SKARLET SAID:
“Well, you put forward that Arminians deny that God can be trusted to plan their lives, that Bennon evidences a lack of faith in God's wisdom, and that Brennon doesn't trust God to plan his life. You've made one very crucial mistake though - What you mean is that Arminians deny that God-As-Calvinism-Paints-Him, or the Calvinist God for short, can be trusted to plan their lives.”
i) Wrong. I’m not arguing on Reformed assumptions. Rather, I’m arguing on Arminian assumptions. It’s Arminians who constantly object to the notion that everything we think and say and do was scripted by God.
So I simply take them at their word. If you don’t trust God to plan your life, then you don’t trust God with your life.
ii) However, let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that I was judging them by my own theological standards. So what? I also judge John Spong by own theological standards. Do you think I should judge John Spong by his theological standards?
For that matter, when Arminians like Wesley, Olson, and Brennon compare the God of Calvinism to Satan (or worse), they are judging Calvinism by their own theological standards.
Everyone takes his own position as the point of reference. Big deal.
“If the Calvinist God is, in fact, a misrepresentation of God, and merely a man-made concept, then it is wise of them not to trust a man-made concept…To say that that they don't trust the real God because they don't trust the version of God that you think exists is a blade that cuts both ways. They could as easily claim that you don't trust the real God because you don't the version of God that they think exists.”
I don’t have a problem with tu quoque arguments. If the blade truly cuts both ways, fine.
“They do trust God-As-They-See-Him-To-Be.”
So does the Muslim, Mormon, Hindu, Buddhist, Baal-worshiper, Jehovah’s Witness, &c.
“But despite these difference, you both worship Jehovah God, Jesus Christ, the one and only Truine God, in Spirit and Truth as much as you know how.”
Actually, the Arminians I typically deal with play a double game: They say: “You Calvinists worship the Devil! In fact, your God is even worse than the Devil! But, hey, we’re still brothers and sisters in Christ!”
“Arminians are elect too, you know, and are brothers and sisters in Christ.”
“Elect” in what sense? In the Arminian sense, viz. conditional election (e.g. foreseen faith and/or corporate election), or the Reformed sense, viz. unconditional election? Your usage is equivocal.
Are you asking me to judge Arminians by Calvinist standards? By Calvinists standards, some Arminians are elect while other Arminians are reprobate–just as some Calvinists are elect while other Calvinists are reprobate.
If, however, you’re asking me to judge Arminians by Calvinist standards, then you’ve just contradicted yourself since you now asking me to judge the Arminian “as-Calvinism-paints-him.”
ARMINIANPERSPECTIVES SAID:
“Exactly. It is a massive case of question begging on Steve's part from the very start.”
To the contrary, I’m describing the Arminian according to his own theology.
“Truly, if the Arminians are right and God did in fact make a provision of atonement for all and enables all who hear the gospel to respond in faith, then it is the Calvinist that ‘talks back to God’ in denying this Biblical truth. Furthermore, if God has sovereignly decided to grant man a measure of free will and hold him accountable for how He uses that will, then the Calvinists is ‘talking back to God’ in denying God that right, or in re-defining His ‘sovereignty’ so as to exclude that possibility.”
What a splendid example of Scripture twisting. Ben is ripping a Bible verse out of context, then reassigning that verse to perform the polar opposite of what Paul actually said. Here is what Paul said:
“So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills. You will say to me then, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?’ But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, "Why have you made me like this?" 21 Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?” (Rom 9:18-21).
Paul characterizes “answering back to God” as somebody who says, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?’
But Ben redefines “answering back to God” as somebody who says, “Who are you to question God if he allows us to resist his will?”
It would be hard to come up with a more brazen example of negating Scripture.
“If we think that someone has a wrong conception of God, then we should try to correct that through Scriptural examination, but we need to be very careful in our rhetoric since God will certainly hold us accountable for every careless word we speak.”
In that event I’d suggest that Ben redirect his admonition at some of his Arminian cobelligerents.
"By Calvinists standards, some Arminians are elect while other Arminians are reprobate–just as some Calvinists are elect while other Calvinists are reprobate"
ReplyDeleteHow does one tell the difference, whether in terms of oneself or others?
Are the reprobates just putting on a show, all the while secretly being atheists? Do they believe, or just think they believe?
"If you don’t trust God to plan your life, then you don’t trust God with your life."
Can the Calvinist God be trusted, if He doesn't want all to be saved? Your faith may be a trick. He could have "sent you a delusion" so that you think you're among the saved when you're not.
Of course, the same could be asked of the Arminian God, in a way. God may not, in the end, see to it that you are saved. If you're Catholic, you need to make sure you have the sense of timing to die after having gone to confession. If God wants all to be saved and not everyone goes to Heaven, apparently some other factor comes in to play. God can't be trusted in the sense that He will not guarantee your salvation.
Quite a dilemma, no?
If I thought Rob Zechman was a real person, I'd be tempted to answer. But for all I know, he may just be a trick of the mind. A hallucination. A minor character in a bad dream.
ReplyDeleteWhen I wake up, he'll disappear. So why should I debate a figment of my imagination?
Quite a dilemma, no?
For that matter, when Calvinists like Wesley, Olson, and Brennon compare the God of Calvinism to Satan (or worse), they are judging Calvinism by their own theological standards.
ReplyDeleteEh? You mean Arminians like Wesley, no?
