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Tuesday, April 17, 2012

God's playmates

 



JD Walters directed me to a paper by Alan Rhoda which lays out a freewill theist model of providence:


Rhoda helpfully begins with a general definition of his position:

Open theism is a theory of divine providence according to which God has sovereignly chosen to create a world in which his creatures have significant freedom to determine the direction of events. As a consequence of God’s decision, there is no such thing as a completely settled future for him (or anyone) to know. That is to say, there is no complete and unique sequence of events subsequent to the present that is or that is going to be the actual future. Instead, there is a branching array of possible futures.

Let’s compare his definition with some other statements:

Similarly, while it is plausible that no one can thwart the Chess Master’s general goal of victory, a determined opponent could easily thwart many of the chess master’s specific goals, especially if they were announced beforehand.
[Sanders]  This means that though God’s overarching purposes for creation cannot be frustrated, his particular desires for individuals and situations can be frustrated.
A God who does exhaustive contingency planning, one who, for every possibility, has formed a conditional resolution—if this should happen, then I will respond thusly—has no need for ad hoc decision-making. The decisions have already been made. What remains to be seen is which conditional resolutions will be carried out, that is, what actions God will perform in response to his creatures...Either God is able to do exhaustive contingency planning or he is not. If he is not, then that must be because he cannot anticipate all of the possibilities. But on a theistic worldview, all possibilities ultimately derive either from God’s nature or from God’s will, and so inability to anticipate all possibilities would seem to point to a failure of self-knowledge on God’s part, a failure that in turn seems diametrically at odds with the core theistic idea that God is a perfect knower. Alternatively, if God can do exhaustive contingency planning, then why wouldn’t he? It wouldn’t take a taxing effort on God’s part to do so, and not to do so would be to court unnecessary risks that might endanger not only God’s chances of obtaining his goals for creation but also the long-term prospects of those creatures who have allied themselves to God. I submit that this would amount to inexcusable recklessness on God’s part. If God can do exhaustive contingency planning, he definitely should.

But if, due to his exhaustive contingency plans, God’s overarching goal cannot be thwarted, then in what sense do “his creatures have significant freedom to determine the direction of events”? If God always wins in the long run, because he has a back-up plan for every play we make, then we aren’t determining the direction of events. At best we can stall for time. Postpone the inevitable.

But no matter what we choose to do, Rhoda’s God will always beat us in the long run. For every move we make, he has a countermove. So Rhoda’s model of providence is essentially fatalistic. No matter what you do, God gets his way. So what you do makes no difference to the ultimate outcome. Why endow creatures with the freedom to choose between alternate timelines if every alternate timeline leads to the same place?

Indeed, as Rhoda goes on to say:

In a mutually disadvantageous situation, the player that has the ability or the resources to “hold out” longer can generally induce the other player to compromise on his or her terms. For example, in the game of Chicken, the more courageous (or, rather, foolhardy) driver will usually win because he is prepared to hold out under the threat of collision longer than the other player. Similarly, since God is generally prepared to mete out punishment longer than we are prepared to endure it, he can often induce repentance (at least for a time).

So Rhoda’s God endows his creatures with “significant freedom to determine the direction of events,” then punishes them when they exercise their God-given freedom to influence the course of events. What’s the point of having significant freedom on those terms?

Likewise, if God can always hold out longer than the human player, it’s futile to play against God. So isn’t the entire exercise a charade?

When God invites us into a loving relationship with himself, he’s looking for a win–win outcome. We win in life not by competing with God, but by cooperating with him.

What if I don’t want to have a “loving relationship” with Rhoda’s God? What if I just don’t like him? Normally we get to choose our friends.

Mind you, there’d be a strong incentive to play along with Rhoda’s God. And that’s because Rhoda’s God is a lot like Trelane (The Squire of Gothos) and Damien (The Omen). For sheer survival’s sake, it’s prudent to pretend to like him. To humor him. To keep him amused.

Indeed, with a God like that, even if you could beat him at his own game, you’d let him win every time. Make him think he’s a better player than he really is.

