I’m going to comment on a recent post by Bill Vallicella:
“Hitch has lived his life as if God and the soul are childish fictions. As a result, he has done none of the things that might earn him him immortality and fellowship with God, even assuming he wanted them. This suggests that it is not just strange, but incoherent to pray for Hitch's metanoia. For that would be like praying that he win the lottery without playing, without doing the things necessary to win it.”
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2010/09/on-praying-for-christopher-hitchens.html
From a Christian standpoint, the obvious problem with this objection is his assumption that salvation is something we must earn. That might be good Buddhist theology, but it’s poor Christian theology.
“Hitch does not want salvation of his soul via divine agency, and he has reasons that seem good to him for denying that there is such a thing. And he presumably believes (though I am speculating here) that survival of bodily death and entry into the divine milieu would not be desirable. For one thing, his brilliance would be outshone by a greater Brilliance which would be unbearable for someone with the pride of Lucifer, the pride of the light bearer. It may also be that he believes, as many atheists and mortalists do, that the meaning of life here below, far from requiring a protraction into an afterlife, is positively inconsistent with such an extension. ‘How boring and meaningless eternity would be, especially without booze and cigarettes and (sexual intercourse with) women!’"
This is a stress-point in freewill theism. God is supposed to respect our choices–even when we make the wrong choices.
But from a Calvinistic standpoint, it’s merciful when God disrespects our foolish, self-destructive choices. Hitchens’ basic problem is his failure to act in his best interests. As such, a Calvinistic prayer for his salvation would be coherent with Reformed theism, although it might well be incoherent with freewill theism.
"But from a Calvinistic standpoint, it’s merciful when God disrespects our foolish, self-destructive choices."
ReplyDeleteThank you Lord!
"Hitchens’ basic problem is his failure to act in his best interests."
For whatever reason, he doesn't think it's his best interest to follow Jesus Christ as his Lord and Savior.
"As such, a Calvinistic prayer for his salvation would be coherent with Reformed theism, although it might well be incoherent with freewill theism."
Okay.
Steve wrote "This is a stress-point in freewill theism. God is supposed to respect our choices–even when we make the wrong choices."
ReplyDeleteSteve, when you say 'this', what exactly is 'this'? Is it the idea that 'earning one's way into heaven' is a stress point for freewill theism? If so, how so?
WRT your point that freewill theism has a stress point, I don't see it (so if you could elaborate, that would be appreciated).
I believe any stress point that exists with freewill theism really is a stress point between Calvinism and freewill theism.
I explain the stress point in the sentence you quote–and that in reference to Vallicella's objection.
ReplyDeleteSteve said: "God is supposed to respect our choices–even when we make the wrong choices."
ReplyDeleteOk.
Do you assert that the above is a necessary consequence of freewill theism?
If the above were re-stated as "God is free to respect our choices-even when we make the wrong choices." would you argue that a stress-point still exists for freewill theism?
The point is not that God is "free" to response our choices, a la freewill theism. Just the opposite: God is not free not to respect our choices, a la freewill theism.
ReplyDeleteOr, dropping the double negation, in freewill theism, God is not at liberty to disrespect our choices.
Steve said: "God is not at liberty to disrespect our choices."
ReplyDeleteAre you saying God's nature demands he punish sinners?
Accordingly, His sovereignty is constrained by His righteousness?
ἐκκλησία said...
ReplyDelete"Are you saying God's nature demands he punish sinners?"
That's a complete non sequitur.
The point, rather, is that in freewill theism God must respect human autonomy. He cannot "violate" our will (as the saying goes).
Steve said: "The point, rather, is that in freewill theism God must respect human autonomy. He cannot "violate" our will (as the saying goes)."
ReplyDeleteThis assertion is unjustified. How is it necessary, in freewill theism, that God cannot "violate" our will (as the saying goes)?
Freewill theism neither asserts, nor demands this; and its not clear why you are asserting it.
Jesus asked God in prayer, that if it were possible, for God to take the cup from Him, yet still Christ submitted Himself to God's will. [Matt 26:39]
Though Christ asked God the father to take the cup from Him, God did not 'respect' His request, and Christ was still faithful.
To believe freewill theology does not require one believe God cannot violate our will. God can and does violate our freewill, but he also considers it.
In [2 Kings 23:18-20] God considered the petition of Josiah to stay His judgment against Jerusalem. Because of Josiah's obedience, God chooses to stayed his judgment, but only until Josiah's death.
Likewise, in [2 Kings 20:1-7] God considered the petition of Hezekiah to spare his life, and God here grants Hezekiah's request.
So how does freewill theology make it necessary for God to respect human autonomy?
If God is at liberty to disrespect our choices, it cannot be a stress point.
I don't know what reading you've done on freewill theism. Your responses to me suggest that you've done precious little. I'm merely summarizing commonplace positions in freewill theism.
ReplyDeleteἘΚΚΛΗΣΊΑ SAID:
ReplyDelete"If God is at liberty to disrespect our choices, it cannot be a stress point."
It's a stress point for freewill theism inasmuch freewill theism denies that God is at liberty to disrespect our choices.
‘How boring and meaningless eternity would be, especially without booze and cigarettes and women!’
ReplyDeleteThis is precisely the way Orthodox view Hell's torments.
Steve said: "It's a stress point for freewill theism inasmuch freewill theism denies that God is at liberty to disrespect our choices."
ReplyDeleteActually, if freewill theism doesn't in fact, deny that God is at liberty to disrespect our choices, than its a straw man.
What freewill theism denies is that the God of the Bible is the God of Calvinist determinism incapable of endowing man with free agency.
Try boning up on freewill theism by reading David Basinger's book, for starters.
ReplyDeleteSteve said: "Try boning up on freewill theism by reading David Basinger's book, for starters."
ReplyDeleteIts a good recommendation, and I haven't yet read Basinger's book.
Even so, I was under the (perhaps mistaken) perception that Jacob Arminius was the grand-father of freewill theism, so I checked out what he had to say.
Jacobus Arminius said (in part): "This is my opinion concerning the free-will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him. Yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace."
In other words, man's free-will does not deny God the ability to disrespect our choices, rather man's free-will only works through the assistance of {God's} Divine Grace.
Free-will is a consequence of God's Grace, not a constraint upon His sovereignty.
"Free-will is a consequence of God's Grace, not a constraint upon His sovereignty."
ReplyDeleteThat sounds nice, but is meaningless. It's like saying, "I'm in control of a vehicle when I let someone else drive because I chose to let them drive." But such a strained concept of "control" turns the definition of the word on its head.
So it is with Sovereignty. You can't say, "God remains sovereign because He gives you free will" because that's like saying "God remains sovereign because He *voluntarily* gave up sovereignty."
Words have meaning. If God gives up sovereignty, He's abdicated the throne. You are now in charge of God.
Furthermore, just what is God's grace doing when you get free will? I mean, if God's grace causes you to choose option A instead of option B, you could hardly say you chose A of *YOUR* free will. If God's grace doesn't do that, then why is it even needed?
ReplyDeleteI would love to see an Arminian actually explain this transaction. Because as it is, the Arminian argument seems to boil down to: "I can't cut God completely out of the picture, so I'll just say He provides grace. As long as I don't have to explain what that grace actually does, then everything's jake!"
And it makes no sense to claim that God's grace *enables* you to choose something. After all, what is keeping you from choosing an option in the first place? By that, I mean, suppose the claim is that God's grace enables you to believe in Him. Before you get that, what *specifically* is it that keeps you from choosing God? Is it because you don't *want* to choose God? But if that is the case, then if God enables you to believe and you still don't want to choose God, then in what sense have you been enabled to believe? How are you actually different?
Just a few of the questions Arminians never bother to get around to thinking about...
ἐκκλησία said:
ReplyDeleteI was under the (perhaps mistaken) perception that Jacob Arminius was the grand-father of freewill theism
Well, I'd guess most people who are freewill theists probably used to be classical Arminians. But I think freewill theism is generally used interchangeably with open theism. Although I suppose it's sometimes used as a broader term to include Arminianism, Molinism, open theism, etc.
Peter Pike said: "I mean, if God's grace causes you to choose option A instead of option B"
ReplyDeleteHow does God's grace causes you to choose anything? Having free will doesn't require that. Only Calvinism presupposes determinism.
But since you say this, do you deny that there are any constraints on God's sovereignty?
Peter Pike said: "I would love to see an Arminian actually explain this transaction. Because as it is, the Arminian argument seems to boil down to: "I can't cut God completely out of the picture, so I'll just say He provides grace."
If course you would. It's the Calvinist's favored straw-man. But before an Arminian is obligated to defend the position, someone needs to show either its a necessary consequence of free will, or that its part-and-parcel of the Arminian position.
If its neither, it needs no argument.
Patrick Chan said: "But I think freewill theism is generally used interchangeably with open theism."
