JD WALTERS SAID:
The model put forward by Gregory Boyd in his article in ‘Divine Providence: Five Views’ envisions a process where libertarianly free choices accumulate and solidify into a character that becomes increasingly fixed over time.
One problem with that claim is that you’re doing theology by stipulation rather than revelation–or even reason. Boyd can postulate that position, but why should I believe that his position is true?
It’s like the difference between the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. To parry the logical problem of evil, we only need to come up with an answer that’s logically possible or logically consistent. It doesn’t have to be true, or even plausible. But that’s not an adequate theodicy.
Likewise, even if Boyd’s position is logically possible or logically consistent, that doesn’t create any presumption that it’s true, or probably true.
There are far more possibilities than actualities. Most possibilities are unexemplified. Many theories chasing a few facts.
Habits to character to destiny. The freewill model is not one where libertarianly free agents are constantly making spontaneous, unpredictable decisions. The initial spontaneity gives way to increasingly fixed patterns of behavior that evidence a distinct character. So there is a point of no return for all human agents, beyond which they are firmly fixed on a trajectory that either takes them to ultimate conformity to the image of God in Christ, or to final, irreversible depravity.
i) That’s not required by a theory of libertarian freedom. Rather, that’s required by your theological construct. But what requires your theological construct?
ii) It also fails to distinguish libertarianism from Calvinism. What you’re actually giving us is a theory of character-determinism. But that doesn’t single out libertarian freewill. Indeed, character-determinism is Derk Pereboom’s model of hard incompatibilism.
iii) Even if we grant your theory of character-determinism for the sake of argument, the cut-off is still arbitrary. People die at different times. Their character development is at different stages when they die. Yet the Palingenesis doesn’t occur at different times. Much less is the Palingenesis synchronized with when people die.
According to your theory, everyone naturally arrives at a fixed character just in time for the Palingenesis. But that’s ad hoc. There’s no reason to think everyone’s character development is synchronized to that degree. Indeed, if character development is a natural process, there’s every reason to think it’s different for each individual.
iv) Moreover, there’s no reason to think a natural process of character development is irreversible. Or even if it’s irreversible, there’s no reason to think behavior has become so reflexive that someone could never again succumb to temptation. You can’t extrapolate from libertarian freewill to a universal pattern.
You say “there’s a point of no return” because that’s what your theological construct requires, and not because there’s any independent reason to think character development is that stereotypical.
No, we maintain the freedom no matter what we choose. But we do need to understand that the consequences of not doing things his way are severe.
So why give us freedom to choose more than one option, then punish us for choosing more than one option?
It is illegitimate to bring in associations from the more popular meanings of the word.
Except that his game theoretical model of providence seems very Pelagian.
I still don't see how you can make that comparison. Rhoda's God responds to his people with blessings if they obey and punishment if they disobey, but is much more inclined toward mercy and blessing than punishment. For their own sake, he would much rather the people returned and found their true happiness in him. How does any of that conjure up Damien?
I’ve explained that to you. You’re just pretending not to understand because you’re so invested in freewill theism.
Go back and reread what I said about the kind of God that emerges from Scripture according to neotheist hermeneutics. You’re being very selective and one-sided about what part of that you cite.
Rhoda does not swallow the exegesis and hermeneutics of Sanders, et al. wholesale. Aren't you the one who's always cautioning that just because you approvingly quote an author on one point, that doesn't mean you put a rubber stamp on everything they say?
Rhoda hasn’t given us his own exegesis or counterexegesis. He defaulted to Sanders et al. So that’s all I have to go by.
In any case, I have a hard time associating the wise, patient, infinitely loving, resourceful God who emerges from the descriptions of open theists with your description.
i) Of course open theists aren’t going to compare their God to Damien or Trelane. They will try to put the best face on their view of God. Play up the positives and downplay the negatives.
ii) But on a consistent neotheist reading of Scripture, God has limited wisdom. God is still learning how to be God. How to deal with people. On-the-job-training. Trial-and-error.
Rhoda’s God isn’t consistently patient. Indeed, he’s often impatient. Rhoda’s God isn’t “infinitely loving.” Rather, he’s loving when he happens to be in a good mood, but if you catch him when he’s out of sorts, you better duck and keep your head down. He’s “resourceful” in the sense that he’s having to make things up as he goes along. Just like the Greek demigods (e.g. Hercules, Perseus) were resourceful, or Jason Bourne. Indeed, Bourne is more resourceful than the neotheist God.
Rhoda isn’t getting a God with “exhaustive contingency plans” from a neotheist reading of Scripture, but from his philosophical theology. The neotheist God of Scripture isn’t very good at thinking on his feet. Indeed, he needs human beings to give him advice. Help him out of a bind.
On freewill theism, God does not ensure that some people be lost for the benefit of the redeemed, or for anything He has to gain from it. The granting of free-will stems entirely from God's regard for His creatures.
On freewill theism (especially open theism), God does not ensure that anyone will benefit. He doesn’t know, by rolling the dice, if that will come up sixes or snake eyes. So he’s putting his creatures at an incalculable risk of immeasurable harm.
