Apostate anti-Trinitarian Dale Tuggy has a forthcoming article.
What is this "identity of God"? It is "who God is."
This is how Dale endeavors to trip up Christians. Lead by asking if they believe Jesus is God. When they say "yes," ask if they believe the Father is God. When they say "yes," ask if they believe that Jesus is the Father. Tie them up in knots with this semantic game.
But "Jesus is God" in the sense that the NT describes Jesus as God. By ascribing to Jesus exclusive names, titles, attributes, actions, and prerogatives that are uniquely reserved for the one true God. The same way the NT describes the Father. The same way the OT describes God.
Third, we can dismiss the paradigm, fairly popular in twentieth century theology, that there was a shift from a "functional" to an "ontic" christology (roughly, from viewing Christ as a man performing functions on behalf of and at the behest of God, to viewing Christ as himself divine).
Does Dale take the opposite position? Does he think the NT contains an evolutionary Christology and/or conflicting Christologies, some higher and some lower?
But if he's going to say the NT is not a trustworthy witness to the person of Christ, then by the same token, he can't appeal to his unitarian alternative, for a unitarian Bible would be just as unreliable as a Trinitarian Bible.
Sixth, we can ignore recent complex debates about the status of supposedly divine or semi-divine "intermediaries" between God and humankind in the period of Second Temple Judaism.
To say the NT doesn't really mean Jesus is God, but is just using agential language based on Second Temple models, won't cut it with scholars like Bauckham and Hurtado. They're thoroughly familiar with that argument, and they know their way around the literature far better than Tuggy.
Seventh, there is no need to think of catholic/mainstream christology as really developing in higher direction after the composition of the New Testament. High christology didn't finally emerge circa 180, 210, 325, 381, or 450 CE; no, Bauckham urges, it lies fairly obviously on the surface of the New Testament, for all faithful eyes to see, and the catholic tradition has always recognized this. Eighth, we can view the ecumenical creeds as simply recognizing Jesus' inclusion in the divine identity, and expressing it in a more Greek idiom, in metaphysical terms (nature, being, essence, person). Ninth, it is not hard for us, then, to confess orthodox/catholic belief (i.e. the content of the ecumenical creeds, rightly understood). We needn't fuss over the processes which led to the creeds, their metaphysical language, or their foreignness to our ways of thinking. They indeed say, or imply, that Jesus is included in the divine identity – and that is what we, following Bauckham, say. And this doesn't seem arcane, outdated, metaphysics-laden, or particularly hard to understand. Tenth, we can dismiss as wrongheaded most of the questing (past or current) for a "historical Jesus" which supposedly differs from the "Christ of faith." What we know about Jesus is nearly all in the New Testament, which is packed with non-subtle clues to Christ's inclusion in the identity of the one God.
That's a diversionary tactic.
The reader should take note that I'm using "identity" in this paper to mean only numerical identity, i.e. being numerically the same thing as – a relation which a thing may only bear to itself, and which as it were obeys the law of the indiscernibility of identicals, as explained an the end of section II below.
Unless Bauckham is using "identity" in the same sense as Tuggy, Tuggy's attack on Bauckham's argument is vitiated by equivocation.
This principle is sometimes called "Leibniz's Law." It is commonly expressed in standard logical symbols like this: □(x)(y)( x = y → (F)(Fx ↔ Fy)). (Necessarily, for any x and any y, x is identical to y only if for any F, x is F if and only if y is F.) Roughly: it is impossible for numerically identical things to differ. In my view, this principle should be explicitly complicated so as to allow that a thing may intrinsically change through time.
i) That's a fatal concession. No wonder he demotes that to a footnote–the way the New York Times buries a retraction in the back pages. He's compromised his key principle. By diluting abstract identity to make allowance for change over time, he can no longer deploy abstract identity to attack NT Christology or Triadology as contradictory.
If an individual can intrinsically change over time, and still be the same "self," rather than a series of selves, then what excuses his applying a stricter principle to the Trinity? Why does he allow for discontinuities in the case of personal identity, but not in the case of Trinitarian identity? If a person is the same self despite differences between earlier and later stages over a lifetime, why does he refuse to allow for any distinctions concerning the members of the Trinity?
ii) In addition, his "complication" is an ad hoc qualification on Leibniz's Law. For Tuggy has now abandoned strict identity. How does that follow from the identity of indiscernibles/indiscernibility of identicals?
iii) Another exception would be counterfactual identity. If we say an agent could do otherwise, and we gloss that by reference to possible worlds, then is he the same self?
