Children of a Lesser God

It is good to remind yourself that you could be wrong and to recommit yourself to your desire to know if you are wrong.

I think that Calvinism makes certain claims about the Christian God which are false and are, among other things, inconsistent with his metaphysical perfection. I reject those claims.

You think that Arminianism makes certain claims about the Christian God which are false and are, among other things inconsistent with his metaphysical perfection. You reject those claims.

But will you shine Dr. Olson’s shoes if you’re wrong? (I’ll gladly shine John Piper’s shoes if I’m wrong.)

Heck, if I’m wrong about Calvinism I’ll even clean the mud off of Mark Driscoll’s scuffed up Doc Martens.

If I’m wrong.

http://randalrauser.com/2012/12/ill-shine-john-pipers-shoes-under-one-condition/

Before responding directly, let’s put Rauser’s statement in a broader context. He says Calvinism makes certain claims about God that are “inconsistent with his metaphysical perfection.”

But that’s a somewhat euphemistic way of expressing his true sentiments. Here’s a sampling of some other statements he’s made:

I hope the Calvinists who pray the imprecatory psalms can appreciate why other Christians do not.

http://randalrauser.com/2012/01/imprecations-for-arminians/

If I were to summarize the problem with GBB in a single sentence it would be this: in multiple instances the book’s defense of God’s behavior depends at least in part on obscuring the depth of the problem at issue. Whether the issue is punishing an entire nation for the sins of its leaders or committing genocide or causing the mauling of youthful tormenters, Lamb’s defense depends on multiple arguments with implausible moral premises which obscure the nature of the issue of debate.

http://randalrauser.com/2012/11/how-good-is-god-behaving-badly-a-review/

But the text is still deeply problematic for it still affirms the appropriateness of sacrifice as a means to relate to God (presumably including human sacrifice; more on that below) and it also affirms the appropriateness of asking a father to commit a truly heinous act.

As for Abraham specifically, if it is intrinsically wrong to engage in an act, then it seems also intrinsically wrong to ask a person to commit the act, even if your intention is ultimately that they not perform the action. For example if rape is intrinsically wrong then it is wrong to ask somebody to rape a third party, even if your ultimate intention is that they not do so. I think the intuition is very strong that it is inherently wrong to engage in acts of devotional killing of one's child to a deity. But then it is wrong for a third party -- even if that party is God -- to ask a person to engage in that action, even if God intended ultimately that they not follow through with it.

http://randalrauser.com/2011/04/is-god-a-moral-monster-a-review-part-2/

i) One of the striking, but hardly unusual features of his position is the way Rauser’s objection to the Calvinist God dovetails with his objection to the OT God.

In addition, Rauser is a militant critic of everlasting punishment. So he also has a problem with the NT God. He is, by turns, antagonistic to Reformed theism, OT theism, and NT theism. His objections to Calvin’s God shade into his objections to Yahweh and the NT Judge. They are pretty much interchangeable.

He relieves the tension by denying the inerrancy of Scripture. That enables him to cherry pick which passages he accepts and which he rejects.

ii) This, in turn, raises the question of what he means when he says he’s open to the possibility that he might be wrong, and, what is more, that he’d be prepared to embrace John Piper’s God if proven wrong.

But what does that hypothetical admission refer to? Is he saying that he might be wrong about the existence of the Calvinist God? Or that he might be wrong about the character of the Calvinist God?

Or are these linked? That if the Calvinist God is the true God, then that, in turn, automatically revises Rauser’s conception of what constitutes a metaphysically perfect God?

iii) Let’s take a comparison. Protestant debates over baptism or the millennium are purely exegetical debates. It’s just a question of which side has the best interpretation and integration of the Biblical data. In that event, it wouldn’t be hard to switch sides.

But Arminians like Rauser have raised the stakes where God is concerned. They’ve assured us that Calvinism has dire consequences for the character of God if Calvinism were true.

Given that posture, it’s hard to see how they can walk back those statements and suddenly regard the Calvinist God as worshipful in case it turns out that he’s the real deal. After all, the usual way in which the hypothetical is framed is not that if the Calvinist God existed, then we’d be wrong about our moral intuitions, that the Calvinist God would be praiseworthy. Just the opposite, the usual way in which the hypothetical is framed is that if the Calvinist God existed, then that would be a morally monstrous state of affairs. The worst-case scenario. The worst of all possible worlds. Worse than Satan. A cosmic Hitler.

It’s difficult to see how Arminians who cast the issue in such Manichean terms can climb down from that characterization and do a last-minute change of heart regarding the worshipfulness of Calvin’s God. Seems a bit like the Vichy collaborators: If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em.

