TGL: In your review Design Theory and its Critics, you wrote that "If (perhaps for overwhelmingly good reasons) science is restricted (even just methodologically) to 'natural' explanatory and theoretical resources, then if there is a supernatural realm which does impinge upon the structure and/or operation of the 'natural' realm, then the world-picture generated by even the best science will unavoidably be either incomplete or else wrong on some points. Unless one assumes philosophical naturalism (that the natural constitutes the whole of reality) that will be the inescapable upshot of taking even mere methodological naturalism as an essential component of scientific procedure." This suggests that the distinction between the two forms of naturalism collapses, but there seems to be little awareness of the argument. Do you intend to develop it further?
DR: I have discussed it some elsewhere (e.g., in "Natural Theology, Methodological Naturalism, and 'Turtles all the way down'" (Faith and Philosophy, Vol 21 #4, October 2004, pp. 436-455)).
[...]
The basic problem with pre-stipulated conceptual/theoretical boundaries is that if reality itself happens to fall outside those boundaries, theorizing within the confines of those boundaries will inevitably generate either incompleteness or error. But methodological naturalism just is a stipulated prohibition on anything outside the 'natural' playing any conceptual role in scientific theorizing and explanation. If it turns out that reality chooses to ignore our restrictions (and why on earth shouldn't it?), then theorizing forbidden to cross those boundaries will inevitably be either incomplete or mistaken.
Here is an analogy. [All right - caught analogizing again.] Suppose that during the final pre-launch crew briefing for NASA's first manned mission to Mars, the head of NASA warns the crew of the dangers of starting public panics and instructs them to make no mention in any of their reports of aliens - regardless of what they happen to find on Mars. The restriction does make some sense. But suppose that the first thing the crew sees upon exiting their lander is an utterly undeniable Martian bulldozer. The question instantly arises: where did that come from? But the crew has a problem answering that question. Given the prohibition barring reference to aliens, the crew has only two options: (a) they can refrain from addressing the question, or (b) they can construct a theory of the chemical evolution of Martian bulldozers. But that means that their science of Mars will be either (a) woefully incomplete - leaving out perhaps the single most fascinating aspect of the mission - or (b) outrageously mistaken.
[...]
But even just methodological naturalism conjoined with aspirations for completeness has substantive implications. First, if one restricts science to the natural, then assumes that science can in principle get to all truth, then one has implicitly presupposed philosophical naturalism. But even if one merely stipulates methodological naturalism as essential to science, then assumes only that science is competent for all physical matters, or that what science (properly conducted in the long run) does generate concerning the physical realm will in principle be truth, then if the truth of the specific matter in question is non-natural, even the most excruciatingly proper naturalistic scientific deliverances on that matter may be wide of the mark, typically in exactly the way a science built on philosophical naturalism would be. For practical purposes, that comes close to importing philosophical naturalism into the structure of science.
So whether methodological naturalism has substantive philosophical implications (contrary to the common denial) or is philosophically neutral depends upon what it operates in tandem with. At the least, methodological naturalism makes the de facto assumption that there is an identifiable realm of reality which is on the scientifically relevant level functionally self-contained, and which is on that level functionally de-coupled from the supernatural. That assumption is neither obvious, trivial, nor - since it is an empirical universal negative - demonstrable.
But to actually answer your question, I may try to push it a bit further. But despite the above (and some other) reservations and qualifications, I think that methodological naturalism is a useful - perhaps even essential - provisional strategy, and one not to be lightly overridden.
TGL: Much has been made of the importance of methodological naturalism, particularly as definitive of what makes something science. What do you think of the arguments in its favour?
DR: Arguments for its value as a provisional strategy may be right. But even as a strategy, it has to be used with care. Over-rigid adherence can (as indicated earlier) have consequences for the self-corrective nature of science, and it can have other consequences (as noted just above) if care is not taken concerning what assumptions it is employed with.
Arguments for it will depend in part on exactly what methodological naturalism is, and more care is required there than is sometimes given. For instance, it is quite common to see methodological naturalism defined as a requirement that science be restricted just to natural concepts, resources, data, and theories, that being interpreted to mean that whether or not philosophical naturalism is true, science must proceed as if it is. (That, for instance, is the position of the National Center for Science Education - or at least of its director.) But the problem here is that (as Boyle pointed out three plus centuries ago) nature in a created universe might well - indeed most likely would - be very different from nature in a random, chance universe. Thus, the typical equating of a restriction to the natural with proceeding as if philosophical naturalism is true, turns out to beg some deeper questions.
Most of the actual arguments for methodological naturalism being a definitive, unchallengeable rule of science seem to me to be problematic. Very briefly, the three most common types of arguments are (1) arguments that anything non-natural is outside the realm of empirical detectability or testability, (2) arguments that allowing the non-natural into science is destructive in that it allows scientists to take the lazy way out in difficult scientific situations (simply saying "Well, God must have done that - no point in trying to figure it out", then wandering off to find the coffee pot) and (3) historical arguments claiming that the history of science has shown the bankruptcy of non-natural considerations in science. The first is the most prima facie plausible, but I think that there could be possible empirical cases in which the most reasonable conclusion would be that something supernatural was at work. (That's one of the cases I try to make in Nature, Design and Science.) Regarding the second, it is often the conviction that something is a product of design that keeps scientists in the hunt. Any company trying to reverse engineer a competitor's new computer model pays particular attention to puzzling components - refusing to give up trying to understand it precisely because they believe it to be a product of design. And of course historically most scientists took nature to be a product of design, and saw themselves as in effect reverse engineering nature - trying (as Kepler is alleged to have said) to think God's thoughts after him. The fundamental intelligibility of nature consequent upon its being designed by God was one of the key motivations underpinning the whole scientific project.
http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43816
Martiansdidit!!!
ReplyDeleteMartians-of-the-gaps!!!
Martians??
ReplyDeleteI thought it was the leprechauns.
----
Seriously, thanks for posting this Steve. I'd like to see comments from Ken Pulliam, Kaffinator, Edward T. Babinski, and other evolutionists (theistic or atheistic) respond to this post.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteThis post is helpful at least in clarifying where your comments about methodological naturalism are coming from. I agree with Ratzsch that some scientists and some arguments made in defense of philosophical naturalism try to sneak that metaphysical position into the defintion of scientific method.
