“only true god” - yes, that phrase refers to the same thing as “Father” in v.1. The term “god” here, though, is quantified over. Compare: addressing the King as “King” (proper noun) vs. saying “you are the only true king” (common noun). Don't be fooled by the English capital “G”. But really, this common vs. proper nouns distinction is irrelevant. Read it your way – “that they may know you, the Father, and Jesus” - there are two objects of knowledge here - eternal life consists in knowing *them*.
i) The fact that there are two parties (the Father and the Son) in Jn 17:3 is a red herring. No one is arguing that the Father and the Son are interchangeable Jn 17:3.
ii) Your argument would only go through if (a) John always uses “theos” as a common noun rather than a proper noun, and (b) John reserves “theos” for the Father to the exclusion of the Son.
iii) You also disregard the idiomatic nature of the phase “only true God” in Jn 17:3. You act as if John is simply adding the sense of the adjective (“only,” “true”) to the sense of the noun (“God”).
To the contrary, John is using stereotypical Jewish jargon, where the “only God,” “true God,” or “only true God” picks out Yahweh in distinction to pagan deities. This idiomatic semantic unit is not synonymous with the individual parts of speech which comprise it.
Then, as I already pointed out (which you ignore), John sets this characterization in implicit contrast to the attitude which the religious establishment took to Jesus. John is using this as a wedge issue. The Jewish establishment prides itself on following the one true God (i.e. Yahweh), over against heathen idolaters–like the Romans. Yet the same establishment is guilty of rejecting the Son, whom he sent.
That’s the intended contrast. The point is not to contrast the deity of the Father with the non-deity of the Son. The point, rather, is to underscore the ironic position of Christ’s Jewish opponents.
In Jn 17:3, the “one true God” deliberately evokes intertextual parallels with earlier confrontations in the narrative arc (e.g. 5:44; 7:28).
non sequitur
It’s hardly a non sequitur to point out that Jn 17:5 further weakens the unitarian interpretation of Jn 17:3
red herring - it needn’t be contrasting them, but only assuming them two - and it plainly does. There’s the one god, and the one whom that one god sent. In other words, the Father isn’t the Son.
i) Irrelevant. Trinitarian theology presupposes a distinction between the Father and the Son.
ii) Your dichotomy would only work on the dual condition that (a) John only uses theos as a common noun and (b) his use of theos is confined to the Father.
a) It’s arguable that John typically uses theos as a synonymous proper name for the Father.
b) In addition, there are programmatic examples in Jn 1:1,18 where John alternates between theos as a common noun and theos as a proper noun when he uses the common noun as a covering term for the Father and the Son alike. Both are divine.
Right. Any Trinity theory is an attempt to explain the data of the texts. Problem is, there are many of them, and they're incompatible.
At best, that’s a theoretical problem, not a doctrinal problem. The primary issue is the witness of the Bible to the Trinity. That’s the raw material for doctrinal formulations.
Sure. All unitarians have always known this. We can’t take such applications to imply that Jesus is Yahweh himself, though. Why? That's inconsistent, because according to the texts some things are true of one that are not true of the other.
i) That argument cuts both ways. If NT writers often assign Yahwist passages to the Father, would you say, We can’t take such applications to imply that the Father is Yahweh himself, though. Why? That’s inconsistent, because according to the texts some things are true of one that are not true of the other.
ii) It’s a presupposition of Trinitarian doctrine that the Father, Son, and Spirit differ in some respect. Everything that’s true of the Father won’t be true of the Son without remainder, or vice versa.
On your idea that I somehow misunderstand nouns - this is a careless misreading. My point was that these authors assume the numerical identity of the Father and God. If f=g, and not(f=s) then it can't be that s=g. You're not getting my point that the authors don't merely predicate divinity of f & s - rather, they identify f and Yahweh.
i) I’m not sure if your using “God” as common noun or a proper noun.
ii) Once again, your objection cuts both ways. Yes, NT writers identify the Father with Yahweh. But NT writers also identify Jesus with Yahweh. They treat the Father as divine, but they also treat Jesus as divine.
You’re artificially isolating NT ascriptions regarding the Father from NT ascriptions regarding the Son (or Spirit, for that matter). But NT practice is the same. NT writers don’t identify the Father as Yahweh rather than the Son as Yahweh. You’re not getting that antithesis from the actual practice of NT writers.
Rather, you’ve chosen to artificially privilege NT statements about the Father’s Yahwistic identity, make that your yardstick, then oppose that to NT statements about the Son’s Yahwistic identity.
iii) In addition, you begin with your philosophical preconception of what constitutes identity, and then use that to filter out dominical ascriptions that don’t jive with your preconception. But that’s faulty theological method.
You’re using your philosophical categories to prejudge the exegetical results. To preempt what the NT is allowed to say.
But there’s no reason to think NT writers begin where you begin. Even if you think Trinitarian theology generates internal tensions vis-à-vis the one-over-many relation (“numerical identity”), what if NT writers don’t share your concern about how Jesus can be Yahweh if the Father is Yahweh?
