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Thursday, April 19, 2012

Damien's playmates




On this model, what we do does make a difference, in that it results in a different version of 'God getting his way'. For instance, it is guaranteed that there will be a new heavens and a new Earth, and a redeemed resurrected people on it, but we may or may not be in that group, depending on our choices.

The new heavens and earth presuppose a situation in which the consequences of one’s decisions in this life are finalized for all time.

Yet libertarian agents still retain the freedom to choose between good and evil, do they not? On the open theist model, what happens to you if you make the wrong choice? Do you get other chances down the line to change your mind?

If you don’t make the first cut for the new heavens and earth, what’s your fate? Are you annihilated? But what if, given libertarian freedom, you were going to repent at a later date?

You can’t live on the new earth if you’re still choosing evil. Are you incarcerated somewhere?

Or what if you made the cut, but then fell off the wagon? After all, glorified saints retain their libertarian freedom, don’t they?

What keeps the world to come from reverting to the conditions of a fallen world?

God does give us significant freedom, but of course with the intent that we will freely choose him and his ways.

So he gives us freedom of choice on condition that we only do it his way. Kind of like a mother who gives her daughter the freedom to choose the boyfriend that her mother approves of.

But isn’t libertarian freedom generally freedom to choose between alternatives?

The consequences of either playing with or against God are very real for the player, indeed they have eternal significance.

So we have to play a game to be saved? We have to win a game to be saved? Sounds more like The Hunger Games. Whatever happened to salvation by grace?

How do you 'just don't like' God?

Because Rhoda’s God isn’t very likeable. He isn’t admirable or praiseworthy. I don’t respect Rhoda’s God. He’s too much like Trelane or Damien.

But choosing to play against God is evidence of a perverted, irrational, self-destructive will.

To play against Rhoda’s God would be irrational and self-destructive, although it wouldn’t be perverted.

It would be imprudent in the way it was imprudent for Prometheus and Diomedes to challenge the gods. You’re bound to lose.

So it’s wiser to be obsequious. Like people who have to serve under a tyrant. 

This is a bit unfair. The freewill theist God certainly cannot be tricked or outwitted. The omniscience possible for the freewill theist model includes the constant, perfect awareness of the state of each person's soul, down to the very core. Rhoda's God is not subject to anything near the limitations of Trelane or Damien.

Open theists like Rhoda stipulate that God knows all possibilities, that God has exhaustive contingency plans, but that stipulation is in tension with open theist hermeneutics.

When open theists prooftext their position from Scripture, the God that emerges from their interpretation of Scripture is a short-sighted, short-tempered deity who has to improvise on the fly.

Rhoda is trying to combine some attributes of a Zeus-like God with a God who shares some attributes of classical Christian theism. That’s an unstable hybrid.

God loves all his image-bearers deeply. It is a significant loss to lose any of his image-bearers to eternal perdition.

Except that Rhoda’s God puts his image-bearers at risk. It’s a bit disingenuous to put them in harm's way, then lament the consequences–especially when that’s a “foreseeable possibility.”

Also, allowing part of world history to unfold according to human and spiritual free-will may result in more suffering and struggle than God would prefer, but He considers that trade-off worth it for the precious prize of the rest of his image-bearers freely and gratefully conforming to His will.

That’s very utilitarian. Crush the few for the good of the many. Sacrifice a few peons for the common good.

How is that more compassionate than what freewill theists find so objectionable in Calvinism?

Again, this is quite unfair. The freewill theist God is not childish and impulsive. As the Bible teaches, God is slow to anger and eager to be merciful. Nothing in the freewill theist model implies that God would be impulsive or vindictive.

That’s a very selective appeal to Scripture. But remember how open theists prooftext their position. Indeed, Rhoda himself appeals to the exegesis of Boyd, Sanders, Pinnock et al (footnote 41).

Very well, then. When open theists prooftext their position, they contrast their hermeneutical approach with classical Christian theism. They don’t make allowance for irony or anthropomorphism. The God they prooftext is a mercurial, high-strung deity. A God prone to wild mood swings. A forgetful God. A God who’s on a learning curve. A God who’s often blindsided by events. Who flies into a rage. Lashes out. Then, after cooling off, regrets his impetuous destruction of human life. A God whom humans have to calm down–like a SWAT team negotiator who’s trying to talk down a hostage-taker with a dead man’s switch.

In sum, a child God. An omnipotent kindergartner. A godlet whose power vastly exceeds his understanding or maturity. Just like Trelane or Damien.

See the Lewis quote above for a better understanding of why God might play a Creation game with creatures whose choices are not predetermined.

To my knowledge, Lewis’s view of God was much closer to classical Christian theism than open theism.

Again, what leads you to think that the freewill God would be easily frustrated, any more than a master chess player would be easily frustrated by a novice, or a martial arts master would be easily frustrated by a new pupil?