On the other hand, Ratzsch deals with the issue too abstractly for my taste. The devil is in the details, and Ratzsch's sole venture into details, the Mars mission, is only an analogy and not particularly helpful. One of science's strengths is the capacity for self-correction. By adopting methodological naturalism, scientists have precommitted to ignoring crucial data and fallen into serious error that cannot be corrected until the precommitment is given up. Is that the point? Makes for a nice sermon but not a framework for a research program.
What I'm looking for is something detailed enough to see the consequences of the alternative when trying to answer a real-world question. What examples can you furnish?
I've said it before and I'll say it again. You really, really need to read Sagan's The Demon-Haunted World. He deals extensively with methodological naturalism. He explains why scientists use it, how it works in specific cases (lots of them), and even gives some examples of how a "supernatural" event could be investigated using scientific methods (via an update to John Wisdom's Invisible Gardener parable. OK, OK! Stop shooting!). He tackles directly many of the issues Ratzsch raises in your post, and even agrees with him on some of them.
DEAN DOUGH SAID:
ReplyDelete"What I'm looking for..."
What you're looking for doesn't dictate what the rest of us are looking for. Methodological naturalism is a transparent evasive maneuver.
"...is something detailed enough to see the consequences of the alternative when trying to answer a real-world question. What examples can you furnish?"
You're playing dumb. Secular scientists have, themselves, spelled out the alternative as they see it. Richard Lewontin, for one, was quite frank about that in his notorious review of Sagan's book:
"Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. The eminent Kant scholar Lewis Beck used to say that anyone who could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen."
http://www.drjbloom.com/Public%20files/Lewontin_Review.htm
"Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door."
ReplyDeleteSuch transparency by an atheist scientist to a priori rule out certain explanations just plainly gives up the gig for the Scientism game.
Christians/Christianity happily utilizes both Science and the Supernatural Triune God to understand and explain things.
Atheists limit themselves to a precommitment to Materialism to understand and explain things.
DEAN DOUGH SAID:
ReplyDelete"What I'm looking for is something detailed enough to see the consequences of the alternative when trying to answer a real-world question. What examples can you furnish?"
Which misses the point. Methodological naturalism is prejudicial. It screens out the undesirable consequences in advance of the facts.
Removing the filter of methodological naturalism isn't predictive. It simply lets the chips fall where they may.
Dean Dough said:
ReplyDelete"One of science's strengths is the capacity for self-correction."
Me:
Complete propaganda completely contrary to historical fact.
Scientific communities operate within paradigms just as much governed by group-think and dogma as any other organization.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteYou're right, you don't have to answer my questions. And I don't have to pay any attention to your answers. And vice versa. Not a good way to learn anything. Would you rather I go back to slashdot? At least there you get some good laughs between the flame balls. :) This is a chance for me to learn something from people who think in a way I find highly objectionable and maybe get somebody who doesn't like the way I think to learn something too.
I'm not playing dumb. I've read Lewontin's article already. He is confessing his religious belief in materialism, and trying to confess his colleagues' religious beliefs for them. And his grousing about Sagan is more nuanced than this quote lets on. Yes, atheists want to claim methodological naturalism as their home territory -- and its use by anyone else as a concession to their position. I don't buy it. Presumably you don't either, or you wouldn't have produced this post in the first place.
I'm asking for an alternative to methodological naturalism, fully worked out in detail, with examples of how specific problems would be solved. If you want to point me somewhere you think would be helpful, great!
Saint and sinner
ReplyDelete"Scientific communities operate within paradigms just as much governed by group-think and dogma as any other organization."
IOW, scientists are human. Go back and read Bacon. The whole point of the scientific method is to correct the normal human tendency to screw up. Massive overstatement which you don't believe yourself.
Saint and Sinner:
ReplyDelete... I hope.
DEAN DOUGH SAID:
ReplyDelete"I'm asking for an alternative to methodological naturalism, fully worked out in detail, with examples of how specific problems would be solved."
A methodology doesn't solve any problems. A methodology is not substitute for having the right answer. Only the right answer solves a problem.
Take ostensible cases of demonic possession. Is it really demonic? Or is there a natural explanation?
That's ultimately a case-by-case issue. What's the best available explanation given the evidence in any particular case?
In some or many cases, a naturalistic explanation might be preferable. But there may be other cases where we're forcing a naturalistic grid onto the evidence.
Dean Dough said:
ReplyDelete"IOW, scientists are human. Go back and read Bacon. The whole point of the scientific method is to correct the normal human tendency to screw up. Massive overstatement which you don't believe yourself."
Me:
Um...No. Try reading Thomas Kuhn (a history of science professor) who has documented numerous examples throughout history.
http://www.amazon.com/Structure-Scientific-Revolutions-Thomas-Kuhn/dp/0226458083/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1271196309&sr=8-1
Dean Dough,
ReplyDeleteI went to your blog and read the following excerpt from the post titled: "Theologians Have a Lot to Answer For."
http://newchristianity.blogspot.com/2010/02/theologians-have-lot-to-answser-for.html
"Orthodox Christian theology is poison in the well of the human heart. There is good in orthodoxy, but it is ruined by foolishness which invariably accompanies it. I am not saying religion is the ultimate cause of human evil. The ultimate cause is our own nature. Evolution has endowed the human heart with very destructive, malicious passions. Nobody escapes this. The problem with orthodox Christianity is that it masks its own malice in holiness. The consequence? The God clung to by the orthodox becomes a monster.
...
Are you a theologian? Fix this problem with orthodoxy. Tear the God-damned prophetic theology apart and put it back together so that it stops slandering God."
Your rant (no need for the warning) is somewhat nonsensical.
Unfortunately, I'm going to have to take a break from these endlessly diverting discussions to deal with that basic fact of life called taxes. I'm stringing together responses in one post. Be back in communication after the 15th.
ReplyDeleteSteve:
Yes, a case of purported demonic possession would be a good one to work with. Yes, the idea is to get the right answer. So, how do you know when you have the right answer? What criteria do you use? What kinds of evidence count and how much? What theoretical framework(s) will you use to relate your data? You are absolutely correct to focus on individual cases. But you wouldn't rethink the entire issue from the ground up each time. You would have some rules of thumb at least. That's what I'm interested in.
Saint and Sinner:
Been there, done that -- a very long time ago, admittedly. His distinction between normal science and paradigm-breaking science is provocative, but you have to be careful not to overplay it. The distinction between a paradigm and dependent theories or models is relative. These things play out at many levels. On the "paradigm" level, a scientist/community may be extremely unwilling to acknowledge or recognize disconfirming evidence for what it is. On other levels the same scientist/community may abandon theories in the face of disconfirming evidence many times over. That's self-correction at work in "normal" science. The barriers are higher when it comes to breaking "paradigms," but the process is essentially the same, and it eventually works, sort of. We're dealing with human beings, after all.