ReplyDeletePerhaps only in Calvinist circles. Freewill theism doesn't necessitate or require open theism. (Equivocation)
I'm not denying that open theists profess to be freewill theists, but it is fallacious to argue that because one is a freewill theists, one is also necessarily an open theist.
Open theism commits the same fallacy as Calvinism does in saying God's perfect foreknowledge makes future events necessary. (Open theism inherits this fallacy from Calvinism because it held this Calvinist argument to be correct)
Freewill theism does not necessarily accept this premise.
Ekklesia,
ReplyDeleteIt would be nice if you actually answered my question. No Arminian has ever explained to me what God's grace is supposed to accomplish when it comes to the will.
What does it do?
Give me the mechanics.
Don't just say, "It does something." I want details. Give me the relevant factors before God's grace and after God's grace so that I can look at it and say, "Ah, so *THIS* right here is exactly what grace is doing."
Otherwise, it's a word without content.
And Arminians *DO* have to answer that question. It's not like they have a default privileged position from which everything else must be compared.
ἐκκλησία said...
ReplyDeleteFreewill theism doesn't necessitate or require open theism. (Equivocation)
I'm not denying that open theists profess to be freewill theists, but it is fallacious to argue that because one is a freewill theists, one is also necessarily an open theist.
Well now, if you're claiming that's what I'm arguing, then you're jumping to conclusions. Just because I said I think x is "generally used interchangeably" with y doesn't therefore mean I then think x and y are interchangeable philosophical positions too. I didn't argue the one logically follows from or entails the other. I didn't make a case either way. I'm just noting what I think I've observed in the literature.
That is, I think what I said refers to common semantic use among Christians - or at least what I perceive to be common semantic use among Christians. But I granted I could be mistaken (hence phrases like "I'd guess," "I think," "I suppose"). I think it's the terminology which is often used interchangeably, whether or not the terms logically entail one another as philosophical positions.
Similarly many people often use the terms "communism" and "socialism" interchangeably. Some communists might even call themselves socialists. But it doesn't necessarily mean the two are interchangeable political ideologies.
Of course, I'd think some of the people using the terms might be using them in a technical philosophical sense and context. So maybe some of these people would think they're interchangeable philosophical positions or make some related sort of an argument. But that's not what I think.
Not to mention you apparently gleaned over the bit where I said: "Although I suppose it's sometimes used as a broader term to include Arminianism, Molinism, open theism, etc."
Peter Pike said: "It would be nice if you actually answered my question."
ReplyDeleteA few questions were also posed of you, which you nicely dodged:"Why is it necessary that God give up sovereignty in order for man to have free will?"
Another question posed was "Are there any constraints on God's sovereignty, what-so-ever (in your opinion)?"
Of course I dodged your question, because neither of us is on the same playing field.
Lets hash out the presuppositions first, and once we've worked that out, then we'll separate the straw-men from the issues.
As it stands though, I suspect we've got differing definitions of free-will, sovereignty, grace and so on.
We must also first understand the underlying presuppositions. If you want answers don't tell me what my position is suppose to be.
I'm willing to defend the Arminian position, but you must first understand what that position is, rather than foisting up what you think it is, or one you think you can defeat.
For the sake of argument, I'll commit to the following presuppositions:
1. There are no constraints to God's grace, or his righteousness;
2. Neither God's grace nor His sovereignty deny man free will;
3. Free will in no way constrains God;
4. God's grace enables man to have free will, but not unlimited free will;
5. Arminianism is monergistic.
6. Arminianism is not open theism.
Ill defend any of the above, and of course the consequences that derive from them.
Arminianism is not monergistic.
ReplyDeleteBTW, I'll respond more later--getting ready for bed. But I'm just looking for a straightforward "Here's the nuts and bolts." I don't care if I agree or not (I'll disagree--we already know that), but no Arminian has ever presented that for me, and it SEEMS to be somewhat important, ya know.
ReplyDeletePatrick Chan said: "Well now, if you're claiming that's what I'm arguing, then you're jumping to conclusions."
ReplyDeleteI agree with your rebuttal Patrick.
Peter Pike said: "Arminianism is not monergistic."
ReplyDeleteFirst Strawman.
Clearly, you've not bothered to read Jacobus Arminius where he most certainly asserts monergism.
Do you want a reference and a web-link?
"How is it necessary, in freewill theism, that God cannot "violate" our will (as the saying goes)?"
ReplyDeleteBecause then we would not be free or responsible (as the saying goes) because, *by definition*, a free and morally responsible will cannot be violated or else it is not the ultimate source of its willing. So it appears analytic. God *can* violate our will, but then we're not free anymore. That's why Universalists will say that God might have to violate some wills to get them into heaven. They claim the desiderata of freely accepting Christ isn't as important as avoiding hell.
"Open theism commits the same fallacy as Calvinism does in saying God's perfect foreknowledge makes future events necessary."
First, what fallacy? The modal one? That's been shown time and time again to not be the issue.
Second, Calvinism does not say God's perfect foreknowledge makes (causes?) future events necessary. On Calvinism that's not true, and on Arminian views our claim is that God's foreknowledge doesn't cause a future event to necessarily happen, but the foreknowledge argument shows that future events are unpreventable.
ἘΚΚΛΗΣΊΑ SAID:
ReplyDelete"Free-will is a consequence of God's Grace, not a constraint upon His sovereignty."
In modern Arminian and neotheist literature, it's a stock claim, repeated ad nauseum, that "true love" can't be "force," that God would never "violate" the will of the creature. Our choices, to be "real," "authentic" choices, must be such that God can't overrule our choices.
That's how the issue is cast by freewill theists generally. And at that level, Vallicella has a point.
Ekklesia said:
ReplyDelete---
Clearly, you've not bothered to read Jacobus Arminius where he most certainly asserts monergism.
---
Clearly you have no understanding of what the term "monergism" means. I don't care if Arminius asserts it or not (although you ought to provide sources for you claims anyway). The bottom line is that unless you hold to regeneration preceeding faith, you are not a monergist.
Monergism literally means "one work" but you have to define what that work is. It's specifically referring to regeneration. Our regeneration is solely the work of God, not predicated by anything man does. It's God doing everything.
So not only do you need regeneration preceding faith, but you need Unconditional Election too.
You might think your view has monergism, but that's like saying the Mormons believe in Jesus. Sure, they have the same word, but there's a fundamental difference between the Second Person of the Trinity who has always been God, and the spirit brother of Satan who happened to evolve to "Godhood."
So don't accuse me of strawmen when you're merely co-opting a Reformed term that has a specific definition and misapplying it to a view such a definition was created to oppose.
Paul Manata said: "Because then we would not be free or responsible (as the saying goes) because, *by definition*, a free and morally responsible will cannot be violated or else it is not the ultimate source of its willing."
ReplyDeletePaul, the core of this controversy is the constraint "cannot". The categorical implication here, is that this 'cannot' is warranted by man's will. But, no Arminian argues that any definition of a free and morally responsible will, places constraints on God. If that were the case, I'd have sympathy for the Calvinist position.
So in the Armenian view, the view of constraint is narrow, being limited only to man's ability to influence God.
Assuming that the Calvinist view of constraint is more broad (apart from man), than yes the Arminian position recognizes that God's sovereignty is limited, but not by man's will, but by God's nature.
Since the Arminian positions posits a free and morally responsible will that has its root in God's grace, this means God's nature alone determines what God does and does not do.
This is no different, than a Calvinist saying it is ridiculous to consider a God that saves everyone. (Indeed such a God's is not the God of the Bible, and this comparison is put forward to show that both Calvinists and Arminians consider God's nature in constructing theology)
Arminians agrees with Calvinist that man never in any circumstances God.
So then does the Calvinist deny God's sovereignty is ever constrained? Biblically, it most certainly is! God promised to never again destroy the earth with a flood; this is a constraint on God's sovereignty, but one imposed by his nature.
So the Calvinist has to decide, are constraints on God's sovereignty permissible if the warrant is his very nature?
Consider the analogy of marriage in God's treatment of the elect [Isa 54:5]
A marriage covenant bonds husband to wife. The terms of the marriage provide blessings on condition the bride remain faithful.
Is it the brides 'will' itself that constrains the husband from violating her will?
Absolutely not. Does the husband need to deny the bride willAgain no.
The very fact the husband established a covenant with his bride constrains his sovereignty. It is the grace of the Husband, his nature, that makes it so.
The sovereignty of a Husband, unimpeded by this nature, could indeed violate the brides will, but as long as the Husband exhibits infinite grace, it will never happen.
An Arminian is not unBiblical, or disrespectful of God's qualities to consider the impact God's grace has on his sovereign decisions. However, the tendancy is to portray this mindset as 'man imposing restrictions on God' which is false.