For when Rhoda’s God becomes bored or frustrated, he’s dangerous to be around. Has second thoughts about making the human race, so he destroys everyone except for Noah and his family. If Rhoda’s God gets tired of his playmates, you better watch out!

Consider the following passage from Jeremiah 18:7–10 (NASB):
At one moment I might speak concerning a nation or concerning a kingdom to uproot, to pull down, or to destroy it; if that nation against which I have spoken turns from its evil, I will relent concerning the calamity I planned to bring on it. Or at another moment I might speak concerning a nation or concerning a kingdom to build up or to plant it; if it does evil in My sight by not obeying My voice, then I will think better of the good with which I had promised to bless it.
This passage tells us that God will adjust his strategy from blessing to punishing (or vice-versa) in response to whether a particular nation submits to God or rebels against him.

Two problems:

i) In this passage, God doesn’t change his policy. Rather, God has a standing policy. A consistent policy. The policy doesn’t change. The policy varies with the situation, but that variation is built into the policy.

ii) This passage is entirely consonant with predestination. God has predestined that if a nation does x, he will do y, and if a nation does other than x, he will do z. Moreover, God has predestined whether a nation will do x or other than x.

Given that God has a choice in what sort of ‘Creation Game’ to play, a natural question, and a key one for understanding divine providence, is why God would choose to play the sort of Creation Game that he has rather than some other kind of game. To answer that question we have to think about the value of a game. What sorts of factors tend to make a game worth playing? I will identify several such factors and argue that they suggest that God would, all things being equal, prefer to exercise his providence along open theist lines.
Intuitively, there are at least four overlapping factors that can make a game intrinsically more worth playing, at least where human players are concerned...Another desideratum (for us) is that a game have significant and diverse outcomes in which differences in outcomes are predictably, though not necessarily inexorably, correlated with the players’ strategic choices. Thus, in the game of life in which we all find ourselves, we each have a variety of strategies to choose from. For this choice to be worth taking seriously, for the game to be worth taking seriously...

But on Rhoda’s model, we can only affect short-term outcomes, not long-term outcomes. Diversity won’t make a dime’s worth of difference over the long haul.

If that’s right, then it is reasonable to expect that God would prefer to play a Creation Game in which the stakes, both for himself, and for the other players, are non-trivial...Finally, the best games (for us) have uncertain outcomes. Of course, we wouldn’t want outcomes to be completely uncertain, otherwise there would be no predictable correlations between strategies and outcomes...The main reason why the best games have uncertain outcomes is because those that don’t are comparatively boring. That’s why so many games involve randomizing devices, like dice or shuffled cards. That’s why people don’t want to know in advance who is going to win the Super Bowl or the World Series. It eliminates the suspense. For games like chess, knowing exactly how the game was going to go would obviate any reason for actually playing it through. One could just contemplate the series of moves in one’s head. Similarly, if God knew exactly how the Creation Game was going to play out, then one wonders why he would actually initiate the game rather than simply contemplate a virtual “creation.”...Hence, it is at least somewhat unclear why God would choose to initiate a Creation Game unless it were one in which not even he could predict with certainty exactly how it would turn out.
It suggests that God would want the Creation Game to be a meaningful one, with potentially high stakes for the players involved, including God himself. And, finally, it suggests that God would rather have a Creation Game in which there is some degree of genuine risk for him, such that there is no advance guarantee that all of his specific preferences will be met. In short, these reflections suggest that God would play the very sort of Creation Game that open theists believe he is playing.

i) But on Rhoda’s model, there is no risk to God. Even if God loses a hand, he never loses a game. He may win some and lose some in the short term, but he always wins in the long-term.

ii) Moreover, losing doesn’t cost God anything, except his pride. He can’t be physically hurt.

iii) By contrast, it’s his playthings who have everything to lose. Everything to fear. When Rhoda’s God gets mad at his playmates, he becomes vindictive. An unholy terror. Rhoda’s God is like a child God. Like Damien or Trelane.

iv) Rhoda’s God creates playmates because he’s easily bored. He needs someone to play with. He needs to be entertained.