Truth Unites ... and Divides:
Hey, you may be my first customer! 4 years of rants, and until now I had no idea anyone had seen any of them. (Turrentinfan visited once, but as far as I know he only read my profile.) I expect you won't be back either, but that's OK. If you really want to talk about my posts, comment over there.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteThanks for this post. Its very interesting. First, Del Ratzsch is a philosopher not a scientist. Again if he were a practicing scientist in the laboratory, he might have a different opinion. Philosophers want to see everyting in terms of philosophy. Second, he admits that methodological naturalism is a good provisional strategy . That is basically all I am arguing for. Everything is provisional in science and subject to change.
Third, he says that the objection that the supernatural cannot be detected or tested is prima facie plausible, but I think that there could be possible empirical cases in which the most reasonable conclusion would be that something supernatural was at work . The problem I have with that is he still doesn't explain how one would know that the supernatural was at work if it can't be detected or tested (which are fundamental requirements of the scientific method). I would like to see him or someone explain how they would be able to recognize the supernatural at work and how they would be able to test it to verify that it is definitely supernatural. Unless one can explain how this methodological supernaturalism would actually work in the lab, then its all just hypothetical.
I will leave you with an interesting quote: Order is not necessarily design. Design is not necessarily good design. Good design is not necessarily benevolent design..
In order for ID to get to where apologists would like for it to get--provide evidence for the God of the Bible, it must be able to show that the supposed design in the universe is benevolent design. I think that will be very unlikely. If God used evolution as his means to create life on the earth, he used a very inefficient and cruel means.
Dean Dough said:
ReplyDeleteYes, a case of purported demonic possession would be a good one to work with. Yes, the idea is to get the right answer. So, how do you know when you have the right answer? What criteria do you use? What kinds of evidence count and how much? What theoretical framework(s) will you use to relate your data? You are absolutely correct to focus on individual cases. But you wouldn't rethink the entire issue from the ground up each time. You would have some rules of thumb at least. That's what I'm interested in.
No one is stating we're to "rethink the entire issue from the ground up each time". That's an overstated assumption you're making about our beliefs.
Remember the context of this and previous posts is the argument that methodological naturalism should be assumed in order to investigate various phenomena and such like. Steve et al have responded to this claim and its severe limitations. Particularly the fact that methodological naturalism screens out the evidence in advance of the evidence.
Now you're asking an entirely different question. You're asking for an alternative to methodological naturalism.
Also you're (re)acting as if rejecting methodological naturalism implies rejecting the scientific method.
Likewise you're acting as if the scientific method has been set in stone since it was first formulated. Sure, the broad brushstrokes are the same or similar to varying degrees (e.g. hypothesis based on observation, reproducible experimentation). But do you think the scientific method and/or how scientists apply it hasn't been refined since Bacon?
KEN PULLIAM SAID:
ReplyDelete"Thanks for this post. Its very interesting. First, Del Ratzsch is a philosopher not a scientist. Again if he were a practicing scientist in the laboratory, he might have a different opinion. Philosophers want to see everyting in terms of philosophy."
Methodological naturalism is a philosophical principle–not a scientific datum. It is not something derivable from science. Rather, it is a metascientific filter.
"The problem I have with that is he still doesn't explain how one would know that the supernatural was at work if it can't be detected or tested (which are fundamental requirements of the scientific method). I would like to see him or someone explain how they would be able to recognize the supernatural at work and how they would be able to test it to verify that it is definitely supernatural. Unless one can explain how this methodological supernaturalism would actually work in the lab, then its all just hypothetical."
i) That has already been explained to you. Take the principle of counterflow.
ii) Moreover, it's disingenuous of you to feign ignorance. The reason that methodological naturalism was introduced in the first place is that proponents of methodological naturalism have a clear idea of what they're trying to exclude by that methodology. Lewontin is a case in point. So don't pretend that you're in the dark regarding the alternative. Proponents of methodological naturalism wouldn't be so hostile to the alternative unless they thought they had a pretty clear idea of what that involves.
"I will leave you with an interesting quote: Order is not necessarily design. Design is not necessarily good design. Good design is not necessarily benevolent design. In order for ID to get to where apologists would like for it to get--provide evidence for the God of the Bible, it must be able to show that the supposed design in the universe is benevolent design. I think that will be very unlikely. If God used evolution as his means to create life on the earth, he used a very inefficient and cruel means."
i) There's no good reason to think that ID theorists are trying to provide evidence for the God of the Bible. For instance, Behe is a Catholic theistic evolutionist, not a young-earth creationist.
ii) The theodicean objection to ID is a theological objection, not a scientific objection. That objection is irrelevant to evidence of design.
iii) Some ID theorists reject macroevolution.
iv) You need to explain and justify your allegation that evolution is "cruel" and "inefficient."
a) To say it's cruel projects a human standard onto the subhuman order. But that hardly reflects the viewpoint of the subhuman order. So your objection is anthropomorphic.
b) Keep in mind that I don't subscribe to macroevolution, so the charge of inefficiency, even if true, has no purchase on my own position.
However, you need to explain what you mean by inefficiency. For example, do you define redundancy as inefficient? But redundancy can be a mark of good design.
Dean Dough said...
ReplyDelete"Yes, a case of purported demonic possession would be a good one to work with. Yes, the idea is to get the right answer. So, how do you know when you have the right answer? What criteria do you use? What kinds of evidence count and how much? What theoretical framework(s) will you use to relate your data? You are absolutely correct to focus on individual cases. But you wouldn't rethink the entire issue from the ground up each time. You would have some rules of thumb at least. That's what I'm interested in."
i) One can use standard diagnostic methods to screen out cases with detectable natural causes. That's a preliminary step.
ii) There's also the question of whether the patient responds to conventional therapies.
iii) There's the further question of whether the patient exhibits paranormal abilities.
However, I'm not impressed by your affectation of ignorance. Take critics of Rupert Sheldrake's experiments. Sheldrake has very specific criteria.
The underlying objection to his experimentation is not the lack of protocols, but philosophical resistance to the paranormal.
Same thing with Stephen Braude's investigations into the paranormal. He's also quite meticulous about the criteria.
I don't mention that to vouch for their conclusions, just to make the point that this pretense about not knowing what the alternative would look like is just that–a pretense.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteYou say: Methodological naturalism is a philosophical principle–not a scientific datum. It is not something derivable from science. Rather, it is a metascientific filter.