To take a comparison, suppose you came to the conclusion that Moloch was the true God. Would that mean Moloch was a metaphysically perfect God after all? Or would that mean an evil God actually exists?

iv) Finally, Rauser turns the question back on the Calvinist. Fair enough.

Hypothetically speaking, there are degrees of worshipfulness. Some Gods (or gods) would be more worshipful than others.

Suppose Zeus was real. In some respects he’d be a superior being. Not morally superior. Even the Greeks didn’t think he was very admirable. But superior in the sense of superhuman. More knowledgeable. More powerful. So you’d have to show him respect, just as you’d have to show a grizzly bear respect.

Now the Arminian God is clearly several notches above Zeus. Arminian theism is greatly influenced by Scripture.

Still, the Arminian God is a lesser God compared to the Calvinist God. He does less for his people than the Calvinist God. And he does less because he’s less capable.

His creatures wield some power over the Arminian God, whereas his creatures wield no power over the Calvinist God.

As William Lane Craig put it, God must play the hand he was dealt. The cards are our autonomous choices. These are independent of God. And not all possible worlds are even feasible worlds.

Likewise, God’s knowledge of the future is caused by what we will do. So he is dependent on his own creation to some degree.

All told, the Arminian God would be less worshipful than the Calvinist God. He’s a smaller God. Lesser in what he is and does. A greater being than human beings, but a lesser being than the Calvinist God.

Notice that I’m judging Arminian theism on its own terms. By its own claims.

But even within his limitations, the conduct of the Arminian God raises questions about his goodness. As one philosopher recently noted:

Long ago, I remember reading with great curiosity Rabbi Kushner's When Bad Things Happen to Good People? How disappointing that Kushner's intellectual answer seemed to be that God isn't omnipotent. (His practical answer not to worry about the question but just to do good is much better.) The idea of limiting divine attributes in part to answer the problem of evil has recently had some defense (e.g., here and in the work of open theists), so I guess it's time to blog the objection to Kushner—which applies to the others as well—that I had when I read him, with some elaboration.

Basically, the objection is that as long as God remains pretty good, pretty smart (he was smart enough to create us!) and powerful enough to communicate with us (Kushner at least accepts this), then serious cases of the Problem of Evil remain. Moreover, these cases do not seem significantly easier to solve than the cases of the Problem of Evil that were removed. Consequently, the intellectual benefit with regard to the Problem of Evil is small. And the intellectual loss with regard to the simplicity of the theory is great—the theory that God has all perfections is far simpler.

Start by considering a deity whose goodness is unlimited but whose knowledge and power are fairly limited.

Consider, first, the problem of polio. This is certainly a horrendous evil. And the limited deity could have alleviated a significant portion of the problem hundreds of years earlier simply by whispering into some people's ears how to make a vaccine—surely any deity smart enough to create this world would be smart enough to figure out how to make vaccines. Maybe the limited deity couldn't have prevented all cases, in the way that an unlimited God could. But given that neither did the wholesale prevention happen nor did the partial prevention by vaccines happen as early as it could have.

Consider, second, the many cases where innocent people suffered horrendously at the hands of attackers, where the attack could have been prevented if the people had been warned. Even a deity of limited power and knowledge should be able to see, for instance, that the Gestapo are talking about heading for such-and-such a house, and could then warn the occupants. (I am not saying that such warnings were never given—for all I know, they were in a number of cases. But I am saying that there are many cases where apparently they were not.)

Moreover, even if one limits the goodness of the deity, and only claims that he is pretty good, the problem remains. For unless the deity had a very serious reason not to tell people about vaccines and not to warn the innocent victims of horrendous attacks, it seems plausible that the deity did something quite bad in refraining from helping, so bad as to be incompatible with being pretty good. (If the deity had a reason that fell a little short of justifying the refraining, then that might be compatible with being pretty good; but a reason would have to be pretty serious for it to fall only a little short of justifying the refraining when the evils are so horrendous.) So even if one thinks that the deity has limited power and knowledge and is only pretty good, the problem of finding very serious reasons for the deity's non-interference remains.

Granted, the problem is diminished, especially if one has decreased the belief in divine goodness. But notice that the decrease in belief in divine goodness is the most religiously troubling aspect of a limited God doctrine. And even that does not make the problem go away.

http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2012/12/limiting-god-to-solve-problem-of-evil.html

The freewill defense won’t avail in these cases, for divine intervention of this kind wouldn’t abridge human freedom. Indeed, it would give humans more choices. More opportunities.