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Wednesday, May 02, 2012

Sermonizing on the Sermon on the Mount

A friend recently asked my advice about a sermon series he’s planning to do on the Sermon on the Mount. Here’s what I said:

1) One problem is that many Christians interpret the Sermon on the Mount the way the Amish do. Based on that interpretation, they view the Sermon as hopelessly unrealistic. That creates a dilemma.

2) I think one of the errors of the Amish interpretation is a failure to make allowance for the amount of hyperbole in the Sermon. A number of the injunctions are unrealistic because they are hyperbolic. They were never meant to be realistic. Jesus employs rhetorical overstatement for shock value or graphic effect.

That doesn’t mean we disregard them. Rather, we distinguish between the core teaching and the hyperbole.

3) Then there’s the thorny question of how to relate 5:17-20, which seems to teach absolute continuity between OT and NT ethics, to the succeeding antitheses, which seem to teach abrupt discontinuity. I think the relationship is twofold:

i) On the one hand there’s a contrast between Jesus and the Pharisees. Put another way, there’s a contrast between the written Torah (or written law) and the oral Torah (or oral law).

The oral Torah was the common law or tradition of judicial precedent. This involves both interpreting the Mosaic law and applying the Mosaic law.

There’s nothing inherently wrong with that. It’s inevitable that when Jewish judges had to try cases, they had to interpret the law and apply the law to the case at hand.

However, Jesus objects to the oral Torah on two or three grounds:

a) The oral Torah often evaded the Mosaic law by attempting to create loopholes.

b) The oral Torah often subverted the Mosaic law by ignoring the underlying rationale for various provisions. Mindless, mechanical enforcement of the law which disregarded legal intent. Failure to distinguish between ends and means, higher and lower obligations. Failure to distinguish between laws of utility and laws of morality.

c) In sum, the oral Torah came to displace the written Torah. Man-made regulations became a substitute for obeying God’s law. Indeed, Jesus accuses the Pharisees of breaking the law. They nullify the law through their traditions.

ii) On the other hand, there’s also a contrast between Jesus and Moses. Jesus is the new and greater Moses. Christians follow Jesus rather than Moses. Or to nuance that, Christians follow Moses through Jesus. The antitype surpasses the type. And Jesus, rather than the Pharisees, is the true interpreter of the Mosaic law.

4) There’s also the question of how Jesus “fulfills” the law. This isn’t derivable from the meaning of the Greek verb alone, but from the concept of fulfillment in the Gospel of Matthew. In principle, Jesus could fulfill the law in one of two ways:

i) Fulfill in the sense of annulling or abrogating the law. Replacing the law. When Jesus comes, the law comes to an end.

ii) Fulfill in the sense of the law achieving its intended or appointed goal. Of course, that, of itself, doesn’t tell you what the goal is.

5) Apropos (4), I don’t think Christ’s fulfillment of the law has a uniform sense in Matthew. That varies according to the context.

i) Given Matthew’s prophetic/typological scheme, it would be counterproductive to present Jesus as a lawbreaker. There must be some basic continuity for Jesus to be the realization of what the law pointed to.

ii) On the other hand, there are some laws, like the Mosaic cultus, that terminate in the person and work of Christ. Like shadows that foreshadow the rising sun. Once the sun is risen, the sunlight drives the shadows away.

iii) There’s some carryover between OT ethics and NT ethics. That goes to the point that much of what Jesus says is directed at the oral Torah rather than the written Torah.

Turning to a few specifics:

6) 5:38-39 are not about self-defense, but honor/shame. How should we respond when someone disrespects us by a backhanded slap? We should let it slide. Not take ourselves too seriously.

7) 5:40-48. I think this articulates a common grace principle. All things being equal, we should treat people better than they deserve. Conversely, there are times when we should allow ourselves to be wronged. Resist the natural impulse to get even–trusting in God’s eschatological justice to right the scales.

Keep in mind that this is about individuals. But we also have an obligation to protect and provide for our dependents.

