Eric10/17/2012 4:21 PM
What is your basis for saying domestic violence would be grounds for divorce? And why the distinction between verbal and physical abuse? Neither is mentioned in the bible as reasons for divorce.
Before getting to the
specifics, let’s review some broader considerations:
i) It’s a parody of sola
Scriptura to think sola Scriptura means we need direct biblical warrant for
whatever we do. Rather, Sola Scriptura means that we are obligated to believe
or do whatever Scripture requires, and obligated to disbelieve or refrain from
doing whatever is contrary to Scripture.
But there are many issues
where we have to use sanctified common sense.
ii) The argument from silence
is plausible in situations where, if something were the case, we’d expect it to
be mentioned. But the argument from silence has no forces in situations where
no reasonable expectation to that effect exists.
iii) A society has unwritten
rules as well as written rules. An unspoken understanding of social
expectations, based on cultural osmosis. Something you pick up through
observation.
Some things aren’t written
down because they are so obvious or familiar that everyone knows the score
without being told. For instance, the Bible doesn’t prohibit torturing children
for fun. That doesn’t mean it’s okay to torture children for fun.
iv) This also figures in
communication. Writers leave many things unsaid because they can rely on
cultural conventions.
v) Law typically deals with
frequent rather than infrequent behavior.
vi) Apropos (v), biblical law
is illustrative or paradigmatic rather than exhaustive. Biblical law doesn’t
spell out every possible contingency:
Modern societies generally have opted for exhaustive law codes. That is, every action modern society wishes to regulate or prohibit must be specifically mentioned in a separate law…By this approach, all actions are permitted that are not expressly forbidden or regulated. Thus it is not uncommon that criminals in modern Western societies to evade prosecution because of a “technicality” or a “loophole” in the law…Ancient laws didn’t work this way. They were paradigmatic, giving models of behaviors and models or prohibitions/punishments relative to those behaviors, but they made no attempt to be exhaustive. Ancient laws gave guiding principles, or samples, rather than complete descriptions of all things regulated. Ancient people were expected to be able to extrapolate from what the sampling of laws did say to the general behavior the laws in their totality pointed toward. Ancient judges were expected to extrapolate from the wording provided in the laws that did exist to all other circumstances and not be foiled in their jurisprudence by any such concepts as “technicalities” or “loopholes. When common sense told judges that a crime had been committed, they reasoned their way from whatever the most nearly applicable law specified to a decision as to how to administer proper justice in the case before them.
“Excursus: The Paradigmatic
Nature of Biblical Law,” D. Stuart, Exodus (Broadman 2006), 442-43.
The same reasoning applies to
NT household codes and other paraenetic material.
vii) Suppose a newlywed
discovers that her husband is a serial killer. He’s been married before. His
wives die in mysterious accidents. He collects their life insurance, changes
his identity, then remarries–repeating the cycle.
Even if this were valid
grounds for divorce, we wouldn’t expect the Bible to discuss it because this is
so unusual.
Jesus answers a question
about divorce (Mt 19:3), while Paul discusses divorce in relation to mixed
marriages (1 Cor 7). These are responses to specific questions or particular
situations. We know the grounds for divorce and remarriage in those cases
because a question was asked, or a particular situation in the NT churched
occasioned an explanation.
Scripture might be silent on
other grounds for the simple reason that there was no occasion to discuss other
grounds, given the needs of the immediate audience.
viii) Jesus had two
contrasting criticisms of the religious establishment. On the one hand, he
attacked the religious establishment for being too lax. It would invent
loopholes to evade God’s law.
On the other hand, he also
attacked the religious establishment for being too strict. It would woodenly
enforce the law without regard to the purpose of the law.
These might seem to be
contradictory criticisms, but they identify a common error: the religious
establishment didn’t take seriously the intent of the law.
Therefore, we can’t just play
it safe by sticking to the letter of the law. That might seem to be faithful,
but Jesus has taught us that this kind of superficial obedience can be the
opposite way of flouting the law.
