Craig on Calvinism and divine command theory

On the one hand:

Universal, divine, determinism makes God the author of sin and precludes human responsibility. In contrast to the Molinist view, on the deterministic view even the movement of the human will is caused by God. God moves people to choose evil, and they cannot do otherwise. God determines their choices and makes them do wrong. If it is evil to make another person do wrong, then on this view God is not only the cause of sin and evil, but becomes evil Himself, which is absurd. By the same token, all human responsibility for sin has been removed. For our choices are not really up to us: God causes us to make them. We cannot be responsible for our actions, for nothing we think or do is up to us.

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-vs-calvinism

On the other hand:

I think that a good start at this problem is to enunciate our ethical theory that underlies our moral judgements.  According to the version of divine command ethics which I’ve defended, our moral duties are constituted by the commands of a holy and loving God.  Since God doesn’t issue commands to Himself, He has no moral duties to fulfill.  He is certainly not subject to the same moral obligations and prohibitions that we are.  For example, I have no right to take an innocent life.  For me to do so would be murder.  But God has no such prohibition.  He can give and take life as He chooses.  We all recognize this when we accuse some authority who presumes to take life as “playing God.”  Human authorities arrogate to themselves rights which belong only to God.  God is under no obligation whatsoever to extend my life for another second.  If He wanted to strike me dead right now, that’s His prerogative.

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/slaughter-of-the-canaanites

That raises an interesting issue. How is a Molinist divine command theorist in any position to attack the morality of Calvinism? What would a debate between a Molinist divine command theorist and a Reformed divine command theorist look like? Could we argue that God’s decrees (e.g. reprobation) are morally analogous to God’s commands?

I don’t see how Craig could deploy his moral intuitions against Calvinism given his position on divine command theory.