Rob, if so, maybe he sent you a "strong delusion" to think you have a good argument, or that the verses you have read really say what you think, or that the questions you receive to your answers are incorrect when they're in fact correct, etc. Quite the dilemma, no?
ReplyDeleteRob Zechman said:
ReplyDeleteYour faith may be a trick.
If you truly distrust yourself because you think you're self-deluded, then shouldn't you also distrust your distrust of yourself? Quite a dilemma, no?
Love the title, by the way.
ReplyDelete"i) Wrong. I’m not arguing on Reformed assumptions. Rather, I’m arguing on Arminian assumptions. It’s Arminians who constantly object to the notion that everything we think and say and do was scripted by God.
So I simply take them at their word. If you don’t trust God to plan your life, then you don’t trust God with your life."
You say you are arguing on Arminian assumptions, but Arminians claim to trust God with their life. They don't think that God DOES make their life a script, but that is not at all the same as saying that they wouldn't trust him too. For example, my brother does not carry me on his shoulders, but if the situation ever came up, I would not hesitate to trust him to do that safely. To reiterate, they trust God to plan their life, and to that end they attempt obey His commands even when they don't understand fully how it's going to work out well, but they do not believe that God does, in fact, script their life. They would trust Him to if He did, but they don't believe that He does. They believe, in fact, that it's against His character to do so. Consider Richard Wurmbrand. He was a non-calvinist christian, an Arminian if you will, and he spent 14 years in a communist prison for serving God. He wrote books about it, and even founded Voice of the Martyrs. He trusted God implicitly, not just in word, but in deed. What he said with his lips, he sealed with his blood.
"ii) However, let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that I was judging them by my own theological standards. So what? I also judge John Spong by own theological standards. Do you think I should judge John Spong by his theological standards?
For that matter, when Calvinists like Wesley, Olson, and Brennon compare the God of Calvinism to Satan (or worse), they are judging Calvinism by their own theological standards.
Everyone takes his own position as the point of reference. Big deal."
By your own theological standards, we are wrong about God. We may even be accidentally spreading lies about who God is, and defaming His character. However, even from your view, you cannot claim that our motives are all wrong: That we "try to edit God" or that we don't trust God. Trust is a relationship component, and we do have a relationship with God. We are sons and daughter of God, adopted into His family, by His grace and Lovingkindness. As a pointed out before, even given that Calvinism is correct, there are good many Arminians who pour their lives heart and soul into serving and worshiping Him.
"I don’t have a problem with tu quoque arguments. If the blade truly cuts both ways, fine."
ReplyDeleteA tu quoque argument is called a logical fallacy because it proves nothing. Example: "Smoking is bad for your health. You shouldn't smoke." "Oh yeh? Well you do!" In that example, the response did not answer the original proposition, and therefore adds nothing to the argument. It's little more than a red herring. In another example of a sword that cuts both ways: "Calvinist gives more glory to God." "No, Arminianism gives more glory to God." "No, Calvinism." "No - Arminianism!" "Calvinism!" "Arminianism!" In that example, the argument just degrades into simple contradiction without any meaningful points being put foward from either side. (Hmm, kinda reminds me of the Monty Python Sketch: The argument clinic) Those sort of arguments are pointless.
"Actually, the Arminians I typically deal with play a double game: They say: 'You Calvinists worship the Devil! In fact, your God is even worse than the Devil! But, hey, we’re still brothers and sisters in Christ!'"
Well, yes, that is the position of most Arminians. A very very few will say that perhaps calvinists are false teachers, and not christians at all. But personal experience tells me that that view is dead wrong. I know a great many Calvinist who are truly born-again christians, dedicated to God, godly men, in the family of God, and members of the body of Christ. One can say that the position of another is wrong, and yet still maintain that the other person is a christian. Some may even throw around the word "heresy," but I think the word "heresy" only applies to teachings which deny the gospel itself. (Such as Mormonism, Jehovah's witnesses, etc) No one says that Calvinists worship the devil. It is said that the Calvinist God, logically, is worse than the Devil (I'm thinking of Wesley here) but since no Calvinist admit that logic, they don't truly worship that version of God. If they admitted that God was worse than the Devil and still worshiped Him - well, that would be another story. But that isn't the way it is. Calvinists, for the most part, are true christians who worship the Lord God in Spirit and in truth.
"'Elect' in what sense? In the Arminian sense, viz. conditional election (e.g. foreseen faith and/or corporate election), or the Reformed sense, viz. unconditional election? Your usage is equivocal.
Are you asking me to judge Arminians by Calvinist standards? By Calvinists standards, some Arminians are elect while other Arminians are reprobate–just as some Calvinists are elect while other Calvinists are reprobate.
If, however, you’re asking me to judge Arminians by Calvinist standards, then you’ve just contradicted yourself since you now asking me to judge the Arminian 'as-Calvinism-paints-him.'"
When I say that Arminians are elect, I mean that they are born-again believers. (For the most part, are you mention, there are obviously both Arminians and Calvinists who claim to be Christian, but are not) Elect in the usage of "God planned that they will be saved and go to heaven before the world was made." My point is not the usage of the word. I'm not trying to engage in simple logomachy here. I'm saying that we are all members of the body of Christ. We are the church. We are the bride of Christ. And when I say we, I mean born-again Arminians and Calvinists. We are family. Let's act like family! :)
Skarlet said:
ReplyDeleteA tu quoque argument is called a logical fallacy because it proves nothing.