Is this, then, Bauckham's bargain, that we should (1) construct a patently incoherent reading of the New Testament, (2) believe that interpretation, and (3) choose to loudly say only the positive side of the contradiction in order to stick it to the Jesus-seminar types of the world? This is, to be sure, a problematic claim, for the reason explained at the start of section IV above. In short, it strongly seems (to anyone who carefully considers it) to be false. For this very reason, we should be wary of attributing it to the New Testament authors.Should we really take them to be asserting or assuming what is obviously false? Perhaps we should, if after all relevant considerations, this best explains what they say and don't say. But we should leave no stone unturned in considering seeminglyself-consistent readings. There is no way, in doing exegesis, to postpone these considerations for some later theological stage; inconsistency is an indispensable tool of interpretation, specifically, for ruling out proposed interpretations.
Self-consistency, and consistency with obvious truths, are important not only for theology, but also for interpretation. So is vagueness. A good interpretation of a text should fit well with and explain what the text says and does not say. If someone offers a very vague thesis, we won't be able to judge its fit with the text, nor its explanatory power, and so we won't be able to reasonably read the text in that way. Suppose that someone suggested that according to the Gospel of John, Jesus "had it." It is unclear what this means, and so unclear whether it fits the text of John. And as it stands, it is unqualified to explain what that text says about Jesus and God. Likewise, if we were decide on the content-thin reading of Bauckham's "christology of divine identity" sketched at the end of section IV above, we would have a problematic interpretation of any given New Testament text, for it would be too vague for us to judge its fit or explanatory power. I conclude that construing the "christology of divine identity" as mere exegesis does not exempt it from problems of consistency and unclarity.
He's projecting his own complaints onto the text, as if the NT writers saw the issues the same way he does.
But suppose for the sake of argument that what St. Paul or St. John thought that what God revealed to them was incoherent. What then? Are they supposed to exclaim, "God, that doesn't make any sense! You can't expect me to pass that along to the church!"
Their duty is to faithfully transmit whatever God discloses to them. Assuming that appears to be contradictory, so what? It's not their job to sit in judgment of God's self-revelation.
Steve, it's odd to spend so many words sniping at my summary of what Bauckham holds forth as advantages of his theory. e.g. After the seventh point (of Bauckham's!) you object, "That's a diversionary tactic." Is that an objection to Bauckham? Read all the way through, then think, and then, finally start objecting.
ReplyDeleteAbout the "fatal concession", I'm afraid you're mistaken. The time-explicit version of the indiscernibility of identicals is all I need to make the point. Jesus and God have, at one time, differed. It follows that they are not identical (by the time-explicit version). This is in a footnote just because it's a technical point. See here if you still don't get it. http://youtu.be/9IPJq1kcDuc?t=5m49s
"Tuggy has now abandoned strict identity" Eh... no.
" If we say an agent could do otherwise, and we gloss that by reference to possible worlds, then is he the same self?"
This is what is impossible: Steve being dismissive and not being dismissive at one and the same time, in one and the same "possible world". In another possible world (at this same time), it may be that Steve is not dismissive. That is wholly compatible with him being dismissive in this, the actual world.
"He's projecting his own complaints onto the text, as if the NT writers saw the issues the same way he does." Wow, are you shooting from the hip here. Of course, I'm not complaining at all about the NT, but rather about Bauckham's theory. Maybe you have a hard time separating the two?
"By ascribing to Jesus exclusive names, titles, attributes, actions, and prerogatives that are uniquely reserved for the one true God."
Yeah, I discuss this argument in the paper. Only God can be truly described as F. Jesus is truly described as F. Ergo, God = Jesus. And, you admit, because the NT says so, that the two have differed. So you directly imply that one and the same being has, at one time, differed from itself.
Has God himself told us this? If so, we might try to overlook that it seems as obviously false as any claim does. Of course, the point of the whole paper, which I don't think you've really digested, is that Bauckham's theory seems ill-equipped to help us understand the texts. When faced with such a patent incoherence, we really ought to doubt our theory, and see if we can make better sense of the text. We should be afraid that the apparent contradictions have come from our own confused theorizing, and not from the texts themselves. In every other context, we rightly hesitate to attribute an obviously confused message to a text.
Is it arrogant to refuse to believe what appears contradictory? It can be. It doesn't seem to be in the above case; it is the humble course to try to make the best sense out of a text. But it is plainly arrogant to foist a demonstrably incoherent theory on the Christian public, and if they point out its incoherence, accuse them of sitting in judgment over God's self-revelation. I dare say God does not appreciate this condemnation; as we listen to him, he expects and requires us to use the minds he so generously gave us.
The fact is that the argument above was not endorsed by a great many historic mainstream theologians. e.g. http://trinities.org/blog/archives/5000 They called Jesus "God" and thought of him as in a lesser sense divine, but they demonstrably did not draw the conclusion that Jesus and the Father were the same being, or the same God. Instead, the argued that the one God of the OT is the Father, who is greater than Jesus. In your mind, Steve, the numerical identity of Jesus and God is an obvious implication of the NT. Well, then Justin, Origen, Tertullian, etc. didn't get the memo. Which is to say, no - that's not at all an obvious implication of the NT, but rather a controversial theory about it.
