Parsing the problem of evil

I would argue that the ontological existence of gratuitous, pointless, unnecessary evil makes much more sense of Christian theology and human experience than its nonexistence does.

http://seedbed.com/feed/evil-sometimes-the-human-explanation-is-better-than-the-divine-explanation

This is Ragozine’s Arminian take on the problem of evil. But, ironically, an atheist would argue that the ontological existence of gratuitous, pointless, unnecessary evil makes much more sense if a world without God. That the existence of gratuitous, pointless, unnecessary evil is just what we’d expect if there is no God. Suffering is random because there is no cosmic purpose or cosmic justice. It’s just your bad luck if you happen to find yourself in the wrong place at the wrong time.

How would Ragozine empirically distinguish his interpretation of events from the atheist?