If the Calvinist can concede that God's sovereignty is indeed limited by God's nature, His covenants, and His promises, than the controversy is reduced to assessing if the Arminian position is reasonable (and IAW the Bible).
It should also be pointed out that it is indeed God's sovereignty in the first place that chooses to establish covenants or makes promises which limit His sovereignty in the first place.
Paul Manata said " .. but the foreknowledge argument shows that future events are unpreventable."
ReplyDeletePaul, unpreventable has the same scope as necessary (in logical terms). Understanding that particular modal fallacy, depends upon understanding the 'scope' of of necessity (or preventibility).
The necessary condition of the knowledge of X, does not make X necessary IS the same modal fallacy whether you say 'necessary' or unpreventable. You could rephrase the fallacy as:
It is unpreventable for God to pre-knows event X, therefore event X is unpreventable.
This still takes the modifier of God's fore-knowledge and distributes it to the event itself.
You're either going to have to accept the fallacy of modal logic and give up the idea that there is correlation between foreknowledge and necessity, or you're going to have to show how that fallacy is itself fallacious.
Steve, my comments above about God's sovereignty having constraints due to his nature, rather than anything to do with man, apply to your augment too. (There is a logical and linguistic difference between can't and won't.
ReplyDeleteTo refute this point, you're going to have to show that any constraint free-will places on God is warranted by man rather than God.
ἘΚΚΛΗΣΊΑ SAID:
ReplyDelete"To refute this point, you're going to have to show that any constraint free-will places on God is warranted by man rather than God."
You suffer from a persistent mental block on this issue. I'm not depicting freewill theism from the viewpoint of Calvinism; rather, I'm depicting freewill theism from its own viewpoint, as proponents conventionally depict it.
You act as if you fell of the turnip truck. Acquaint yourself with the abundantly available literature, in print and on the web, regarding the way in which proponents of freewill theism present their position, and how they contrast it with Calvinism.
Peter Pike said "It's specifically referring to regeneration. Our regeneration is solely the work of God, not predicated by anything man does. It's God doing everything."
ReplyDeleteJacobus Arminius said "This restoration is the restitution, and the new or the second creation, of sinful man, obnoxious through sin to death temporal and eternal, and to the dominion of sin. III. The antecedent or only moving cause is the gracious mercy of God, by which it was his pleasure to pardon sin and to succour the misery of his creature.": DISPUTATION XXXIII ON THE RESTORATION OF MAN
Yep, WRT to man's restoration the .. only moving cause is the gracious mercy of God is monergism.
Peter, the idea that Jacob Arminius taught anything but pure monergistic is simply false, but it makes a nice scarecrow.
What's more, if you had even read a single Arminian apologist in the last 100 years, you'd know, this is almost always the first stawman they debunk. Arminians affirm monergism.
As a Calvinist apologist, you might at least do your opponents the service of knowing what their position is.
"Arminians affirm monergism."
ReplyDeleteIs that right? I wasn't aware of that claim.
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDelete"You're either going to have to accept the fallacy of modal logic and give up the idea that there is correlation between foreknowledge and necessity, or you're going to have to show how that fallacy is itself fallacious.
While [1] P,
[2] If P then Nec(Q),
therefore,
[3] Nec(Q)
is a fallacy, that is not the logic of the incompatibilist argument.
The basic incompatibilist argument, rather, has this form:
[1] Now-unpreventably(P),
[2] Nec(If P then Q),
[3] therefore, Now-unpreventably(Q),
which is logically valid in every system of modal logic.
You're confusing logical necessity with historical/accedental necessity. Same error Norman Swartz makes in his IEP article on the subject.
Steve wrote: "I'm not depicting freewill theism from the viewpoint of Calvinism; rather, I'm depicting freewill theism from its own viewpoint, as proponents conventionally depict it."
ReplyDeleteI expected this, which is why, you'll notice that response was structured in two parts.
The logical part of the argument addresses the view point from a Calvinist perspective (I assume this is what you're reacting to).
So that entailed first sharing a common view of constraint on sovereignty. I adopted a broad Calvinist view, just to be safe, then on Calvinist terms, had to agree that God's sovereignty is limited, but pointed out not by man but God's nature.
Then expecting to be held accountable for its own self depiction, I followed up the argument by addressing freewill according to its own view that it is a consequence of God's infinite grace, and framed this in terms of the Biblical marriage metaphor between God and His elect.
Finally, it may be true that you are more well read than I, but I can neither presume to know your references, nor your knowledge. Accordingly, in my controversy with you I address the points you actually raise rather than the one's you know.
If you happen to point out the arguments of other authors (and cite them), I will appreciate it, but will continue to deal with the point itself, rather than a phantom expert.
BTW what's wrong with Turnips?
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeleteYour 11/10/2010 8:48 AM post was unresponsive to my 11/10/2010 5:42 AM post, as well as going off on several unhelpful tangents.
Incompatiblism is a thesis that if true is logically tue. God cannot violate laws of logic. If God wants libertarian free people to love him, he must not violate their will. It is necessary that he not violate their will if their will is to libertarian free.
Paul Manata wrote " ..which is logically valid in every system of modal logic."
ReplyDeletePaul, look at 2.
[2] Nec(If P then Q)
Nec means that (If P then Q) must be true.
When is (If P then Q) true?
1. Its true when both P and Q are true.
2. Its true when both P and Q are false.
BUT
3. It's also true when P is false, and Q is true.
(look at the truth table for logical implication
)
So if P is man's choice, it can be either true or false without effecting the necessity of (P->Q) as long as God's foreknowledge Q is true.
This is exactly what I've been saying all along:
God's power is always above the whimsical choices of man.
Accordingly, man's freewill is NOT able to constrain God.
Ekklesia said:
ReplyDelete---
Peter, the idea that Jacob Arminius taught anything but pure monergistic is simply false, but it makes a nice scarecrow.
What's more, if you had even read a single Arminian apologist in the last 100 years, you'd know, this is almost always the first stawman they debunk. Arminians affirm monergism.
As a Calvinist apologist, you might at least do your opponents the service of knowing what their position is.
---
Again, WORDS HAVE MEANING. Arminians do not get to redefine the term "monergism" so they can pretend to be monergistic.
Paul Manata said "Incompatiblism is a thesis that if true is logically tue. God cannot violate laws of logic."
ReplyDeleteAgreed. God cannot violate the laws of logic.
However if the thesis uses faulty premises, which is what I argued, than the thesis itself is false.
Let me make this clear (AGAIN) for Ekklesia:
ReplyDeleteDo you affirm that regeneration precedes faith?
Do you affirm unconditonal election?
If you answer "no" to either one, you cannot possibly be monergistic, because of the very definition of the theological term "monergism."
Peter Pike wrote "Arminians do not get to redefine the term "monergism" so they can pretend to be monergistic."
ReplyDeleteThat's true, which is precisely why there's no pretension here. Arminians take monergisim on its own terms.
That God alone is responsible for regeneration was perfectly fine, with Arminius. So much so, that he asserted it himself.
Ill answer your question once we're on the same page.
ReplyDeletePlease clarify for me, "Is it possible to be 'elect' and have no faith?"
I do affirm unconditional election.
Why can't you just answer my questions, Ekklesia?
ReplyDeleteYou said:
---
That God alone is responsible for regeneration was perfectly fine, with Arminius. So much so, that he asserted it himself.
---
Arminius did NOT believe in unconditional election, so how could he possibly have beleived God alone is responsible for regeneration? Under Arminianism, God regenerates AFTER man has faith. That's why it's synergistic. God doesn't do anything until man first does something; thus TWO works are involved.
It would be like saying, "If you paint the walls, I'll paint the ceiling" and then after I watch you paint the walls, I paint the ceiling and say, "I painted the ceiling without any work on your part." But I only painted the ceiling because you painted the walls. Therefore, it's not true that you did nothing in the process.
This is not at all difficult. But let's pretend with you for a minute that Arminianism is monergistic. Are you claiming that Arminianism is monergistic in the same way that Calvinism is? If not, then that's proof you're hijacking the word and forcing it to mean something it has historically never meant.
Arminianism is not Calvinism. You can't steal words that have always been used to differentiate the two positions and make up your own definitions for those words.
"Please clarify for me, "Is it possible to be 'elect' and have no faith?"
ReplyDeleteHow can you not know this?
Of course you can be elect without faith. The elect are elect before the foundation of the world. They are elected by God unconditionally, NOT because they have faith.
The elect are assured that they will be regenerated; they are assured that they will have faith. But they are elect before they actually have that faith.
For someone chastising me for not knowing what Arminians have believed over the past 100 years, if you don't know this, it doesn't bode well for your theological acumen.
Peter Pike said: "Why can't you just answer my questions, Ekklesia?"
ReplyDeleteBecause something you said makes me suspect we're not using terms in the same way.
You asked me to affirm that "regeneration precedes faith".
