be tempted, unless you think it's *impossible* for X to intentionally Y without intending to Y.
I don't see how 'temptation' implies 'possible failure'. But, how is the modal claim being decided? If God determines S to be tempted by X, does it count for it to be "possible" that S fails to be tempted by X, that there's some other world, w, than the actual world, @, sharing the same laws with the actual world, and sharing at least one proposition about the past, and S isn't tempted by X in w? Okay, So God decrees that S be tempted by X in @ but not in w, and w and @ share the same laws and at least one proposition about the past.
(I haven't read what AP just wrote. I saw mr Fletcher's was shorter and read that. I have a bed time.)
ReplyDeleteBy "failure" I mean to be understood in light of my earlier stating that:
"(2) Possibly, if subject S is tempted to perform E, then S will perform non-E."
Being tempted to sin (for instance) implies my possibly *not* sinning. Overcoming.
Just like I can fail to persuade someone of something yet both my attempt at persuasion and my "failure" at persuading someone can both be decreed by God. That's all.
If you come back tomorrow, you can go ahead and address "Mr. Fletcher" since his insights are much better than mine (I know his secret identity). And I've pretty much exhausted my insights.
Delete"does it count for it to be "possible" that S fails to be tempted by X, that there's some other world, w, than the actual world, @, sharing the same laws with the actual world, and sharing at least one proposition about the past, and S isn't tempted by X in w?"
ReplyDeleteNot failure to be tempted by the one being tempted, but rather failure of the tempter or the temptation to succeed in his/its goal (be it sin or watching Seinfeld). Jesus was tempted to sin even though he never sinned. BY the way, I never watched Seinfeld. So, AP "failed" in at least some respect.
BY the way, I never watched Seinfeld. So, AP "failed" in at least some respect.
DeleteAh....but it'll haunt you in your dreams. I predict you'll be watching Seinfeld by the end of the week. ;-)
"could God command a catch 22 situation? Can God prescribe the following, "I command you to disobey me to your perdition!"? One would LITERALLY be "damned if he did, and damned if he didn't." I don't think God would do that on account of His virtue and goodness."
DeleteI agree. Examples could be multiplied: God wouldn't command idolatry, etc. But I think this gets us into things away from the topic.
Yes, I was referring to the paper he partially presented at the GPTS conference.
"I accept your minimal definition and how you use it. However, for many Christians (including some Calvinists) it probably wouldn't be enough to vindicate God in their understanding since it doesn't address God's intention."
I agree. I'm only stating a conclusion and a necessary condition. I'm intentionally avoiding getting into more details and sufficient conditions.
"I have to wonder if by your definition of temptation, anyone can be tempted since God's decree cannot change, and since (given some Calvinistic conceptions of providence) no one actually can choose contrary to God's decree."
I might not be expressing myself clearly. I'm trying to avoid overkill in the comment boxes, or maybe I'm just not good at quickly summarizing. I think you're confusing my talk of God's actions and my talk of creatures' actions.
Can God decree a non-effectual event in the sense that would be found, say, in God's decreeing someone's failed attempt to persuade someone else? God's decree would be the ultimate sufficient cause of the events described above, yet the decreed intentions of the creaturely persuader never came to fruition. God 'intended' the failed 'intentions' of creatures. But God's intentions [to decree something] did not and do not fail.
"Ah....but it'll haunt you in your dreams. I predict you'll be watching Seinfeld by the end of the week. ;-)"
When Crackle cycles through another set of episodes, you're prediction will surely come true.
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DeleteCan God decree a non-effectual event .....
DeleteI think that would be acceptable to (even required of) all Calvinists.
But God's intentions [to decree something] did not and do not fail.
You're addressing God's intentions THAT something is decreed and will come to pass. But it doesn't address God's intentions, in the sense of REASONS, for why those things are decreed.
As I've explained in my blog HERE, I make 5 distinctions in God's will.
God's Will of 1. Decree, 2. Design, 3. Demand/Command/Prescriptive/Preceptive, 4. Delight/Disposition/dispositional, 5. Direction/directional.
I think we need to distinguish between God's will of decree (WHAT God decrees) and God's will of Design (WHY [i.e. the purposes] God decrees certain things). The Arminian objects to certain things the God of Calvinism 1. decrees, 2. the reasons He decrees them, 3. the mode in which He does so (i.e. unilaterally), 4. how He may cause them (i.e. causally bring them to pass).
I agree with most of what you've written. I just think the crucial issues apologetically (e.g. regarding theodicy) are whether 1. God CAN (ontologically & causally) tempt (which is dependent on one's definition of "tempt") and 2. whether God MAY/DOES (ethically/morally) tempt. I'd rather not say that God does, but given my understanding of Calvinism, I can't help but conclude that God does. Though, obviously, I maintain that God remains non-blameworthy when He does so. Partly because a creature is tempted because his nature and personality desires such things. However, his nature is itself molded by God's providence (both with regard to his upbringing and genes; and the fact that God also decreed the Fall by which we all inherit a totally depraved nature).
Steve has pointed out that if a mob boss permitted or commanded one of his hitmen to kill (say...) a policeman, that the mob boss isn't free of responsibility merely because he didn't personally pull the trigger. Arminians have tried to distance God from the responsibility of causing the evils of the world in the above way in order to vindicate God. Nevertheless, Steve (our Triablogue Steve) accepts and has argued that God actually is ultimately responsible for all the evils that happen in the world. If God can be non-blameworthy even though He causes (directly or indirectly) all the evils in the world, why may not God be non-blameworthy though He might directly or indirectly "tempt" any of His creatures? I don't see why not. That's basically what I'm getting at.
Delete@Mr Fletcher:
ReplyDeleteBased on what I said in response to you, am I understanding you correctly?
Your first two paragraphs I agree with, even though I'm not sure I quite understand the last clause of the second paragraph.
Yeah, I also didn't understand the last clause of the second paragraph. It also seemed to end abruptly, as if Mr. Fletcher didn't complete is thought/point.
Delete