Not all laws are equally
obligatory. Some laws are given for the sake of other laws. Sabbath-keeping
exists to promote human flourishing. But there are emergency situations where
keeping the Sabbath is detrimental to human flourishing.
ix) Both divine and human
intent are germane to genuine compliance. For instance, sacrifice offered
without right intention invalidates the offering (Hos 6:6; Mt 9:13; 12:7).
Likewise, some vows are
unlawful vows (Mt 15:1-9; Mk 7:1-13). By the same token, some vows could be
nullified (Num 30:5,8).
x) The Bible deploys a
fortiori arguments from analogy, viz.
15 Then the Lord answered him, “You hypocrites! Does not each of you on the Sabbath untie his ox or his donkey from the manger and lead it away to water it? 16 And ought not this woman, a daughter of Abraham whom Satan bound for eighteen years, be loosed from this bond on the Sabbath day?” (Lk 13:15-16).9 For it is written in the Law of Moses, “You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads out the grain.” Is it for oxen that God is concerned? 10 Does he not certainly speak for our sake? It was written for our sake, because the plowman should plow in hope and the thresher thresh in hope of sharing in the crop (1 Cor 9:9-10).
xi) In discussing divorce and
remarriage, Jesus grounds his position in the nature and purpose of marriage.
Therefore, that’s a relevant background factor when we consider possible
grounds for divorce.
At the same time, Jesus
response isn’t meant to be exhaustive. He’s discussing the issue in a Jewish
context, with reference to OT law and common law.
If we were to give a fuller
description of the nature and purpose of marriage in Scripture, that would
include the following:
a) Marriage is a covenant
b) To procreate the image of
God
c) To provide a unique kind
of companionship
d) To illustrate God’s
devotion to the redeemed
xii) For instance, suppose a
spouse enters into marriage with no intention of having kids. His intention not
to have kids defies (one of) God’s intention for instituting marriage in the
first place.
So that might be grounds for
divorce. The intentions of both the divine and human parties are germane to the
validity of the arrangement. If the human party makes a mockery of the
institution by contracting a marriage in defiance of God’s design for marriage,
one could argue that his marriage lacks divine authorization.
Likewise, suppose one party
deceives the other party, when he or she has no intention of having kids. That
might also be grounds for divorce. That would be a fraudulent agreement. By
analogy, if you lack right intention when you offer sacrifice, that invalidates
the sacrifice. Your hidden motives give the lie to your outward actions.
I’m not presenting a
full-blown argument for these two examples. I’m just giving two examples to
illustrate how one might argue grounds for divorce. Citing relevant
considerations.
xiii) In application to the
specific issue at hand:
a) Domestic violence is a
travesty of what marriage represents, in terms of companionship as well as the
emblematic significance of marriage (i.e. to illustrate God’s devotion to the
redeemed). It’s the antithesis of how marriage is supposed to function (e.g. Eph 5:22-33).
b) Breach of covenant can
nullify a covenant if one party fails to honor the terms of the covenant. And
this isn’t the case of a spouse who makes a good faith effort, but falls short
due to sin. Rather, this is acting in bad faith.
c) There is also an argument
from analogy. A battered slave could be manumitted (Exod 21:26-27). A fortiori,
a battered wife can divorce her husband. What’s true in the lesser case of a
slave is true in the greater case of a wife, for a wife has greater rights than
a slave.
As I’ve noted, scripture uses
a minore ad maius arguments.
xiv) My aim is not to present
a full-blown argument, but to show how we ought to frame the issue. The sorts
of factors relevant to considering grounds for divorce.
For what it's worth, the late Dr. Bahnsen had very similar argument based on essentially the same logic and exegesis: http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/pe058.htm
ReplyDeleteAs to (xiii)(c), what makes you think that a wife has greater rights than a slave?
ReplyDeleteWhere does the Bible ever speak of a woman divorcing her husband?