But if someone without faith is being regenerated its important to understand how you view the elect.
(There's no sense in arguing a position, if the cause of the controversy is difference in definition).
Peter Pike said: "Of course you can be elect without faith."
ReplyDeleteYes this is fruitful. Bear with this line of thought a bit longer).
Of course you'd say that, its required of the Calvinist position.
So those chosen by God don't require faith; can you show me a Biblical reference that shows this?
Or let me ask alternatively, can we identify the elect Biblically through a promise such as "I will be your God and you will be my people"
ReplyDeletePerhaps they might be identified by something like "For you are a people holy to the LORD your God. The LORD your God has chosen you to be a people for his treasured possession, out of all the peoples who are on the face of the earth."
Would you agree that would be a clue to whether or not people were 'elect', of God said something like that to them?
Ekklesia,
ReplyDeleteYou've yet to answer any of my questions, yet ask that I follow your ever-lengthening demands? "Just one more question" becomes 27 questions later, all because you cannot answer my questions at all.
I refuse to play your game. You will answer the questions I gave you, or our conversation is over. And while you consider your answer, you can research for even one Reformer who ever defined "monergism" other than I have done. Because if you cannot find such a person, then you will have to admit (if you're intellectually honest, as up until now you've most certainly appeared to be) that if you're going to critique Reformed views, you have to agree to its definitions.
I really don't care if your definition is different. You don't get to decide what the terms mean in this context. There's plenty of historical documents out there already that have established this meaning. I'm not going to reinvent the wheel with you simply because you don't want to shoulder your burden of proof.
Peter, in your very own arguments you've, used the idea that words are important. If they are, they must be used consistently.
ReplyDeleteAre you really faulting me, for seeking clarification on how you use 'elect', 'regeneration' and 'faith' when its possible to become regenerate without faith, though God promises the elect faith?
No matter. I continue to respect your formidable apologetic skills, and integrity enough to declare this rabbit hole ended.
Peter Pike said: "you can research for even one Reformer who ever defined "monergism" other than I have done"
ReplyDeleteI don't find fault with your definition of monergism. I find fault with your contention Arminians don't agree with it.
John Wesley said "Nay, but we affirm, that God alone does the whole work, without man's working at all."
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeleteIt would appear that you're confused about how are we describing the relationship between regeneration and faith. There is no such thing as "regenerate without faith" nor is any such thing as "being regenerated." We're not talking about regeneration temporally preceding faith. We're talking about regeneration logically preceding faith. Temporally, they are instantaneous.
Also, that quotation from Wesley is completely out of context. Wesley was actually quoting a hypothetical person. Here's the entire citation:
"If you then say, "We ascribe to God alone the whole glory of our salvation;" I answer, So do we too. If you add, "Nay, but we affirm, that God alone does the whole work, without man's working at all;" in one sense, we allow this also. We allow, it is work of God alone to justify, to sanctify, and to glorify; which three comprehend the whole of salvation. Yet we cannot allow, that man can only resist, and not in any wise "work together with God;" or that God is so the whole worker of our salvation, as to exclude man's working at all. This I dare not say; for I cannot prove it by Scripture; nay, is it flatly contrary thereto; for the Scripture is express, that (having received power from God) we are to "work out our salvation;" and that (after the work of God is begun in our souls) we are "workers together with him." (John Wesley, The Works of the Reverend John Wesley, A. M., Volume 6 of the Works of the Reverend John Wesley, A.M., Edited by John Emory [J. Emory and B. Waugh, The University of Virginia, 1831], 42, available here)
Wesley believed contrary to that statement. In fact, he had just previously said:
"If so, you assertion is, "If man do at all work together with God, in working out his own salvation, then God does not do the whole work, without man's working together with him.'" Most true, most sure: but cannot you see, how God nevertheless may have all the glory? Why, the very power to "work together with him" was from God." (ibid.)
ἘΚΚΛΗΣΊΑ SAID:
ReplyDelete"Finally, it may be true that you are more well read than I, but I can neither presume to know your references, nor your knowledge. Accordingly, in my controversy with you I address the points you actually raise rather than the one's you know. If you happen to point out the arguments of other authors (and cite them), I will appreciate it, but will continue to deal with the point itself, rather than a phantom expert."
You're not dealing with the point. Instead, you've gone on a tangent. I've described the position I'm referring to. If that's not your position, so much the better. But this was never about you. Indeed, since you're not forthcoming about your religious background, I couldn't target your views even if I wanted to.
This is not, and never was, about your idiosyncratic definition of freewill theism. I'm not interested in pursuing you down your rabbit trails. I've defended Calvinism on many occasions, as well as pointing out the problems with Arminianism and neotheism on many occasions. I'm not going to repeat all that for you.
I've explained what I mean when I say that freewill theism generates a stress point vis-a-vis Vallicella's objection. Whether or not that's germane to your own position is a red herring.
Steve said: "Indeed, since you're not forthcoming about your religious background, I couldn't target your views even if I wanted to."
ReplyDeleteSteve, I provide Biblical references, and rational argument to justify the assertions I make. Similarly I've answered every question you've asked of, (I assert honestly).
If your goal was to judge me, I've provided you sufficient evidence to judge soundly.
If you're not interested in engaging the arguments I make, that is your prerogative as an active apologist, of course.
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeletePaul, look at 2.
[2] Nec(If P then Q)
Nec means that (If P then Q) must be true.
When is (If P then Q) true?
1. Its true when both P and Q are true.
2. Its true when both P and Q are false.
BUT
3. It's also true when P is false, and Q is true.
(look at the truth table for logical implication
)
So if P is man's choice, it can be either true or false without effecting the necessity of (P->Q) as long as God's foreknowledge Q is true.
Right, that's because God is infallible. He only believes truths. P is never false. And if God believes that S will A at t, then it is true that S will A at t. It is certain. You may claim it's open, and that it is not an object of knowledge, but then you're an Open Theist, and I thought you had denied that.
ἐκκλησία said...
ReplyDeletePaul Manata said "Incompatiblism is a thesis that if true is logically tue. God cannot violate laws of logic."
Agreed. God cannot violate the laws of logic.
However if the thesis uses faulty premises, which is what I argued, than the thesis itself is false.
11/10/2010 10:00
There is no faulty premise, on incompatibilism it is analytic that a free will cannot be violated and remain free.
Sorry my point in my 11/10/2010 1:30 PM post was unclear. Nec P > Q is the entailment principle. Necessarily, if God believes that q, then q. Q is "S will A at t." So, yes, if P is false, then that means God has no belief that S will A at t. However, if God does believe that S will A at t, then S will A at t. Once God believes it, it is settled. And given infallibility, that is necessarily true.
ReplyDeletePaul Manata said: "Necessarily, if God believes that q, then q.""
ReplyDeletePaul, this is a seductive fallacy which mistakes the necessity of God's knowledge with the necessity of a thing itself.
If S is "God believed Q"
and T is "Q".
Than the above is (S->T) ∧ (T->S).
(T->S) no one refutes.
(S->T) is fallacy of modal logic, since the necessary condition of knowing Q doesn't make Q necessary.
Your definition is built on a fallacy. Here is an example of the fallacy in action:
A flying plane loses all of its engines. An astute witness on the ground sees the plane. The observer believed perfectly, that the would crash.
Clearly it was not the observer's belief that made the plane crash. Even if the observer's belief ranged from absolute certainty, to somewhat uncertain, the quality of his belief played no role what-so-ever in making the plane crash.
Confusing the necessity of belief in X with the necessity of X itself is the fallacy.
As you said before God cannot be logically contradictory, and it is fallacious to argue that God's foreknowledge necessitates anything, since the necessity of His knowledge cannot logically necessitate the event itself.
ἐκκλησία said:
ReplyDelete> Paul Manata said: "Necessarily, if
> God believes that q, then q.""
Paul, this is a seductive fallacy which mistakes the necessity of God's knowledge with the necessity of a thing itself.
Interesting. So you hold to "not-necessarily if God believes that q, then q"?
Ie:
If God believes q, then possibly q
Is that what you're saying?
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDelete"Paul Manata said: "Necessarily, if God believes that q, then q.""
Paul, this is a seductive fallacy which mistakes the necessity of God's knowledge with the necessity of a thing itself.
Um, Nec(P --> Q) is not a fallacy, it is a premise. I did not say, Nec(Q), did I? I said, Nec(P-->Q). I have not reasoned: P; Nec(P --> Q); Therefore Nec(Q). Therefore I have not transferred the necessity to the thing itself. I am at a loss as to how you came up with what you did because it is clearly the case I am not guilty as you suggest.
So again, Necessarily, if God belives that q, then q.
This is because it is *impossible* for God to believe that q is the case, and for q to not be the case. Notice, Ihave not said that it is impossible for q to not be the case. I have said given that God believes that q, it is imposible that q not obtain because that would mean, per impossible, that God held a false belief.
