God's VCR

STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

"In Molinism, we can choose otherwise."

i) Of course, that's equivocal. We can choose otherwise in what setting? In possible worlds? Or the actual world?

ii) And it's not as if the Molinist agent chooses which possible world will become the actual world. God makes that final decision in that regard.

BTW, I once ran that question by Alfred Freddoso, and he agreed with me.

iii) It's not as if, in Molinism, God shows possible Judas two different scenarios, then lets Judas choose one or the other. He doesn't say to possible Judas, Look, Judas, if I instantiate this possible world, you will betray Christ and go to hell, but if I instantiate that possible world, you will stay faithful to Christ (or repent) and go to heaven. So, Judas, which scenario would you like me to realize?

There is no possible Judas who stands over and above his counterparts in different possible worlds, and gets to choose which scenario actually plays out. Rather, each possible Judas is a worldbound individual. He only knows one possible world at a time (so to speak).

4/23/2010 3:10 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"Using the author analogy, you said...Seem like you are trying to have your cake and eat it too."

Are you really that confused? There's an obvious equivocation.

When the phrase "author of sin" is used in historical theology, is that being used as a literary metaphor? Or is that being used in the literal Latin (or Middle French) sense of "authorship"?

You're confusing the lexical meaning of a word with the metaphorical meaning of a word. They are hardly synonymous.

Try to think clearly.

4/23/2010 3:16 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"In Molinism, God is not ultimately responsible for evil, since He does not start a causal chain that predetermines evil will occur. Sure, God is a necessary cause of all things, including evil, but not a sufficient cause of all things."

How is that a morally salient distinction? How is that exculpatory?

Suppose I see a toddler wander into a busy intersection. I didn't cause the intersection. I'm not even a necessary cause of the intersection, much less a sufficient cause.

Does this let me off the hook if I allow the toddler to be run over? After all, I didn't start the causal chain leading to his death. I merely stood by as I saw a speeding car approach and mow him down–even though it lay within my power to rescue the child.

Drawing metaphysical distinctions is not the same as drawing moral distinctions. Why don't you try to offer a serious response?

Why is it that Arminians are so morally complacent? Why are they satisfied with such shallow, inadequate responses?


STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

"Of course, I agree with that too. But you fail to either understand or take into account the difference between this and what I said."

To say I fail to understand doesn't begin to demonstrate that I fail to understand.

"Again, I agree. But this does not mean Judas' damnation is inevitable or Judas is unable to choose otherwise (in the sense I describe above)."

But if you agree, as you just admitted, that possible Judas doesn't get to decide which one of the possible worlds containing him will become the actual world, then he is unable to choose which outcome becomes the real outcome.

His freedom to do otherwise is a freedom between one possible world and another possible world, not a freedom within the actual world, or a freedom to choose which possible world, with its attendant outcomes, is actualized.

And, yes, if God instantiates the possible world in which Judas goes to hell, then his damnation is inevitable in the real world.

4/23/2010 4:39 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"You said 'authorship of sin' is equivocal and asked for a definition. I provided one."

It would help if you could follow your own usage. Try to pay attention to you just said. It saves time. You gave to different definitions back-to-back:

i) "Using the author analogy, the author of evil, would be the author that writes evil into the storyline."

That's a figurative definition.

ii) "The author of something is the person The author of something is the person ultimately responsible for it or in other words the agent that initiates the causal sequence that predetermines and necessitates evil’s occurrence.

That's a literal definition.

Why can't you tell the difference between a figurative definition and a literal definition?

"Now you seem to think it's not equivocal and you have the one true historic sense of the phrase."

Did I say if I had the historic sense? No. I didn't say what I think it means, although I have discussed that in the past.

When Arminians like you use a phrase from historical theology, you need to define the term in historical terms. Do you have any documentary evidence that when "authorship" is used in historical theology, it denotes "the person ultimately responsible for it or in other words the agent that initiates the causal sequence that predetermines and necessitates evil’s occurrence."?

Or is this just your made-up definition?

When Reformed confessions and theologians deny that God is the "author of sin," what definition do you think they are using? Or do you even care?

If you're going to allege that, contrary to the denial of Reformed confessions and theologians, Calvinism makes God is the "author of sin," you first need to define the term the same way they did, then show that God is the author of sin on their own terms.

"By all means, provide the one and only understanding; noting that Edwards said God is the author of sin."

Gee, that's cute. If you're going to cite Edwards as an example of what you mean, then need to explain what you think he meant by that term.

Keep in mind that Edwards' metaphysical outlook was pretty idiosyncratic. He was either an idealist or occasionalist. So that's hardly representative of mainstream Reformed metaphysics.

4/23/2010 4:55 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"A greater good would get you off the hook for not helping."

And Calvinism helps itself to the same consideration.

"But of course, not helping is an omission, not a comission and a greater good doesn't get you off the hook for comissions (we are not to do evil that good may come)."

Was the Molinist God doing evil by instantiating a world with evil agents?

"Further, how did you wind up in that situtiation? IOW, how is sin even possible, if man isn't ultimately responsible?"