That’s really a separate issue. You have to play the hand you’re dealt. If NT writers who treat the Father as Yahweh also treat the Son as Yahweh, then that’s what you’ve got to work with. The NT doesn’t prioritize one set of statements over another set of statements in that regard.
iv) When we move to philosophical synthesis, even if (arguendo) the Trinity is paradoxical, so what? Paradox is a common phenomenon in math, science, and logic. And some paradoxes prove highly resistant to domestication. Cf. N. Rescher, Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution (Open Court 2001); R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes (Cambridge, 2nd ed., 2002).
Re: your narrative line - sorry, I don’t understand anything about the ‘poetics of narrativity’ that would require a ‘God’ which is not a self to be depicted as a self...
i) Narrative theology doesn’t “require” it to be either “a self” or several “selves.” That’s beside the point.
The point is the narratological function of the divine character in the story, as well as whether or not the narrator has any particular occasion to distinguish more than one divine character.
ii) Keep in mind, too, that a “self” is a rather crude category to work with.
Yes, an almighty God could appear other than he is, but I don’t see how this changes the fact that ‘God’ in the OT is supposed to be a god.
Do Trinitarians deny the fact that “God” in the OT is supposed to be divine? How is that pertinent to the issue at hand?
= is a one-one relation. Two different things can’t be = to one thing. This is self-evident, when you grasp what is meant by = (numerical identity). It is ‘exclusive’ in that nothing else can be = to a thing, but only itself. If I’m sounding dogmatic on this, I am - this is basic logic.
i) I used “=” to equate “kurios” as a Septuagintal loanword for Yahweh. You’re transferring what I said to something else.
ii) In addition, you’re imposing your extraneous grid on the NT data. On the face of it, NT writers don’t say the Father and the Son can’t both be Yahweh, even though NT writers also distinguish the two. Maybe you think that’s illogical, but you can’t use that to gag the witness of the NT. You have to let the writers say what they want say, whether or not that adds up in your own mind.
v) You also have a simplistic notion of how two things can (or can’t be) one thing, or vice versa. But there are different ways of modeling identity. Take enantiomorphic symmetries. These can be mapped onto each other in one-to-one correspondence, yet they’re not interchangeable.
The verses you put so much weight on are like this: OT text says Yahweh will do X. NT applies that text to Jesus, making it be fulfilled in him. So, he’s Yahweh, no? No! You’re saddling the text with foolish nonsense - saying that those are =, even though they differ (some things are true of one that aren’t true of the other).
I don’t see any fundamental, or even appreciable, difference between the way NT writers apply Yahwistic texts to Jesus and the way they apply Yahwistic texts to the Father. They freely alternate in their ascriptions.
You have a habit of relativizing one set over against another set although the NT itself doesn’t do that. But in exegeting a passage, the salient issue is not whether that seems like “foolish nonsense” to the reader (i.e. Dale Tuggy), but whether that seems like “foolish nonsense” to the writer (e.g. St. Paul, St. John).
Whether that’s foolish nonsense from Tuggy’s viewpoint is immaterial, since all that counts is the viewpoint of the NT writer. In doing exegesis, you need to assume their viewpoint, not substitute your own viewpoint for theirs.
That’s the case whether or not you agree with them. But if you disagree, what are you going on? If you don’t have God’s self-revelation to guide you, what’s your fallback? Only God can disclose what God is like.
Really, those texts needn’t puzzle. Analogy: Astrologer says “Bush will invade Iraq.” Years later, general Smith leads the charge (sent in by Bush). See, she says, my prediction was fulfilled in Smith. She doesn't think Bush is Smith. Rather, it was through Smith that Bush accomplished his invasion.
That’s you’re harmonistic gloss, but NT writers frequently apply Yahwistic passages interchangeably to the Father and the Son.
I read the first edition of Greg Stafford's "Jehovah's Witnesses Defended: An Answer to Scholars and Critics" when it first came out. I have a high regard to the many learned readers and commentators of this blog. In order not to sidetrack Steve's blog, you're all invited to comment about the book on my blog at
ReplyDeletehttp://gospelcrumbs.blogspot.com/2011/06/your-comments-about-greg-staffords-book.html
One way to analyze whether John 17:3 supports Unitarianism over Trinitarianism is to identify all the propositions it entails and consider which of them (if any) are inconsistent with Trinitarianism.
ReplyDelete"And this is eternal life, that they know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent." (ESV)
Given that the referent of 'you' is the Father (v. 1), we can see that it entails the following four propositions:
[1] Eternal life is to know the Father.
[2] The Father is the only true God.
[3] Eternal life is (also) to know Jesus Christ.
[4] Jesus Christ was sent by the Father.
Clearly [1], [3], and [4] present no problem for Trinitarians. ([3] may well present a problem for Unitarians, given the broader context, but that's an argument for another time.) [2] is the only potentially problematic one for Trinitarians -- and this is the proposition Unitarians focus on, of course.
I can understand why one might think that [2] is incompatible with Social Trinitarianism, since according to ST the Father and the Son are numerically distinct divine beings (or substances). But ST is just one interpretation of Trinitarianism. [2] is quite compatible with Latin Trinitarianism; indeed [2] seems to be entailed by LT (as defined, e.g., in Tuggy's SEP article). According to LT, the Father is truly God and there is no other God than the Father; that is, there is no other divine being than that divine being identified with the Father. Yet it is also true (however mysteriously) that the Son is truly God; that is, the Son is to be identified with that same divine being, even while the Son is distinct from the Father (i.e., the Son possesses properties not possessed by the Father).