Methodological naturalism is a methodology not a philosophical principle. Metaphysical naturalism is a philosophical principle.
You say: methodological naturalism have a clear idea of what they're trying to exclude by that methodology
I don't think so. They can't include something that no one knows how to detect or observe. Just because something might be counter to known natural causes does not mean that it is automatically supernatural.
When I said apologists, I am talking about people like Bill Craig who is a big proponent of ID. They would like to use ID arguments as evidence for God and they mean the God of the Bible.
I don't know what your particular view of origins is, perhaps you could tell me? Are you YEC or OEC? If OEC, how did life come about on earth if not by evolution?
Its cruel because, by the very nature of the definition, its survival of the fittest. The weak are eliminated. God of the Bible is supposed to be for the weak and
disadvantaged. The suffering in the animal world, even today, is incredible.
Dean Dough said:
ReplyDelete"That's self-correction at work in "normal" science. The barriers are higher when it comes to breaking "paradigms," but the process is essentially the same, and it eventually works, sort of. We're dealing with human beings, after all."
Me:
a.) The current paradigm happens to be protected by an overriding philosophical barrier, methodological naturalism. So, breaking down this paradigm will be far more difficult than others.
b.) If there are paradigms, and paradigms do change (sometimes drastically), then how can you know that the current paradigm, neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, is true?
KEN PULLIAM SAID:
ReplyDelete"Methodological naturalism is a methodology not a philosophical principle."
Of course it's a philosophical principle. Methodological naturalism is bound up with one's philosophy of science:
"In what follows, ‘methodological naturalism’ will be understood as a view about philosophical practice. Methodological naturalists see philosophy and science as engaged in essentially the same enterprise, pursuing similar ends and using similar methods."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/#Sci
"I don't think so. They can't include something that no one knows how to detect or observe."
Of course, that's a philosophical claim. Thanks for proving my point.
"Just because something might be counter to known natural causes does not mean that it is automatically supernatural."
Just because something might be counter to known natural causes does not mean that it is ultimately natural.
Why do you keep raising reversible objections? Why are you unable to advance the argument?
"I don't know what your particular view of origins is, perhaps you could tell me? Are you YEC or OEC?"
I think YEC is defensible. On the other hand, I also think the time-markers in Gen 1 may well be numerological figures.
"How did life come about on earth if not by evolution?"
By special creation and microevolution.
"Its cruel because, by the very nature of the definition, its survival of the fittest."
Once again, that is merely projecting your human feelings onto the animal kingdom. Does a deer say to itself, "Wolves are cruel!"
"The weak are eliminated. God of the Bible is supposed to be for the weak and
disadvantaged."
That's utterly acontextual. Scripture is discussing human rights, not animal rights.
"The suffering in the animal world, even today, is incredible."
Do you know what it's like to be a guppy? Have you ever been a guppy?
Steve,
ReplyDeleteIf you defend YEC, then I don't know why you bother with ID proponents. You and they are on different sides of the fence.
If you can answer one question for me, then perhaps I will conceded your point. How does one detect and test supernatural processes?
If you defend YEC, then I don't know why you bother with ID proponents. You and they are on different sides of the fence.
ReplyDeleteIt could be true that the vast majority of ID proponents do not defend YEC. But that doesn't necessarily mean YEC and ID are utterly incompatible where never the twain shall meet.
Besides Steve didn't limit himself to defending YEC alone. Or didn't you read his next line?
If you can answer one question for me, then perhaps I will conceded your point. How does one detect and test supernatural processes?
He already responded above. In fact he gave further avenues for people to pursue such as criteria by Rupert Sheldrake and Stephen Braude.
But whether one has criteria for detecting supernatural processes has little to do with your own illogical points and poor argumentation. Your arguments are still quite mistaken on their own terms.
KEN PULLIAM SAID:
ReplyDelete"If you defend YEC, then I don't know why you bother with ID proponents. You and they are on different sides of the fence."
i) My, what an ignorant characterization of ID. ID is neutral on YEC. ID is consistent with YEC, OEC, TE, &c.
ii) You're also changing the subject. Is that because you lost the argument?
I'm not defending YEC in this thread. Rather, I'm opposing methodological naturalism.
"If you can answer one question for me, then perhaps I will conceded your point. How does one detect and test supernatural processes?"
i) As Patrick points out, I already answered that question. You're not paying attention.
ii) Also, you and Dean continue to play this dumb little game of pretend about the inability, even in principle, to detect the supernatural.
But a primary reason that unbelievers reject the miraculous is because they do think miracles, if genuine, would implicate God's existence.
It's not as if the average sceptic says, "Well, I believe that Jesus walked on water, multiplied fish, and turned water into wine. What I deny is that such events were supernatural. For all we know, there's a natural explanation, and future science will uncover the natural laws and forces which made them possible."
No, most sceptics reject all such reported events because they are irreducibly miraculous or supernatural.
So why don't you and Dean drop all the playacting about the undetectability of the supernatural?
Tell me, do you believe in the miracles of Scripture, but simply reclassify them as naturally occurring events? I don't think so.
Steve,
ReplyDeletethe classic dodge is to say, I have already answered that. Please describe again how one would detect and then test supernatural processes. That is the whole question in a nutshell. If science had tools to do that, then they would not have to employ methodological naturalism.
KEN PULLIAM SAID:
ReplyDelete"If science had tools to do that, then they would not have to employ methodological naturalism."
That's illogical. If the supernatural is indetectable, then science doesn't need install a naturalistic methodology to avoid contamination from supernatural factors since, ex hypothesi, the supernatural never impinges on the natural world in any discernible fashion.
Rather, as Lewontin was candid enough to admit, secular scientists introduce the filter of methodological naturalism to eliminate the wild card of miracles. They want to keep everything predictable and utterly mundane. A closed-system.
Ken:
ReplyDeleteIts cruel because, by the very nature of the definition, its survival of the fittest.
Much of the Darwinist literature I read doesn't exactly say survival of the fittest. They takes a more nuanced position that what survives is more able to breed successfully in its present environment. So an animal that is less advanced that its genetic cousin may be better able to breed and thus be the survivor.
Example: Say a woman has two kids, Smart and Dumb. Smart dies of swine flu while Dumb marries and has a large family. Is that survival of the fittest?
My point here is that Darwinists often imply a teleological direction to evolution that their own theory doesn't support.
Steve:
Have you read Paul Helm's recent discussions on creation and ID?