Since when does someone have to be ultimately responsible to be sinful? In the film Double Indemnity, which character is ultimately responsible for murdering the husband: the adulterous boyfriend or the adulterous wife?

If a Mafia Don orders a hit, who is ultimately responsible: the trigger man or the Don?

And if only one is ultimately responsible, then is the other one innocent?

4/23/2010 5:03 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"You said 'authorship of sin' is equivocal and asked for a definition. I provided one."

What you did was to take my *figurative* use of divine authorship, come up with your own *literal* definition, then impute *your* definition to my literary metaphor.

Do you lack the critical detachment to see how fallacious that is?

"The author of something is the person The author of something is the person ultimately responsible for it or in other words the agent that initiates the causal sequence that predetermines and necessitates evil’s occurrence."

i) I don't treat responsibility and culpability as synonyms. One party to a transaction can be *ultimately* responsible without being either *solely* responsible or *blameworthy*.

ii) You Arminians are the ones who keep recasting *predestination* or *foreordination* or the *decree* in *causal* and/or *determinist* categories.

I'm not the only who constantly frames my theology in those terms, although I sometimes use that terminology in response to somebody else who frames the issue in those terms.

iii) Apropos (ii), it is sufficient for my Calvinism to say that:

a) God has a complete plan for the world.

b) God's plan for the world doesn't derive from the world.

c) God creates the world according to his plan.

c) God's plan for the world doesn't derive from the world.

d) Everything happens according to plan.

e) Everything happens in the way it does on account of God's plan.

f) There are no unplanned events.

g) Nothing can happen contrary to God's plan.

iv) If you're going to use "causal" categories, then you need to define your terms. For instance, on a counterfactual theory of causation, both God and Judas were causal factors in the Crucifixion. And that's true whether you're Calvinist, Molinist, or non-Molinist Arminian.

If you think a different theory of causation is preferable, make your case.

v) If you're using "predetermine" and "necessitate" as synonyms for the absence of libertarian freedom, and you deem that to make God culpable, then your definition is a tendentious definition which takes Arminian action theory for granted.


STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

"That does not follow."

Since you don't even attempt to say anything responsive to what I wrote, there's nothing I need to reply to.

You also seem to suffer from an inability to distinguish between what this or that Molinist may claim, and whether his claims are internally consistent.

I'm not merely dealing with the claims of Molinism, but the implications of Molinism, which may not be consistent with everything a Molinist would like to claim for his position–in the event that Molinism is incoherent in some respects.

Unless and until you're prepared to deal with my arguments, instead of posing as some expert on Molinism, whose bare ipse dixit settles all disputes, there's nothing further to discuss.


STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

"Right. In an Arminian schema of responsibility, if God were to predetermine sin, He would be culpable. In a Calvinists schema, he would not. But then the question is God’s character. Does He really hate sin?"

Does the Arminian/Molinist God really hate sin? Sin was avoidable? Was he forced to make a world in which sin occurs? Do you think a fallen world is necessitated?

If no, then it what sense does God hate sin if he makes a fallen world, even though that sinful consequence was divinely foreseeable and avoidable?

5/04/2010 7:56 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"Fair enough, but if you want to argue against the internal consistency of Molinism, you should at least present Molinism in a way recognizable and acceptable to Molinists."

You keep falling back on that intellectual shortcut. Why is that? Surely you don't think that's convincing, do you?

Since you're evidently impervious to the obvious, I guess I will have to spell it out to you: people who are deeply invested in a given position have a disincentive to "recognize" a critical statement of their position.

The mere fact that they claim that a critical statement of their position is "unrecognizable" is not a serious response. Indeed, it's frequently an evasive maneuver. They don't ever have to deal with a challenge to their position because they can always claim that so-and-so's statement of their position is "unrecognizable."

Are you capable of having a serious debate? Or will you continue to fall back on these "you-just-don't-understand" cop-outs?

You're not the world authority on Molinism, Dan. I've corresponded with Alfred Freddoso and Thomas Flint. Learn a little humility.

"The object of Judas’s choice is to betray Christ or not, and his choice actualizes that specific aspect of history."

Really? How does that work, exactly? After all, his choice is intertwined with other parties as well, such as members of the Sanhedrin. Does his choice actualize the Sanhedrin? Is the existence of the complicit members of the Sanhedrin contingent on his choice?

You keep asserting that Judas had the freedom to do otherwise. In what sense did possible Judas have the freedom to do otherwise? Is possible Judas a conscious agent? Did God present possible Judas with a range of possible timelines, then ask him which one he'd like to see realized?

Is possible Judas privy to all the possible worlds in which possible Judas exists? Did Judas give informed consent?

"But this does not mean Judas' damnation is inevitable or Judas is unable to choose otherwise (in the sense I describe above)."

Sure about that? As a friend of my recently said,

"It's hard for Molinism to avoid making God the author of evil. But the reason, I think, is that 'God's decree to actualize a world plus his knowledge of what would ensue if he were to do so' is both necessary and sufficient for evil to come to pass. It's necessary, because the evil can't come to pass unless God decrees to actualize the feasible world in which it would come to pass. It's sufficient, because the decree embraces all the means to the chosen end. (In addition, deciding to actualize a feasible world, while knowing infallibly what would happen if that world gets actualized, *is* sufficient for the evil to come to pass. After all, it's sufficient for the free choice to be actually made, and that's sufficient for the evil itself.)"


STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

“Yes, God hates sin. I doubt that evil was necessary; that seems to imply God had to create.”

So the Molinist God instantiates a sinful world even though he hates sin, and sin is unnecessary.

Doesn’t sound very coherent to me. Much less a promising theodicy.

“Certainly in the sense that He is not ultimately responsible for sin.”

What’s the theodicean value of the adjective (“ultimately”) in relation to the noun (“sin”)? How does the adjective magically exculpate God on Molinist grounds?

You don’t have to be “ultimately” responsible to be partially responsible. You don’t have to be “ultimately” responsible to be culpable. So how does your distinction automatically exonerate the Molinist God?

“It seems that the greater good God is able to bring out of sin in this world, makes the world we live in at least as desirable to God as not creating, dispite His hatred of sin.”

If that’s your argument, then sin is a necessary means to a second-order good. Felix culpa. Very supralapsarian of you.

“In reducto ad absurdum argument, both the minor and major premise must be acceptable your opponent.”

Really? Says who? You’re confusing the soundness of an argument with person-variable persuasion.

“I consider choices as mental resolutions, to they can’t physically bump into each other.”

i) Well, when I defined choice as a mental resolution (quoting Kane), you took exception.

ii) How is “physically bumping into each other” the least bit responsive to what I said? This is what I said: “After all, his choice is intertwined with other parties as well, such as members of the Sanhedrin. Does his choice actualize the Sanhedrin? Is the existence of the complicit members of the Sanhedrin contingent on his choice?”

How did you manage to miss the point? The libertarian choices of Judas have real world consequences for the existence and choices of other libertarian agents. So do his libertarian choices actualize other agents in the transaction? Do his choices instantiate the network of consequences, including all of the other parties to the same transaction?

Try again.

5/10/2010 8:29 AM
STEVE SAID:
Cont.

“Causally possible and logically, in a divided sense.”

What is “causally” possible for merely possible Judas? Does Judas cause things to happen in a possible world? In what sense? Aren’t possible worlds timeless objects? So there is no actual cause/effect sequence in play. Do you simply mean “cause” in the sense that one fictional character causes something to happen in the narrative?

“Possible Judas is possible conscious agent; of course, he is not an actual conscious agent.”

So possible Judas didn’t consciously choose to be instantiated in a world where he betrays Christ. If so, then in what sense is his choice a “real” choice? Do merely possible, unconscious agents make “real” choices?

“Not timelines or whole worlds, but in some sense God ran hypothetical Judas (not to be confused with his ugly stepfather possible Judas) through a hypothetical senario.”

That’s not responsive to my question. The question is not whether the Molinist God ran hypothetical Judas through a battery of hypothetical scenarios.

The question, rather, is whether the Molinist God ran a battery of hypothetical scenarios past hypothetical Judas so that Judas had a say as to which possible world God would instantiate. Unless hypothetical Judas was shown the options, how was he in any position to give informed consent?

But, of course, you’re forced to admit that this isn’t tenable, for a merely possible agent is not a conscious agent. Therefore, Judas didn’t get to vote on which real world he’d find himself in. It was the luck of the draw (as Arminian critics of Calvinism are wont to say), and he had the ill-fortune to wind up on a world where he betrays Christ and presumably goes to hell. Not his lucky day.

Explain how that’s an improvement over what Arminians and Molinists find so odious in Calvinism.

“It’s as if God created multiple actual worlds in multiple dimensions and sees how things turn out, except, God doesn’t actually have create those worlds and yet His knowledge corresponds to what they would have been if He had.”

i) And how is the Molinist God in a position to see how things turn out? Is he just a spectator who watches what nonexistent agents would do in any given situation? Why is there anything at all, much less anything in particular, that a nonexistent agent would do? Where do you think possible agents come from in Molinism? You act as if they preexist in some static modality, like a DVD, with all of their choices in place. And God simply decides which DVD to put into the player.

ii) Even if Molinism were coherent, why should we believe it? Molinism is not a revealed truth. At most, the Bible reveals that God has counterfactual knowledge, not middle knowledge.

So what evidence do you have that Molinism is true? It’s not a truth of reason. It’s not entailed by a truth of reason. It’s not an empirical fact.

“While the decree embraces all the means it does so in nuanced ways; some things directly, other indirectly via permission.”

Traditionally, Calvinism also “nuances” the decree the same way.

“In Molinism, the decree (in conditions with MK and FK) are sufficient conditions for our choices but not sufficient causes for our choices.”

i) How do you define a “cause”? What’s your theory of causation?

ii) Even if your metaphysical distinction were tenable, how is that morally germane? How does your metaphysical distinction between sufficient conditionality and sufficient causality ipso facto exonerate the Molinist God?

iii) How does that stand in contrast to Calvinism? What theory of causation do you attribute to Calvinism?

iv) Apropos (iii), why is Molinism able to distinguish between sufficient conditionality and sufficient causality, but Calvinism is not?