-TurretinFan
Turretinfan
Delete"As to (xiii)(c), what makes you think that a wife has greater rights than a slave?"
i) A wife has a higher social status than a slave. A slave enjoyed certain protections, but his condition was essentially punitive. In the case of a Hebrew slave, he was a debtor.
By contrast, marriage confers certain privileges (as well as responsibilities).
ii) In addition, a Jewish wife clearly had a higher social status than a foreign slave, just as members of the covenant community in general had rights (and responsibilities) which outsiders didn't.
"Where does the Bible ever speak of a woman divorcing her husband?"
i) That's misleading. For instance, in Mt 19:3, Jesus talks about a man divorcing his wife because that's how the question was phrased.
ii) In addition, the grounds for divorce (infidelity) would be applicable to husband and wife alike inasmuch as you can have faithful wives of faithless husbands as well as faithless wives of faithful husbands.
iii) In 1 Cor 7:15, Paul treats the grounds for divorce (desertion) as gender neutral.
Steve
DeleteAs to the first part)
i) Why do you think that greater social status is indicative of greater rights?
ii) Do you acknowledge that men (other things like wealth and family relation being equal) enjoyed greater social status than women?
iii) Isn't comparing a male slave to a wife an apples to oranges comparison, rather than a lesser to greater comparison?
As to the second part)
i) The question isn't misleading (more on that below). Matthew 19:3 isn't the only passage talking about divorce. So, it's irrelevant whether one passage or another happens to deal with the issue I've identified.
ii) "Infidelity" in these kinds of discussions is often a euphemism for adultery. I assume you're using it that way. And, of course, both men and women can be guilty of adultery. But that wasn't the question.
iii) In 1 Corinthians 7 Paul addresses the issue of the attempted desertion of a believing spouse by an unbelieving spouse. You are right that a kind of gender neutrality is maintained. Neither a Christian man nor a Christian woman is to prevent the desertion of the unbelieving spouse. You should notice, however, that divorce is not mentioned. May I encourage you to re-read the context of the verse you quoted, and you will see the contrast between men divorcing and women leaving.
-TurretinFan
iii) Isn't comparing a male slave to a wife an apples to oranges comparison, rather than a lesser to greater comparison?
DeleteI imagine Steve has his own defense in mind, but this seems to deal somewhat clearly, given the statements Steve made directly above his argument, with degrees of obligation. Both are bound to social agreements.
If you wanted to make an objection, it would have to be along the lines of the debtor/master relationship being "easier" (as it were) to break than the marriage covenant, since the latter is more valuable, serious, carries more theological import/symbolism, or some such thing. (I'm not endorsing this line of argument, but I can't see many other workable objections here.) Here, I suppose, it could be said that the marriage partners should be willing to endure more given the superior nature of the bond to debtor/master.
"I imagine Steve has his own defense in mind, but this seems to deal somewhat clearly, given the statements Steve made directly above his argument, with degrees of obligation. Both are bound to social agreements."
DeleteBut slavery isn't a greater degree of the same kinds of obligations as marriage, so I assume Steve wouldn't use that defense. Both apples and oranges are fruit, but that doesn't really address the objection.
"If you wanted to make an objection, it would have to be ... "
a) You'll have to allow me to make my own objections, brother.
b) The argument was premised on the idea that slave is the lesser to wife being the greater. But that is not a premise I'm willing to accept without some reason.
c) And, of course, while my request for a reason is in a sense an objection, it's a request the opens the door to explanation - just asking for the reason doesn't defeat the argument.
" ... along the lines of the debtor/master relationship being "easier" (as it were) to break than the marriage covenant, since the latter is more valuable, serious, carries more theological import/symbolism, or some such thing. (I'm not endorsing this line of argument, ..."
a) I'm not sure what it is you don't endorse about this (and I'm a little scared to ask).
b) I don't adopt the argument you're making here either, but probably for different reasons.
" ... but I can't see many other workable objections here.)"