1.) Here he says "Personally, like Professor Reiss, I have no brief for creationism." There's no explanation.
http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2008_09_01_archive.html
2.) In another essay, he makes criticism of ID that curiously parallels Feser (and Beckwith), albeit in a non-Thomist direction:
http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2008/08/design-arguments-and-apologetics.html
I'd be interested in seeing your comments.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteYou said: If the supernatural is indetectable, then science doesn't need install a naturalistic methodology to avoid contamination from supernatural factors since, ex hypothesi, the supernatural never impinges on the natural world in any discernible fashion.
Exactly and they haven't installed a filter because they don't know what supernatural processes would look like. You still haven't told me by the way.
What they are eliminating are theories of causation that go beyond what they are able to detect.
KEN PULLIAM SAID:
ReplyDelete"Exactly and they haven't installed a filter because they don't know what supernatural processes would look like."
Of course, your question is faulty since supernatural causation doesn't need to be a "process."
"You still haven't told me by the way."
Because, for reasons I've stated, your question is disingenuous.
"What they are eliminating are theories of causation that go beyond what they are able to detect."
To say they go beyond what is detectable is a prejudicial assertion. You keep moving in a vicious little circle.
Jerrold Katz, neither a theist nor a naturalist but a philosopher of language, considers three doctrines that go by the name of naturlism on p. xii of his book "Realistic Rationalism".
ReplyDeleteFirst, he describes "ontological [or metaphysical] naturalism", which says that all there is are natural objects: spatiotemporal objects within the causal order of nature. (That is somewhat circular, but I think good sense can be made of it just by removing the "of nature".) Second, he defines "epistemological naturalism": the view that all knowledge is of natural objects. Third, there is "methodological naturalism": the belief that only prescientific and scientific investigations of natural objects yield knowledge.
Ontological naturalism implies the other two, but neither converse is true. Interestingly, as Katz notes, W. V. O. Quine is a methodological naturalist who is neither an ontological or epistemological one (despite his "naturalized epistemology"). He accepts the existence of knowable abstract objects because they arise in our best scientific theories.
Science and scientific reasoning precede methodological naturalism, not vice versa. So the latter is hardly essential to science.
I wonder: Can one accept as true young-earth creationism and treat the theory of evolution as precisely that "appearance of age" which that cosmogony implies? In other words, could evolution be true of the cosmos in theory (being what present-day organisms and the laws of nature imply) but not in fact? Or does that make God mendacious (creating fossils of creatures that never lived and all)?
Or does that make God mendacious (creating fossils of creatures that never lived and all)?
ReplyDeleteI've never understood how an omphalos (apparent age) theory makes God a liar any more than the general doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Is a playwright being deceptive if he doesn't the whole backstory to his characters before the first scene?
SRNEC SAID:
ReplyDelete"I wonder: Can one accept as true young-earth creationism and treat the theory of evolution as precisely that 'appearance of age' which that cosmogony implies? In other words, could evolution be true of the cosmos in theory (being what present-day organisms and the laws of nature imply) but not in fact? Or does that make God mendacious (creating fossils of creatures that never lived and all)?"
I don't attribute the fossil record to mature creation.
Randall van der Sterren said...
ReplyDelete"Have you read Paul Helm's recent discussions on creation and ID?
1.) Here he says "Personally, like Professor Reiss, I have no brief for creationism." There's no explanation.
http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2008_09_01_archive.html
2.) In another essay, he makes criticism of ID that curiously parallels Feser (and Beckwith), albeit in a non-Thomist direction:
http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2008/08/design-arguments-and-apologetics.html
I'd be interested in seeing your comments.
1. Like everyone, Helm is, to some extent, a product of his generation. His take on creationism a throwback to the British Evangelicalism of Packer (i.e. "Fundamentalism" and the Word of God).
I think that's inadequate.
2. I disagreed with his criticisms of ID, and expressed that in private (cordial) correspondence.
I disagreed with his criticisms of ID, and expressed that in private (cordial) correspondence.
ReplyDeleteSo what did you say?
Randall said: "I've never understood how an omphalos (apparent age) theory makes God a liar any more than the general doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Is a playwright being deceptive if he doesn't the whole backstory to his characters before the first scene?"
ReplyDeleteI never said it did. I merely posed a question. However, if it is not mendacious of God to create a universe appearing to be old it is neither mendacious to create one appearing to have evolved. The prevailing science may have then correctly interpreted God's creation. The scientists would not be wrong because the evidence points in another direction, but because they don't trust Genesis. I am not arguing that this is the necessary conclusion of theory of apparent age, but I am saying that it is a possible one. I wonder why I don't hear anybody arguing for it? Why feel the need to both (i) defend God's right to create an Earth that appears to have undergone aging processes it has not and (ii) deny evidence of one of those processes, namely evolution?
Steve said: "I don't attribute the fossil record to mature creation."
That's fine. Neither did I. But see above. You certainly could, could you not? What would compel one to absolve God of creating a full fossil record of organisms never having lived and instead attribute it to, say, the Deluge if one is willing to regard the young created Earth as apparently aged?
http://evanevodialogue.blogspot.com/2010/04/teaching-science-and-faith-course-in.html
ReplyDeleteSteve, et al,
If you have the time, what do you think of the link above where a Theistic Evolutionist discusses 10 lessons learned from teaching theistic evolution in his church?
Do you think he talked about the limitations of methodological naturalism in his class?
TUAD: I'm amazed this guy thinks he is brave for teaching TE at a PC(USA) church.
ReplyDeleteSRNEC SAID:
ReplyDelete"That's fine. Neither did I. But see above. You certainly could, could you not? What would compel one to absolve God of creating a full fossil record of organisms never having lived and instead attribute it to, say, the Deluge if one is willing to regard the young created Earth as apparently aged?"
If you object to the notion of apparent age, do you also object to the notion of apparent recency? Is it a problem if natural objects are younger than they appear, but not a problem if they're older than they appear (e.g. starlight)?
RANDALL VAN DER STERREN SAID:
ReplyDelete"So what did you say?"
I don't think I saved the email thread, although I shared it with some friends who may have saved it.
Steve: I'll ask a different question. Edward Feser and Paul Helm both seem to oppose ID for similar reasons from different angles. Feser, specifically, complains that it makes a methodological mistake is assuming a "modern mechanistic philosophy of nature." Is that a fair criticism?
ReplyDelete(There's also the "God of the Gaps" accusation, which, IMHO, has become a cliche.)