Well, Peter Geach thinks otherwise. See his book, Reason and Argument. BTW, Geach was a philosopher and logician. He was Elizabeth Anscombe's husband too. As for Anscombe, she is sometimes said to have bested C.S. Lewis in debate. In any case Lewis revised the relevant chapter in his book Miracles.
Patrick,
ReplyDeleteI don't have the book. Would you mind explaining to me his reasoning for saying that tu quoque is a good argument? I would love to hear about it.
From Peter Geach:
ReplyDeleteAd hominem arguments. This Latin term indicates that these are arguments addressed to a particular man - in fact, the other fellow you are disputing with. You start from something he believes as a premise, and infer a conclusion he won’t admit to be true. If you have not been cheating in your reasoning, you will have shown that your opponent’s present body of beliefs is inconsistent and it’s up to him to modify it somewhere. This argumentative trick is so unwelcome to the victim that he is likely to regard it as cheating: bad old logic books even speak of the ad hominem fallacy. But an ad hominem argument may be perfectly fair play.
Let us consider a kind of dispute that might easily arise:
A. Foxhunting ought to be abolished; it is cruel to the victim and degrading to the participants.
B. But you eat meat; and I’ll bet you’ve never worried about whether the killing of the animals you eat is cruel to them and degrading to the butchers.
No umpire is entitled at this point to call out “ad hominem! Foul!” It is true that B’s remark does nothing to settle the substantive question of whether foxhunting should be abolished; but then B was not pretending to do this; B was challengingly asking how A could consistently condemn foxhunting without also condemning something A clearly does not wish to condemn. Perhaps A could meet the challenge, perhaps not; anyhow the challenge is a fair one - as we saw, you cannot just brush aside a challenge to your consistency, or say inconsistency doesn’t matter.
Ad hominem arguments are not just a way of winning a dispute: a logically sound ad hominem argues does a service, even if an unwelcome one, to its victim - it shows him that his present position is untenable and must be modified. Of course people often do not like to be disturbed in their comfortable inconsistencies; that is why ad hominem arguments have a bad name.
Patrick,
ReplyDeleteThank you for sharing that. It's very interesting. However, I have to disagree with his conclusions. First of all, he calls it an ad hominem, when really, as you said originally, it's a tu quoque. I think he's mis-labeling the whole discussion in fact.
An ad hominem attack basically relies on the logic that if a stupid of evil person believes something, that something must be wrong. Example: Bill says that abortion is wrong. But Bill beats his wife - we can't listen to him. Therefore, abortion is right. You can see how that doesn't hold up.
The tu quoque fallacy is that if one person does it, it's right for another person to do it. It's the "two wrongs make a right" fallacy, in general. Example: The romans kept slaves. Therefore, it's fine for us to keep slaves. Though, it's more often used like this: "It's wrong to steal" "Yeh, well, I know you cheat on your taxes too. (implied: so it's okay if I steal)"
What Geach is addressing here is not only not an ad hominem attack, which is nullifying the statement based on a person's character, nor a tu quoque attack which is nullifying the statement based on hypocrisy. Rather, Geach says that "It is true that B’s remark does nothing to settle the substantive question of whether foxhunting should be abolished; but then B was not pretending to do this; B was challengingly asking how A could consistently..."
Geach is talking about questioning consistency. Questioning consistency is a great thing to do. I agree. I do it all the time. But I think that one should point out the lack of consistency, so as to make it clear that they are not "pretending to settle the substantive question," which both ad hominem attacks and tu quoque arguments do pretend.
What do you think?
Rob Zechman said...
ReplyDeleteAre the reprobates just putting on a show, all the while secretly being atheists? Do they believe, or just think they believe?
Reprobate persons need not be atheists. They can also be theists. Judas was probably a genuine theist when he commited suicide, and we know reprobate angels (Satan and his demonic cohorts) are theists. One can believe *that* God exists, without believing *in* God in the sense of trusting God. As the Bible says, "You believe that God is one You do well; the demons also believe, and shudder." (James 2:19).
Rob Zechman...
Can the Calvinist God be trusted, if He doesn't want all to be saved? Your faith may be a trick. He could have "sent you a delusion" so that you think you're among the saved when you're not.
Yes, that's a logical possibility. However, God has created us in His rational image and therefore we are rational creatures (though not always consistently so). To the degree that we are being rational (as God commands us to be), and understand the basics of the Gospel, then we can have Biblically (and "Gospel-ly", if one doesn't have access to a Bible) warranted confidence that when we positively respond to the Gospel, that we shall be saved. You asked whether God can be trusted. Well, part of trusting God is trusting His promises in the Gospel.
Maybe, what you're really asking is whether [the Calvinistic] God is *worthy* of our trust given His (as you might say) capricious nature. In the former sense, we're dealing with epistemic issues from our perspective if Calvinism were true. In the latter sense, we're dealing with God's own internal integrity, consistency and power since you're making an internal critique of Calvinism. Well, if we take Calvinism seriously, then God has the power (being omnipotent), and internal consistency to perform His promises. Among the things that God cannot do; He cannot lie, die, or deny Himself (i.e. contradict His own nature or word).
At the end you asked about the Arminian and Catholic conceptions of God. There's no need to answer because I'm neither.
Skarlet said...
ReplyDeleteA tu quoque argument is called a logical fallacy because it proves nothing.
It's true that in a formal debate the use of a tu quoque is fallacious because it doesn't necessarily prove that the oposition's position is false or that your position is true.