If what you said where true, i.e., that Nec(P-->Q) is a fallacy, then this argument would be fallacious:
The basic incompatibilist argument, rather, has this form:
[1] Now-unpreventably(P),
[2] Nec(If P then Q),
[3] therefore, Now-unpreventably(Q),
But(!), that argument is not fallacious, therefore [2] isn't a "fallacy." QED.
Paul Manata said "I said, Nec(P-->Q)"
ReplyDeleteYes, and as long as P is foreknowledge of Q (P-->Q) is a still a fallacy, even wrapped inside Nec(P-->Q).
The point is, that one false premise ruins the logical integrity of the entire argument.
Paul Manata said: "
ReplyDelete[2] Nec(If P then Q),
[3] therefore, Now-unpreventably(Q)
One more thing:
Even if we assume [2] as non-fallacious (which is a logically impossible concession since it is fallacious)
By definition:
Nec(P->Q) -> Nec(Q)
but that does not disprove:
P->~Q
or even
Nec(P->~Q)
because by definition the Nec(Q) is excluding the case where ~Nec(Q) holds.
If you declare Nec(Q) in the definition (by declaring Nec(P->Q)) you're rigging the cards because you're trying to ultimately prove Nec(Q).
Remember this also holds:
~Nec(P->Q) -> Nec(Q)
Since you won't believe me:
ReplyDeleteFrom The Modal Fallacy in Epistemic Determinism
"Once the logical error is detected, and removed, the argument for epistemic determinism simply collapses. If some future action/choice is known prior to its occurrence, that event does not thereby become “necessary”, “compelled”, “forced”, or what have you. Inasmuch as its description was, is, and will remain forever contingent, both it and its negation remain possible.
All fallacies are a lie. ([2 Thess 2:11] could be read substituting lie for fallacy.)
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDelete"Since you won't believe me:
From The Modal Fallacy in Epistemic Determinism
[SNIP].
Yes, I referenced Swartz's paper above. I already covered this in my 11/10/2010 9:44 AM post. With Swartz, you're confusing necessities.
"If some future action/choice is known prior to its occurrence, that event does not thereby become “necessary”, “compelled”, “forced”, or what have you.
Again, ἐκκλησία, I have not argued above, and you cannot demonstrate from premises I have endorsed, that I claimed that Nec(Q).
"Paul Manata said "I said, Nec(P-->Q)"
Yes, and as long as P is foreknowledge of Q (P-->Q) is a still a fallacy, even wrapped inside Nec(P-->Q)."
This is not an argument, ἐκκλησία, you're simply repeating yourself and not advancing your initial position.
(P-->Q) is not a fallacy, neither is Nec(P-->Q). The fallacy, ἐκκλησία, is confusing the necessity of the consequence with the necessity of the consequent. I have not done that. You don't get the fallacy under discussion from one premise. The fallacy comes in via an illicit inference. The point is not to confuse 'Nec(p --> q)' with 'p --> Nec q.'
For example, if I said: "Necessarily(if you know something, then it is true)," I would not have uttered a fallacy. However, if I transferred the necessity to the consequent, as in: "Therefore, if something is known, it is necessarily true," then I would have committed the fallacy.
More formally:
Necessitas consequentiae =
necessarily (if p, then q)=
[](p-->q)
Necessitas consequentis =
if p then necessarily q =
p --> []q
Now, [](p-->q) may be true even if both p and q are contingent truths. Thus, I may say: "Necessarily, if ἐκκλησία's outfit is Denim, then ἐκκλησία's putfit is blue." The fallacy would occur if I illicitly inferred from this, "ἐκκλησία's outfit is necessarily blue."
Clearly, then, Nec(P-->Q) is not fallacious, and it doesn't "become" so if the antecedent is a proposition about one of God's beliefs. To say that it does is to confuse the nature of deductive logic (because the premise would not be truth preserving and so all instances would be out), confusing object language and meta-language. Now, you may claim that in the foreknowledge argument, Nec(P-->Q) is false, but that would require an argument denying the infallibility of God's beliefs---which you said you didn;t want to deny.
If God infallibly believes that I will do something tomorrow, then it necessarily follows that I will do it (can god be in error?). However, it does not follow that I will do it necessarily.
And so as I said in my initial response to you regarding the modal fallacy:
While [1] P,
[2] If P then Nec(Q),
therefore,
[3] Nec(Q)
is a fallacy, that is not the logic of the incompatibilist argument.
The basic incompatibilist argument, rather, has this form:
[1] Now-unpreventably(P),
[2] Nec(If P then Q),
[3] therefore, Now-unpreventably(Q),
which is logically valid in every system of modal logic.
You're confusing logical necessity with historical/accedental necessity. Same error Norman Swartz makes in his IEP article on the subject.
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeleteWhile you referenced Swartz, who is not a logician, let's see what Graham Priest, who is a logician, says on the matter:
"The argument trades on an ambiguity. If a is the sentence "It is true to say that I will be involved in a traffic accident," and b is the sentence "I will be involved (in a traffic accident)," then the boldface conditional is true in this sense:
1. [](a-->b)
Necesarily, if it is true to say something, then that something is indeed the case. But what needs to be established is:
2. a --> []b
After all the next step [in the traditional fatalist argument] is precisely to infer []b from a by modus ponens. But as we have seen, 2 does not follow from 1 at all. Hence Aristotles argument is invalid.
[...]
But there is a closely related argument that cannot be answered so easily. Come back to the example we had about changing the past. It does seem to be true that if some statement about the past is true, it is now necessarily tue. It is impossible, now, to render it false. The Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066, and there is now nothing that no one can do to make it have been fought in 1067. Thus, if p is some statement about the past, p --> []p.
Now consider some statement about the future. Again, for example, let it be the claim that I will be involved in a traffic accident tomorrow. Suppose this is true. Then if someone uttered this sentence 100 years ago, they spoke truely. And even if no one actually uttered it, if anyone had uttered it, they would have spoken truly. Thus, that I will be involved in a traffic accident tomorrow was true 100 yeas ago. This statement (p) is certainly a statement about the past, and so, since tue, necessarily true ([]p). So it must be necessarily true that I will be involved in a traffic accident tomorrow. But that was just an example; the same reasoning could be applied to anything. Thus, anything that happens, must happen. This argument from fatalism does not commit the same fallacy (that is, use the same invalid argument) as the first one that I gave (Priest, Logic, Sterling, 59-60, last emphasis mine).
The reason you, and Swartz, think there is a fallacy is because you're confusing logical necessity with historical necessity. Now, you may argue against the above view (via Ockhamism, Boethianism, etc), but the point is that this form of the argument is not fallacious.
If you won't listen to me, maybe you'll listen to Priest? In any case, I'll let you have the last word.
ἘΚΚΛΗΣΊΑ SAID:
ReplyDelete"All fallacies are a lie. ([2 Thess 2:11] could be read substituting lie for fallacy.)"
I'm not defending fallacies. However:
i) A fallacy is a question of logical invalidity, not falsehood.
ii) Apropos (i), fallacies can be true. Put another way, unsound arguments can be true.
iii) A necessary condition for lying is the intent to deceive.
Given (i-iii), I don't see that fallacies are synonymous with lies.
Truths can't be lies, and even falsehoods, per se, are not equivalent to lies.
Paul Manata said: "You're confusing logical necessity with historical/accidental necessity. Same error Norman Swartz makes in his IEP article on the subject."
ReplyDeleteSorry, just to be clear, how exactly is logical necessity being confused with accidental necessity?
Are you saying that either Swartz's (in his IEP article) or I have employed accidental necessity at any point?
Or, are you saying one has been mistaken for the other? If so, where?
Steve said: "iii) A necessary condition for lying is the intent to deceive."
ReplyDeleteSteve, I fundamentally agree with your concise post above, and I agree unsound arguments can be true.
However, deception doesn't need to favour premises and conclusions only, but can target the integrity of logic as well.
Why?
Deception targeting premises or conclusions may corrupt specific outcomes, but deception targeting the integrity of the argument themselves, corrupts the process of all logic.
Even if it must tolerate the occasional sound conclusion being drawn from a fallacious argument, the scope of the deception is far greater.
Deception is not exclusive or particular.
"Sorry, just to be clear, how exactly is logical necessity being confused with accidental necessity?"
ReplyDeleteThat's the point Preist makes in my quote from him in my 11/11/2010 3:12 PM post.
Paul Manata said: "While you referenced Swartz, who is not a logician, let's see what Graham Priest, who is a logician, says on the matter."
ReplyDeleteDid you just argue from authority? That's kind of an underhanded swipe at Swartz, who makes a living teaching the same courses Priest does. Swartz could be a fisherman from Galilee, and still make a perfectly valid logical argument.