Loving our enemies is not our only social obligation in Scripture. We also have a duty to love our spouse, parents, children, friends, and neighbors.

Not all obligations are equally obligatory. Not all obligations are simultaneously consistent. Sometimes one takes precedence over another.

8) 6:12,14-16. I think this implicitly teaches conditional rather than unconditional forgiveness. God doesn’t forgive impenitent unbelievers. Rather, God forgives penitent believers.

By analogy, our obligation is to forgive penitent believers, not impenitent unbelievers–or even impenitent believers. That’s made more explicit in passages like Mt 18:15-35.

God is often merciful to unbelievers, and by analogy, we should normally be merciful to unbelievers. There is, however, a difference between mercy and forgiveness.

This doesn’t necessarily mean we can’t forgive impenitents or unbelievers. Just that we don’t have a duty to do so. Likewise, unconditional forgiveness can let offenders off the hook too easily. That may harden them.  They never suffer the consequences of their misdeeds–until it’s too late.

9) 7:1 doesn’t forbid judging others. Rather, it forbids hypocritical censoriousness. We shouldn’t judge others while we exempt ourselves.

10) 7:7-12 is an encouragement to prayer, not a guarantee that we will get whatever we ask for.

11) 5:27-28. In his revised commentary on Matthew, D. A. Carson challenges the conventional rendering. He argues that the prohibition doesn’t concern lusting after others, but enticing others to lust after you. Seduction.

Even if we reject his interpretation, the passage is about adulterous lust.

18 comments:

  1. "Sermonizing on the Sermon on the Mount"

    Much thanks and appreciation for your sermonizing, Steve.

    I've read Bonhoeffer's sermonizing on the Sermon on the Mount, and yours is quite invaluable.

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  2. "ii) On the other hand, there are some laws, like the Mosaic cultus, that terminate in the person and work of Christ. Like shadows that foreshadow the rising sun. Once the sun is risen, the sunlight drives the shadows away"

    Hello Steve,

    I'm curious about your take on this. Usually the norm is to say that Christ fulfilled those ceremonial aspects that the mosaic law pointed to, such as the passover, the sacrifices, the high priesthood, etc. And elsewhere it's supposed that a Christian's separation from the world fulfills the Jewish rites that separated them from the other nations, like the kosher diet, circumcision, and so on.

    So I'm wondering how you would harmonize these ideas (if you would harmonize them at all) with passage that say that these laws or practices are "forever", or "eternal", such as Exodus 12:17; 29:9; Leviticus 7:36; Jeremiah 33:18, and - depending on whether you're a sabbatarian or not - Exodus 31:16-17.

    So if these things are fulfilled in Christ (or the Christian life), it seems that these practices could still, in a way, be said to be "forever". But if they are simply abrogated or annulled, then the problem seems a bit trickier. What are your thoughts?

    Also, on a completely tangential note - DA Carson and AW Pink both have commentaries on the Sermon on the Mount - do you know if anyone has done a decent commentary on the Decalogue?

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  3. Mathetes,

    i) I think "forever and ever" language is sometimes a stereotypical formula, like liturgical refrains. But that depends on the genre.

    ii) Even in the OT, before we get to the NT (e.g. Hebrews), the fulfillment of the priesthood is embodied in the person of the Messiah (Ps 110:4; Zech 3:8; 6:9-13).

    iii) I think the duration of covenantal injunctions is indexed to the duration of the covenant itself. As long as the covenant remains in force, the injunctions remain in force for the duration of the covenant.

    In principle some covenantal injunctions could be temporary. Take a contract with deadlines. There may be a series of deadlines. The deadlines are temporary. Once you complete one deadline, there's another deadline. The contract itself doesn't expire when a particular deadline expires. If, on the other hand, the contract expires, then all of the contractual deadlines automatically expire.

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  4. In general, the best commentaries on the Decalogue aren't independent, stand-alone commentaries on the Decalogue itself, but commentaries on Exodus and Deuteronomy, which exegete the Decalogue–among other things.