Dale
Delete"Is that an objection to Bauckham? Read all the way through, then think, and then, finally start objecting."
It does nothing to show that Bauckham's exegesis is flawed. It's only relevant to high-church Christians who think the creeds must be isometric with the NT.
"About the 'fatal concession', I'm afraid you're mistaken. The time-explicit version of the indiscernibility of identicals is all I need to make the point. Jesus and God have, at one time, differed. It follows that they are not identical (by the time-explicit version). "
You're not entitled to both invoke and modify Leibniz's law Your time-explicit version abdicates the principle of strict, abstract identity. Once you make allowance for identity that falls short of strict, abstract identity, you disqualify yourself from wielding Leibniz's Law to attack the Trinity. For, by your own admission, you now operate with a more flexible concept or standard of identity.
"Eh... no. "
Eh…yes. If according to your time-explicit version of Leibniz's law, it's possible for the same individual to undergo intrinsic change, then your definition of identity is now consistent with one or more intrinsic differences.
"This is what is impossible: Steve being dismissive and not being dismissive at one and the same time, in one and the same 'possible world'. In another possible world (at this same time), it may be that Steve is not dismissive. That is wholly compatible with him being dismissive in this, the actual world."
Dale, you're fudging strict identity. Is he the same individual in two or more possible worlds? Is he the same self in both the actual world as well as an unexemplified possible world (where things turned out slightly differently)? If you allow for him to be the same individual, despite alternate life-histories, then you ditched strict identity for a more flexible standard.
Cont. "Has God himself told us this? If so, we might try to overlook that it seems as obviously false as any claim does."
DeleteThere's an elementary distinction between what a writer means, and whether you agree with him. An honest interpreter is concerned with what the writer meant. Whether the interpreter personally agrees with the writer is a separate issue.
"Of course, the point of the whole paper, which I don't think you've really digested, is that Bauckham's theory seems ill-equipped to help us understand the texts."
The duty of an interpreter is to construe the text on its own terms, not reinterpret the text the according to what he would say if he were the writer.
"When faced with such a patent incoherence, we really ought to doubt our theory, and see if we can make better sense of the text. We should be afraid that the apparent contradictions have come from our own confused theorizing, and not from the texts themselves. In every other context, we rightly hesitate to attribute an obviously confused message to a text."
This is not a question of what the text means, but whether you're prepared to believe it. The fact that a unitarian reader can't bring him to accept what a Bible writer said is irrelevant to exegesis. The object of exegesis is not to pacify the reader, but to ascertain the meaning of the text.
"Is it arrogant to refuse to believe what appears contradictory? It can be. It doesn't seem to be in the above case; it is the humble course to try to make the best sense out of a text."
You systematically confound the outlook of the reader with the outlook of the writer. At best, the outlook of the reader would only be relevant in reference to the implied audience, viz. John's 1C audience.
But where a modern reader is concerned, his beliefs, his plausibility structure, is irrelevant to what the ancient writer meant. Writers can say things readers disagree with, Dale.
Of course, due to the authority of Scripture, Christians are supposed to align or realign (if need be) their beliefs with what the Bible teaches. That's your predicament.
"But it is plainly arrogant to foist a demonstrably incoherent theory on the Christian public, and if they point out its incoherence, accuse them of sitting in judgment over God's self-revelation. I dare say God does not appreciate this condemnation; as we listen to him, he expects and requires us to use the minds he so generously gave us."
That's a transparent rhetorical ploy. This is about you screening the Bible through your extraneous filter. Because you refuse to believe what the Bible says about Jesus, since that conflicts with your metatheory, you're the one who's foisting makeshift interpretations onto the text.
"The fact is that the argument above was not endorsed by a great many historic mainstream theologians. e.g. http://trinities.org/blog/archives/5000 They called Jesus 'God' and thought of him as in a lesser sense divine, but they demonstrably did not draw the conclusion that Jesus and the Father were the same being, or the same God. Instead, the argued that the one God of the OT is the Father, who is greater than Jesus. In your mind, Steve, the numerical identity of Jesus and God is an obvious implication of the NT. Well, then Justin, Origen, Tertullian, etc. didn't get the memo. Which is to say, no - that's not at all an obvious implication of the NT, but rather a controversial theory about it."
The early church fathers were groping with how to model the deity of Christ in relation to their preconceived notions of monotheism, using the conceptual resources of Greco-Roman philosophy at their disposal. They were experimenting with various Christological and Trinitarian paradigms. Historical theology evolves. And that's continuous, from Clement of Rome to Oliver Crisp and beyond.
But that's a separate question from what the Bible teaches.
"Eh…yes. If according to your time-explicit version of Leibniz's law, it's possible for the same individual to undergo intrinsic change, then your definition of identity is now consistent with one or more intrinsic differences."