Here's Feser:
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010_04_01_archive.html
Steve said: "If you object to the notion of apparent age, do you also object to the notion of apparent recency? Is it a problem if natural objects are younger than they appear, but not a problem if they're older than they appear (e.g. starlight)?"
ReplyDeleteI object to neither. As this thread is getting old, I won't try again.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteI come back from finishing my taxes and find this:
"However, I'm not impressed by your affectation of ignorance. Take critics of Rupert Sheldrake's experiments. Sheldrake has very specific criteria.
The underlying objection to his experimentation is not the lack of protocols, but philosophical resistance to the paranormal....
I don't mention that to vouch for their conclusions, just to make the point that this pretense about not knowing what the alternative would look like is just that–a pretense."
In the meantime, Ken Pulliam showed up to defend the use of some sort of methodological naturalism. You manage to lump him in with me:
"Also, you and Dean continue to play this dumb little game of pretend about the inability, even in principle, to detect the supernatural."
To paraphrase a certain hobbit, "From him that's a compliment, and so, of course, not true."
Speaking for myself, of course I have an agenda. It's not like I've been hiding it. Why else would I keep asking the same question over and over? It may irritate you, but this is important (see well below). And yes, I had suspicions about what kind of answer I would get, but I know you are pretty smart and I could be surprised and learn something. But just when your discussion of demon possession was about to get interesting, you went ad hominem on me.
I have never even heard of Rupert Sheldrade or Stephen Braude or their investigations of the paranormal or any resulting controversy. Thanks for the mention; I'll look them up.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteSince Ken Pulliam hasn't seen fit to respond to your attempt to equate "methodological" and "philosophical" naturalism, let me make an admittedly rather weaker attempt.
You make the following statement:
"Of course it's a philosophical principle. Methodological naturalism is bound up with one's philosophy of science:
'In what follows, "methodological naturalism" will be understood as a view about philosophical practice. Methodological naturalists see philosophy and science as engaged in essentially the same enterprise, pursuing similar ends and using similar methods.'"
Thanks for the URL reference. It sure sounds like you've skewered us -- until I read this in the VERY NEXT PARAGRAPH:
"In some philosophy of religion circles, ‘methodological naturalism’ is understood differently, as a thesis about natural scientific method itself, not about philosophical method. In this sense, ‘methodological naturalism’ asserts that religious commitments have no relevance within science: natural science itself requires no specific attitude to religion, and can be practised just as well by adherents of religious faiths as by atheists or agnostics (cf. Draper 2005). This thesis is of interest to philosophers of religion because many of them want to deny that methodological naturalism in this sense entails ‘philosophical naturalism’, understood as atheism or agnosticism. You can practice natural science in just the same way as non-believers, so this line of thought goes, yet remain a believer when it comes to religious questions.
Not all defenders of religious belief endorse this kind of ‘methodological naturalism’. Some think that religious doctrines do make a difference to scientific practice, yet are defensible for all that (Plantinga 1996). In any case, this kind of ‘methodological naturalism’ will not be discussed further here. Our focus will be on the relation between philosophy and science, not between religion and science."
WTF? Quote-mining? You can't be serious. Obviously, "methodological naturalism" means different things to different people in different contexts. I can't speak for Ken Pulliam, but I know I am referring to the kind of "methodological naturalism" the author above says he is not discussing. See my next comment for more.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteNow, to get back to Lewontin. Consider this comment: "The eminent Kant scholar Lewis Beck used to say that anyone who could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen." Why does he agree with Lewis Beck? Lewontin is not thinking of Jews, Christians or Muslims believing in columns of pink bunnies marching across the ceiling at night. He's thinking of things like the "spectral evidence" in the witch trials, to pick one notorious example.
In no way did those who were willing to admit "spectral evidence" into testimony at these trials believe that God allowed demons to get away with absolutely everything. For one thing, the demons were constrained to reveal their presence by such impressive evidences as the devil's teats. For another, they were not allowed to so deceive the courts that the courts would misinterpret the evidence in favor of the accused and let her off scot-free. The demons were permitted, apparently, to carry out curses against victims' economic well-being via ruined harvests, diseased animals, and fires, or make victims sick, or sexually assault them. And they were permitted to make the witches appear to be in one place when they were really in another, an ability that conveniently ruled alibis out of court.
Sure, the courts were ignorant of possible alternate explanations for some of the events attributed to demonic activity instigated by the witch. But they had plenty of knowledge about others, and it didn't matter. If you presented a natural explanation, they would simply insist that the demon was the real impetus behind the natural event.
I assume you reject this kind of "spectral evidence." In light of that, are you suggesting that if a supposedly demon-possessed person's symptoms can be explained by, say, a chemical imbalance, you won't jump to the conclusion that a demon is just "flying under the radar?" Or does it depend? On what? And I guess I should read the works of Sheldrake and Baude to find out how you would evaluate any "paranormal" phenomena displayed by the demon-possessed person.
One final aside about The Demon-Haunted World. The central issue that frames the book's defense of science is "alien abduction" and other pseudo-scientific claims about aliens. None of this has to do with supernaturalism; the closest it comes is the claims by some of those "abducted" by aliens that the aliens, possessing superior technology, are able to completely disguise all evidence of their deeds from investigators such as Sagan. Sagan is not betraying his illegitimate precommitment to metaphysical naturalism because he won't believe it unless he sees some evidence that can't be explained more simply.
I've gotten pretty far afield from the original issue of evolutionary theory. When Michael Behe published Darwin's Black Box I was excited about the idea of irreducible complexity; it made sense to me. I followed the exchanges between Behe and his critics enough to see Behe (to his credit) retract claims that he could not substantiate with evidence or be definitively refuted by other studies in molecular biology. Ah, simpler explanations. That did it for me. Perhaps Dr. Waltke went through some of the same experiences.
Dean Dough said:
ReplyDeleteBut just when your discussion of demon possession was about to get interesting, you went ad hominem on me.
and
WTF? Quote-mining? You can't be serious.
Well, Dean Dough, not that I'd agree with your assessment or allegations, but you say Steve "went ad hominem on you" as if it's a bad thing while you yourself have had no qualms about "[going] ad hominem" on others.
What's more, your own weblog posts have not only "[gone] ad hominem" but also "quote mined" others. For example you "quote mine" Augustine, contrast him to E.O. Wilson, and then berate Augustine for what you judge to be substandard ethical conduct vis-a-vis Wilson.
Why the double standard?