However, in informal discussions they can be useful in showing one's opponent the logical implications of his position or argument(s). Implications that would either prove their position as inconsistent (and therefore possibly wrong), or prove one of his arguments as useless since it can undermine his own position. So, while it cannot prove either position as true; it can nevertheless prove that his argumentation is faulty, or (at the most) prove both positions false. Therefore, in a debate between and atheist and a deist, a tu quoque can call into question (or disprove) both atheism and deism. Since, a tertium quid might be true (i.e. Christian theism, heh).
Skarlet said...
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, he calls it an ad hominem, when really, as you said originally, it's a tu quoque.
Actually, there are various Ad Hominem arguments. For example, there's ad hominem 1. Abusive, 2. Circumstantial, 3. Poisoning the Well, 4. Tu Quoque
http://www.fallacyfiles.org/adhomine.html
From Wikipedia in reference to Tu quoque arguments:
ReplyDelete"It is considered an ad hominem argument, since it focuses on the party itself, rather than its positions."
Steve,
ReplyDeleteFor the record, I wasn't specifically trying to exegete Rom. 9:19, 20 (if that post was about an exegesis of Rom. 9, then I apologize for missing that), I was using the phrase in a general sense since you seemed to be saying that an Arminian rejecting Calvinistic determinism didn't trust God with His life. That was the question begging I was referring to (assuming your position [or interpretation] and then faulting the Arminian for not holding to your specific view of things).
If one is essentially "answering back to God" by denying what you believe to be Biblical truth (apparently based on your interpretation of Rom. 9:19, 20, which Arminians obviously disagree with), then an Arminian could say the same thing with regards to numerous passages that they believe Calvinists "twist", as you say, in order to preserve their determinism, etc.
As far as Rom. 9:19, 20, I am interested in your interpretation. You faulted Brennon for robotic metaphor. Why exactly? Why is robotic metaphor not reprehensive of your view? You appeal to Rom. 9 as a reference to absolute determinism. Therefore, you have God forming the clay just as He wants down to every thought, motive, and decision the "clay" makes. You then have God (through Paul) rebuking the clay for "answering back" to the Potter when the Potter specifically formed the clay to answer back to God in such a way that the clay could no more avoid answering back than a robot can go against its programming. Why then the bristling against robotic metaphor?
Also, you compare our lives to scripted characters in a book. Can a scripted character do anything other that the Author who writes the script causes them to do? If not, then how is that any different than robots or puppets that can likewise do nothing other than what the puppet Master or Programmer irresistibly controls them to do?
I'm not looking for a debate, I really haven't got the time. I'm just curious why Calvinists get hyped up about Arminians using puppet or robot "metaphors" and yet Calvinists use metaphors (e.g. an Author scripting a character, a Potter forming clay) which boil down to the exact same thing? Why do Calvinists get hyped up about Arminians supposedly “answering back to God” when we are doing just what the Potter formed us to do according to His good pleasure? Shouldn’t you rather feel sorry for us that God has caused us to do such things and formed us in such a way? But of course, you can just say that your indignation is likewise “scripted”, etc. Do you feel tremendously lucky, in contrast, that the Potter formed you to defend the truth rather than “answer back” to God?
I don’t want to misrepresent Calvinism, so please help me to understand. I will probably not be responding further, but if you could give me your perspective on this I would much appreciate it. I will think carefully about whatever answer you give me so that if I ever decide to post on the subject, I can take your thoughts into consideration.
Thanks,
Ben
Correction: "Why is robotic metaphor not reprehensive of your view?"
ReplyDeleteShould be "representative of your view"
SKARLET SAID:
ReplyDelete“You say you are arguing on Arminian assumptions, but Arminians claim to trust God with their life. They don't think that God DOES make their life a script, but that is not at all the same as saying that they wouldn't trust him too.”
Except that it is the same. If they don’t trust God to plan their life, then they don’t entrust their lives to the wisdom of God.
“To reiterate, they trust God to plan their life, and to that end they attempt obey His commands even when they don't understand fully how it's going to work out well, but they do not believe that God does, in fact, script their life.”
If God didn’t script their life, then God didn’t plan their life.
“They would trust Him to if He did, but they don't believe that He does.”
No. If God did, then–according to Arminians–that would make him diabolical. And a diabolical being is untrustworthy.
“Consider Richard Wurmbrand.”
No. Consider the logic of the Arminian position.
“Trust is a relationship component, and we do have a relationship with God.”
A relationship doesn’t depend on trust. I have a relationship with Barack Obama. I’m an American citizen. He’s the American president. As such, I have a legal relationship with Obama. Which doesn’t me I trust him.
“A tu quoque argument is called a logical fallacy because it proves nothing.”
That’s unfortunate for you since you were the one who deployed a tu quoque argument. You tried to discredit my objection by claiming that an Arminian could say the same thing in reverse. But if you now claim that’s a logical fallacy, then you just invalidated your own counterargument.
“No one says that Calvinists worship the devil. It is said that the Calvinist God, logically, is worse than the Devil (I'm thinking of Wesley here) but since no Calvinist admit that logic, they don't truly worship that version of God.”
Why do you think that you can drive a wedge between what a worshiper believes in and the actual object of his belief? Isn’t his worship directed at his idea of God?
Does a Viking really worship the Trinity even though he consciously worships Thor?
arminianperspectives said...
ReplyDeleteAlso, you compare our lives to scripted characters in a book. Can a scripted character do anything other that the Author who writes the script causes them to do? If not, then how is that any different than robots or puppets that can likewise do nothing other than what the puppet Master or Programmer irresistibly controls them to do?