    In theory, you could borrow some good commentaries on Exodus/Deuteronomy (e.g. Currid, Hamilton, Stuart) via interlibrary loan, then scan or photocopy the sections on the Decalogue.

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  5. "Even if we reject his interpretation, the passage is about adulterous lust."

    Your point being? Deliberate lust, when the subject or object or both are married, is adultery in the heart. By analogy, deliberate lust when both are unmarried is fornication in the heart. Deliberate desire for any sin is that sin in the heart.

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  6. Ben Douglass said:

    "Your point being? Deliberate lust, when the subject or object or both are married, is adultery in the heart. By analogy, deliberate lust when both are unmarried is fornication in the heart. Deliberate desire for any sin is that sin in the heart."

    1. "Deliberate" means it's conscious and intentional.

    2. "Desire" doesn't have to mean "lust." "Desire" could simply mean to "want" an object. Like I want or desire a glass of water because I'm thirsty. What's wrong with that?

    3. What you say assumes "desire" is always wrong. But why should that be? How is it wrong for me to consciously and intentionally want to drink a glass of water because I'm thirsty?

    4. As such, what you say assumes a conscious and intentional want for a man or woman (of the opposite sex) is "sin in the heart." Or to put it another way, would you say it's wrong for a young man to consciously and intentionally want to ask out a young woman for a cup of coffee or lunch or something like that?

    5. Also, I don't see how your statement about the married is analogous to your statement about the unmarried. In fact, the state of being "married" vs. being "unmarried" would be entirely disanalogous.

    Likewise "adultery" and "fornication." I could agree both adultery and fornication are in and of themselves quite wrong. But they're certainly not analogous. Or better yet they certainly don't make the two statements or situations analogous to one another.

    In any case, if the unmarried are forbidden to consciously and intentionally desire or want a member of the opposite sex, then this would seem to imply marriages should be entered into solely platonically. It'd seem there'd be no room for any sort of romantic love prior to marriage.

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  7. It'd seem there'd be no room for any sort of romantic love prior to marriage.

    Here here. In fact, it goes a step further. Most people who forbid the whole "single person having sexual thoughts for another single person" would, if pushed to their logical conclusion, would have to retain a purely platonic relationship even AFTER marriage. It's pretty screwed up stuff.

    Oh, BTW: Thanks for the post, Steve.

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  8. "What you say assumes 'desire' is always wrong."

    What comment did you read? "Deliberate desire for any sin is that sin in the heart."

    There's nothing wrong with desiring, prior to marriage, sexual union with one's partner after marriage. What's wrong is jumping the gun, which includes, not only physical fornication, but also taking venereal pleasure from looks or thoughts, i.e., fornication in the heart.

    "I don't see how your statement about the married is analogous to your statement about the unmarried."

    The analogy is that, if desiring sin X involves one in the guilt of sin X, then desiring sin Y involves one in the guilt of sin Y.

    Steve,

    Your post suffers on account of its missing the concept of "counsels of perfection."

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  9. Ben Douglass said:

    "What comment did you read? 'Deliberate desire for any sin is that sin in the heart.'"

    1. So how did you define "sin"? You equated deliberate lust with deliberate desire and deliberate desire for another person (presumably of the opposite sex) with sin (e.g. "fornication in the heart"). As such, this assumes what you need to prove, that is, that "deliberate lust when both are unmarried is fornication in the heart."

    2. Also, as I alluded to above, terms like "deliberate lust" and "deliberate desire" can be quite loaded. Such terms need to be unpacked.

    "There's nothing wrong with desiring, prior to marriage, sexual union with one's partner after marriage. What's wrong is jumping the gun, which includes, not only physical fornication, but also taking venereal pleasure from looks or thoughts, i.e., fornication in the heart."

    1. You're backpedaling from your original contention. This isn't what you originally stated. At best, you're adding a qualifier or proviso to your original argument.