[A]re you suggesting that if a supposedly demon-possessed person's symptoms can be explained by, say, a chemical imbalance, you won't jump to the conclusion that a demon is just "flying under the radar?" Or does it depend? On what? And I guess I should read the works of Sheldrake and Baude to find out how you would evaluate any "paranormal" phenomena displayed by the demon-possessed person.
Sounds like you've answered your own question - although Sheldrake and Baude's criteria are not necessarily identical to what Steve may have in mind. Rather the point is Sheldrake and Baude have detailed criteria which more than suffices for what you're apparently "interested in": "some rules of thumb at least". Yet you persist in maintaining a posture of ignorance toward alternatives.
One final aside about The Demon-Haunted World. The central issue that frames the book's defense of science is "alien abduction" and other pseudo-scientific claims about aliens. None of this has to do with supernaturalism; the closest it comes is the claims by some of those "abducted" by aliens that the aliens, possessing superior technology, are able to completely disguise all evidence of their deeds from investigators such as Sagan. Sagan is not betraying his illegitimate precommitment to metaphysical naturalism because he won't believe it unless he sees some evidence that can't be explained more simply.
So what? This doesn't conflict with anything Steve has said.
Plus, as you've described it, if "Sagan is not betraying his illegitimate precommitment to metaphysical naturalism because he won't believe it unless he sees some evidence that can't be explained more simply," then science doesn't ipso facto necessitate metaphysical naturalism. As such, it'd undercut your own point that one must assume methodological naturalism in order to conduct science. You've just proven yourself wrong on this score.
I've gotten pretty far afield from the original issue of evolutionary theory.
No, the "original issue" as far as you've been concerned concerns your assumptions about the centrality of methodological naturalism in conducting science.
When Michael Behe published Darwin's Black Box I was excited about the idea of irreducible complexity; it made sense to me. I followed the exchanges between Behe and his critics enough to see Behe (to his credit) retract claims that he could not substantiate with evidence or be definitively refuted by other studies in molecular biology. Ah, simpler explanations.
Again, so what? Has Behe retracted his argument for irreducible complexity?
And you don't explain how you view irreducible complexity as relevant to your argument for methodological naturalism or our counter-arguments against it.
That did it for me.
But, unless Behe retracted his argument for irreducible complexity, it didn't do it for Behe. Not to mention other proponents.
DEAN DOUGH SAID:
ReplyDelete"WTF? Quote-mining? You can't be serious."
It's hardly "quote-minding" to quote passages which express the viewpoint of the writer if that entry, such as: "In what follows, ‘methodological naturalism’ will be understood as a view about philosophical practice. Methodological naturalists see philosophy and science as engaged in essentially the same enterprise, pursuing similar ends and using similar methods...If we want to isolate a serious debate about philosophical method, we will need to go beyond initial reactions to science and look at more specific methodological commitments. For the sake of the argument, let us thus understand methodological naturalism as asserting that at bottom philosophy and science have just the same aims and methods, namely, to establish synthetic knowledge about the natural world, in particular knowledge of laws and causal mechanisms, and to achieve this by comparing synthetic theories with the empirical data. (So understood, methodological naturalism is committed to equating ‘science’ with ‘natural science’. This equation will be considered further in section 2.5.) Methodological naturalists will of course allow that there are some differences between philosophy and science. But they will say that these are relatively superficial. In particular, they will argue that they are not differences in aims or methods, but simply a matter of philosophy and science focusing on different questions."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/#Sci
Dean Dough said...
ReplyDelete"Why does he agree with Lewis Beck? Lewontin is not thinking of Jews, Christians or Muslims believing in columns of pink bunnies marching across the ceiling at night. He's thinking of things like the 'spectral evidence' in the witch trials, to pick one notorious example."
No, he's staking out a universal position on the inadmissibility of *any* and *every* appeal to supernatural causation.
RANDALL VAN DER STERREN SAID:
ReplyDelete"(There's also the 'God of the Gaps' accusation, which, IMHO, has become a cliche.)"
As Del Ratzsch also responds to that objection:
[Quote] I don't see that as necessarily a defect. We routinely employ gap arguments in all sorts of contexts. For instance, the SETI program is a gap-searching project - trying to find signals which nature alone couldn't or wouldn't produce, then constructing alien-civilizations-of-the-gap arguments. Further, it is nowhere written in stone that nature has no causal or explanatory gaps of the relevant sort. For all we know nature may contain gaps which can only be bridged by divine action. And that could be intentional - God might like running some things in nature hands-on, and might have created nature to allow for that in its normal operations. Anyway, gaps and gap arguments as such are unproblematic in principle.
Of course, there are serious questions concerning how we might identify supernaturally bridged gaps as such, especially scientifically. Such gaps might thus be inconvenient - or worse - for our investigative efforts and procedures, and we might have no choice but to assume continuity as a working strategy, but we can hardly demand that nature conform herself to our limitations - i.e., we cannot very appropriately issue inflexible ontological edicts propped up solely by reference to our epistemological limitations. Reality, it seems to me, is a bit more independent and robust than that. But many see gap-type arguments as having a troubled history and a troubling character.
But not all design arguments are gap arguments. In fact, during the heyday of natural theology - late 18th and early 19th centuries - non-gap arguments involving the interlocking structure of laws, cosmic order, the elegance and beauty built into nature, and the like, were very widely seen as preferable to and more powerful than gap arguments. And many contemporary ID advocates also embrace some non-gap arguments, including the 'frontloading' picture mentioned earlier. Front-loading types of design pictures go back at least to Augustine.
More specifically, gaps have to do with e.g. mechanical causal histories, whereas design has to do with intentional histories. Those are in many cases intimately related issues. Gaps can be important clues to design, since depending on the context an actual mechanical, causal gap could suggest agency as a causal factor, and it is a relative short step from there to design. But the issues are distinct, and the ritual allegation that design views are all God-of-the-gap theories is inaccurate philosophically, as well as historically and contemporarily. There are, again, many (especially lay) design-gap advocates, but the blanket universalization is straightforwardly mistaken.
It is also worth noting that if nature is designed and if it does contain causal or explanatory gaps, then any prohibition on gap theories will nearly guarantee that science - discarding one failed non-gap theory only by replacing it with another (not yet failed) gap theory - will not self-correct in the usual advertised way, and that science will never correctly understand the relevant phenomena.
http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43816
And here's another response:
ReplyDelete[Quote] The point it that ID is not confined to biology, to begin with, nor is it confined to arguments of negations of natural causes, as Beckwith seems to assume in his assessment of irreducible and specified complexity. ID is comprised of positive arguments, not only that chance alone (non-intelligence) cannot account for the particulars in nature that appear designed, but that the formation and information of nature requires an intelligence. This is a positive argument in and of itself, regardless of how the design gets implemented (whether it’s through nature or through some other medium, doesn’t really matter to ID). It’s really an argument about intelligence v. non-intelligence.