DeleteAt different times, yes. Identity is the relation that everything bears to itself, and not to anything else, and which forces indiscernibility. But this is not thought by most philosophers to rule out intrinsic change - a thing being one way at time t, and a different, incompatible way at time t + 1. Some do deny intrinsic change, though, being four-dimensionalists - but that's another conversation. Steve, I'll wager that you assume Ind Id, in my preferred formulation, in all other contexts. e.g. in a court case.
"This is what is impossible: Steve being dismissive and not being dismissive at one and the same time, in one and the same 'possible world'. In another possible world (at this same time), it may be that Steve is not dismissive. That is wholly compatible with him being dismissive in this, the actual world."
"Dale, you're fudging strict identity. Is he the same individual in two or more possible worlds? Is he the same self in both the actual world as well as an unexemplified possible world (where things turned out slightly differently)? If you allow for him to be the same individual, despite alternate life-histories, then you ditched strict identity for a more flexible standard."
No, sorry. Steve in the other possible world is not real. So, he's not identical to you, the Steve in this actual world. To talk about "possible worlds" is just to talk about how things might (logically) have been - it's a way of talking about mere possibilities. To say that Steve in the other word is not dismissive, is just saying that Steve (the real, actual one - here in this world) could have been, at this time, not dismissive. There are some, in physics, who speculate (unreasonably, in my view) about multiple *actual* histories; take care not to confuse that with philosophers' habit of talking about "possible worlds" as a way to take about modality (what must be, what can't be, what could possibly be but isn't, would is but could possibly not be).
Dale
Delete"At different times, yes. Identity is the relation that everything bears to itself, and not to anything else, and which forces indiscernibility."
Is it the same "itself" at different times if it changes through time? If you allow for diachronic change, then you admit differences. Yes, the individual is self-identical at any given time. That's not the issue, The issue is whether the individual is the same individual across time. The same individual between T1 and T2, given the changes it undergoes. Clearly your definition of sameness falls short of *strict* identity. And then moment you allow for a concept of personal identity that's looser than strict identity, you're dealing with degrees of similarity. More alike and less alike. At that point, what basis to you have to attack the Trinity?
"Steve, I'll wager that you assume Ind Id, in my preferred formulation, in all other contexts. e.g. in a court case."
The question is whether your preferred formulation waters down the indiscernibility of identicals to something less than strict identity.
"No, sorry. Steve in the other possible world is not real. So, he's not identical to you, the Steve in this actual world. To talk about "possible worlds" is just to talk about how things might (logically) have been - it's a way of talking about mere possibilities. To say that Steve in the other word is not dismissive, is just saying that Steve (the real, actual one - here in this world) could have been, at this time, not dismissive."
The question at issue is the nature of counterfactual identity. Who are counterfactual statements about Dale about? Are they about the real Dale in the real world? Yet they are contrary to fact statements. Statements that aren't true of what Dale actually does in the actual world. So what's the reference point for the truth of these statements? Are counterfactual statements about you about *you*, or about someone *like* you?
"An honest interpreter is concerned with what the writer meant. Whether the interpreter personally agrees with the writer is a separate issue."
ReplyDeleteAgreed. But my point is that we think it important to be charitable in what interpretation of their speech or writing we adopt. Normally, it's a deal-breaker in the interpretation we're considering is plainly self-contradictory - we resist this, the more we have reason to think the speaker non-confused. Here, I take it, we have a lot of reason to think that, because we agree that the inspirer is God himself.
"The duty of an interpreter is to construe the text on its own terms, not reinterpret the text the according to what he would say if he were the writer."
I heartily agree. Odd... queesy sensation... never agreed with Steve before... I'm sure it will pass. :-P
"You systematically confound the outlook of the reader with the outlook of the writer."
Really? How so? Note that the tools I'm wielding are very simply ones, that all people at all times possess: concern with consistency, the concept of a single being, and the belief that a thing can't at one time be and not be a certain way, simple plainly valid arguments. Pretty plain-Jane stuff, no? I stick deliberately to common sense there. Show me where any speculations intrude, if you think they do. It's easy to accuse.
"unitarian reader"
Read the piece carefully. Which claim there, do you think, only a unitarian would accept? I can't think of a single one. It seems me that trinitarians should agree with the entirety of it. Bauckham's theory just seems unhelpful, whatever side you're on.
"Of course, due to the authority of Scripture, Christians are supposed to align or realign (if need be) their beliefs with what the Bible teaches."
Agreed.
"screening the Bible through your extraneous filter"
Steve, what I called incoherent was precisely *your* claim that both Father and Son are identical to God, and yet they differ from one another. If you think the Bible says that, you're saying something pretty bold. And every trinitarian Christian philosopher who is discussed in the main part of my "Trinity" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy would disagree. They conconct various ways of understanding the creedal formulas where obvious incoherence is avoided. You can hop up and down and insist that the Bible's really saying your preferred contradiction (that Jesus and the Father are and aren't identical), but people who hold out hope that what the Bible says is *true*, and who don't accept your special pleading appeal to "mystery" are going to be looking elsewhere to understand what the Bible really says.