    2. I never said "physical fornication" wasn't wrong.

    3. You're still casting the issue in loaded terms like "venereal pleasure."

    4. Your previous phrase, "deliberate lust when both are unmarried," could have reasonably been taken to include both "venereal pleasure" as well as "desiring, prior to marriage, sexual union with one's partner after marriage."

    5. More to the point, where exactly would you draw the line between "venereal pleasure" and "desiring, prior to marriage, sexual union with one's partner after marriage"?

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  10. "The analogy is that, if desiring sin X involves one in the guilt of sin X, then desiring sin Y involves one in the guilt of sin Y."

    1. There are several problematic elements. First, whether the first and/or second halves of your if-then conditional statement are true.

    Likewise, whether the first and second halves of the if-then conditional are necessarily even related in an if-then fashion in the first place. For example, it's possible the first half is true but the second half is false. Or it's possible both halves are true but the second half doesn't absolutely have to follow from the first. In fact, whether what you say is even an analogy since, for instance, you don't relate x and y to one another (e.g. x is like y). The two could simply be unrelated independent variables.

    Moreoever, whether you're begging the question.

    2. Let's try to tease this out. Let's take an example where sin x = "deliberate lust, when the subject or object or both are married" and sin y = "deliberate lust when both are unmarried." By your logic, if a married man desiring a married woman involves one in the guilt of adulterous desire, then an unmarried man desiring an unmarried woman involves one in the guilt of fornicatory desire.

    One problem with your argument is it assumes what it needs to prove, i.e., that desire between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman is wrong, that it's "fornication in the heart." Let's agree for the sake of argument that, generally speaking, desiring to sin involves guilt. If you desire to murder a man or rape a woman, even if you don't actually carry out the act, nevertheless in God's eyes, you're still culpable for your desire to murder or rape to some degree. However, none of this tells us much about our specific case, whether "deliberate lust when both are unmarried is fornication in the heart." You just assume "deliberate lust" or "deliberate desire" "when both are unmarried" is wrong.

    Another problem is it relates the two sins in an if-then conditional but the two aren't necessarily so related. They could each be wrong on their own terms, perhaps, but unrelated in an if-then fashion to one another. It could be wrong (arguendo) for a married man to desire a married woman, it could be wrong (arguendo) for an unmarried man to desire an unmarried woman, but how does the latter follow from the former in an if-then fashion?

    Furthermore, just because the first half may be true doesn't necessarily mean the second half must be true. Just because it might be true (arguendo) that a married man desiring a married woman is adulterous lust doesn't necessarily mean an unmarried man desiring an unmarried woman is fornicatory desire or "fornication in the heart." Again, this assumes what it needs to prove.

    3. Anyway, bottom line, your argument is essentially an exercise in circular reasoning. You assume an unmarried man desiring an unmarried woman is sinful because it involves illicit desire, which begs the question.

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  11. "Your post suffers on account of its missing the concept of 'counsels of perfection.'"

    1. For one thing, this assumes "counsels of perfection" is taught in the passage.

    2. If not, why should Steve's post be judged in light of (Catholic) notions like "counsels of perfection"?

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  12. BEN DOUGLASS SAID:

    "Your post suffers on account of its missing the concept of "counsels of perfection."

    My post answered a question about the Sermon on the Mount. Traditional prooftexts for the "counsels of perfection" don't come from the Sermon on the Mount. Rather, they are taken from the Catholic interpretation of passages like Mt, 16:24; 19:10-12; 16-21,27; I Cor, 7:25-35, 37-38, 40.

    I've already discussed the Catholic prooftexts:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2012/02/little-is-much-when-god-is-in-it.html#4576436406220106567

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2012/02/little-is-much-when-god-is-in-it.html#2980463450165945302

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  13. Ben Douglass said...

    "Your point being? Deliberate lust, when the subject or object or both are married, is adultery in the heart. By analogy, deliberate lust when both are unmarried is fornication in the heart. Deliberate desire for any sin is that sin in the heart."

    i) My point being: we need to respect what the passage is actually referring to, and not make it say something it doesn't.

    ii) We also have to define "lust" in Biblical terms. Too many readers begin with popular connotations of the word, which is something they bring to the text (from personal experience). That's not exegesis.

    iii) I agree with John Frame's definition: "Lust is specifically the desire to break God's law in sexual matters."