It seems that Beckwith’s assumption of ID’s conceptual program runs like this: ID proponents posit that nature at large is undesigned, a blank slate of sorts, and that the designer intervened only at particular places and stamped his stamp on the otherwise blank slate, and that it’s ID’s job to discover the stamp only, whereas Thomism sees the whole thing as designed (slate, stamps and all). Thus Beckwith concludes that arguments deriving from the stamps alone are confusing what was actually designed (the whole show). But, what Beckwith fails to consider, is that it need not be this way. This is a false picture of ID. To say that design is detectable in some instances, is not to say that the rest of the instances are not designed. It only means that a particular methodology of design detection (specified complexity) can determine design in certain specific cases, not that it, therefore, negates all other cases. It has nothing to say about other cases. It can detect some instances where design is, but does not, by extension, say where design isn’t. Specified complexity never pretended to be exhaustive. This methodology does not have to be all encompassing or nothing. Certain literary devices detect certain hallmarks of authorship, but that doesn’t mean the critic believes that there is only one literary device to discover everything about literature, or that the literature that the narrow literary device can discover was all that was written.
http://www.uncommondescent.com/evolution/francis-beckwiths-biography-pertaining-to-id/#more-12483
Randall van der Sterren said...
ReplyDelete"Edward Feser and Paul Helm both seem to oppose ID for similar reasons from different angles. Feser, specifically, complains that it makes a methodological mistake is assuming a 'modern mechanistic philosophy of nature.' Is that a fair criticism?"
Depends on what he means:
i) Nature does have some machine-like properties.
ii) ID isn't "mechanistic" in denying final causes (i.e. teleology). To the contrary, intelligent design is a fundamentally teleological notion.
iii) This also gets us sidetracked into a debate on the correct exegesis of Aristotle and Aquinas.
iv) And it takes for granted the validity of Thomistic metaphysics.
Dear Patrick,
ReplyDeleteThis thread has gotten quite old and I suppose just about everybody has moved on, but you reponsded to my comments and I suppose you deserve some kind of response in return.
First, ad hominem refers to the use of an attack against an opponent's motivations and/or character as a way to undercut arguments he/she raises in support of a position. I'd really rather confine discussion of my own blog to the comment area there, but let me at least point out that I wasn't raising questions about any arguments Augustine was making, I was simply making an observation about his tone or attitude. Frankly, I was ranting. I know quite well that Augustine wrote long passages on many subjects without any of the condemnations or implied condemnations I was complaining about. Steve, on the other hand was just about to get to the key point in answer to my question when he started questioning my motives, as in "I'm not going to answer any insincere question."
Second, quote-mining is the practice of citing the words of an author in support of your argument but failing to call attention to elements in the context of the cited words that would seriously qualify or undermine the support. Perhaps I have done the same somewhere, hopefully nowhere near as flagrantly as Steve did in this case. You're welcome to track one down and point it out. Just post it as a comment on my blog and I'll fix it.
Third, you say, "Yet you persist in maintaining a posture of ignorance toward alternatives." Cut me a break, will you? When you wrote it, I had all of a couple of days to take a look at Sheldrake and Braude, in which I was already heavily engaged in other matters.
Fourth, you say "Plus, as you've described it, if 'Sagan is not betraying his illegitimate precommitment to metaphysical naturalism because he won't believe it unless he sees some evidence that can't be explained more simply,' then science doesn't ipso facto necessitate metaphysical naturalism." Precisely! Steve's point all along has been that if I insist on methodological naturalism I have to accept metaphysical naturalism as well. The one requires the other.
I don't agree at all. The whole point of my discussion about Sagan's and Behe's books is that the real issue is not what could happen but what did happen. Is it possible for species to appear fully-formed without ancestors? Yes! Is it possible for people to be abducted by aliens so technologically advanced that we could not detect their presence? Yes! Now, what evidence that these events took place will satisfy you? If I can come up with an explanation that satisfies the available evidence and does not resort to visits by these technologically-superior aliens or the immediate action of God, would you still consider the "supernatural" explanation more likely?
That's it for me on this thread too. I want to read Sheldrake and Braude.
DEAN DOUGH SAID:
ReplyDelete"Second, quote-mining is the practice of citing the words of an author in support of your argument but failing to call attention to elements in the context of the cited words that would seriously qualify or undermine the support. Perhaps I have done the same somewhere, hopefully nowhere near as flagrantly as Steve did in this case."
I already responded to your allegation by providing further documentation for my quote.
It isn't "quote-mining" to quote an author consistent with his viewpoint. The fact that his viewpoint isn't the same as your viewpoint is irrelevant to the charge of quote-mining.
It would behoove you to acquire a modicum of honesty.
"I don't agree at all. The whole point of my discussion about Sagan's and Behe's books is that the real issue is not what could happen but what did happen."
And methodological naturalism prejudges what did happen in advance of the facts. It only admits evidence of what did happen if that evidence happens to dovetail with a naturalistic explanation.
"If I can come up with an explanation that satisfies the available evidence and does not resort to visits by these technologically-superior aliens or the immediate action of God, would you still consider the 'supernatural' explanation more likely?"
Appealing to what is antecedently likely is a metaphysical claim, not a methodological claim. Probabilities make assumptions about the nature of the world. So you're demonstrating my point as you tacitly revert to metaphysical naturalism.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteI think "metaphysical" naturalism and "methodological" naturalism are two different concepts. The latter does not logically demand the former. You disagree. The quote-mined citation you used identifies the two. I'm not arguing that the quote goes against the author's viewpoint. My point is that the author goes on to distinguish the definition of "methodological naturalism" he is using from another definition of "methodological naturalism" that others use. The latter definition matches my conception more closely than the definition used by the author. In fact, he chooses not to deal with my conception at all and says so very clearly. Therefore, his equation of the two does not advance your argument because he's not talking about what I'm talking about in the first place. We're arguing over definitions, and this liar doesn't intend to argue about it any further.
I could say a lot about your assessment of my use of probabilities, but I'd rather get to Sheldrake and Braude before getting bogged down with new issues.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteNot knowing how else to get hold of you, I wanted to let you know that I've finally gathered some further thoughts on methodological naturalism in light of your suggestion to look at Sheldrake and Braude. The initial post is here with more to come.