"that's a separate question from what the Bible teaches"
It's relevant in that it shows that what you claim the Bible obviously says or implies, is not so.
Dale:
Delete"Really? How so? Note that the tools I'm wielding are very simply ones, that all people at all times possess: concern with consistency, the concept of a single being, and the belief that a thing can't at one time be and not be a certain way, simple plainly valid arguments. Pretty plain-Jane stuff, no? I stick deliberately to common sense there. Show me where any speculations intrude, if you think they do. It's easy to accuse."
i) Dale, you're prevaricating. There's no philosophical consensus on the conditions under which individuals are identical or distinct. Consider the intricate debate between endurantists and perdurantists.
Do you think "all people at all times" possess formal criteria for personal identity? Do you think "all people at all times" have a solution to Frege's Julius Caesar problem?
ii) Ironically, if you're going to appeal to pretheoretical intuitions of identity, that undercuts your definition. Let's compare two definitions back-to-back, beginning with yours:
"This principle is sometimes called 'Leibniz's Law.' It is commonly expressed in standard logical symbols like this: □(x)(y)( x = y → (F)(Fx ↔ Fy)). (Necessarily, for any x and any y, x is identical to y only if for any F, x is F if and only if y is F.) Roughly: it is impossible for numerically identical things to differ. In my view, this principle should be explicitly complicated so as to allow that a thing may intrinsically change through time."
This is Tuggy's definition of numerical identity, which he expounds in relation to Leibniz's law. Notice that his definition allows for persistence through time.
Let's compare that to another definition:
"Butler said there are two senses of the word 'identity.' There is, he says, identity in the strict sense and identity in 'a loose and popular sense.' The problem that Butler was concerned with was that of identity of persons and other objects over time. We say that a certain person we saw today is the very same person that we saw yesterday. Does that mean that the person today and the person yesterday are actually identical?…'The same river' would equally well do as examples. Here is an argument for saying that a person today and a person yesterday are not strictly identical: Strict identity is governed by a principled that is called the Indiscernibility of Identicals. This says that if a is strictly identical with b, then a and b have exactly the same properties. Sameness of thing gives sameness of properties. It is sometimes called Leibniz's Law. Now consider a person yesterday and a person today. Many of the person's properties will be different on different days. The person may have been cold yesterday and may be hot today, standing up yesterday and sitting today. So it seems that we conclude, by the Indiscernibility of Identicals, that the person yesterday is not strictly identical with 'the very same person' today. This is where Butler's distinction can be used. We can soften the blow by saying that what we have when we speak of a person yesterday and the same person to day is identity only in a 'loose and popular sense' of the word 'identity.'"
D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Westview Press, 1989), 2-4.
Notice that Armstrong definition distinguishes between strict and loose senses of identity. He defines strict identity by reference to Leibniz's law. But he sets that in direct contrast to persistence through time. For Armstrong, personal identity, involving diachronic change, falls short of strict identity (i.e. the indiscernibility of identicals).
So you and Armstrong present diametrically opposing definitions of identity. Your common man appeal only gets you the "loose and popular" definition of personal identity, in contrast to strict identity (i.e. the indiscernibility of identicals).
Cont. iii) Let's run with Armstrong's definition. Timeless (abstract) objects are paradigm cases of strict identity. Temporal objects can have incompatible properties by losing or gaining properties over time. That results in some differences–before and after. Some discontinuity.
DeleteBy contrast, timeless objects have no incompatible properties. They don't change over time. They don't undergo change because they are timeless. So they are what they are without qualification.
If that's how we define numerical identity (a la Leibniz, Armstrong), then personal identity may only been identity in the loose rather than strict sense of the term. Tuggy tries to play both ends off the middle. Where the Trinity is concerned, he seems to demand strict identity, as if he were using abstract objects (e.g. numbers) as the paradigm of personal identity.
Yet he defines identity to make allowance for change. However, that's a a looser definition of identity than strict identity. And once he forfeits strict identity, I don't see how Tuggy can attack the Trinity as a violation of Leibniz's law.
iv) In addition, Tuggy rejects divine eternalism for divine temporalism. So he thinks the same God (same divine "self") has incompatible properties, spread over time.
How is that consistent with personal identity, but the Trinity is not?
Dale:
Delete"Agreed. But my point is that we think it important to be charitable in what interpretation of their speech or writing we adopt. Normally, it's a deal-breaker in the interpretation we're considering is plainly self-contradictory - we resist this, the more we have reason to think the speaker non-confused. Here, I take it, we have a lot of reason to think that, because we agree that the inspirer is God himself."
i) It's not as if we're born with innate definitions of personal identity or numerical identity.
ii) Moreover, if God reveals himself to be Trinitarian, then we should allow that divine self-disclosure to inform or reform our preconceived notions of numerical identity or personal identity.