But I actually see a number of other workable objections, including some that I haven't introduced. But the bigger question is why we should grant the lesser-greater premise. If we have no good reason to accept that premise, then the rest of the argument is moot.
"Here, I suppose, it could be said that the marriage partners should be willing to endure more given the superior nature of the bond to debtor/master."
My objections are a lot more fundamental than that, but I certainly agree that spouses (not "marriage partners"), especially husbands, ought to be willing to sacrifice themselves to the point of death for their wives. The master/slave relationship is not like that. On the other hand, the moral obligations of husbands and wives are not the same thing as their legal obligation. It's easy to conflate the two, since there is an interrelation.
-TurretinFan
But slavery isn't a greater degree of the same kinds of obligations as marriage, so I assume Steve wouldn't use that defense. Both apples and oranges are fruit, but that doesn't really address the objection.
DeleteHonestly, your objection isn't really clear. You think they are different. But in what specific sense and how does that connect to the relationship on the table? Perhaps I just haven't had enough coffee today, but I don't see you addressing the connection Steve raised in a way that can move the analysis of the argument forward.
Here's how I understand a potential defense of the argument:
The stipulated relationship is across bond agreements and the rights of the aggrieved to break bonds. I imagine there is a more technically and philosophically rigorous definition, but crudely, a bond is a relationship entered willingly between two people which can be broken under certain conditions.
Under this definition, master/debtor and husband/wife are both bonds, for there are conditions under which these bonds can be broken and they are entered voluntarily (albeit mostly under some measure of external pressure).
Bonds were created to maintain or increase human flourishing. From this point it can be observed that the rights of a wife to acts conducive to human flourishing from her husband are greater than the rights of a debtor to human flourishing from a master.
One critical difference here is the debt and the need for it to be paid by the debtor, which (initially) constrains many aspects of human flourishing, whereas many of the obligations of the wife are inherent to and conducive to human flourishing. Due to the nature of their obligations, the wife can expect more from a husband than a debtor can from his master.
You can also add to this the broad social standing of a wife as compared with a debtor. From what we know about the ANE, wives have more rights than a debtor.
As another point, marriage in the ANE was often arranged between husband and wife and further entrenched in a set of social and legal obligations to the system of patriarchy. This strikes me more like a debtor/master relationship than not, especially given the inherent inferiority of all persons, most certainly including women, to the eldest son in a patriarchal structure. Women were often functionally in servitude to this system.
If a debtor can break his bond with a master because of a physical beating, so too can a wife break her bond with a husband because of a physical beating.
So that's how I see the argument with several additional lines of defense. Obviously Steve has no obligation to defend my formulation, and he is free to critique, reject and/or otherwise dismiss any or all of it. But perhaps now you can explain in more detail your objection(s).
a) You'll have to allow me to make my own objections, brother....a) I'm not sure what it is you don't endorse about this (and I'm a little scared to ask)... (not "marriage partners")
As if I were restraining you somehow! I'm explaining how I see the situation and potential lines of attack. You're welcome to elucidate your fundamental objections if you think they would go along another route and are more fruitful. In fact, I think that would be highly interesting.
This isn't a courtroom, and I'm not some Catholic epologist who wants to unsuitably frame the debate so I can win it before it occurs. You don't need to cast about, sensationalizing the possibilities of whatever it is you think my position entails or taking exceptions to terminology that strike as pedantic rather than critical.
"If a debtor can break his bond with a master because of a physical beating, so too can a wife break her bond with a husband because of a physical beating."
DeleteI doubt I'll continue this discussion here (perhaps I'll post a more systematic response to my own blog), but I wanted to illustrate my point about additional objections. Even if I agreed with your premise that marriage is a degree of bondage on a spectrum with slavery (I don't), there are still two problems with your argument.
