In this
post I’m going to defend a position I don’t happen to agree with. I’m going to show how
it’s potentially defensible. In other words, if I subscribed to this position,
then here’s how I’d go about defending it.
There
are Calvinists who think God has unrequited desires. God sincerely desires the
salvation of the reprobate.
Not
surprisingly, Arminians attack this position as inconsistent. They also use it
as a wedge issue.
But in
principle, there is a pretty straightforward argument which a Calvinist of this
persuasion could use to demonstrate the consistency of his position.
If we
accept the metaphysical assumption that only one possible world can be
instantiated, then God might like to save the reprobate. But since he can only
instantiate one possible world, that desire might be in conflict with another
possible world which is preferable overall. All things being equal, God wishes
that he could save everyone–but all things considered, a world in which some
are lost may be preferable to a world in which everyone is saved. And keep in
mind that we’re not necessarily referring to the same set of people in each
world.
If this
case, God is “limited” (as it were) by what’s logically compossible. Not all
possibilities are compossible.
And that
would be a “limitation” internal to God, inasmuch as logic is internal to God.
The mind of God constitutes the laws of logic.
A
Calvinist of this stripe might say God is “frustrated” with his choices. Even
so, that would have a fundamentally different basis than divine frustration in
freewill theism. In the latter case, God is stymied by human freedom. That’s a
limitation imposed on God by outside forces. By something external to God. By
the sinful or libertarian will of the creature.
So
that’s not a wedge issue. It doesn’t concede a principle to freewill theism.
For divine frustration would operate on two essentially different, respective
principles.
I myself
am sympathetic to a qualified version of the megaverse, so I don’t grant the
metaphysical postulate underlying this position. And I also don’t share the
hermeneutical assumptions driving this view of the well-meant offer.
If,
however, we presume that only one universe can exist at a time, then this is a
simple, elegant argument for a Calvinist God who can’t get everything he wants.
In essence that's what I argued for in my comments in Steve's blog titled "Is God's will bifurcated?". But Steve has done it more elegantly and succinctly here than I've ever done so in the past.
ReplyDeleteI've used the analogy of a woman who has conflicting multivalent desires (or sets of desires). For example,
A woman can desire another bowl of ice cream, but chooses not to because she has a higher desire and goal to fit into the dress she's going to wear at her daughter's wedding. Since to choose is to forego, it's sometimes logically necessary for a person to choose one desire [or set of desires] or goal [ or set of goals] over another/others. If God, being Holy and Just, can *in some sense* desire the destruction of ALL sinners [i.e. including the elect while on earth pre-regeneration](they being guilty and justice requiring punishment); why can't it be the case that since God is naturally benevolent and beneficent that *in some sense* He desires the salvation of all those made in His Image?
By logical necessity, to "choose A" is to also "choose NOT Non-A".
Steve said...
Not surprisingly, Arminians attack this position as inconsistent. They also use it as a wedge issue.
Yet interestingly, Arminians sometimes use the same concept of multivalent desires in God as part of their theodicy too. God may have the ability and opportunity to choose to manifest Himself in ways that would lead to more people believing in his existence (and possibly being saved).
But He chooses not to so that 1. they aren't forced to believe in his existence and 2. to ensure that they believe in him *FREELY* and willingly. Especially since, believing in the existence of God is not equivalent to believing IN Him. The latter requires a loving trust, while the former doesn't. Even demons believe *that* God exists. I explored the idea and implications of God making His existence more plain at the comments of this blog.
Finally, IF it's the case that God does create multiple universes, then there might be a sense in which God may be able to "have His ice cream topped cake and eat it too". *G*
Steve,
ReplyDeleteI agree with most of your post. But it leads to the question of why God only has one possible world He can create? If the answer is ultimately His own nature, then this view starts to look like God is unhappy with Himself.
God be with you,
Dan
It would be up to the proponent of this view to make a case for why only one possible world can exist. Since I find that dubious, it's not incumbent on me to defend that assumption.
DeleteThere are, however, many philosophers and theologians who take that for granted, so it's not an unusual assumption.
This no more makes God unhappy with himself than other logical limitations on divine omnipotence.
Let's say a man has a birthmark with aspects he doesn't like, but he's shaping an exact replica of the birthmark out of clay. In the same way, if God's nature provides the pattern for all of history, and there's aspects of history He doesn't like, then in a way, He doesn't like aspects of Himself.
DeleteGod be with you,
Dan
Once again, do you apply that same line of reasoning to logical limits on divine omnipotence generally?
Delete(Mind you, I don't think a multiverse is logically or metaphysically impossible. I'm merely considering a popular variant of Calvinism for the sake of argument.)
Well God does not want to make a square circle (there's no such thing), so there's not frustration over that. And our libertarian free actions are unlike a birthmark - so if we do things God does not want, He's not hating Himself, but rather our actions.
ReplyDeleteGod be with you,
Dan
On that view, he'd be hating the consequences of his own actions inasmuch as our actions are the result of his actions. God has to create free agents in the first place. So even if their actions are free in the libertarian sense, that's still linked to God's creative fiat. In order to hate their actions, he must hate the hateful consequences of his own actions, which result in their actions. At least, that's that the logic of your argument.
DeleteOf course, it's possible to distinguish "hating" sin considered in isolation, and desiring that sinners sin in the furtherance of a higher end. But that's not a distinction you can successfully deploy against Calvinism inasmuch as that distinction is entirely consonant with Calvinism.
Steve,
DeleteI think that depends on how successful on LFW is on "breaking the link" between God's actions and our own. But we have both said a lot on that topic, so no need to rehash.
Anyways, I appreciate your kind tone and hope to hear more on your views on the possibility of God making more than one universe.
God be with you,
Dan
On the two-wills view (a la Murray, Piper), it's not that God is unhappy with the result, but that God is somewhat ambivalent about the result. God has mixed feelings about the result.
ReplyDeleteOnce more, that's not my own position. To deploy the strategy I defended (for the sake of argument), a Calvinist or Amyraldin would have to defend the proposition that God can only make one universe at a time.