Calvinists like ourselves usually dislike the use of robotic metaphors used by non-Calvinists because they often use them in a way that denies the traditional Calvinistic view that affirms secondary causes and secondary means. Also, they often use such metaphors in an unnuanced way. As if all Calvinists were occasionalists (when only a minority are) who believe that God directly (immediately/without means) controls human beings (their wills, desires and actions) like a puppetmaster controls his puppets. Though, there are Calvinistic occasionalists who do teach that. See Vincent Cheung's book Author of Sin (freely online) where he argues that the puppet analogy doesn't go far enough(!).
In reality, different Calvinists have different ways of accounting for how God, in His providence, ensures that what He has ordained will come to pass, *actually* comes to pass. Some Calvinists (most) appeal to some form of theistic compatibilism. Other Calvinists (sometimes in conjunction with the former) appeal to the B-Theory of time (ala McTaggart's famous philosophic paper). Other Calvinists appeal to occasionalism (e.g. Vincent Cheung) and/or continuous creation (e.g. Jonathan Edwards). Other Calvinists make use of middle knowlege (e.g. Terrance Tiessen, Bruce Ware).
Oops, I just realized that my previous post was really a respone to this statement by arminianperspectives
ReplyDeleteI'm just curious why Calvinists get hyped up about Arminians using puppet or robot "metaphors" and yet Calvinists use metaphors (e.g. an Author scripting a character, a Potter forming clay) which boil down to the exact same thing?
***********
arminianperspectives
said...
Can a scripted character do anything other that the Author who writes the script causes them to do? If not, then how is that any different than robots or puppets that can likewise do nothing other than what the puppet Master or Programmer irresistibly controls them to do?
No, we agree that the results are the same, but the means to those results can differ. It all depends on one's Calvinistic views concerning *how* God brings about those results. All Calvinists want to consistently affirm that the reasons for our choices, the choices themselves, and the consequences themselves (physically, spiritually, morally) are ALL real.
The caricature that many (not all) non-Calvinists make usually deny those things. When those things are taken into consideration, even the most deterministic view (e.g. hard determinism and/or occasionalism), to use an extreme, need not be problematic. It might not make intuitive sense to an Arminian, but there's no logical internal contradiction or inconsisteny.
Hi Skarlet,
ReplyDeleteHere's my response:
An ad hominem attack basically relies on the logic that if a stupid of evil person believes something, that something must be wrong.
An ad hominem argument doesn't have to rely on a person being "stupid" or "evil" as you say. It could be anything objectionable about the person in the context of the argument. For example, it'd be an ad hominem argument to say something like: "Obama claims that universal health care is better for the average American than our current system. But Obama is a Democrat. Therefore his claim about universal health care is false." There's nothing necessarily intellectually or morally deficient about being a Democrat.
The tu quoque fallacy is that if one person does it, it's right for another person to do it. It's the "two wrongs make a right" fallacy, in general.
A tu quoque argument is not that "two wrongs make a right" argument. Rather it's the "hypocrisy" ("you too!") argument.
What Geach is addressing here is not only not an ad hominem attack . . . nor a tu quoque attack . . . Geach is talking about questioning consistency.
Actually, Geach's above example of an ad hominem argument is a tu quoque argument inasmuch as a tu quoque argument is generally considered a subspecies of the ad hominem argument. Geach is talking about questioning consistency because that's what a tu quoque argument does.
But I think that one should point out the lack of consistency, so as to make it clear that they are not "pretending to settle the substantive question," which both ad hominem attacks and tu quoque arguments do pretend.
But doesn't this undercut your claim that tu quoque arguments are fallacious? If you think tu quoque arguments do attempt to settle the substantive question, then what's wrong with tu quoque arguments?
Annoyed Pinoy,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the clarifications. I understand that there are Calvinists who approach the details differently. I find the "second cause" defense to be problematic on several fronts, and I don't see that it solves anything. We can speculate quite a bit as to how God causes us to choose things, but God causes it non-the-less, and the "person" has no ability to resist that control. We could say that a puppet master doesn't control a puppet because the strings (second causes) actually are what moves the puppet around, but most people immediately see that this does not take the control away from the one who manipulates the strings, etc.
Also, traditionally, Calvinists assert that if God does not control everything, then He is not sovereign. That would mean that He must control “secondary” causes as well. Maybe you have a different view of sovereignty. Truly, it is hard to paint either view (Arminian/Calvinist) with a broad stroke, since there are variations in some of the nuts and bolts details, but the main premises are rather standard and I think the main premise of Calvinistic exhaustive determinism makes such analogies as robots and puppets appropriate. Of course, we will probably just need to agree to disagree, but I have yet to see a Calvinist refute the charge (though that may just be a matter of opinion as well).
God Bless,
Ben
Pinoy,
ReplyDeleteJust noticed your further response. You wrote:
No, we agree that the results are the same, but the means to those results can differ.
That's good enough for me.
God Bless,
Ben
Patrick,
ReplyDelete"An ad hominem argument doesn't have to rely on a person being "stupid" or "evil" as you say. It could be anything objectionable about the person in the context of the argument."
I agree. The examples I gave were meant to be just examples rather than an exhaustive definition.
"A tu quoque argument is not that "two wrongs make a right" argument. Rather it's the "hypocrisy" ("you too!") argument."