1) The slave is not "permitted to break his bond" but rather is granted freedom in lieu of the redeemable eye-for-eye, tooth-for-tooth justice that a free man would have. The passage states:
Exodus 21:26-27
And if a man smite the eye of his servant, or the eye of his maid, that it perish; he shall let him go free for his eye's sake. And if he smite out his manservant's tooth, or his maidservant's tooth; he shall let him go free for his tooth's sake.
2) Physical beating did not grant the servant his freedom.
Exodus 21:20-21
And if a man smite his servant, or his maid, with a rod, and he die under his hand; he shall be surely punished. Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished: for he is his money.
-TurretinFan
Turretinfan
Delete"Physical beating did not grant the servant his freedom."
i) As Matthew explains, that objection overlooks the a fortiori nature of my argument. An a fortiori argument (in which case, of the a minore ad maius variety) involves an element of disanalogy as well as analogy. To point out that the two cases aren't identical misses the point, since an a fortiori argument requires a degree of dissimilarity.
ii) In addition, under OT law a master had the right to physically discipline a slave. So TFan's objection would only work if a husband had the right to physically discipline his wife. Absent that, Exod 21:20-21 is inapplicable to the case at hand.
Turretinfan:
Delete"The slave is not 'permitted to break his bond' but rather is granted freedom in lieu of the redeemable eye-for-eye, tooth-for-tooth justice that a free man would have."
Suppose we grant that distinction for the sake of argument. Instead of saying a battered wife as the right to divorce her husband, it would mean her husband is required to divorce his wife. What's the practical difference?
Remember that my argument was about the *grounds* for divorce. My argument isn't premised on the assumption that a battered wife has the right to divorce her husband (although I think she does, in fact, have that right). It's sufficient for my argument that physical abuse is grounds for divorce. If you cash that out in terms of the husband's obligation rather than the wife's right, the underlying argument still goes through.
Turretinfan
Delete"But slavery isn't a greater degree of the same kinds of obligations as marriage, so I assume Steve wouldn't use that defense. Both apples and oranges are fruit, but that doesn't really address the objection."
Several problems with that objection:
i) TFan hasn't shown how marital obligations are different in kind from slavish obligations.
ii) Even assuming that they are different in kind, TFan hasn't shown how that's relevant to the comparison.
iii) Two things can be similar or identical at a higher level of generality, but dissimilar at a lower level of generality. TFan needs to show why specific differences vitiate the comparison. He needs to demonstrate that my comparison operates at the wrong level of abstraction.
iv) I wonder how his objections would cut against a fortiori arguments in Scripture, viz. Lk 13:15-16; 1 Cor 9:9-10. Are these the same *kinds* of things? They are clearly different in kind in *some* respects.
v) As a matter of fact, apples and oranges are comparable in many respects.
1) The slave is not "permitted to break his bond" but rather is granted freedom
ReplyDeleteWhat is the functional difference? The bond is broken.
2) Physical beating did not grant the servant his freedom.
Physical beatings that left permanent damage did. Here is where the wife as greater than the debtor plays into the argument. At the very least she would have the same rights as a debtor. More likely, she would have more rights, and it would take less physical violence to allow a breaking of her bond to her husband.
Turretinfan
ReplyDelete"On the other hand, the moral obligations of husbands and wives are not the same thing as their legal obligation. It's easy to conflate the two, since there is an interrelation."
Now you seem to be saying the obligations could be comparable at a legal level, but not at a moral level. Legally of a kind, not morally of a kind. Yet you also say the two different kinds are "interrelated."
These qualifications greatly complicate the nature of your objection.
Apparently you'd have to admit that even though the marital/slavish obligation is the same kind of obligation in one respect, that's not the right kind of obligation to carry the a fortiori argument.
Keep in mind that TFan is concentrated all his fire on just one of my arguments for the permissibility of divorce in case of domestic violence.
ReplyDelete"An a fortiori argument (in which case, of the a minore ad maius variety) involves an element of disanalogy as well as analogy. To point out that the two cases aren't identical misses the point, since an a fortiori argument requires a degree of dissimilarity."