Paul Manata said: "That's the point Priest makes in my quote from him in my 11/11/2010 3:12 PM post"
I see your argument now, thanks.
I find it odd I'm being accused of mistaking logical necessity with accidental necessity since I am not at all a fan of accidental necessity. I reject any premise applied to God that employs either "now-necessary" or "accidental necessity"; The structure of my objection did not require temporality (which accidental necessarily does).
Essentially the argument relied on the premise that foreknowledge does not posses the property of being counter-factually manipulative (i.e. knowing a plane will crash it not what makes it crash).
From what you posted, Priest argues:
1. [](a-->b)
2. a-->[]b
You've cut out the next bit, so it's possible I'm not see the whole context, but it seems Priest agrees that 2. does not follow from 1., since he refutes Aristotle’s argument with it.
Even so take the statement you attribute to Preist: “Again, for example, let it be the claim that I will be involved in a traffic accident tomorrow. Suppose this is true. Then if someone uttered this sentence 100 years ago, they spoke truely. And even if no one actually uttered it, if anyone had uttered it, they would have spoken truly.”
There is no reason to belief this assertion.
What's true at some point in time, is not necessarily true at all points in time. For example, take the necessarily true statement S “Tomorrow it will rain.”. Tomorrow, the statement S may not be true at all. Because something is necessarily true at some point, does not mean it will be at all points.
Even if we grant this premise though, the argument goes on to say: “This statement (p) is certainly a statement about the past ..”. His point requires us to presuppose 'accidental necessity', but there are at least 3 reasons to reject the use of 'accidental necessity when it comes to God:
ReplyDeleteA. Accidental necessity, presupposes temporality (since it differentiates between past, present and future contingents). God, is timeless. I reject this presupposition outright;
B. Priest's argument supposes the principle of "now-necessary" applies to God, which means His knowledge is not timeless since it affects how God views events in time, and “now-necessary” requires past-tense; and
C. Even if the above two points weren't true, temporal necessity is transparently weak. Can it even be shown that God's belief falls within the part of time to which the necessity of the past applied (assuming God did 'know' in tenses)?
Paul, I've enjoyed your dialogue.
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeleteSorry, I knw I said you could have the last word. I'm just pointing something out. All your points are points that we could debate, the salient feature of your response, though, is that it lacked any rejoinder to the argument that the foreknowledge argument didn't commit the modal fallacy you initially charged it with. I take it that I've established that it doesn't.
Paul, the first part of that post was cut off, so its missing the core of my objection. Needless-to-say I don't agree its been established the fallacy of modal logic doesn't stand.
ReplyDeleteThe argument originally made didn't rely upon accidental necessity, AND I reject any premise applied to God that employs either "now-necessary" or "accidental necessity" since both presuppose temporality, which doesn't apply to a timeless God.
Essentially the force of the argument relied on the premise that foreknowledge does not posses the property of being counter-factually manipulative, out of logical necessity (i.e. knowing a plane will crash it not what makes it crash) and this is true both outside of time and within.
In any event, there will be opportunity for both of us to advance our positions again.
Well argued.
Ekklesia, I notice you didn't answer my question above. Maybe you missed it in your dialog with Paul. I am very interested in the answer, though.
ReplyDeleteDominic Bnonn Tennant said "Interesting. So you hold to "not-necessarily if God believes that q, then q"?"
ReplyDeleteDominic, the problem is the English is clearer than the logic. The logic is poorly stated. What I hold is that:
1. [](a-->b) does not imply
2. []b (Fallacy of Modal logic)
Stated in English, I hold that God has perfect foreknowledge about event E, but that his foreknowledge is not what makes event E necessary, because even perfect knowledge does not posses the property of being counter-factual manipulative.
Paul's rebutted that I've confused logical necessity for accidental necessity (which requires temporality).
I've rebutted that I reject any form of necessity that requires temporality when it applies to God, as God is timeless (so he accuses me of employing a type of necessity I outright reject).
But that doesn't end it. Paul graciously gave me the last word, so I reciprocate by conceding a draw, until such time he wishes to take up our controversy again.
Just so you're clear, ἐκκλησία, I did not say that you were advocating accidental necessity to God or were assuming that God was in time, I said that the incompatibilist argument is what assumes accidental necessity. Since the argument does, it therefore, as shown by me above, does not commit the modal fallacy (referenced by you directly above). It appears, per your response to Dom, that you are under the impression that I said you held to a temporal God and that you employed accidental necessity.
ReplyDeleteNow, I understand that you hold to timelessness. But this means that you find the argument unsound insofar as it employes a premise that assigns temporality to God. But that the argument is unsound does not mean it is fallacious. There's nothing fallacious about the argument, and hardly any philosopher today thinks there is. I did not try to argue against timelessness, I merely pointed out the logic of the incompatibilist argument. I hope this clears things up for you.
(BTW, I have addressed the timelessness solution here :-)
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2010/03/timelessness-solution-to-problem-of.html
)
Paul, forgive me. But is this the argument you are calling the incompatibilist argument?
ReplyDelete[1] Now-unpreventably(P),
[2] Nec(If P then Q),
[3] therefore, Now-unpreventably(Q),
If so, I didn't specifically spend a whole lot of time on that one, but I did point out that:
[2] Nec(If P then Q) is still true when P is false.
To which you replied "Right, that's because God is infallible. He only believes truths. P is never false."
Although I agree God only believes truths, if you were going to impose that restriction on the argument, that changes the truth table your argument presupposes, so its represented wrong.
You cannot then use:
[2] Nec(If P then Q) if it does allow P to be false since that is the required truth table for If/Then.
If you exclude P being false, you need to use the truth table for XNOR which is:
[2] Nec(P <--> Q)
This is an entirely different argument of course. I assumed you either erred, or wouldn't want to pursue and argument containing Nec(P<--Q) since that one is even more difficult to defend.
Also, if it's true that the incompatibilist argument supposes accidental necessity (and hence temporality), I would have attacked that argument on other grounds as well. [I will read over that other link you just provided]
I now see why you accused me of going off on tangents. I wasn't really taking the bait I was suppose to be.
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeletePaul, forgive me. But is this the argument you are calling the incompatibilist argument?
[1] Now-unpreventably(P),
[2] Nec(If P then Q),
[3] therefore, Now-unpreventably(Q),
Yes.
If so, I didn't specifically spend a whole lot of time on that one, but I did point out that:
[2] Nec(If P then Q) is still true when P is false.
To which you replied "Right, that's because God is infallible. He only believes truths. P is never false."
You will note I said that comment was unclear and cleared it up in my 11/10/2010 4:53 PM post, the second post below the one you cite. In any case, the argument above is valid on every system of modal logic, ask any logican you please.
"Also, if it's true that the incompatibilist argument supposes accidental necessity (and hence temporality), I would have attacked that argument on other grounds as well. [I will read over that other link you just provided]
Let's recall the dialoectical context here. You claimed the foreknowledge argument committed the modal fallacy of confusing the necessity of the consequent with the necessity of the consequence, which the argument you cite from me above clear doesn't. I was not intending the make the argument here, I was attempting to defeat your claim that it commits the previously mentioned modal fallacy.
Paul Manata said "You will note I said that comment was unclear and cleared it up in my 11/10/2010 4:53 PM post"
ReplyDeletePaul, you are hardly clearing things up by adding new fallacies (which are not valid in any system of modal logic), as you address my question about God's belief not seeming to matter.
Observe the truth table for IF/THEN:
P Q P-->Q
T T T (1)
T F F (2)
F T T (3)
F F T (4)
Given that your argument says [2] Nec(If P then Q) is necessarily true, it is true in case 1,3 & 4.
In case 1, God has the belief and Q is true. In case 3, God does not have the belief and Q is still true. So Q is true whether or not God has belief (your argument not mine).
But you noticed that you're argument was true whether or not God had belief, so you rejected case 3 as false citing God's infallibility. But this changes everything.
If God's infallibility makes case 3 false, you are no longer arguing IF/THEN (because you are using some other truth table). What you are arguing now is XNOR. This is an entirely different argument altogether that now need to defend.
Although you say you are arguing IF/THEN, by quietly adding the caveat that case 3 is false, your argument changes the IF/THEN to XNOR. Observe the truth table for XNOR:
P Q P-->Q
T T T (1)
T F F (2)
F T F (3)
F F T (4)
It is now:
[2] Nec((If P then Q) AND (If Q then P))
This argument presupposes - that which you were trying to prove in the first place.
If you don't reject case 3 and stick with the original IF/THEN, you have to explain how God's belief doesn't matter, and you still have to explain how God's belief is temporal in nature.
This new argument I cite for you above is worse than your original one and most certainly is not valid in any system of modal logic. It not only contains fallacies that are more basic, but it employs some rather questionable premises.
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeleteThe argument I cited is not a fallacy, and I've challenged you to cite one logician who says that it is. I have already cited the respected Graham Priest.