"Really? How so? Note that the tools I'm wielding are very simply ones, that all people at all times possess: concern with consistency, the concept of a single being, and the belief that a thing can't at one time be and not be a certain way, simple plainly valid arguments. Pretty plain-Jane stuff, no? I stick deliberately to common sense there. Show me where any speculations intrude, if you think they do. It's easy to accuse."
I've already presented a lengthy response, but to make some additional points:
i) Take a stock definition of numerical identity: "to be one and the same: one thing rather than two."
Problem is, that's not very informative. For it fails to explain what *makes* something to be one and the same thing. And that's the nub of the issue. So you can't get much milage out of that minimal definition. It's practically a cipher.
ii) Apropos (i), the popular concept of a "single being" involves a fuzzy notion of personal identity rather than strict identity. So your man-on-the-street appeal backfires.
iii) It's unitarians rather than Trinitarians who disregard the "identity" statements in Scripture. Trinitarians accept the "identity" statements that Scripture makes about the Son's relationship to God (as well as the Spirit's relationship to God). We take it as far as Scripture takes it. Unitarians are the ones who stop shot of accepting the predications of Scripture.
"Steve, what I called incoherent was precisely *your* claim that both Father and Son are identical to God, and yet they differ from one another. If you think the Bible says that, you're saying something pretty bold."
You're equivocating. Are you using "God" as a common noun or proper noun? Are you using "identity" in some technical sense of personal identity or numerical identity? There's no philosophical consensus on personal identity.
Do you equate numerical identity with strict identity? Apparently not.
"(that Jesus and the Father are and aren't identical)"
Don't be simpleminded. Individuals can be identical in one or more respects, but distinct in one or more respects. It's not all or nothing.
Cont. "but people who hold out hope that what the Bible says is *true*, and who don't accept your special pleading appeal to 'mystery' are going to be looking elsewhere to understand what the Bible really says."
Deletei) I needn't appeal to "mystery." If that's what God reveals about himself, then that's sufficient justification.
ii) However, appealing to paradox is not ipso facto "special pleading." Paradox is a common and tenacious phenomenon in logic, science, metaphysics, and mathematics.
"It's relevant in that it shows that what you claim the Bible obviously says or implies, is not so."
That's a non-sequitur Dale. The fact that you imagine the Trinity to be incoherent based on your preconception of identity conditions or identity relations hardly obviates what the Bible "obviously says or implies."
And the formal criteria for determining identity conditions or identity relations is a vexed issue in philosophy and mathematics. That's not something you're entitled to treat as a given. Far from it, that's a matter of ongoing debate.
"prevaricating"
ReplyDeleteCareful, Accuser. I said that I was deliberately sticking with *common sense* - not that the assumptions I made were one's that all or most philosophers agree to. Most philosophers, these days, are naturalists. And philosophers, naturalist and not, say some very strange things. But my argument is with Christians, and it seems to me that all Christians agree, e.g. that the one who dies = the one who is raised from the dead, and that the one who sins = the one who suffers in hell.
"formal criteria for personal identity"
All people believe, in my view, that they endure through time; at least, that's the default position. Memory and anticipation presuppose endurance. Buddhist or four-dimensionalist philosophy make intrude. Note that I don't adhere to "criteria of identity" - I think identity-facts are basic, and are not to be analyzed in terms of anything else, e.g. memory, bodily continuity.
About Butler, he believed that people, human selves, do remain strictly the same through time. The baby is the old man. It is material objects, and perhaps events which he thinks are the same "only in the loose and popular sense." (Armstrong there is not concerned with Butler per se.) About material objects (which aren't selves), there is much disagreement; but in a sense, who cares? In contrast, with you and I, it matters a great deal. If Steve, say, slanders someone, and later feels bad about it, this only make sense given that the one now feeling bad is numerically the same as the one who said the nasty stuff. If the slanderer and the ashamed one are merely similar and causally connected, the latter is badly mistaken. If it was merely a similar and causally connected person who said that stuff, you might regret that it happened, but you would not rightly take the blame. Blame attaches to the doer.
"personal identity may only been identity in the loose rather than strict sense of the term"
Look around - you'll see that basically no Christian philosopher, and wider than that, no moral realist endorses this, for the reasons above. Another reason is that we experience true change. Change, properly speaking, presupposes that one and the same thing is first one way, and then that same thing is another way. If it's not the same thing both times, we have replacement, not change. The four-dimensionalist doesn't believe in change. He reduces the appearance of change to replacement, or simply to differ person-stages at different times. But I know that I'm the person who typed the last sentence. And you know you're person who made this blog post on Oct 9.
Dale:
Delete"Careful, Accuser. I said that I was deliberately sticking with *common sense* - not that the assumptions I made were one's that all or most philosophers agree to. Most philosophers, these days, are naturalists. And philosophers, naturalist and not, say some very strange things. But my argument is with Christians, and it seems to me that all Christians agree, e.g. that the one who dies = the one who is raised from the dead, and that the one who sins = the one who suffers in hell."