Well, if you insist on calling questioning consistency a tu quoque argument, then I will now deliniate between a tu quoque argument, and a tu quoque fallacy. A tu quoque argument is the hypocrisy argument. A tu quoque fallacy is trying to use the hypocrisy argument to settle the original question or point. IE You are a hypocrite, and therefore what you put forward is wrong. Kids will use the tu quoque argument to justify their own sins. That's a fallacy, not simply an argument to point out the inconsistency of the other person in their own life.
"Actually, Geach's above example of an ad hominem argument is a tu quoque argument inasmuch as a tu quoque argument is generally considered a subspecies of the ad hominem argument. Geach is talking about questioning consistency because that's what a tu quoque argument does."
Yes, I agree now. I see the deliniations. The tu quoque argument is a subset of the ad hominem argument, and any ad hom argument is a fallacy if it attempts to settle the original question.
"But doesn't this undercut your claim that tu quoque arguments are fallacious? If you think tu quoque arguments do attempt to settle the substantive question, then what's wrong with tu quoque arguments?"
It is not my point that tu quoque argument are fallacious. I do support, as I said, pointing out inconsistencies. I had just never called it a tu quoque argument, because in general, tu quoque is used only as a fallacy and not as a legitimate argument. If the "you too!" statment is meant to merely point out inconsistency, then it can be a legitmate argument against the consistency of the person's position, if you can show that they act or believe something inconsistent with what they say. However, using the tu quoque argument to prove the original prosition false is a fallacy. Just because a person smokes and believes that smoking is bad does not prove that smoking is not bad for your health. I don't have a problem with what you call tu quoque arguments, but rather with the tu quoque fallacy.
And I don't think that the "sword that cuts both ways" argument gets very far. It quickly becomes mere contradiction. "You're being intellectually dishonest by not agreeing with me." "Nope. You're the one who's being intellectually dishonest by not agreeing with me." "Nope, you." "Nope, you!" Does this really get anywhere?
Skarlet,
ReplyDeleteI think you're not taking into account that there are two different types of hypocrisy. There are the hypocrisy arguments of the sort you've mentioned, as in "One should never smoke" while said person is smoking. However, there are also hypocritical arguments that are fundamental to the argument, where the tu quoque renders the original argument void.
An example of this type is when a relativist says: "One should never make any assertions about reality, for truth is relative." A tu quoque defeats this position. In fact, I don't see how anyone can even begin to mount a refutation WITHOUT beginning with the tu quoque here. In this instance, it is the very fact that the person has indeed done that which he claims you are not allowed to do that renders his argument invalid.
In fact, I think the main difference is the difference between "can't" (meaning "ability", not "permission") and "shouldn't". That is, if one argues "You can't do X" while doing X then the tu quoque is the best argument you can use against that position. If someone says, "You shouldn't do X" while doing X, that is a different thing altogether. Do you see the difference there?
Peter,
ReplyDeleteYes, I understand your clear delinations, but I'm beginning to become confused about how people are using tu quoque.
Which of these can properly be called a tu quoque argument, and which is a tu quoque fallacy?
i) You say smoking is wrong
You smoke
Therefore, smoking is not wrong
ii) You claim that there is no truth
You claim that your claim is true
You have defeated your own point
iii) From your point of view, I'm closing my eyes to the obvious
From my point of view, you're closing your eyes to the obvious
Without further evidence, there is no way to determine which is correct
From my point of view, the first is a tu quoque fallacy, the second is a legitimate argument, and the third is not tu quoque at all.
Thoughts?
arminianperspectives said...
ReplyDeleteI think the main premise of Calvinistic exhaustive determinism makes such analogies as robots and puppets appropriate.
Agreed, so long as the full-orbed Calvinistic view(s) are represented.
Also, I admit that for myself, the Arminian-like positions are more intuitively plausible. I wouldn't have a problem holding to an Arminian-like position. However, when I assume that Scripture is consistent with itself, I can't help but conclude that something like Calvinism is true. Having been on both sides, I prefer the Calvinistic position. Though, I have great respect for many Arminian/Arminian-like pastors/teachers/scholars/preachers. :-))
Skarlet,
ReplyDeleteI would generally agree with your assessments of the three arguments, although your final example is not technically an argument at all (opinion statements are not arguments, by definition). That's not to say that another reader can't tell what the argument BEHIND the opinion is, of course.
HAYS SAID:
ReplyDelete"If God didn’t script their life, then God didn’t plan their life."
"If they don’t trust God to plan their life, then they don’t entrust their lives to the wisdom of God."
"Consider the logic of the Arminian position."
I say consider Richard Wurmbrand, because trusting God is not just a mental assertion of facts, it's a choice, and it's part of a relationship. You must have misunderstood my point about trust being a relationship thing. I'm not saying that everyone with a relationship with someone else trust them. That would be obviously untrue. What I am saying is that, aside from semantical debates about the meaning of this or that verse, you can look at someone's life, and see the evidences of their relationship with God, and see if they live a life where they trust and rely on God to the extent that they can with the information that they understand. Richard Wurmbrand obviously practically trusted God, even if he disagreed about what Reformed Theology claims is the logical implication of certain verses.
Also, Arminians often would completely trust God to script their life. I know I would. It'd be a load off my back to know that I wasn't messing up! But I believe that if God scripted my life, He would never decree that I must do evil. But you seem to insist that if we aren't content with the idea of God forcing (causally determining) us to do evil, then we just don't trust God!