ReplyDeleteThis kind of response misses the point of the objection to the a fortiori. The fact that a 6 oz. stone is greater in weight than a 4 oz. loaf of bread doesn't mean that if a hungry child is satisfied with a 4 oz. loaf of bread, he'll certainly be satisfied with the 6 oz. stone.
Both stone and loaf of bread may be in the category of "givable roundish things," but that still doesn't mean that the argument works.
-TurretinFan
Turretinfan
Delete"This kind of response misses the point of the objection to the a fortiori. The fact that a 6 oz. stone is greater in weight than a 4 oz. loaf of bread doesn't mean that if a hungry child is satisfied with a 4 oz. loaf of bread, he'll certainly be satisfied with the 6 oz. stone. Both stone and loaf of bread may be in the category of 'givable roundish things,' but that still doesn't mean that the argument works."
That comparison is just an abstraction. You have yet to show that my a fortiori argument is fallacious. Why think your illustration has any bearing on my actual argument?
"That comparison is just an abstraction."
ReplyDeleteRight. It's an illustration.
"You have yet to show that my a fortiori argument is fallacious."
The primary objection to your argument was and is that you haven't demonstrated that it qualifies as a legitimate case for application of a fortiori. Once I raise the objection, the burden falls on you to demonstrate that it qualifies, not on me to somehow prove that it does not.
"Why think your illustration has any bearing on my actual argument?"
The illustration is just an illustration to help you see why your argument is not buttressed simply by identifying any way in which A is greater than B. You need more than that.
The objection could be briefly expressed this way: the argument you are using requires comparing two things that lie at different points on a single spectrum, with the second thing on the same side but farther from the dividing line that divides the spectrum; however, you haven't established either that the two things are on the same spectrum or that the second thing is farther away from the dividing line that divides the spectrum.
More specifically, your argument seems to rely on the following premises (my objections in parenthesis):
1) A wife has greater rights than a slave (a. the evidence you provide is actually explicitly the opposite - the slave has an explicit right never given to wives; b. "rights" are an anachronistic framework in which to interpret OT law or its NT explication, "legal protections" would be a better framework).
2) Wives have greater social status and grater social status implies greater rights (a. this isn't actually a Scriptural teaching; b. male slaves had greater social status than female slaves, but had equal legal protection under the cited provision; c. in general, where the law provided different legal protection based on social status, the law provided more legal protection for those with lower social status, example, the wife who was also a slave had more legal protection than a normal wife)
3) freedom from slavery is so closely analogous to freedom from marriage that if something warrants one kind of freedom it warrants the other (but obviously no one thinks that slave owners were bound by the law to permit unbelieving slaves to leave, nor does anyone think that adultery on the part of the master gave the slave freedom, nor did the death of the master free the slaves - if none of the things that explicitly justify liberation from marriage justify liberation from slavery, why should we think that anything that justifies liberation from slavery justifies liberation from marriage?)
-TurretinFan
There are many who would allow divorce for abandonment (that cannot be remedied by the church or civil magistrate) while not allowing divorce for domestic violence. Such thinking I find legalistic. I find it equally legalistic not to allow for divorce when abandonment has taken place while under the same roof. Concerning the latter, isn’t abandonment possible while living under the same roof? Hasn’t a man who refuses to speak to his wife after having been confronted and disciplined by the church abandoned her? How about a man who makes it a point never to see his wife while living in a 56,000 square foot home? If abandonment is possible given such a large living space, then simply scale the space back one square foot at a time and state when living space may no longer enter into the equation. No, we must say that abandonment need not be a function of physical proximity. Regarding domestic violence, if one spouse must leave the other for physical protection (for instance, to preserve innocent life according to Scripture), the result would seem to equate to abandonment. But the sin of abandonment would have to be indexed to the one who caused the separation lest the wrong party would be found guilty. There are other weighty matters as well, for instance a willful crime that calls for a man to serve prison time for many years.
ReplyDelete