Since you're raising philosophical objections to the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the deity of Christ, you don't get to evade philosophical objections to your position by "sticking with common sense." That oscillation is an example of your studied duplicity.
"All people believe, in my view, that they endure through time; at least, that's the default position. Memory and anticipation presuppose endurance. Buddhist or four-dimensionalist philosophy make intrude. Note that I don't adhere to "criteria of identity" - I think identity-facts are basic, and are not to be analyzed in terms of anything else, e.g. memory, bodily continuity."
Dale, you act as if you can resolve philosophical controversies by edict. That's not how it works.
"Look around - you'll see that basically no Christian philosopher, and wider than that, no moral realist endorses this, for the reasons above. Another reason is that we experience true change. Change, properly speaking, presupposes that one and the same thing is first one way, and then that same thing is another way. If it's not the same thing both times, we have replacement, not change. The four-dimensionalist doesn't believe in change. He reduces the appearance of change to replacement, or simply to differ person-stages at different times. But I know that I'm the person who typed the last sentence. And you know you're person who made this blog post on Oct 9."
Dale, I've cited specific counterexamples like the endurantist/perdurantist debate and Frege's Caesar problem which belie your facile assertions.
"A related point: 'loose and popular identity' is not a kind of identity, not a kind of numerical sameness. There are no kinds of it. So no, there's nothing tricky going on... on my side. On your side, I note that you're endorsing, at least in this discussion, an implausible and revisionary metaphysical theory, only because you suppose that it'll help you maintain a cherished Trinity theory. This is ad hoc. But also, it doesn't work."
I quoted David Malet Armstrong. Are you suggesting that he's a fringe figure in modern philosophy? He's a leading philosopher on attribute-agreement, so he has well-considered views on the nature of identity. You're free to disagree with him, but don't pretend he's eccentric. That tactic exposes your desperation.
A related point: "loose and popular identity" is not a kind of identity, not a kind of numerical sameness. There are no kinds of it. So no, there's nothing tricky going on... on my side. On your side, I note that you're endorsing, at least in this discussion, an implausible and revisionary metaphysical theory, only because you suppose that it'll help you maintain a cherished Trinity theory. This is ad hoc. But also, it doesn't work. Let's say that that trickster Tuggy is somehow requiring too much re: the Father and Son. You say that these are "loosely" identical, meaning that they can have different properties at different times. Great! But, in the NT, they have incompatible properties at the same time. And even if you didn't see that, it would remain that it is possible (non-contradictory) on your own views, that Father and Son differ at a given time. It follows that they are not numerically one.
ReplyDelete"In addition, Tuggy rejects divine eternalism for divine temporalism. So he thinks the same God (same divine "self") has incompatible properties, spread over time.
How is that consistent with personal identity, but the Trinity is not?"
About God and time: my view is, like Craig's, that if there is time, everything's in it, even God. But this is good - he couldn't respond to us if he weren't temporal, due to his free creation.
About your last question, my reply is: intrinsic change is actual - we know this by experience. Thus, it is possible. Thus, change is real. Thus, Leibniz's Law must be understood to allow the reality of change. I've shown more than one way to do this; there are others. e.g. E.J. Lowe's Metaphysics. Thus, while it's not possible that Steve by happy and not-happy at t1, it is possible (and sometimes actual) that he's happy at t1 and not-happy at t2.
"the Trinity is not"
So, the Steve Hays interpretation of the Trinity is,
f=g
s=g
It logically follows that f=s. (= is symmetical and transitive)
Add in now that at some time t, f is P, but s is not P. (New Testament)
Thus, by L's Law: not-(f=s)
Thus, the theory above implicitly affirms and denies the same claim - a theoretical disaster. Something must go. I suggest a hard look at your interpretations of the Bible.
Do you know who first pointed out to me that L's Law implies that Jesus and God are not numerically one? I won't say who, but it was a trinitarian prof @ Biola - someone who as far as I know now holds one of the Trinity theories I mentioned before - one of the not-obviously-contradictory ones. My point is that it's a rather obvious difficulty, and it depends neither on any unitarian assumption, nor on any off the wall or ad hoc understanding of =.
Finally, let me substantiate my claim that you, and every reader of this blog, are committed to something like my version of Leibniz's Law (aka the Indiscernibility of Identicals). You're on the jury, and they've hauled in Joe Biden. They know *someone* spray-painted "You should move to Kolob" on the side of Romney's bus, but they don't know who. Joe is a suspect. How will he be acquitted? This will suffice, for you, and for any juror - that there has been a time, any time, no matter when or how brief, that the spray-painter was one way, and Joe was another. Why? You infer, that as they have differed, they (Joe and the spray painter) are not numerically the same.
Dale:
Delete"the Father and Son. You say that these are "loosely" identical, meaning that they can have different properties at different times. Great!"