Now the immediate Unitarian response to this (reflected in Dale's comment here) is to complain that Latin Trinitarianism is paradoxical. But note that this is no longer an exegetical argument; it's a philosophical one. The upshot is that John 17:3 can be effectively wielded against Trinitarianism only if one rules out a priori that biblical teachings can be paradoxical.
Of course, Dale hasn't ignored this important point. Quite the opposite: he has published a critique of my defense of theological paradox (or 'mysterianism' as he calls it). My only point here is that there are philosophical presuppositions being brought to the biblical data that pretty much determine in advance what kind of exegetical arguments one will find compelling.
In case anyone reads this, you should fix the blockquote problems above, so folks can tell who is saying what.
ReplyDeleteConsider this sentence: Steve, poster on this blog, likes beer.
Here, I affirm that you like beer. But this also shows I assume what is in the dependent clause. Why'd I add it? To clarify just who I was talking about. I'm not here asserting that you post here, but this does show I assume it.
Now, go back to the verse. Jesus is praying in front of the disciples.
"Now this is eternal life: that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent."
Again, the relative clause specifies who the "you" is. It's the only true God - the speaker here assumes that the Father (v.1) is (numerically identical to) the one true God.
The only difference between the examples is that "poster on this blog" but not "the one true God" could be predicated of more than one thing.
Re: John 17:5 - oh, I see - you think it implies pre-existence. We think it is a matter of foreknowledge - there are other NT examples of this idiom, but I don't have time to dig them up at the moment. This is a wash in the present debate.
ReplyDelete"Your argument would only go through if (a) John always uses “theos” as a common noun rather than a proper noun, and (b) John reserves “theos” for the Father to the exclusion of the Son."
Eh, no, I don't think so. The question is who John thinks is identical to whom. He can use words however, according to all the normal rules of language.
I think in the phrase "one true god" the noun theos is a common noun, but because of the qualifiers, it can only apply to one being. So, it is much like a proper noun.
"disregard the idiomatic nature of the phase" No, I do not.
"as I already pointed out (which you ignore), John sets this characterization in implicit contrast"
Sorry, I don't see what this has to do with a unitarian reading of John 17.
"The point is not to contrast the deity of the Father with the non-deity of the Son."
Well, sure. The point is not being made, for it is everywhere assumed in the NT. There is no need to make that point. They saw Jesus with their eyes. They touched and smelled him, and knew him to be a man. And they assumed Yahweh to not be a man. And they heard and saw Jesus pray to God, and relate to God, who he said was HIS god too. The agonies of Chalcedonian two-natures theories never entered their heads.
"a theoretical problem, not a doctrinal problem" Distinction without a difference, I think. If there are several incompatible claims which various folk firmly believe is THE doctrine - Sorry, that seems like a doctrinal problem to me. Nor is it separable from interpretive issues.
ReplyDelete"That argument cuts both ways."
No, not at all!
"If NT writers often assign Yahwist passages to the Father, would you say, We can’t take such applications to imply that the Father is Yahweh himself, though. Why? That’s inconsistent, because according to the texts some things are true of one that are not true of the other."
Steve, slow down, my friend. It's explicitly said, and plainly assumed throughout the NT, that Father = Yahweh. That needn't confuse anyone, if those names should also be applied to others. (How many "Steves" are there in the world?) The texts do not say anything of the Father that isn't true of Yahweh - if they did, one or more writers would be confused.
"It’s a presupposition of Trinitarian doctrine that the Father, Son, and Spirit differ in some respect. Everything that’s true of the Father won’t be true of the Son without remainder, or vice versa."
Right - so it can't be that each is numerically identical to God. Do you see why?
Add in the point that Father = God/Yahweh, and since the Son isn't = the Father, then he can't be = God. He could (consistently with this) be divine in some sense, and he could be addressed as "God", and even called a god. The fathers like Origen would agree with all this. I think that he's not asserted to be literally divine, because the NT uses the OT concept of divinity, as outlined in Is 40-55. Origin had that concept, but also used a looser Greek concept of a god (on which BOTH f and s count as gods).
"i) I’m not sure if your using “God” as common noun or a proper noun."
In the part quoted, name/proper noun. only names can go on either side of a = symbol.
"Once again, your objection cuts both ways. Yes, NT writers identify the Father with Yahweh. But NT writers also identify Jesus with Yahweh. They treat the Father as divine, but they also treat Jesus as divine."
ReplyDeleteNot, this is a confusion. They do not identify Jesus as YHWH. Theologians are sloppy in their identity talk; what you say is true if "identify" means "associate with". But not if "identify" means assert or assume to be numerically identical to. But that's how I've been using it all along.
You grant that no NT author thinks f=s - they deny that. Well, they'd be pitifully confused if they also thought f = g and s = g. Do you see why?
"Rather, you’ve chosen to artificially privilege NT statements about the Father’s Yahwistic identity, make that your yardstick, then oppose that to NT statements about the Son’s Yahwistic identity."
Oh dear, it's too late for Bauckham-talk... Working on a paper on that. I'll just say now, no, I'm looking at the whole picture - have been for a long time.