1. Boyd's model requires something like purgatory, for many die (infants) without setting their wills.
ReplyDelete2. One problem for these will-setting models, is that it looks like our characters are formed by outside influences (parents, environment, genetics, economic conditions, biology, etc) *before* one is able to be an agent who can make will-setting choices. Announcing that this just cannot be so, and the facts (or evidences) of science be damned, makes the libertarian sound fundy—and one wonders how they could mock the 6-dayer for doing the same.
another great post!
ReplyDelete"One problem with that claim is that you’re doing theology by stipulation rather than revelation–or even reason. Boyd can postulate that position, but why should I believe that his position is true?"
ReplyDeleteIt is presented as a model that reconciles two ostensible data points from Scripture: that we have libertarian free will, and that we have a final destiny. You, of course, will dispute that Scripture suggests we have LFW, but at least formally this is reasoning from Scripture. Every systematic theology introduces stipulative models in various domains that go beyond the direct statements of Scripture.
But this model is based on reason as well, the cognitive science of habit formation. In fact, Boyd's model is close to the consensus on the psychology of motivation. See, for example, Charles Duhigg's "The Power of Habit".
"What you’re actually giving us is a theory of character-determinism."
The salient distinction is where character comes from. On the libertarian model a character is formed by the exercise of libertarian free-will, a factor internal to the agent. On Calvinism, character is formed entirely by factors external to the agent, and is just the instrument whereby the agent completes his/her unalterable destiny.
"Even if we grant your theory of character-determinism for the sake of argument, the cut-off is still arbitrary. People die at different times. Their character development is at different stages when they die."
That's true, and it is a tension in the model, and it might lead to an increase in the plausibility of some kind of post-mortem process for those who accept it. Calvinists think that's heresy, but again, every theological model has implications that members of other camps find hard to swallow. In my view, the theological advantages of freewill theism outweigh the disadvantages and tensions.
"Of course open theists aren’t going to compare their God to Damien or Trelane. They will try to put the best face on their view of God. Play up the positives and downplay the negatives."
And of course Calvinists aren't going to give a flattering portrait of the open view of God. They will try to put the worst face on that view. Play up the negatives and downplay the positives.
"But on a consistent neotheist reading of Scripture, God has limited wisdom. God is still learning how to be God. How to deal with people. On-the-job-training. Trial-and-error."
Citation from a neotheist author that suggests on that view 'God is still learning how to be God' please?
"Rhoda’s God isn’t consistently patient. Indeed, he’s often impatient. Rhoda’s God isn’t “infinitely loving.” Rather, he’s loving when he happens to be in a good mood, but if you catch him when he’s out of sorts, you better duck and keep your head down."
There's nothing arbitrary about Rhoda's God's good moods. God is delighted when His people do peace and justice, and disappointed and hurt when they wrong each other and Him.
But this back and forth is pointless. You're determined (in more ways than one) to cast the open God in this light.
"On freewill theism (especially open theism), God does not ensure that anyone will benefit. He doesn’t know, by rolling the dice, if that will come up sixes or snake eyes. So he’s putting his creatures at an incalculable risk of immeasurable harm."
God does not ensure that anyone will benefit, but neither does He ensure that anyone will not, as the Calvinist God does. This God is fair and just. He hasn't rigged the game from the start in favor of his arbritrarily chosen in-group.
"On Calvinism, character is formed entirely by factors external to the agent"
ReplyDeleteThat's false—at least, it doesn't need to be true. Even libertarians recognize that compatibilism doesn't necessitate the view that character is formed "entirely by factors external to the agent." Indeed, the agent and her choices, desires, beliefs, reasons, etc., can be *necessary* for character formation. Compatibilism has accounts of agent causation (see Markosian, Nelkin, etc), ultimate origination (see Fischer, Ravizza, Markosian), and even analyses of alternative possibilities that aren't hypothetical (see Vihvelin), and ought implies can (see Nelkin). A compatibilist need not hold one or more of these views, but they are out there.
Paul,
ReplyDeleteYes, but again where do those desires, choices, beliefs, etc. ultimately come from? That makes all the difference for me. I understand that compatibilists can account for saying that I made a choice and that I wanted to make that choice. But what made me want to make that choice? If the answer is, 'a divinely orchestrated sequence of secondary causes which will make me inexorably play out a predetermined destiny', then that counts as external formation of character in my books.
P.S. In your first comment you referred to evidences that our characters are formed by outside influences. What evidences in particular are you referring to? From my reading of the psychological literature these factors are important but not all-determining.
ReplyDeleteJD,
ReplyDeleteThere are compatibilist accounts of "ultimate" origination (see e.g., Haji and Fischer). "Ultimate" is subject to several different analyses. Once the incompatibilist spells out his preferred understanding of the necessary and sufficient conditions of "origination," it loses its intuitive appeal (if it ever had one).
Of course, no compatibilism worth its salt, at least that I am aware of, will claim that "wanting to make the choice you made" is sufficient for responsibiliy. Moreover, your use of the term "made you" is subject to multiple analyses, and some of them are simply question begging against both compatibilism per se and Calvinist compatibilism in particular.