Based on neotheist narrative theology.

When God expresses frustration in the Bible, it is only after long periods of God trying to guide His people in the right direction, only to have them disobey again and again.

At which point, according to open theists, he loses his temper and does things in the heat of the moment that he may later regret.

Didn't Edwards argue that the end for which God created the world is that it would be more fitting for God to demonstrate all His attributes, and have sentient creatures bear witness to them, including His great mercy as well as His fearful judgment? John Piper argues that the rationale for everything God does is to maximize His glory.

I’ve often pointed out the limitations of Piper’s view. So has Jeremy Pierce.

On the contrary, I think the freewill theist model is the best conceptualization of God as overflowing goodness.

The God of open theism is a moody, mercurial godling who overflows with many conflicting emotions and rash actions.

On Calvinism, world history as the result of the predetermined choices of creatures is the 'Grand Demonstration' of God's attributes (Jay Adams).

That’s true. However, Jay Adams presents a very simplistic version of the argument. 

3 comments:

  1. "The new heavens and earth presuppose a situation in which the consequences of one’s decisions in this life are finalized for all time. Yet libertarian agents still retain the freedom to choose between good and evil, do they not?"

    The model put forward by Gregory Boyd in his article in "Divine Providence: Five Views" envisions a process where libertarianly free choices accumulate and solidify into a character that becomes increasingly fixed over time. The process is well summarized by an aphorism of Margaret Thatcher:

    "Watch your thoughts, for they become words. Watch your words, for they become actions. Watch your actions, for they become...habits. Watch your habits, for they become your character. And watch your character, for it becomes your destiny!"

    Habits to character to destiny. The freewill model is not one where libertarianly free agents are constantly making spontaneous, unpredictable decisions. The initial spontaneity gives way to increasingly fixed patterns of behavior that evidence a distinct character.

    So there is a point of no return for all human agents, beyond which they are firmly fixed on a trajectory that either takes them to ultimate conformity to the image of God in Christ, or to final, irreversible depravity.

    "So he gives us freedom of choice on condition that we only do it his way."

    No, we maintain the freedom no matter what we choose. But we do need to understand that the consequences of not doing things his way are severe.

    Suppose someone buys a gasoline-powered car and pours vinegar into the gasoline tank. Would that person be right to complain to the manufacturer, "I thought when I bought the car I could do whatever I wanted with it?"

    Well, yes, you can, but if you want it to run well you need to fuel it with gasoline. It's not an infringement on freedom to stipulate what you MUST do if you want to achieve a certain outcome.

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  2. "So we have to play a game to be saved? We have to win a game to be saved?...Whatever happened to salvation by grace?"

    As is clear from Rhoda's article, he is using the word 'game' in an abstract, technical sense to model certain aspects of the interactions between God and His creations. It is illegitimate to bring in associations from the more popular meanings of the word.

    Game theory can be applied to economics, but no one is suggesting that economists sit around playing board games all the time. The word game there has a very specific, technical meaning.

    "Because Rhoda’s God isn’t very likeable. He isn’t admirable or praiseworthy. I don’t respect Rhoda’s God. He’s too much like Trelane or Damien."

    I still don't see how you can make that comparison. Rhoda's God responds to his people with blessings if they obey and punishment if they disobey, but is much more inclined toward mercy and blessing than punishment. For their own sake, he would much rather the people returned and found their true happiness in him. How does any of that conjure up Damien?

    "Open theists like Rhoda stipulate that God knows all possibilities, that God has exhaustive contingency plans, but that stipulation is in tension with open theist hermeneutics."

    Rhoda does not swallow the exegesis and hermeneutics of Sanders, et al. wholesale. Aren't you the one who's always cautioning that just because you approvingly quote an author on one point, that doesn't mean you put a rubber stamp on everything they say?

    In any case, I have a hard time associating the wise, patient, infinitely loving, resourceful God who emerges from the descriptions of open theists with your description.

    "That’s very utilitarian. Crush the few for the good of the many. Sacrifice a few peons for the common good. How is that more compassionate than what freewill theists find so objectionable in Calvinism?"

    The distinction is the teleological reasoning involved. Under Calvinism, God predestines some people to be reprobate IN ORDER to demonstrate His glory in judgment upon wickedness and His mercy to the elect. The reprobate are the peons who inexorably enact a lesson in God's attributes for the benefit of the elect.

    On freewill theism, God does not ensure that some people be lost for the benefit of the redeemed, or for anything He has to gain from it. The granting of free-will stems entirely from God's regard for His creatures.

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  3. Habits to character to destiny.

    But libertarian wills aren't like drying cement or curing caulk where you have to make sure to mold or shape the substance in the desired way before it's permanent (i.e. there's a time limit). As Steve pointed out, given libertarian free will, the saints in heaven could exercise their wills and fall again.

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