"you begin with your philosophical preconception of what constitutes identity"
ReplyDeleteWe all interpret the Bible assuming laws of logic and other self-evident truths (e.g. no claim can be both true and false, and no contradiction is true).
Thus, this:
"You’re using your philosophical categories to prejudge the exegetical results. To preempt what the NT is allowed to say."
is a hollow charge. Compare: you object to my contradictory reading of some passage. I can complain till I'm blue in the face that you're allowing your philosophical commitments distort your reading of the text. You should allow that contradictions can be true, and embrace my nonsense. In a case like this, you'd be in the right; it's called common sense, and we should thank God we've got it.
If you want to know why paradoxes are epistemological trouble, read my "On Positive Mysterianism", which discusses in depth James Anderson's creative attempt, in my view, the best yet, to defend positive mysterianism.
"Do Trinitarians deny the fact that “God” in the OT is supposed to be divine? How is that pertinent to the issue at hand?"
Good question. If "being divine" means being (= to) a god, then yes, many social trinitarians do deny that "God" is a god! They think it's a group, or maybe a complex thing which consists of selves but isn't a self. By a "god" here I mean just what is meant in both mono- and polytheism - a powerful, conscious being, a self, with a domain in which they act, which in some sense ought to be honored by someone. Others, in particular modalists (who are legion), do think that Father, Son, and Spirit constitute a god. Others are unclear about it, though outside of theologizing, they think of the Trinity as a self.
"imposing your extraneous grid" The crime, I take it, is reading them as assuming the identity of the Father and Yahweh. Sorry, that's just common sense - no big theory at work there. In a way, it's like figuring out that Abram just is Abraham.
"You also have a simplistic notion of how two things can (or can’t be) one thing, or vice versa."
Eh, no. There are many senses in which things can be "the same" or "identical". Having studied and taught metaphysics, I'm probably aware of most. Indeed, most come up in my SEP piece somewhere or other.
"But there are different ways of modeling identity. Take enantiomorphic symmetries. These can be mapped onto each other in one-to-one correspondence, yet they’re not interchangeable."
Example please? I'm not familiar with that term.
"Whether that’s foolish nonsense from Tuggy’s viewpoint is immaterial"
Well, we've finally agreed on something! ;-) The thing is, no one likes contradictions, and everyone has the concept of =, and knows the indiscernibility of identicals. And that's really all the philosophy that is at issue here. The project is finding a charitable and plausible interpretation - one which is seemingly consistent (charitable) and plausible - so it can't require any really out there thesis which only mathematicians or logicians or metaphysicians or physicists can grasp. Unitarian readings are just of this sort - they read the NT as self-consistent, and don't attribute anachronistic ideas to the authors. This is in sharp contrast to some (not all) Trinity theories.
"NT writers frequently apply Yahwistic passages interchangeably to the Father and the Son."
This is fine, not confusing, in a context where everyone assumes them to differ.
James Anderson said...
ReplyDeleteSocial Trinitarianism, since according to ST the Father and the Son are numerically distinct divine beings (or substances). But ST is just one interpretation of Trinitarianism.
To anyone who wants to answer...
Please excuse my theological ignorance, but is Social Trinitarianism an orthodox Evangelical option? I'm guessing "no" because it appears to be a form of tritheism (and so a form of polytheism). Or are there Evangelicals who hold t ST? My understanding is that most hold to something like LT. A small minority are open to the possibility of something like Eastern Orthodox Trinitarianism (EOT).
In times past Steve has been willing to let go of some of the distinctives of patristic trinitarianism because he's found them to be subordinationistic. I'm kind of sympathetic to that but then what keeps ringing in my ears is the rhetorical question that anti-trinitarians (like Stafford) ask, "Why is the relationship between the first and second persons of the Trinity that of Father and Son? Why doesn't Scripture present the personal relationships of the Godhead as the eternal three brothers?" (paraphrase).
James, good analysis, as always.
ReplyDeleteYes, LT - or at least, the less sophisticated, contradictory sort - is consistent with f = y.
"this is no longer an exegetical argument; it's a philosophical one"
This is a key disagreement. I say there is no way to isolate exegesis from your wider intuitions about what is true, and about what is possible and impossible. I think you should agree - when seeking to exegete a passage, we all strive for consistency. Yes, as a last resort, one might allow a paradoxical reading - but normally, that sinks a proposed interpretation. Trying to get into the head of the writer, we try to come up with something seemingly consistent; we're reluctant to conclude that his beliefs are contradictory.
I'm *acutely* aware of the ploblem of reading our theories into ancient texts. This is a desperate problem we all face in really listening to those with very different views, or from very different backgrounds. The key is to work out the assumptions operative in the texts themselves.
"Please excuse my theological ignorance, but is Social Trinitarianism an orthodox Evangelical option? I'm guessing "no" because it appears to be a form of tritheism (and so a form of polytheism). Or are there Evangelicals who hold t ST?"
ReplyDeleteExcellent questions, Annoyed. The answer to the last is clearly yes. Many evangelical philosophers hold to ST - Hasker, Moreland, Craig, Copan.
Is it tritheism - I argue yes, in a (hopefully forthcoming) paper. I argue that it is also unbiblical because it makes God out to be a group, and not a self.
Yes, the early fathers were, largely, subordinationists. That is, subordinationist unitarians! Stafford's question is a good one. Brothers, triplets, would be better analogies, if ST were true.
