Musings on the multiverse

The multiverse is becoming popular in some Christian circles. From a Reformed perspective, how should we evaluate the multiverse?

i) Robin Collins draws a useful distinction between two basic types of multiverses:

Second, we need to get clear on what we mean by the multiverse hypothesis. There are essentially two versions of the multiverse (or many-universe) hypothesis, what could be called the physical or universe-generator versions and what could be called metaphysical versions. In the universe- generator versions, some particular real physical process - such as an inflation field - is postulated that generates the many universes, whereas in the metaphysical versions the universes are thought to exist on their own without being generated by any physical process.

http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/stanford%20multiverse%20talk.htm

ii) One variant of the first version (“the physical or universe-generator versions”) is what we might call the quantum multiverse. From what I’ve read, this version is based on Everett’s many-worlds solution to the measurement conundrum in quantum mechanics. We could spend time debating the pros and cons of the quantum multiverse. However, I’m more interested in the metaphysical multiverse.

iii) In Christian discussion, the metaphysical version is a theistic adaptation of David Lewis’s modal realism. (There are also theistic adaptations of the quantum version.)

On this (theistic) version, at least some possible worlds are concrete objects rather than abstract objects. God instantiates a world ensemble of parallel worlds which (selectively) exemplify abstract possible worlds. 

God doesn’t instantiate every logically possible world, but only those which are sufficiently good to make the cut.

iv) Is there any theological reason to think this might be true? One reason is divine freedom. Must God choose only one possible world to instantiate?

Except for theists who subscribe to universal possibilism (e.g. Descartes, Leftow), most orthodox Christians say divine omnipotence is restricted to what’s logically possible. God cannot perform logical contradictions.

This isn’t a real limitation on God. Since a logical contradiction is a pseudotask, there’s nothing there for God to “really” do. In that sense, God wouldn’t be “frustrated” by his “inability” to do what’s logically impossible or logically incompossible.

v) However, to say that God must choose which possible world to create seems to impose an arbitrary restriction on divine power. For, on the face of it, it doesn’t appear to be logically impossible for God to create alternate timelines as long as these are kept separate in self-contained parallel worlds.

vi) One might object that the metaphysical multiverse is pure speculation. However, the axiomatic assumption that only one possible world is realizable is no less speculative. Moreover, the latter speculation seems to infringe on divine freedom in a way that’s theologically dubious.

It’s one thing to say that God was forced to choose between mutually exclusive options if those are, indeed, logically incompossible.

If, however, it’s logically or metaphysically possible for God to distributively instantiate alternate histories in discrete parallel worlds, then God didn’t have to accept the tradeoff. In that case, God isn’t confronted with the dilemma of which world to make–to the exclusion of all other options. Although there remain tradeoffs within possible worlds, that doesn’t entail tradeoffs between possible worlds.

vii) Admittedly, that’s not a positive reason to think God has created a multiverse. Rather, that opposes the notion that he could not or would not do so.

viii) Is there any positive reason to think God might have made a multiverse? Here I’d offer two suggestions, which are merely suggestive:

a) Since many alternate histories seem to be equally good (more or less) in different, incommensurable ways, it seems arbitrary for God to confine himself to only one option. That’s a lost opportunity to exemplify so many other goods not captured by just one timeline. Why let all that go to waste? These would be additional ways for God to manifest his surpassing goodness and greatness.

b) It also strikes me as a bit incongruous that humans would be more creative than God. After all, we write stories and make movies which give full play to our imagination. Our capacity to explore and imaginatively experience the road not taken.

I don’t offer these suggestions as proofs. I just think they make the prospect of a theistic multiverse more plausible.

ix) At the same time, there are restrictions on that conjecture. I doubt God would create parallel worlds where those who go to hell in our world go to heaven in a parallel world, or vice versa. Same thing for election and reprobation.

That seems to be cheating hell. Likewise, if everything and its opposite happens in one world or another, that levels everything out–which seems to make everything rather pointless. By the same token, if choices and consequences lack finality, then they aren’t really consequences. Inconsequential consequences are meaningless.

Admittedly, this objection maybe blunted to some degree by the fact that my counterpart in a parallel world isn’t strictly me. So I can’t press this objection too far.

x) In addition, I don’t think God would instantiate every possible world. Some possible worlds have no redeeming value.

That’s fine as long as a possible world remains abstract. Abstract creatures aren’t conscious. They lack actual memories or fears. They can’t actually suffer. They can’t experience actual loss.

I doubt God would create a world where people merely suffer for the sake of suffering. Where there are no compensatory goods. No beneficiaries.

xi) There are many professing Christians who think science has invalidated a literal reading of Gen 1-3, or Gen 1-11. And some go beyond that. They mock the literal reading of Gen 1-11 as inherently absurd. For them, writings like Genesis represent the intellectual infancy of the human race. Due to modern science, we’re the intellectual equivalent of college grads compared to the preschoolers who wrote the Pentateuch.

But many professing Christians who take this view of Bible history are also sympathetic to the multiverse. Yet if the multiverse is true, then they can’t rule out a parallel world in which Gen 1-11 is literally true. Even if they don’t think it’s true in our world, they can’t object to that scenario on a priori grounds.

xii) Finally, we need to resist getting too invested in the multiverse. This is recreational theology. Our primary duty is to understand God’s revelation, then frame our lives in accordance with his revelation.

Recreational theology, like other intellectual or physical recreations, is okay up to a point, but this mustn’t take the place of revealed theology. For instance, I’m appalled at how much time some philosophers invest in formulating minutely detailed models of Molinism. They put their best work into refining Molinism. Yet that’s just a man-made philosophical construct, like intricate versions of idealism (e.g. McTaggart, Sprigge).