We’re his pets. He creates us for his personal amusement. Like a puppy dog or a toy soldier. But Rhoda’s God is easily frustrated. Has a short-fuse. When he gets mad at the puppy, he sets it on fire, then feels bad later on. 

From a non-open theist perspective, God’s rationale for playing any sort of creation game remains somewhat opaque. According to theological determinists like John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards, God has chosen a risk-free strategy that involves his ordaining what all of the created players will do. But if that’s so, then created players are not genuine players in the game-theoretical sense.42 Instead, they are like the pawns on the chessboard and it is as though God were playing chess with himself. Alternatively, the type of Creation Game envisaged by theological determinists is analogous to God’s playing a game of solitaire with a stacked deck. For us, playing that sort of game might be a way to “kill time,” but it would hardly be very interesting or challenging. Thus, it is unclear at best why God would choose to play such a game.

In Calvinism, God creates the elect for their own enjoyment rather than his enjoyment. God is generous. He spreads the goodness around. He doesn’t make the elect for what he gets out of it. He needs nothing. But he makes the elect to share in his beatitude.

Evidently, the notion of disinterested love is a foreign concept to Rhoda. That God would bless his creatures, expecting nothing in return, is an alien notion to Rhoda.

10 comments:

  1. Hey Steve,

    when you write this: "JD Walters directed me to a paper...". are you saying you were direct by the human being or some writing of his that led you to the paper?

    Let me ask, do you know him?

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  2. This is a follow-up to a personal exchange that he and I had on this very blog.

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  3. natamllc, see the comments under:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2012/04/advance-warning.html

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  4. "All",

    thanks.

    I didn't take the time then to read that article though I recall now seeing it show up in here.

    God does have and did have an early warning weather system, "His" people. Paul the Apostle is a classic case in point, Acts 27.

    I assume all sides claim that Apostle as theirs? :)

    Also, just because I asked that question, let me apologize if there is swirling around a mystery for the question I asked?

    I didn't have my reading glasses on when I read JD Walters. Accept my apology, as, when I read it, I saw an "h" in Walters, as in Dr. CFW Walthers the Lutheran theologian that has given my mind headache reading him! :)

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  5. "But no matter what we choose to do, Rhoda’s God will always beat us in the long run. For every move we make, he has a countermove"

    But Open Theists have already said that God only has a specific end in mind for some of the future, not all of it. It is only partially ultimately planned in advance. Things like the second coming of Christ etc. That leaves an awful lot that God doesn't need to countermove over.

    Hence, not sure what the problem is with the Open Theist position here.

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  6. Are you responding to Rhoda's paper?

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  7. Thanks for this, Steve.

    "So Rhoda’s model of providence is essentially fatalistic. No matter what you do, God gets his way. So what you do makes no difference to the ultimate outcome. Why endow creatures with the freedom to choose between alternate timelines if every alternate timeline leads to the same place?"

    On this model, what we do does make a difference, in that it results in a different version of 'God getting his way'. For instance, it is guaranteed that there will be a new heavens and a new Earth, and a redeemed resurrected people on it, but we may or may not be in that group, depending on our choices.

    To use a somewhat crude analogy, suppose you're a German soldier near the end of WWII. The Allies are going to win no matter what you do, but you might die resisting them or you might surrender and have a chance at a new future.

    "So Rhoda’s God endows his creatures with “significant freedom to determine the direction of events,” then punishes them when they exercise their God-given freedom to influence the course of events. What’s the point of having significant freedom on those terms?"

    God does give us significant freedom, but of course with the intent that we will freely choose him and his ways. Every interaction God has with us is geared toward influencing us to make that decision. It's not like God gives us free will and is indifferent to what we actually choose.

    "Likewise, if God can always hold out longer than the human player, it’s futile to play against God. So isn’t the entire exercise a charade?"

    In a sense it IS futile to play against God (Why do the heathen rage, etc.). To do so results in nothing but misery. That doesn't make the exercise a charade, though. The consequences of either playing with or against God are very real for the player, indeed they have eternal significance.