“A tu quoque argument is called a logical fallacy because it proves nothing.”
That’s unfortunate for you since you were the one who deployed a tu quoque argument. You tried to discredit my objection by claiming that an Arminian could say the same thing in reverse. But if you now claim that’s a logical fallacy, then you just invalidated your own counterargument.
I was not saying that you were using a tu quoque fallacy, or a tu quoque argument, (mentioned in my last comment, i and ii). Rather I was making the third claim (iii)
A - From your point of view, we don't trust God to be who He really is
B - From our point of view, you don't trust God to be who He really is
C - Without further evidence, neither can be proven.
"Why do you think that you can drive a wedge between what a worshiper believes in and the actual object of his belief? Isn’t his worship directed at his idea of God?
Does a Viking really worship the Trinity even though he consciously worships Thor?"
Not unless that viking is a born again christian who believes in Jesus as Lord and Savior, and trusts on Christ's finished work on the cross to save him from sin and death. If he then calls God "Thor," but attributes to Him all and only the attributes of Jehovah, then yes he's worshiping the same God. Otherwise, if he thinks that Jehovah is just the Thor of legend, and that Jesus is Thor's Son, then He is not worshiping God.
Skarlet said:
ReplyDelete---
I say consider Richard Wurmbrand, because trusting God is not just a mental assertion of facts, it's a choice, and it's part of a relationship.
---
Why does "choice" matter in the above? Allow me to give an example of two couples:
1) Suppose Adam wants to make Emily fall in love with him, so he produces a love potion that will permanently alter Emily and gives it to her. Emily does, indeed, fall in love with Adam because the potion makes her find Adam desireable and makes her care for him, etc. She will never change from this state because of the way the potion is made. Adam and Emily live happily ever after.
2) Now suppose Aaron wants Elizabeth to fall in love with him, so he courts her in the traditional manner and wins her over. She falls in love with him to such an extent that we know she'll never divorce him, etc. Aaron and Elizabeth live happily ever after.
Given the above, what is the objective difference between the way that Emily feels toward Adam and the way that Elizabeth feels toward Aaron? What is the objective difference between the way each of the women act toward the object of their affection? What is the objective difference between their relationships?
If there is no difference--and I see none--then choice is irrelevant to relationship.
Skarlet said:
ReplyDelete---
But I believe that if God scripted my life, He would never decree that I must do evil. But you seem to insist that if we aren't content with the idea of God forcing (causally determining) us to do evil, then we just don't trust God!
---
If "forcing" someone means that they are required to do an action against their will, then determinism doesn't require force at all. Indeed, the Calvinist usually maintains that it is the will that is altered. In other words, suppose that I like to eat chocolate and cannot stand brocolli. If God then "zaps" me so that I now like brocolli and cannot stand chocolate, I will then willingly choose to eat brocolli instead of chocolate. He has not forced me to do anything against my will, as my will itself has been altered.
So it seems your objection is based on the connotations of a word ("forcing") which do not follow from Calvinist beliefs.
As to the issue of God never decreeing evil, there are many Scriptural illustrations to the contrary. Some quick examples include the Pharisees who put Jesus to death, according to God's foreordained plan; Joseph's brothers selling him into slavery (Joseph told them "You meant it for evil but God meant it for good" showing that God did, indeed, mean it to occur); Assyria's destruction of Israel (which Isaiah tells us is according to God's plan, but which Assyria does for sinful reasons), etc.
Peter,
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, the discussion here is about whether Arminians, Brennon in particular, trusts God with his life.
My point was that trust is not just a mental assertion of facts - trust is not just saying "God determines every part of everything." or else "God has a good plan for my life that He wants me to follow, by His grace." True trust is a choice (IE the difference between believing that a chair is safe to sit on, and actually choosing to sit on it.)
My point, then, is not about salvation and whether we have a choice in it. (Unless of course you guys are also saying that Arminians aren't even saved!) To the best of my understanding, the question was not whether Brennon is saved, but whether Brennon trusts God in his christian walk. And I would say that although Brennon does not mentally assess to what Hays thinks is truth, Brennon does, practically, like Richard Wurmbrand, choose to trust God in his life. He chooses to trust God's wisdom, chooses to trust God's advice, trust that God cares about Him, and trust that God's laws are the best.
Your points about salvation, and the analogies to it, are then completely off topic. But, to answer your point anyway, if the bride ever says "I Do," that's a choice. She choose to say "I Do." Whether she choose freely or not, you can debate, but it is a choice.
Peter,
ReplyDeleteYou say "So it seems your objection is based on the connotations of a word ('forcing') which do not follow from Calvinist beliefs."
I kinda figured that someone would take objection to me use of the word "force" which is why I tried to specifically define it as "causally determining."
I know it's not against the person's will, according to the Calvinist understanding of the will. But God decrees, and thereby determines the actions of men. Not just allowing them either, but actually causing them.
If you disagree that calvinism teaches that God causally determines every action of man, I will be more than happy to cite my sources.
Skarlet,
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what you are refering to when you reference my "points about salvation." I was speaking particularly of whether "choice" was necessary in a relationship, and then disagreeing about your concept of "forcing" and then referenced several people who God purposed to have done evil in the Scripture.
In any case, it seems now you are linking "trust" and "choice", right? If so, I would likewise disagree with this; but I want to make sure that really is what you're doing before I continue.
As to God's causally determining, have you ever studied compatibalism?