Observe the truth table for IF/THEN:
P Q P-->Q
T T T (1)
T F F (2)
F T T (3)
F F T (4)
Given that your argument says [2] Nec(If P then Q) is necessarily true, it is true in case 1,3 & 4.
Why in the world are you trying to give the truth value of Nec(P-->Q) from the truth table of P-->Q??? Modal operators are not truth functions, and so you can't infer the truth of []P or <>P simply from the truth or falsity of P!
Check it out, for example, P v Q has a true truth value in all cases except where both P and Q receive a truth value of false. Now, suppose P is (I will get up at 7 am) and suppose Q is (I will get up at 8 am). P and Q could both be false, which would give it a false truth value, but that would not change the truth value of <>(P v Q), which would, in fact, still be true.
Now let's look at another example:
(*) If I run a 100 yd dash, then I have moved.
This has the form P -> Q. And, as you point out, (*) is true just in case the antecedent is not true and the consequent false.
Now, you could do your truth table on (*), but none of those would show that (*) has a false truth value since (*) is necessarily true. Modal operators are not subject to your truth table analysis.
The reason [] and <> are not truth functions is because they are analyzed in terms of possible worlds. So you could have P's and Q's that have different truth values in different worlds. P and Q may have the same truth value in possible world W1 but not in W2.
Thus, in propositional logic, if I had P as a premise and Q as a premise, I could reason thus:
P
Q
____
P&Q.
But this doesn't hold for
<>P
<>Q
_______
<>(P&Q).
So you whole approach is unprofitable for you.
The modal fallacy occurs on cases of logical necessity, such as:
If S is going to get divorced, then S cannot fail to be married.
This has the form: [](P-->Q).
It is simply a logical truth. It is logical necessity. From this is would be fallacious to reason:
S is going to get divorced, therefore, necessarily S is married.
But there are other cases, cases where logical necessity isn't under consideration. For example, saying that if something is true in the past then it cannot fail to be true now. There is nothing you can do now to change it. It is unpreventable. Where's the fallacy in that? There isn't one. You may disagree with some of the premises, but being unsound doesn't translate to being fallacious.
The argument here is fairly similar to arguments against determinism based on the consequence of the past. If you think the Consequence Argument is fallacious, I'd love to hear it, that would make a lot of compatibilists happy.
There are statements about the past, statements about what those entail, and conclusions about being unable to do otherwise. You will also notice the inclusion of Nec(P->Q), the premise you say is "a fallacy."
I can see why you're attempting to shift this into another debate about timelessness and the truth of premises, but I never intended to debate any of those. I intended to show that the classical incompatibilist argument is not fallacious in the way you suggest. I have not argued that it is true, and I have not argued that it has no fallacy whatever. I have argued that it does not commit the fallacy you say it does.
The existence of the Ockhamist, Boethian, and other responses to the incompatibilist argument support the idea that you're in error. If Nec(p->q) was fallacious as you say, then compatibilists would only need point that out, not engage in detailed discussion on the nature of time or hard facts vs. soft facts.
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeleteThe argument I cited is not a fallacy, and I've challenged you to cite one logician who says that it is. I have already cited the respected Graham Priest.
Observe the truth table for IF/THEN:
P Q P-->Q
T T T (1)
T F F (2)
F T T (3)
F F T (4)
Given that your argument says [2] Nec(If P then Q) is necessarily true, it is true in case 1,3 & 4.
Why in the world are you trying to give the truth value of Nec(P-->Q) from the truth table of P-->Q??? Modal operators are not truth functions, and so you can't infer the truth of []P or possibly P simply from the truth or falsity of P!
Check it out, for example, P v Q has a true truth value in all cases except where both P and Q receive a truth value of false. Now, suppose P is (I will get up at 7 am) and suppose Q is (I will get up at 8 am). P and Q could both be false, which would give it a false truth value, but that would not change the truth value of possibly(P v Q), which would, in fact, still be true.
Now let's look at another example:
(*) If I run a 100 yd dash, then I have moved.
This has the form P -> Q. And, as you point out, (*) is true just in case the antecedent is not true and the consequent false.
Now, you could do your truth table on (*), but none of those would show that (*) has a false truth value since (*) is necessarily true. Modal operators are not subject to your truth table analysis.
The reason [] and the diamond are not truth functions is because they are analyzed in terms of possible worlds. So you could have P's and Q's that have different truth values in different worlds. P and Q may have the same truth value in possible world W1 but not in W2.
Thus, in propositional logic, if I had P as a premise and Q as a premise, I could reason thus:
P
Q
____
P&Q.
But this doesn't hold for
possiblyP
possiblyQ
_______
possibly(P&Q).
So you whole approach is unprofitable for you.
The modal fallacy occurs on cases of logical necessity, such as:
If S is going to get divorced, then S cannot fail to be married.
This has the form: [](P-->Q).
It is simply a logical truth. It is logical necessity. From this is would be fallacious to reason:
S is going to get divorced, therefore, necessarily S is married.
But there are other cases, cases where logical necessity isn't under consideration. For example, saying that if something is true in the past then it cannot fail to be true now. There is nothing you can do now to change it. It is unpreventable. Where's the fallacy in that? There isn't one. You may disagree with some of the premises, but being unsound doesn't translate to being fallacious.
The argument here is fairly similar to arguments against determinism based on the consequence of the past. If you think the Consequence Argument is fallacious, I'd love to hear it, that would make a lot of compatibilists happy.
There are statements about the past, statements about what those entail, and conclusions about being unable to do otherwise. You will also notice the inclusion of Nec(P->Q), the premise you say is "a fallacy."
I can see why you're attempting to shift this into another debate about timelessness and the truth of premises, but I never intended to debate any of those. I intended to show that the classical incompatibilist argument is not fallacious in the way you suggest. I have not argued that it is true, and I have not argued that it has no fallacy whatever. I have argued that it does not commit the fallacy you say it does.
The existence of the Ockhamist, Boethian, and other responses to the incompatibilist argument support the idea that you're in error. If Nec(p->q) was fallacious as you say, then compatibilists would only need point that out, not engage in detailed discussion on the nature of time or hard facts vs. soft facts.
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeleteThe argument I cited is not a fallacy, and I've challenged you to cite one logician who says that it is. I have already cited the respected Graham Priest.
Observe the truth table for IF/THEN:
P Q P-->Q
T T T (1)
T F F (2)
F T T (3)
F F T (4)
Given that your argument says [2] Nec(If P then Q) is necessarily true, it is true in case 1,3 & 4.
Why in the world are you trying to give the truth value of Nec(P-->Q) from the truth table of P-->Q??? Modal operators are not truth functions, and so you can't infer the truth of []P or possibly P simply from the truth or falsity of P!
Check it out, for example, P v Q has a true truth value in all cases except where both P and Q receive a truth value of false. Now, suppose P is (I will get up at 7 am) and suppose Q is (I will get up at 8 am). P and Q could both be false, which would give it a false truth value, but that would not change the truth value of possibly(P v Q), which would, in fact, still be true.
Now let's look at another example:
(*) If I run a 100 yd dash, then I have moved.
This has the form P -> Q. And, as you point out, (*) is true just in case the antecedent is not true and the consequent false.
Now, you could do your truth table on (*), but none of those would show that (*) has a false truth value since (*) is necessarily true. Modal operators are not subject to your truth table analysis.
The reason [] and the diamond are not truth functions is because they are analyzed in terms of possible worlds. So you could have P's and Q's that have different truth values in different worlds. P and Q may have the same truth value in possible world W1 but not in W2.
Thus, in propositional logic, if I had P as a premise and Q as a premise, I could reason thus:
P
Q
____
P&Q.
But this doesn't hold for
possiblyP
possiblyQ
_______
possibly(P&Q).
So you whole approach is unprofitable for you.
The modal fallacy occurs on cases of logical necessity, such as:
If S is going to get divorced, then S cannot fail to be married.
This has the form: [](P-->Q).
It is simply a logical truth. It is logical necessity. From this is would be fallacious to reason:
S is going to get divorced, therefore, necessarily S is married.
But there are other cases, cases where logical necessity isn't under consideration. For example, saying that if something is true in the past then it cannot fail to be true now. There is nothing you can do now to change it. It is unpreventable. Where's the fallacy in that? There isn't one. You may disagree with some of the premises, but being unsound doesn't translate to being fallacious.
The argument here is fairly similar to arguments against determinism based on the consequence of the past. If you think the Consequence Argument is fallacious, I'd love to hear it, that would make a lot of compatibilists happy.
There are statements about the past, statements about what those entail, and conclusions about being unable to do otherwise. You will also notice the inclusion of Nec(P->Q), the premise you say is "a fallacy."
