Sic:
"In contrast to the Molinist view, on the deterministic view even the movement of the human will is caused by God. God moves people to choose evil, and they cannot do otherwise."
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8111
Et non:
"Now as for your argument, I think two of its premisses are false. First, it seems to me that (2) is false, both on philosophical and on theological grounds. Philosophically, I’m persuaded by arguments such as have been offered by Harry Frankfurt that free choice does not entail the ability to do otherwise. Imagine that a mad scientist has secretly wired your brain with electrodes so that he can control your choices. Suppose that in the last Presidential election, he wanted you to vote for Obama and had determined that if you were going to vote for McCain he would activate the electrodes and make you cast your vote for Obama. Now as it turns out, you also wanted to vote for Obama, and so when you went into the polling booth you marked your ballot for Obama, and therefore the scientist never activated the electrodes. I think it’s clear that you freely voted for Obama, even though it was not possible for you to do otherwise."
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=q_and_a
I understand how at first glance this can seem contradictory, but I don't think these statements are upon further consideration.
ReplyDeleteUnder point 1, he's saying that God has complete control over the situation. There is no choice to be made. So whether people do good or evil is actually caused by God and they have no way of doing something different. The person's will is not even a consideration because it doesn't exist.
Under point 2 however, the mad scientist only acts IF the person was going to vote for McCain. So they couldn't do otherwise, but their own will was still part of the equation.
So the difference is in point 1, will does not exist except on the part of God, where as in point 2, will exists but is ultimately irrelevant. So I'm not sure these statements are actually contradictory.
I agree. In the first quotation the thing being objected to is the idea that God controls the person's ability to make a choice to do good or evil. Not necessarily that God forces a person to do evil after they have already chosen to do good, which would fit more into the second quotation's example.
ReplyDeleteYou could, however, say that Craig has missed the point in his second quote. Since he seems to understand that the objection in the free will debate is over whether a contrary choice could have been made, it seems odd for him to focus his example in the second quote only on the actions resulting from that choice. In essence his argument in the second quote seems to be a straw man.
ReplyDeleteTo Leslie and Sean Nelson:
ReplyDeleteI don't see as how your comments resolves the apparent contradiction. If on one hand William Lane Craig sees the inability to do one thing over another as objectionable, then in another area doesn't object to it, then he has contradicted himself.
Seems like the first quote is talking about determinism, while the second is talking about compatabilism. It would only be inconsistent if he was equating the two.
ReplyDelete--Seems like the first quote is talking about determinism, while the second is talking about compatabilism. It would only be inconsistent if he was equating the two.--
ReplyDeleteSo in some cases free will is meaningful without the ability to do otherwise, but in other cases it isn't meaningful? It either is or it isn't.
To Matt:
ReplyDeleteThe issue is this, in his first quotation William Lane Craig is objecting to the idea that God controls what someone chooses to do. He is saying that God rendered it certain that this person would exercise their free will to choose to do evil acts.
In the second quotation WLC is using an example in which a mad scientist controls, not the ability to choose, but the ability to have that choice result in the desired action.The mad scientist is not, as Craig says he is, controlling the choices of the individual. He is merely re-directing the actions of that individual if a certain choice is made.
The reason why there is not a contradiction is because the examples do not discuss the same sort of situation. In the first, God is the one who causes not just the actions of the individual, but the movement of the will towards those actions as well. In the second, the scientist (who I assume represents God in Craig's mind)only exercises control after the movement of the will. If the person in question willed to cast the ballot in the way the scientist desired, there would be no need for the scientist to exercise any control. In the first example God is exercising control either way.
It may be poor argument on Craig's part, but it's not necessarily contradictory.
Would it be fair to understand Craig as affirming the following two propositions?
ReplyDelete1) Necessarily, If X deterministically causes agent S to do A and S cannot do other than A, then S does not do A freely
2) It's not the case that, Necessarily, If S does A freely, then S could have done other than A.
1 and 2 are clearly not contradictory. In 1, Craig expresses the worry that if God causes and moves S to do A, and (for that reason) S cannot do other than A, then S does not do A freely. But that's not inconsistent with 2, which is that the lack of ability to do otherwise is on its own not logically sufficient for unfreedom.
Why think that, in the first quotation, Craig is affirming that the mere inability to do otherwise is "objectionable," when he seems to be suggesting that it is the inability to do otherwise and (or perhaps due to) being caused and moved in a certain way, that is objectionable?
I should have added:
ReplyDeleteNotice that in the Frankfurt case, it's not the case that the agent is being "caused" and "moved" to act as he does. This is why (Craig might suggest) the lack of APs in that case are unobjectionable, while the lack of APs in the first case are - for the first case involves a lack of APs due to the agent's will being determined/caused/moved...
In the first quote, "the movement of the human will is caused by God." That is determinism.
ReplyDeleteIn the second quote, the movement of the human will was caused by the human himself ("you also wanted to vote for Obama"). That is compatabilism.
The fact that you could not have done otherwise (in the second example) does not make your choice any less your own. You still acted in accordance with your own nature and desires.
The fact that you could not have done otherwise, in the first quote, would seem to be irrelevant to the point.
There's an unspoken assumption among a few commenters that predestination makes a person do something at odds with what he would have done absent the decree. Why think that's a presupposition of foreordination?
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure that I see that presupposition being assumed. Could you explain a bit more?
