Is there a tipping point?

I'm going to examine an anxiety that some Christians may be struggling with. Christian apologists field many objections to the faith. But sometimes the intellectual objections to Christianity may seem to be overwhelming. When there are so many objections on so many different fronts, is there a tipping point at we should reconsider our original commitment? Even if we can explain–or explain away–each objection, one by one, yet when we find ourselves on the defensive so often, isn't there a point at which this becomes an exercise in special-pleading? If, even before we hear an objection, we've made up our mind ahead of time that any objection must be wrong, doesn't that mean we've put ourselves in a position where our beliefs are impervious to reality?

By way of response:

i) If Christianity is true, the truth of Christianity doesn't depend on our ability to argue for the truth of Christianity. If Christianity is true, we'd expect God to make the truth of Christianity accessible to believers who don't have prepared answers for every conceivable objection. Supporting arguments can be very useful, but they are not indispensable. 

ii) Cumulative fallacies don't add up to single cogent objection. Critics multiply objections to the Christian faith, but the objections are typically fallacious. Critics have fallacious expectations about the kind of evidence that should exist. Take the minimalist school of archeology, and its critics (e.g. Kenneth Kitchen). 

They have fallacious preconceptions about what inerrancy entails. For instance, when Craig Blomberg or Vern Poythress write monographs defending the inerrancy of Scripture, although they discuss specific passages of Scripture, they also give the critics a lesson in hermeneutics. They discuss the crude notion of error which critics bring to Scripture. 

iii) If the secular alternative to Christianity undermines rationality (e.g. Plantinga's argument against evolutionary epistemology), if the alternative undermines epistemic duties (e.g. moral relativism or moral nihilism), then we can safely ignore the alternative. If the alternative can't ground truth or logic (e.g. the argument from logic to God), then the alternative is a losing proposition. It's not worth pursuing. It commits intellectual suicide. 

Indeed, some atheists torpedo reason (e.g. Alex Rosenberg, Daniel Dennett, Paul and Patricia Churchland). 

Now, an unbeliever might counter that Christianity undermines intellectual standards. However, that's equivocal. That objection doesn't operate at the same level. Usually the atheist means one of two things. He may mean Christianity is false. However, there's a basic difference between claiming a position is irrational, and claiming a position undermines rationality. The latter is far more radical.

To say a position is irrational is to claim that a particular position is unreasonable. The position lacks sufficient evidence. Or the position runs counter to the evidence.

That's quite different than saying a position conduces to global skepticism. That questions the ability to know anything, the ability to prove or disprove anything. 

Or he may mean Christians have an irrational mindset. They are credulous. According to the popular caricature, faith is believing in the absence of evidence or believing in spite of counterevidence. 

And some Christians are fideists. But at most, that only means fideistic Christianity is irrational. 

Likewise, if atheism negates the obligation to be intellectually honest, then that too is self-defeating. 

Now, one could debate whether the secular alternative undermines rationality, but if it does, then objections to Christianity are not symmetrical with objections to secularism. 

iv) In addition, the tipping-point is bidirectional. When distinguished philosophers (e.g. Thomas Nagel, Jerry Fodor) and scientists (e.g. Stuart Newman, Denis Noble, James Shapiro, Richard Sternberg) who are sympathetic to evolution, or think something like evolution must be true, nevertheless lodge fundamental objections to the current theory of evolution, isn't there a point at which Darwinians should reconsider their commitment?