"In times past Steve has been willing to let go of some of the distinctives of patristic trinitarianism because he's found them to be subordinationistic"
Indeed - many thoughtful evangelicals come to the conclusion, with which I agree, that the fathers never had any good biblical grounds for their claims of eternal generation and procession. That is, the texts they cite just don't mean that. And yes, those traditional claims to imply a sort of subordination (the two exist because of the one).
"This is a key disagreement. I say there is no way to isolate exegesis from your wider intuitions about what is true, and about what is possible and impossible. I think you should agree - when seeking to exegete a passage, we all strive for consistency."
ReplyDeleteHi Dale,
1. Can exegesis ever correct or overturn our intuitions? If so, how would this look? If not, why not?
2. How strong or reliable are our intuitions regarding God?
3. Isn't exegesis the process of getting into the sandals of the original audience and finding out what the text meant to them? If that original meaning is inconsistent with some extra biblical intuition, aren't we doing something closer to systematic theology now?
4. I saw you remark that we ought to believe that which seems true to us. If it seems to Jones that it is morally permissible to rape women for fun, are you saying Jones *ought* to believe this? If not, how would you qualify your claim?
5. The philosophical problems involved in identity are no stranger to many, and from some simple applications of identity rules we can derive all kinds of seemingly contradictory or impossible or counterintuitive results. We have clashing intuitions here. Now, there's many answers to these problems, but there's no agreement that any particular one works. Some philosophers think our notions of identity should be reworked, broadened, etc. (Peter Unger makes this claim in All the Power in the World). Shouldn't this factor into our exegesis?
6. At one level, the Bible is a collection of books written by many different authors over thousands of years. Considering that alone, there's no problem with the meaning of a text T written at time t1 by author A1 conflicting with the meaning of T* written at t2 by A2. Considering this alone, there's no reason to "strive for consistency." Exegesis just gets at the meaning. However, when you add the theological presupposition that *God* has authored the entire Bible via inspiring each individual author, then on the presupposition you would want to strive for consistency via the principle of charity. But then there's several other theological presuppositions one could add such that they override any intuitional blank check. For example, here my be one: when my fallible and fallen intuitions conflict with what I take the text to teach, and I have studied the matter out, I should submit rather than reinterpret so as to find a fit between the text and my fallen and fallible intuitions. Thus, if we include the entire set of theological presuppositions in our doing exegesis, it seems less likely that intuitions would have any kind of blank check. Indeed, we see in the Bible many cases of theological truths that conflicted with what the original audience thought true or possible. On your model, it seems harsh that Jesus would say to Peter, "get behind me Satan," for Peter simply interpreted Jesus' claims that he must suffer and die through his intuitions of what he thought was true and possible or impossible in regard to the messiah.
Sorry to bombard you with questions, but I'm just trying to get the claim you think fundamental in this discussion.
Dale, you're probably aware of the following questions, issues and comments I'll be making. But these are these are some of the things that led me out of an Arianistic view in my early years and into trinitarianism. I would ask any non-trinitarian the following questions.
ReplyDeleteHow would you deal with Old Testament passages that suggest (admittedly not conclusively) that there are multiple persons to whom the divine name (YHWH the tetragrammaton) belongs? Or that that there's some kind of plurality about the one true God? Both of which would be consistent with the (Latin) Trinitarian position that three persons share the one being (i.e. substance or essence) of God. That what can be attributed to the being of God can be attributed to each of the persons of the Godhead.
Here are some examples:
Genesis 19:24 "Then the LORD rained brimstone and fire on Sodom and Gomorrah, from the LORD out of the heavens."
This passage suggests that there are two YHWHs. One on earth who had been speaking to Abraham and one in heaven.
Isaiah 54:5: "For your Maker is your husband…" [Literally: makers, husbands.]
Ecclesiastes 12:1: "Remember now you creator…" [Literally: creators.]
Psalm 149:2: "Let Israel rejoice in their Maker." [Literally: makers.]
possibly Job 35:10 too, see John Gill on that verse
Joshua 24:19: "…holy God…" [Literally: holy Gods.]
John Gill says of this verse, "In the Hebrew text it is, 'for the Holy Ones [are] he': which may serve to illustrate and confirm the doctrine of the trinity of, persons in the unity of the divine Essence, or of the three divine holy Persons, holy Father, holy Son, holy Spirit, as the one God..."
Hosea 1:7: "Yet I will have mercy on the house of Judah, will save them by the LORD their God, and will not save them by bow, nor by sword or battle, by horses or horsemen."
Here YHWH speaks about another person as YHWH.
Zechariah 2:8-9: "For thus says the LORD of Hosts: "He sent Me after glory, to the nations which plunder you; for he that touches you touches the apple of His eye. For surely I will shake My hand against them, and they shall become spoil for their servants. Then you will know that the LORD of hosts has sent Me."
This passage could be referring to the prophet (Zechariah) himself, or (possibly) it has YHWH speaking and saying that another person who is YHWH has sent Him (i.e. YHWH).
Isaiah 48:16
" Come near to Me, hear this: I have not spoken in secret from the beginning; From the time that it was, I was there. And now the Lord GOD [YHWH] and His Spirit Have sent Me."
to be continued:
Here's another passage where YHWH is speaking and says that another person who is YHWH and YHWH's Spirit (evidently the Holy Spirit) has sent Him (i.e. YHWH who was speaking).