ReplyDeleteI don't understand why, on a deterministic view, God must "move" and "cause" the will of man? The most typical definition of determinism you get is the past states of the universe in conjunction with the actual laws of nature necessarily entail some specific proposition about the future--but why, if the universe is that way, does God have to force and move the will of men? God could causally determine that Paul sin at t while never once interfering with the created order after the first moment.
ReplyDeleteBut besides that, it is hard to see what Craig's complaint is about the deterministic view if it isn't specifically AP. Maybe sourcehood is the deal.
Steven said:
ReplyDelete---
The most typical definition of determinism you get is the past states of the universe in conjunction with the actual laws of nature necessarily entail some specific proposition about the future...
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Yup. And PAP doesn't just imply that someone could have *CHOSEN* otherwise (as some commenters have stated), but that if someone *DID* choose otherwise they would have *DONE* otherwise. That concept would go against any form of determinism, including what you stated above, which doesn't require God to force anyone to do anything.
Clearly, a major reason incompatibilists think moral responsibility is incompatibe with determinism is because of the ability to do otherwise constraint (need I trot out dozens of incompatibilists who have said this very thing?). So, when asked why determinism is such a threat to freedom, or more relevantly, responsibility, incompatibilists usually tell us that if determinism were true, no one is able to do other than she does (in fact, that the conclusion of the paragdigmatic consequent argument).
ReplyDeleteClearly, if you remove ability to do otherwise as a constraint on moral responsibility, then quite obviously it isn't that that is problematic with determinism, but some other feature. If you say ability to do otherwise is neither necessary nor sufficient for responsibility, then it isn't required in a determined world.
Now, some are suggesting that the apparent contradiction is resolved because in a determined world "God has complete control" or "God causes all things" but this is not the case in an indeterminate world. Well, for starters, that's false; well, for orthodox theists it is. God is the primary cause of all things and God is in "complete control" over all things (and if "control" is being used to indicate something like a puppet, then the resolution of Craig is to impute question begging motives to him). But then this means that the problem for determinism lies in this vague and sloppy talk of "God causing the agent to do what he does."
So, what's the problem here? It can't be that "God's causing the agent leaves him no APs," because APs are not necessary or sufficient for responsibility (per Craig). So, it needs to be something else than the inability to do otherwise that is the problem with determinism.
So, what's the problem? Unfortunately, Craig doesn't tell us. He leads us to believe that it is inability to do otherwise. But this can't be the problem since Craig admits it isn't needed to ground ascriptions of responsibility. For if it is inability to do otherwise that is the problem, the determinist just uses Frankfurt to show that ability to do otherwise isn't necessary, which means you don't have to have it to ascribe blame.
So, Craig's brining up ability to do otherwise is misleading because that's not a problem on determinism. Craig is going to have to argue for something like source incompatibilism.
So, if Craig means that the problem theistic-determinism has is that people have no APs, and one needs APs if one is to be responsible, then Craig is inconsistent. If Craig means soemthing else, then his quote at the top can't be read as bringing up a problem for determinism. So, Craig's either contradicting himself, or he's unintersting.
Well God has determined that I should respond this time! :)
ReplyDeleteSteve asked:
Why think that's a presupposition of foreordination?
I respond:
Yes, there are presuppositions in every response in here, whether you like it or not!
As can be deduced by my opener, I am completely comfortable with being compatable with determinism, like, at rest in the finished work of Christ striving to enter that Rest.
I like Craig but in this case I go with Aristotle.
ReplyDelete“…when the origin of the actions is in him, it is also up to him to do them or not to do them” - Aristotle Ethics Book III.
God be with you,
Dan
Dan quoted:
ReplyDelete---
“…when the origin of the actions is in him, it is also up to him to do them or not to do them”
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Ah, but what does it mean that the "origin of the actions is in him"? For unless the person who is the "origin of the actions" is self-existent, the person who "originates" these actions is contingent upon other factors, no? At the very least, his makeup is determined by his parents, where and when he was born, how he was raised, what he has experienced, and (as theists) how God made him.
So in what sense is the *ORIGIN* of an action in him? What is that which originates these actions?
I'd like to hear your thoughts on Strawson's Basic Argument, Dan
ReplyDeletePeter,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the comment… Usually, the other folks at T-blog pick on me, so I was feeling kinda left out.
I do hold to Divine Concurrence (see Fredosso on Suarez…). So while God determines that we will exist and choose we specify what we will choose. Concurrence provides existance to the effects of secondary causes.
On the other hand, God's concurrence does not determine the effects of secondary causes and agents cause there own actions.
God be with you,
Dan
Steven,
ReplyDeleteI assume you are talking about this:
http://steven-n.blogspot.com/2010/04/galen-strawsons-basic-argument.html
D.V., I will post something on your blog.
God be with you,
Dan
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
ReplyDeletePeter,
Thanks for the comment… Usually, the other folks at T-blog pick on me, so I was feeling kinda left out.
I do hold to Divine Concurrence (see Fredosso on Suarez…). So while God determines that we will exist and choose we specify what we will choose. Concurrence provides existance to the effects of secondary causes.
On the other hand, God's concurrence does not determine the effects of secondary causes and agents cause there own actions.
***************
I notice that Arminians and Molinists have a bad habit of confusing metaphysical distinctions with moral distinctions. But even if we grant your metaphysical distinction, how is that ipso facto exculpatory?