The evidence I referred to is that of the recent neuroscience reports. It has been discussed by Alfred Mele and Eddy Nahimas, most recently. Of course, the brain sciences are in their infancy here, and the evidence adduced is not even close to demanding we rule out something like libertarian free will. But, this is the direction it is *headed*, and the neuroscientists seem more convinced than the philosophers that this has indeed been shown. But the philosophers point out distinctions and ambiguities the scientists are not typically careful to cover. Nevertheless, as Vargas points out, the evidence seems a little stronger than some would like. See Vargas' review of Mele here:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24156-effective-intentions-the-power-of-conscious-will/
At any event, I understand that there is currently some wiggle room for the libertarian vis-avis these scientific studies. That's why I said it "looks like" . . . And, as a parent, if my anecdotal evidence counts for anything, I'm confident that wills and characters are formed to early in the etiology of character formation for libertarianism to play much of a role if any. Some libertarians are happy with those "scraps" or "flickers" of freedom. I don't think that gets you responsibility.
P.S. I'm not trying to name drop. If you want the sources for the names appealed to I can give them.
ReplyDeleteI'd also say that "secondary causes" is ambiguous too. I understand you're using the same *words* some Calvinists have used, but for some reason, it seems to me that incompatibilists are caught in the grip of a metaphor. They have some "picture" in mind according to which compatibilism is "translated" to their conceptual scheme, and without it they just can't think about compatibilism. That picture is something like dominos. If I knock over the first, the second is a secondary cause of knocking over the third. So the incompatibilist thinks God knocked over the first domino, and the subsequent secondary causes that lead to my action are just like dominos falling into me, and my action is another domino that falls into the next one. Or, the picture is of a puppet. God is the puppeteer and he controls a puppet. if a real puppet knocked over a glass in virtue of the puppet master "ultimately" controlling the puppet, the puppet would be the "secondary cause" of the glass being knocked over.
Given that it seems to me that many libertarians aren't up on compatibilist accounts of freedom and responsibility, and that they seem to operate according to some version of the above "picture" (even if they say they don't), I wonder how profitable discussions between the two are. I am not sure (many) incompatibilists can "shake" the "picture" they have in mind when they talk about determinism and compatibilism.
P.P.S. The inability to "shake" the picture I think is explained by what has been referred to as "imaginative resistance." Psychologists have found that people, when reading, say, some piece of literature, come across an event in the story like this: "The good man molested the child," they can't even imagine it. Philosophers (Tamar Gendler) have found that this extends beyond moral situations (which was Hume's example). I am tempted to think the libertarian is in the grip of a psychological phenomenon like imaginative resistance.
ReplyDeleteJD WALTERS SAID:
ReplyDelete“It is presented as a model that reconciles two ostensible data points from Scripture: that we have libertarian free will, and that we have a final destiny. You, of course, will dispute that Scripture suggests we have LFW, but at least formally this is reasoning from Scripture.”
Even on your neotheist exegesis, there’s a major discrepancy between your prooftexts and the specificity of your claims. You claim that we begin life with libertarian freedom, which evolves into character-determinism, to the point where we eventually lose our libertarian freedom, to the point where our moral character is immutable, so that the saints can no longer succumb to evil, or the wicked repent, and everyone’s character development is etched in stone just in the nick of the time for the Palingenesis.
“Every systematic theology introduces stipulative models in various domains that go beyond the direct statements of Scripture.”
It’s not just that your position goes beyond the explicit data points from Scripture; it goes beyond the implicit data points from Scripture–even on a neotheist reading.
“But this model is based on reason as well, the cognitive science of habit formation. In fact, Boyd's model is close to the consensus on the psychology of motivation.”
So once a habit is formed, you can never kick the habit? That’s bad news for chain-smokers, drug addicts, and compulsive gamblers. Might as well not even try to break a self-destructive habit. Just commit suicide and get it over with.
And here I thought psychologists felt it was possible to unlearn bad habits.
“On Calvinism, character is formed entirely by factors external to the agent, and is just the instrument whereby the agent completes his/her unalterable destiny.”
Wrong–as Manata points out.
“That's true, and it is a tension in the model, and it might lead to an increase in the plausibility of some kind of post-mortem process for those who accept it.”
That’s still ad hoc. Let’s say the Palingenesis takes place in 2100. Abraham has had 4000 years of purgatory to complete his character formation whereas other folks died in 2095 or thereabouts.
“And of course Calvinists aren't going to give a flattering portrait of the open view of God. They will try to put the worst face on that view. Play up the negatives and downplay the positives.”
Since you’re being intransigent about the implications of open theism, perhaps I’ll do a separate post.
“This God is fair and just. He hasn't rigged the game from the start in favor of his arbritrarily chosen in-group.”
i) As far as “fairness” goes, it’s not as if the neotheist God gives everyone the same advantages in life. He’s given some runners a tremendous head-start.
ii) That’s why you need to tack on a postmortem reparative therapy program to fix all the damage and even the score–which is a makeshift solution.
iii) In what sense is election arbitrary? Arbitrary in the sense that mercy towards the wicked isn’t obligatory?