ReplyDeleteThere are places where God speaking speaks of "Us" as if there's a plurality in the Godhead.
Gen. 1:26 "Then God said, "Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness..."
Gen. 3:22 "22 Then the LORD God said, "Behold, the man has become like one of Us..."
Isa. 6:8 "Also I heard the voice of the Lord, saying: " Whom shall I send, And who will go for Us?" Then I said, "Here am I! Send me."
The New Testament teaches that no one has ever seen God (John 1:18; 5:37; 6:46; 1 John 4:12). Yet people did see God in the OT. How do you account for that? Trinitarians make sense of that by concluding that no one has seen YHWH the Father, but have seen YHWH the Son.
Here are some examples where the true God has been seen in the OT:
Gen. 18 has YHWH appearing to Abraham in (apparently) human form and speaking to him.
Exodus 24:9-10
"Then Moses went up, also Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel,
and they saw the God of Israel. And there was under His feet as it were a paved work of sapphire stone, and it was like the very heavens in its clarity."
Isa. 6 is a classic passage. I've already mentioned verse 8 above.
Verse 1 of chapter 6 says that Isaiah saw the "Lord" sitting on a throne. This one of the 134 passages the Sopherim substituted "YHWH" with "Adonai". Clearly Isaiah saw "YHWH" because of verse 5 where Isaiah says, "...For my eyes have seen the King, The LORD [YHWH] of hosts."
Interestingly the writer of the Gospel of John seems to identify the one sitting on the throne as Jesus. Because after quoting Isa. chapter 6, the writer says in verse 41, "These things Isaiah said when he saw His glory and spoke of Him."
Gen 3:8 suggests that Adam and Eve had previously seen God's form.
Gen. 3:8 "And they heard the sound of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day, and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God among the trees of the garden."
The major thing that led me to view Jesus as being fully divine is how the New Testament repeatedly and without explanation applies OT passages or phrases, or concepts, or titles, or attributes, or activites (etc) of YHWH to Jesus. They are SO numerous and SO pervasive that, for me personally, I cannot accept Unitarian explanation of it being examples of "agentival" representation (e.g. Anthony Buzzard).
ReplyDeleteHere's just one example out of dozens:
Jesus speaking in Rev. 2:23 "I will kill her children with death, and all the churches shall know that I am He who searches the minds and hearts. And I will give to each one of you according to your works."
compare with:
Jer. 17:10 "I, the LORD, search the heart, I test the mind, Even to give every man according to his ways, According to the fruit of his doings."
Ps. 62:12 "Also to You, O Lord, belongs mercy; For You render to each one according to his work."
1 Kings 8:39 "then hear in heaven Your dwelling place, and forgive, and act, and give to everyone according to all his ways, whose heart You know (for You alone know the hearts of all the sons of men),"
Dale said...
ReplyDeleteYes, the early fathers were, largely, subordinationists. That is, subordinationist unitarians! Stafford's question is a good one. Brothers, triplets, would be better analogies, if ST were true.
You know what? I think Stafford may have used the term "triplets". I forget.
Dale said...
I agree, that the fathers never had any good biblical grounds for their claims of eternal generation and procession. That is, the texts they cite just don't mean that. And yes, those traditional claims to imply a sort of subordination (the two exist because of the one).
Correct me if I'm wrong but all those who hold to the "Eternal
Generation" of the Son also hold to "Eternal Sonship". While NOT all who hold to "Eternal Sonship" hold to "Eternal Generation". LT and EOT disagree on the Spirit's procession (the Filioque controversy). If I recall correctly, men like Adam Clarke and Walter Martin rejected both. Martin would only refer to the pre-incarnate Christ as the "Word" and not as the "Son". It does seem strange to me that if Calvin's view of Christ being autotheos were true then the term "twins" or "triplets" would make more sense. The NT clearly teaches the subordination of the Son to the Father. The question is whether it's only functional and economic or ontological.
For myself, while I have my doubts and questions as to what the Bible actually teaches on the subject, I side with the Latin Trinitarian view. I'm compelled to so long as I maintain to 1. the divine inspiration of Scripture, 2. the inerrancy of Scripture
and 3. the consistency and coherence of Scripture. I'm forced to LT given the following premises.
1. There's only one true God who is YHWH.
2. God is personal not impersonal.
3. The Father (mentioned in the NT) is a person.
4. The Son (mentioned in the NT) is a person.
5. The Holy Spirit (mentioned in the NT) is a person.
6. The person of the Father is not the person of Son or the person of the Holy Spirit.
7. The person of the Son is not the person of the Father or the person of the Holy Spirit.
8. The person of the Holy Spirit is not the person of the Father or the person of the Son.
9. The Father is YHWH (and so the only true God).
10. The Son is YHWH (and so the only true God).
11. The Holy Spirit is YHWH (and so the only true God).
12. There's only one YHWH not two or three.
Here are a few more examples of the NT implying Jesus is fully the one true God.
ReplyDeleteMatt 12:6 "But I say to you that something greater than the temple is here.