No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm simply using diachronic change to illustrate the claim that personal identity doesn't presuppose strict identity.
I don't think the Father or the Son qua Son undergo change. The Son qua Incarnate is subject to change.
"But, in the NT, they have incompatible properties at the same time. And even if you didn't see that, it would remain that it is possible (non-contradictory) on your own views, that Father and Son differ at a given time."
Meaning the Father is not the Son, and vice versa. Needless to say, that distinction is an essential component of the Trinity.
"It follows that they are not numerically one."
That only follows if you beg the question of makes something to be the same thing. If you assume, in the teeth of arguments to the contrary, that strict identity must underwrite numerical identity and/or personal identity.
"About God and time: my view is, like Craig's, that if there is time, everything's in it, even God. But this is good - he couldn't respond to us if he weren't temporal, due to his free creation."
Which ducks the question I raised by changing the subject.
"About your last question, my reply is: intrinsic change is actual - we know this by experience. Thus, it is possible. Thus, change is real. Thus, Leibniz's Law must be understood to allow the reality of change."
That's a non sequitur. The fact that change is real doesn't mean Leibniz's law must be redefined to allow for the reality of change. Rather, that would restrict Leibniz's law to abstract objects. Although concrete objects (or relations) could approximate Leibniz's law, concrete identity would be less stringent. Analogous to the way in which real space exemplifies geometrical universals.
"Thus, the theory above implicitly affirms and denies the same claim - a theoretical disaster."
Don't be a simpleton. Same in most respects, different in another.
"Finally, let me substantiate my claim that you, and every reader of this blog, are committed to something like my version of Leibniz's Law (aka the Indiscernibility of Identicals). You're on the jury, and they've hauled in Joe Biden. They know *someone* spray-painted 'You should move to Kolob' on the side of Romney's bus, but they don't know who. Joe is a suspect. How will he be acquitted? This will suffice, for you, and for any juror - that there has been a time, any time, no matter when or how brief, that the spray-painter was one way, and Joe was another. Why? You infer, that as they have differed, they (Joe and the spray painter) are not numerically the same."
That doesn't pick out any particular theory of personal identity.
"It's not as if we're born with innate definitions of personal identity or numerical identity."
ReplyDeleteTo the contrary, the concept of identity is built-in. So is the concept of a self. I don't think the former concept is really definable. The concept of a self is certainly understandable, or explicable - maybe even definable. "Personal identity" is just whether or not some x and y are the same self - i.e. x is a self, y is a self, and x=y.
"Moreover, if God reveals himself to be Trinitarian, then we should allow that divine self-disclosure to inform or reform our preconceived notions of numerical identity or personal identity."
Numerical sameness is a rock-bottom, basic items in our conceptual toolbox. See Hawthorne on this: http://trinities.org/blog/archives/2999 So no - it doesn't make sense to say we revise this based on the Bible. As to the concept of a self, it has borderline cases, and non-literal applications, so there is some room to argue that it is in some way applicable to a triune God, in other ways not. I've seen several Christian philosophers, e.g. Hasker, try to do this, but I think without much success. Clarity is one problem. But the biggest problem is just that the Bible everywhere supposes God to be a uniquely great self - a thing which all Christians seem to agree on, outside of polemical Trinity-theory-defending contexts.
"You're equivocating. Are you using "God" as a common noun or proper noun?"
The latter. Of course, I'm not equivocating.
"Are you using "identity" in some technical sense of personal identity or numerical identity? There's no philosophical consensus on personal identity."
Just numerical identity. Again, "personal identity" isn't really a kind of identity - see above.
"Do you equate numerical identity with strict identity?"
Yes.
"Don't be simpleminded. Individuals can be identical in one or more respects, but distinct in one or more respects. It's not all or nothing."
Numerical identity IS all-or-nothing. Similarity (aka qualitative identity) of course comes in degrees.
Dale:
Delete"To the contrary, the concept of identity is built-in. So is the concept of a self. I don't think the former concept is really definable. The concept of a self is certainly understandable, or explicable - maybe even definable. 'Personal identity' is just whether or not some x and y are the same self - i.e. x is a self, y is a self, and x=y."
The man on the street has crude notions of personal identity, which is consistent with conflicting philosophical models.
"Numerical sameness is a rock-bottom, basic items in our conceptual toolbox."
Which is a cipher, as I pointed out (see above).
"But the biggest problem is just that the Bible everywhere supposes God to be a uniquely great self…"
That's tendentiously one-sided. The Biblical data is more complex. Unitarianism simplifies theology by simplifying the data.
"Just numerical identity. Again, 'personal identity' isn't really a kind of identity - see above."
Which is unfortunately for your argument.
"Numerical identity IS all-or-nothing."
Really? A few days ago, Alexander Pruss said: "distinguish two different kinds of identity, identity of person and identity of essence, and say that that some predicates only transfer across one of these two identities."
But I guess he's a philosophical bumpkin.