I can see why you're attempting to shift this into another debate about timelessness and the truth of premises, but I never intended to debate any of those. I intended to show that the classical incompatibilist argument is not fallacious in the way you suggest. I have not argued that it is true, and I have not argued that it has no fallacy whatever. I have argued that it does not commit the fallacy you say it does.
The existence of the Ockhamist, Boethian, and other responses to the incompatibilist argument support the idea that you're in error. If Nec(p->q) was fallacious as you say, then compatibilists would only need point that out, not engage in detailed discussion on the nature of time or hard facts vs. soft facts.
"S is going to get divorced, therefore, necessarily S is married."
ReplyDeleteI meant to say, S is going to get divorced, therefore, S is necessarily married.
Paul Manata said: “I've challenged you to cite one logician who says that it is. I have already cited the respected Graham Priest.”
ReplyDeletePaul, whether you provide your own arguments, or someone else’s, if it contains a fallacy, it contains a fallacy.
You’ve suggested the controversial premise Nec(If P then Q) and justified it on the grounds that accidental necessity makes it necessary. I’ve rejected this premise and your rationalization of it, on a number of grounds, and Graham Priest does not, consensus make.
Paul Manata said: “Why in the world are you trying to give the truth value of Nec(P-->Q)? Modal operators are not truth functions, and so you can't infer the truth of []P or possibly P simply from the truth or falsity of P!”
From your use of it you presuppose the following reflexive value connective (commonly found in deterministic arguments) as evidenced below. I have no controversy with this:
[]A --> A
Accordingly (and as you point out), this restrict us to looking at those particular universes where the modal condition applies. I enumerated all of the conditions for your argument to be true or false.
Assuming your argument is valid, I pointed out that it would be true regardless if God necessarily had foreknowledge or not, since whenever the value of []Q is true, the value of []P does not effect the value of Nec(P-->Q).
Furthermore in your example [](P-->Q), where P is ”S is going to divorce”, and Q is ”S is married” you incorrectly translate the logic, into plain English and Nec [] needs to be applied across the whole argument, not just part of it (if you are going to apply the necessessity to the terms themselves).
If we correct for these errors, we obtain []P-->[]Q:
*If P is false that necessarily “S is going to divorce” and Q is true that necessarily “S is married” than your argument is true. (S is likely happily married)
*If P is false that necessarily “S is going to divorce” and Q is false that necessarily “S is married” than your argument true. (S is likely happily unmarried)
*If P is true that necessarily “S is going to divorce” and Q is true that necessarily “S is married” than your argument is true. (S is likely unhappily married)
*If P is true that necessarily “S is going to divorce” and Q is false that necessarily “S is married” than your argument is still true .(S is possibly married, but not necessarily because Nec(Q) is by definition not Possibly not Q, so the negation of that would be possibly not Q..)
You objection is based upon an incorrect application of language to modal logic.
For me to be convinced by your argument that God’s foreknowledge determines outcome, you’re going to have to show how we can use temporal logic with God; or how necessity works timelessly; why your logical representation of God’s omniscience is valid; and how foreknowledge even has the ability to manipulate contingent counter-factuals; otherwise, we’ll have to agree to disagree.
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeleteIt is noteworthy that you have not demonstrated any fallacy but have simply restated my premises in logically equivalent forms and stated some basic axioms of modal logic, which you claim my argument presupposes. Where is the fallacy? When you say that [](P->Q) is equivalent to []P->[]Q, that,s fine, but so what? You claimed that was an "error" of my argument. But that argument (from S's divorce and marriage) was simply used to show when the modal fallacy occurs. So, even if you switch matters to []P -> []Q, you don't get :. []Q from P. You do get :.[]Q from []P, though. You have consistently failed to charitably represent the argument you're being given. You are also struggling hard to turn this into an argument about the truth of the premises. I am not debating that, I am only debating the claim that the foreknowledge argument commits the modal fallacy.
Let's go back to the beginning, then. You claim the foreknowledge argument commits the modal fallacy. Here is the modal fallacy:
The modal fallacy
[1]P
[2] [](P->Q)
[3] :. []Q
We can see the fallacy occurs when you try to infer []Q from [](P->Q) and P.
The basic form of the foreknowledge argument:
[1*] Now-unpreventably(P),
[2*] Nec(If P then Q),
[3*] :. Now-unpreventably(Q),
[1*] - [3*] is valid on every system of modal logic, and therefore cannot be fallacious, but it can have false premises. However, we are not debating the truth of the premises.
So, given that, show me where the fallacy is, not where you disagree with the premises employed. I am not trying to convince you of the argument, as you suggest, I am trying to convince you that it does not commit the modal fallacy. You can be convinced of the one but not the other.
So, offer an argument for the fallaciousness of [1] -> [3] or don't respond except to withdraw your initial criticism.
Paul, as you presented it, since the conclusion doesn`t follow from the premises, it isn`t sound as stands.
ReplyDeleteFor the above argument to be sound it would have to be:
[1*] Nec(Now-unpreventably(P)),
[2*] Nec(If Now-unpreventably(P) then Now-unpreventably(Q)),
[3*] :. Nec(Now-unpreventably(Q))
This form of the argument is not equivalent to the one you present.
As you presented it, since the conclusion doesn`t follow from the premises it isn`t sound.
ReplyDeleteAbout Priest, you realize that as a dialetheists he denies the "Law of excluded middle"?
This is not to disparage him or his philosophy, but it is to point out that Priest does not believe in "true", "false" in the same sense that most logicians do (he believes something can be both "true" and "false" at the same time). This exposes some of his presuppositions which you should be aware of, if you're going to use his arguments.
When you invoke a modality such as 'Now-unpreventably' you're really invoking an (invented) modality whose explication is unique to Priest himself (perhaps including a few fans).
Assuming it even has merit though, there is nothing what-so-ever to suggest that anything follows about human beings' ability to exercise free will from it.
Assuming it's merit, for the above argument you've presented to be sound it would have to be:
[1*] Nec(Now-unpreventably(P)),
[2*] Nec(If Now-unpreventably(P) then Now-unpreventably(Q)),
[3*] :. Nec(Now-unpreventably(Q))
(Using the operator consistently)
ἐκκλησία,
ReplyDeleteLast comment here, the convo has run its course:
"ἐκκλησία said...
Paul, as you presented it, since the conclusion doesn`t follow from the premises, it isn`t sound as stands.
For the above argument to be sound it would have to be:
[1*] Nec(Now-unpreventably(P)),
[2*] Nec(If Now-unpreventably(P) then Now-unpreventably(Q)),
[3*] :. Nec(Now-unpreventably(Q))
This form of the argument is not equivalent to the one you present.
11/17/2010 2:17 PM
The problem here is that you're not keeping track of your own comments. As you say in your 11/10/2010 10:53 AM post:
"Paul, unpreventable has the same scope as necessary (in logical terms). Understanding that particular modal fallacy, depends upon understanding the 'scope' of of necessity (or preventibility)."
The reason that it is unpreventable or now-necessary is because of accidental necessity. You deny accidental necessity in the argument. Fine. But that is to disagree with a premise, it is not to show a fallacy. The argument is valid, and you have not demonstrated that it isn't.
Let's move on to your latest claim:
"About Priest, you realize that as a dialetheists he denies the "Law of excluded middle"?
This is not to disparage him or his philosophy, but it is to point out that Priest does not believe in "true", "false" in the same sense that most logicians do (he believes something can be both "true" and "false" at the same time). This exposes some of his presuppositions which you should be aware of, if you're going to use his arguments.
You need to slow down and think through what you're saying. First, I gave a reference to the book. Anyone who reads it can see that Priest does not assume his particular views when he covers the sections on non-classical logics. In fact, as I quoted Priest above, Priest *does* say that the modal fallacy is a fallacy. He's standing in the tradition. Priest also believes that a limited range of propositions can be true and false at the same time, his view, if you were familiar with it, doesn't apply the propositions like those under discussion. So this object is dialectically irrelevant.
"When you invoke a modality such as 'Now-unpreventably' you're really invoking an (invented) modality whose explication is unique to Priest himself (perhaps including a few fans).
Acutally, you're wrong again. Priest does not use the phrase "now unpreventable." In fact, that phrase was given me by Alan Rhoda. Moreover, it is not new or unique (Rhoda is at Notre Dame doing post-doc research work on this subject with Flint, Freddoso, etc), it's simply accidental necessity, which has been around for a while.
"Assuming it even has merit though, there is nothing what-so-ever to suggest that anything follows about human beings' ability to exercise free will from it.
Right, that's just what one would expect a compatibilist about freedoma nd foreknowledge to say. But no one is bothered by your asserting your compatibilist conclusion. The argument is out there, and I and several others are convinced. You and several others are not. That's the way it goes. The point here though is that you have not demonstrated that the argument commits the fallacy, as I showed the form of the modal fallacy above, and the fatalist argument does not take that form.