"
How could Jesus claim that He is greater than the temple if the temple was the very house of God. It was the localization of the omnipresent God because the Ark with the Shekinah glory was (supposed to) be there. Even though, the 2nd temple probably didn't contain the Ark in the Holy of Holies, the point stands.
John 1:14 "And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth."
The Greek for "dwelt" can be translated "tabernacled", implying that in the incarnation God is present like He is in the temple.
Hebrews 1:3 refers to Jesus as "the radiance of His [God's] glory..." This implies that Jesus is as much God as the shekinah glory of God in the OT.
Again, dozens and dozens of examples can be given where Jesus is so intimately associated with the one true God that something like Sabellianism/modalism, or Binitarianism or Trinitarianism MUST be true.
"1."
ReplyDeleteYes!
"If so, how would this look? If not, why not?"
It would seem to one more strongly that P & Q that it would seem that P & Q are inconsistent.
"2. How strong or reliable are our intuitions regarding God?"
I think they run the gamut.
"3."
Yes
"If that original meaning is inconsistent with some extra biblical intuition, aren't we doing something closer to systematic theology now?"
Yes - but I'm concerned with the prior stage - where you're asking yourself if this author really thought both P & Q, where it seems obvious that both can't be true.
"4."
No - it can also seem to us that we are malfunctioning. In your example, we assume the man also knows that is wrong, and so he ought not trust those seemings. Some seemings trump or undermine others.
"5."
No, not really. The most significant problem is probably that of intrinsic change, which one might think contradicts the Indiscernibility of Identicals.
"Some philosophers think our notions of identity should be reworked, broadened, etc. ... Shouldn't this factor into our exegesis?"
For the human authors' intended meanings, usually not - as they didn't have the requisite training to think these deep thoughts. I only bring in points about = which are part of our God-given common sense. For God's intended meanings - maybe. How plausible this is totally depends.
The main thing you have in mind, I think, are doctrines of relative identity. To say these are controversial is an understatement. I think the Geach type view contradicts self-evident truths - see my SEP entry on this. The Rea type view does as well - I show this in a forthcoming paper, but see the discussion by Hughes.
"6. At one level, the Bible is a collection of books... Considering this alone, there's no reason to "strive for consistency." Exegesis just gets at the meaning."
Sure there is. Charity applies to coherent groups as well, e.g. the apostles. Yes, I agree that considering God as the author gives all the more reason to come up with a plausible reading, although I don't believe in inerrancy.
"it seems less likely that intuitions would have any kind of blank check."
Who thinks they do?
"On your model, it seems harsh that Jesus would say to Peter, "get behind me Satan," for Peter simply interpreted Jesus' claims that he must suffer and die through his intuitions of what he thought was true and possible or impossible in regard to the messiah."
No, I have no problem whatever with this sort of case. That we have expectations that clash with the texts is a lot of what makes them interesting and important. What concerns me is that hard core of truths which God has made self-evident to us, of the same status as 1+1=2. These, it seems no divine revelation could override. Do you see why? Not all seemings are alike - there is a sort of top level to them. "The Messiah will immediately bring peace to Jerusalem" is something that may have seem pretty dare strongly to some folk, but it was never near the level where the opposite seems as plain as day to be impossible.
There are two lights - reason (or right reason) and revelation. Both are the voice of God to us. Protestant theology has always listed hard towards revelation and dumped on reason - but this, in my view, inconsistently. For they rely on it as much as anyone.
"How would you deal with Old Testament passages that suggest (admittedly not conclusively) that there are multiple persons to whom the divine name (YHWH the tetragrammaton) belongs?"
ReplyDeleteI would make the elementary point that names can be used of different beings. (Believe it or not, there is or recently was another "Dale Tuggy" in the world.)
Then, I'd point out that ancient Judaism there was a talk of beings acting on God's behalf "bearing his name." Finally, God *gave* his name to Jesus - it wasn't eternally his. (Phil 2:9)
The "hints of plurality" are, in my view, much overblown. Why would God throw out a handful of hints that he's not a self, when the whole rest of the OT robustly presents him as a self?
About your cases of words with singular meaning but plural (or plural-compatible) form: Suppose I wrote an essay about my pants. They're well broken in, fit just right, are oh so stylish. And, I've got 'em on right now.
It would be a funny sort of exegesis to think I'm hinting about many pants because "pants" in English is structurally plural (or rather, it has only one form for both singular and plural), especially when I clearly imply that it's one pair of which I speak.
Annoyed - none of the passages you cite, even if you're correct in your reading of them, would rule out Clarke's or Origen's subordinationst unitarianism. They too took the view that any theophany in the OT was the pre-incarnate Son. I'm not so sure. See Heb 1:1-2. About that text in John, I see two readings. (1) It is a generalization, but not a universal one,(2) it was misc. angels who always stood in for God in OT theophanies. About this "seeing" - in some of the passages you cite, I suspect it is not seeing with the eyes, but rather understanding, or being personally acquainted with, by our natural powers.
Be careful with this sort of argument. Your view is that no one has ever seen g / f. But, there's another person, also called "YHWH" that was seen, when people thought they were seeing g/f. So...? This seems perfectly neutral between trinitarianism and subordinationist unitarianism. In fact, so long as these one or more other "YHWH"s were not the pre-human Jesus, it's compatible with humanitarian unitarianism as well.