    That's a good starting-point. We must then consider what falls under that general definition.

    iv) Whether 5:27-28 means lusting after another is not a given. As I pointed out, Carson challenges that rendering. So we have to evaluate competing interpretations.

    v) In adultery, one or both parties belong to someone else. They've given themselves to someone else. They are answered for.

    The situation of two singles is fundamentally different in that respect. As such, they enjoy a greater degree of freedom. There is no alienation of affections.

    vi) The Bible itself sometimes appeals to the sexual imagination of the reader. The Song of Solomon is an extended example, although there are other instances in Scripture. As such, it's not ipso facto "fornication of the heart" for a single man to fantasize about a single woman, or vice versa.

    And that's even assuming 5:27-28 refers to lusting after another, which is not something we can take for granted.

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  14. Historically, the church of Rome has turned a blind eye to royal harems. To Catholic monarchs with a bevy of mistresses. So there's this weird continuum from extreme license to extreme scrupulosity. From chaste nuns to regal courtesans.

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  15. Catholic commentators use the concept of "counsels of perfection" to explain the admonitions to "turn the other cheek" and "give him your cloak as well." They acknowledge that it is good and praiseworthy, though not obligatory, to fulfill these admonitions literally. Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount will be impoverished in so far as the interpreter fails to recognize that it is beautiful and practical to actually do what Jesus advises.

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  16. Ben Douglass said:

    "Catholic commentators use the concept of 'counsels of perfection' to explain the admonitions to 'turn the other cheek' and 'give him your cloak as well.' They acknowledge that it is good and praiseworthy, though not obligatory, to fulfill these admonitions literally."

    1. This assumes without argument that the Catholic interpretation of the relevant passages is correct (e.g. Mt 19:12, Mt 19:21, 1 Cor 7).

    2. This assumes without argument that there's sufficient justification to use the relevant passages to explain what's taught in the Sermon on the Mount.

    3. With regard to counsels of perfection, Steve has further responses here and here.

    4. By the way, here is another interpretation of one of the relevant passages.

    "Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount will be impoverished in so far as the interpreter fails to recognize that it is beautiful and practical to actually do what Jesus advises."

    1. This assumes without argument Jesus advises those who would be "perfect" to follow the "counsels of perfection." This assumes without argument Jesus advises those who would be "perfect" to take vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity.

    2. On a practical note, the vow of obedience (to take one example) is only as good as the superior whom one obeys. Sure, there are meant to be limitations on one's obligation to one's superior. And Vatican II and many other reforms have supposedly cleaned up the situation. But there's still room for quite a lot of manipulation and abuse (e.g. here).

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  17. BEN DOUGLASS SAID:

    "Catholic commentators use the concept of 'counsels of perfection' to explain the admonitions to 'turn the other cheek' and 'give him your cloak as well.' They acknowledge that it is good and praiseworthy, though not obligatory, to fulfill these admonitions literally. Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount will be impoverished in so far as the interpreter fails to recognize that it is beautiful and practical to actually do what Jesus advises."

    i) We're obligated to do whatever Jesus commands. Whatever the Sermon actually means, that's a universal obligation on all Christians. A command is not "advice."

    ii) Conversely, it's not beautiful, praiseworthy, or good to literally and actually do what he says if that's contrary to Christ's intent.

    We have a duty to ascertain what Jesus meant. That's the job of the interpreter. Pursuant to that, we also have a duty to obey what Jesus meant.

    This is not an exercise in play-acting.

    iii) The point of my post was to briefly show that the Sermon is not a Pollyannaish, airy-fairy ideal which has no real-world application, not a hopeless ideal that we can't even approximate–which would be futile to aim for. Rather, it's a practical code of conduct. Once you take the hyperbole into account, and understand what it really means, then this is a realistic social ethic for Christians.

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