The argument from nonexistent evil

Some recent comments I left at Victor Reppert’s blog:

steve said...

    An obvious problem with Parsons's position is that an argument from evil presupposes evil. Yet many secular philosophers are moral relativists or moral nihilists (e.g. Michael Ruse, Alex Rosenberg, Quentin Smith, J. L. Mackie, Massimo Pigliucci).

    Because Parsons is an apostate, he retains a residual sense of morality, which is a carryover from his long lost Christian faith.

steve said...

    BeingItself said...

    "That makes no sense. If Alex Rosenberg tried to run an argument from evil, you would have a point. But the fact that there are Alex Rosenburgs is not a problem for Parson's position."

    It's a problem for Parsons if even his fellow atheist philosophers admit that they can't justify a necessary premise in the argument from evil.

    Before Parsons can disprove Christianity, he has to disprove atheistic amorality.

Evil is a key premise in the argument from evil. Well, if many atheist philosophers deny moral realism, then Parsons can't take that premise for granted in his argument.

Rather, it is incumbent on Parsons to argue for his premise before he can use that premise.

steve said...

    BeingItself said...

    “False. That evil exists is a premise of Christianity. The argument tries to show that a certain type of theism is internally inconsistent.”

    What makes you think Parsons is merely assuming the existence of evil for the sake of argument? If you’ve read much of his stuff, he has fits of moral indignation on a regular basis.

    Moreover, why would a moral relativist or moral nihilist care whether a certain type of theism is internally inconsistent? After all, they’re in no position to say it’s morally wrong to be inconsistent, or intellectually virtuous to be consistent. So even if the argument could succeed on purely internal grounds, that’s a pyrrhic victory.

    That reduces atheology to a crossword puzzle. Just a way to pass the time.

    

steve said...

    BeingItself said...

    “False. That evil exists is a premise of Christianity. The argument tries to show that a certain type of theism is internally inconsistent.”

    Well, that's obviously false. When atheists deploy the argument from evil, they typically cite paradigm-cases of gratuitous evil to illustrate their premise.

    That, however, depends on their interpretation of what counts as evil. So the atheist is applying his own yardstick.

steve said...

    BeingItself said...

    "You are getting sillier and sillier. All that is needed is for Parsons and the Christian to agree that there is evil in the world."

    Thanks for illustrating your jejune grasp of the issues. The existence of evil is a presupposition of Christianity, not a disproof of Christianity. In fact, the nonexistence of evil would disprove Christianity.

    The atheist requires something far more specific than the bare existence of evil. Usually, his premise requires the existence of gratuitous evil. And that's something that many Christians don't concede.

    Moreover, some Christians don't consider the existence of gratuitous evil to be a defeater for their version of Christian theism.

    You also dodged the issue of why a moral relativist or nihilist would even care about the problem of evil.

steve said...

    im-skeptical said...

    "I've always found it difficult to understand why this is so hard for most theists to grasp. I think it's much more likely that you will hear atheists speak of 'gratuitous suffering' than of 'gratuitous evil'."

    You keep swinging and you keep missing. There's a reason it's called the argument from evil rather than the argument from suffering. For unless suffering (or a particular type of suffering) is evil, there is nothing even prima facie incongruous about the existence of suffering in relation to God's goodness.

steve said...

    im-skeptical said...

    “You don't even understand the argument from evil. Go back and read what BI and I said, which has obviously gone right over your head.”

    Yes, you’re repeating yourself. That’s because you shot your wad the first time around.

    I responded to your confused objection. Sorry that sailed right over your head.

    “The argument from evil is not in any way predicated on what atheists believe. It's predicated on what YOU believe. You haven't presented any argument at all. You don't even know what you're arguing against.”

    In order for the argument from evil to get off the ground, the atheist must identify examples of evil. And not just any evil will do. After all, the bare existence of evil is not a prima facie defeater or undercutter for Christianity, inasmuch as evil is a given in Christian theology. A fixture of Christian theology.

    That gives the atheist two options. On the one hand, he can cite empirical examples which he deems to be evil by his own standards. However, that will require him to justify his value system. Since many atheists reject moral realism, they disqualify themselves from venturing objectively true moral judgments. Therefore, an atheist can’t take moral realism for granted.

    Conversely, he can try to identify examples which the Christian deems to be gratuitously evil. The problem with that tactic is that, by definition, a Christian wouldn’t be a Christian unless he thought God had a morally sufficient reason for the evils he causes and/or permits. So his attempt to mount an internal argument from evil is abortive from the outset.

steve said...

    im-skeptical said...

    “Obtusity abounds.”

    Thanks for your candid self-admission.

    “I think it's pointless. Leave it to Steve to mindlessly repeat the same old lame objections that don't address the problem: ‘the atheist must identify examples of evil’. No, evil is YOUR problem, not mine. That's what the argument is about.”

    Take Rowe’s famous hypothetical about Bambi dying in a forest fire. Rowe considers that an example of gratuitous evil. That presumes the atheist’s interpretation of the event.

    Sorry you’re chronically unable to draw elementary distinctions.

    “That's the crux of the biscuit. You're OK with it because 1: you haven't given it serious thought, or 2: you just don't care as long as all this bad stuff doesn't happen to you. And I doubt you ever will.”

    Even if your armchair psychology were correct, that’s irrelevant to your claim that the problem of evil demonstrates the incoherence of Christian theism.