Or that that there's some kind of plurality about the one true God? Both
"the New Testament repeatedly and without explanation applies OT passages or phrases, or concepts, or titles, or attributes, or activites (etc) of YHWH to Jesus"
ReplyDeleteYes indeed, without explanation.
Here's one explanation: it is hinting that Jesus is just Yahweh himself.
Here's another: the audience needed no explanation because this sort of agential relationship with God was familiar to them.
The problem with the first is that it would make the NT books contradictory - all of them assume some things are true of Jesus that are not true of God, and vice versa. (indiscernibility of identicals)
Thanks for the answers Dale. A lot could be said as pertains to your argument from exegesis, but I'll just touch on this
ReplyDelete"What concerns me is that hard core of truths which God has made self-evident to us, of the same status as 1+1=2. These, it seems no divine revelation could override. Do you see why?"
I can understand this for the realm of creation. But I'm not sure this easily maps one-to-one over to God. He's sui generis, incomprehensible, a qualitatively not just quantitatively different kind of being, I have no experience with "gods" of the sort I do with everyday, mundane experience. So it seems to me that intuitions kind of run out and aren't as helpful. Revelation is needed.
DALE SAID:
ReplyDelete"Here's another: the audience needed no explanation because this sort of agential relationship with God was familiar to them."
Several basic problems with that explanation:
i) Passages like Jn 1:17 and Heb 1:1-2 posit a stark contrast between mere agents of God and the Son of God.
ii) Jn 1:18 (cf. 6:46) lays down the principle that only God can reveal God.
iii) Angels are agents of God, yet things said about the Angel of the Lord that aren't said about angels in general.
Likewise, prophets are agents of God, but the Spirit of God stands back of the prophets as the divine source of their inspiration.
So the Bible goes behind agency.
iv) Statements are made about the Son which are not reducible to agency (e.g. Heb 1:3).
"I can understand this for the realm of creation. But I'm not sure this easily maps one-to-one over to God. He's sui generis, incomprehensible, a qualitatively not just quantitatively different kind of being, I have no experience with "gods" of the sort I do with everyday, mundane experience. So it seems to me that intuitions kind of run out and aren't as helpful. Revelation is needed."
ReplyDeleteRight - I'm far from being a deist. But I find that many theologians who are not trained in philosophy don't appreciate the concept of a necessary truth - something such that its falsity is absolutely impossible. These are not garder variety generalizations, even universal/exceptionless ones. These apply universally, and would be true even if there were no cosmos. They are true no matter what. So, they apply to God, if they are true. They are not cosmos bound, nor are they really based on our sensory experience. This is all perfectly compatible with God being sui generis, as well as, in a sense "incomprehensible" (but we should be careful with that term - it can be defined in ways incompatible with theism!)
"Jn 1:18 (cf. 6:46) lays down the principle that only God can reveal God."
ReplyDeleteI don't see any general principle there, nor, I think, do most readers. It just asserts that the Son has uniquely revealed God. You're reading the general principle into it, I'm afraid. I think you mean: only a divine being can reveal a divine being. But, that's nowhere stated. And, come on, in a sense, any true prophet does reveal God. (Of course, this requires action on God's part.)
Dale,
ReplyDeleteRight - I'm far from being a deist. But I find that many theologians who are not trained in philosophy don't appreciate the concept of a necessary truth - something such that its falsity is absolutely impossible.
That may be, and I certainly wouldn't want to be taken as denying a necessary truth (!), but (a) there may be something about being God that makes what appears to violate a necessary truth not *actually* a violation of a necessary truth. If your argument is that the Bible can never *actually* violate a necessary truth, fine. If it is that it can *never* *appear* to, then that's not as obvious to me. So while I grant the first point, what's the argument for the second?
And (b), there needs to be more done than simply saying, "It's a necessary truth, so that's the end of matters, no discussion on my end is needed." Because some things may look like necessary truths to us and we find out later that they weren't. With other things, there's serious debate. For example, I suppose you'd say that if anything is a necessary truth, this is: ¬(A & ¬A).
But enter the dialetheists with their sophisticated arguments that are not so easy to refute. They put forward possible counterexamples of the LNC. One response is to say, "Hmmm, I guess what I thought was a necessary truth, isn't." But if some serious candidate is put forward that suggests the necessary truth isn't a necessary truth after all, then I'm not sure it's appropriate to say, "Look, I'm not even going to discuss your counterexample, for the truth is a necessary truth, and thus you simply *must* be wrong." That'd be rather question begging. Moreover, as you know, it's not like the dialetheists deny that the LNC holds for a great many cases—they're not trivialists, after all—they just claim there's some *unique* cases for which it doesn't hold. Normally it holds for the majority of cases, however there's some unique case for which it doesn't hold." Also, maybe intuitionist logics is correct. I don't think so, but boy, intuitionists certainly have some good arguments for their view (and I'm not saying dialetheism *demands* intuitionist logic). Thus, it is at least *possible* (epistemically) for me to think that maybe there's a counterexample to certain normally good inferences drawn by using of identity logic. Odd? Sure! *Impossible*, hmm, I don't know. Now, maybe that's wrong, but it makes things not appear as simple as you appear to make it. And I'm also not saying dialetheism should be or can be applied to the trinity, I was just using them to make the point.