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  8. "What if I don’t want to have a “loving relationship” with Rhoda’s God? What if I just don’t like him? Normally we get to choose our friends."

    There's quite a significant disanalogy between choosing human friends, who don't differ much from ourselves, and choosing how we relate to God, the source of all life and goodness. How do you 'just don't like' God?

    A person can choose not to be friends with someone and be none the worse off. But choosing to play against God is evidence of a perverted, irrational, self-destructive will.

    "Mind you, there’d be a strong incentive to play along with Rhoda’s God. And that’s because Rhoda’s God is a lot like Trelane (The Squire of Gothos) and Damien (The Omen). For sheer survival’s sake, it’s prudent to pretend to like him. To humor him. To keep him amused."

    This is a bit unfair. The freewill theist God certainly cannot be tricked or outwitted. The omniscience possible for the freewill theist model includes the constant, perfect awareness of the state of each person's soul, down to the very core. Rhoda's God is not subject to anything near the limitations of Trelane or Damien.

    "But on Rhoda’s model, there is no risk to God. Even if God loses a hand, he never loses a game. He may win some and lose some in the short term, but he always wins in the long-term."

    God loves all his image-bearers deeply. It is a significant loss to lose any of his image-bearers to eternal perdition. Also, allowing part of world history to unfold according to human and spiritual free-will may result in more suffering and struggle than God would prefer, but He considers that trade-off worth it for the precious prize of the rest of his image-bearers freely and gratefully conforming to His will, which is perfect happiness for them. C.S. Lewis, as usual, said it best:

    "One must face the fact that all the talk about His love for men, and His service being perfect freedom, is not...mere propaganda, but an appalling truth. He really does want to fill the universe with a lot of loathsome little replicas of Himself-creatures whose life, on a miniature scale, will be qualitatively like His own, not because He has absorbed them but because their wills freely conform to His. We want cattle who can finally become food; He wants servants who can finally become sons. We want to suck in, He wants to give out. We are empty and would be filled; He is full and flows over." (Screwtape Letters, Letter VIII)

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  9. "By contrast, it’s his playthings who have everything to lose. Everything to fear. When Rhoda’s God gets mad at his playmates, he becomes vindictive. An unholy terror. Rhoda’s God is like a child God. Like Damien or Trelane."

    Again, this is quite unfair. The freewill theist God is not childish and impulsive. As the Bible teaches, God is slow to anger and eager to be merciful. Nothing in the freewill theist model implies that God would be impulsive or vindictive.

    "We’re his pets. He creates us for his personal amusement. Like a puppy dog or a toy soldier. But Rhoda’s God is easily frustrated. Has a short-fuse. When he gets mad at the puppy, he sets it on fire, then feels bad later on."

    See the Lewis quote above for a better understanding of why God might play a Creation game with creatures whose choices are not predetermined. Again, what leads you to think that the freewill God would be easily frustrated, any more than a master chess player would be easily frustrated by a novice, or a martial arts master would be easily frustrated by a new pupil? When God expresses frustration in the Bible, it is only after long periods of God trying to guide His people in the right direction, only to have them disobey again and again.

    "In Calvinism, God creates the elect for their own enjoyment rather than his enjoyment. God is generous. He spreads the goodness around. He doesn’t make the elect for what he gets out of it. He needs nothing. But he makes the elect to share in his beatitude."

    Didn't Edwards argue that the end for which God created the world is that it would be more fitting for God to demonstrate all His attributes, and have sentient creatures bear witness to them, including His great mercy as well as His fearful judgment? John Piper argues that the rationale for everything God does is to maximize His glory.

    On the contrary, I think the freewill theist model is the best conceptualization of God as overflowing goodness. It is on the freewill theist model that God creates and gives integrity and a degree of autonomy to His creations, for their sake. On Calvinism, world history as the result of the predetermined choices of creatures is the 'Grand Demonstration' of God's attributes (Jay Adams).

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  10. Steve, I've been reading some of your past blogs on penal substitution and I've noticed just how well they provide a good foundation for, and jive with limited atonement.

    Just a note in passing. :)

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