Peter,
ReplyDeleteI thought that your analogy of love and marriage was referring to salvation - that's how to analogy is usually used. If you weren't, then I apologize for reading into your words.
In most cases, I do link trust and choice. However, many times the choice is made without conscious thought. I trust this keyboard without evening thinking about it. Some people trust con artists without even thinking about it. Still, I don't think that can prove trust without action, and from my point of view, every action implies choice (free or not). Does that clarify it a bit?
As to God's causally determining, have you ever studied compatibalism?
Yes, I have studied compatiblism. It seems, to me, to be the doctrine that God decrees our actions (in such a way that we cannot choose otherwise), but that since we choose what we want to do, we have chosen freely and are therefore responsible for our actions.
PETER PIKE SAID:
ReplyDelete"Suppose Adam wants to make Emily fall in love with him, so he produces a love potion that will permanently alter Emily and gives it to her. Emily does, indeed, fall in love with Adam because the potion makes her find Adam desireable and makes her care for him, etc"
Indeed, that's more than a metaphor. There's a chemistry to falling in love.
Skarlet said:
ReplyDelete---
I thought that your analogy of love and marriage was referring to salvation - that's how to analogy is usually used. If you weren't, then I apologize for reading into your words.
---
Nope, all I meant was that each of the women had a real, definite loving relationship with their spouse regardless of the fact that one "had no choice" as it were, and in fact their relationships are indistinguishable from each other in terms of the actions each woman would do, etc. The point being that choice is thereby irrelevant to the relationship aspect.
It could be taken as a metaphor for salvation, I suppose, but I meant it no further than the above.
You said:
---
In most cases, I do link trust and choice.
---
You then gave examples of trusting something without thinking about it, yet still choosing some type of action. I, however, am more interested in the reverse. For there are many things that I trust are true that I have absolutely no ability to "choose" anything.
Example: I trust that if I were to go to Mars without a space suit, I would die.
A second problem that arrises is when you trust in X for Y when X has nothing to do with Y. An example of this is found in story of Dumbo: the elephant believed he needed the feather to fly, when the reality was he could fly all along. In this case, Dumbo's trust is false, yet he acts in a certain way that he deludes himself into believing his trust is true. For a real-world example, think of any superstition that athletes hold to when they're in a slump (not changing socks, etc.).
Finally, even in the examples you've given, I think you've got the order backwards. If you trust someone, you will do certain behaviors that you will not do if you do not trust them. Your choice does not cause the trust; your trust causes the choice. If you didn't trust a chair to support you, you would never sit on it.
As to every action requiring choice, I assume you mean every action a human does (seeing as how a volcano's eruption is not chosen by nature, yet is an action). Even then, my heart beats are not chosen by me. I'm not sure if you can define what specific types of actions you refer to without already circularly referencing choice (i.e., the actions that require choice are the actions that require choice). Even then, we are left with such things as our desires and likes. Can you choose to like spinach if you dislike it? (You can choose to eat it, but can you actually choose to LIKE it?) Or is that instead something that just is? And your likes will certainly influence your actions (if you don't like spinach, it's unlikely you'll order any at the restaurant). In this case, something you have no control over and that you did not choose to have controls what you do or do not eat, even if you don't think about it.
I'll have more to say later, but must run now.
SKARLET SAID:
ReplyDelete"I say consider Richard Wurmbrand, because trusting God is not just a mental assertion of facts, it's a choice, and it's part of a relationship. You must have misunderstood my point about trust being a relationship thing. I'm not saying that everyone with a relationship with someone else trust them. That would be obviously untrue. What I am saying is that, aside from semantical debates about the meaning of this or that verse, you can look at someone's life, and see the evidences of their relationship with God, and see if they live a life where they trust and rely on God to the extent that they can with the information that they understand. Richard Wurmbrand obviously practically trusted God, even if he disagreed about what Reformed Theology claims is the logical implication of certain verses."
In other words, Wurmbrand was a crypto-Calvinist or closet Calvinist in practice.
A Calvinist of the heart, but non-Calvinist of the head.
"Also, Arminians often would completely trust God to script their life."
Uh, no. The Arminians I deal with would insist, as a matter of principle, that if God scripted their life, then that would make God culpable for evil.
"But I believe that if God scripted my life, He would never decree that I must do evil."
So you think that God only planned the good things that come your way, but not the bad things.
In that event, you only trust God for the good things that happen in your life. But, of course, it doesn't take much faith to trust God for good things. Anyone can do that.
The acid test of faith is trusting God when evil befalls you.
"But you seem to insist that if we aren't content with the idea of God forcing (causally determining) us to do evil, then we just don't trust God!"
If an agent acts according to plan, in what sense is he being forced?
For one thing, you're tacitly assuming that there was something else he was going to do instead, but the plan prevents him from doing what he would have done–absent the plan. Where's the argument?
You also need to define "cause." I'd add that "causally determining" seems redundant. Does that stand in contrast to an indeterminate cause? If so, what's an indeterminate cause?
Peter,
ReplyDeleteYou say: "all I meant was that each of the women had a real, definite loving relationship with their spouse regardless of the fact that one "had no choice" as it were, and in fact their relationships are indistinguishable from each other in terms of the actions each woman would do, etc."
But see, if you think that love is little to nothing more than a chemical response, you are much mistaken. There is more to love than just "falling in love" and feelings. I love each one of my 9 younger siblings. But chemicals don't always propel me to treat them kindly - sometimes chemicals work against me in fact and make me feel moody and apt to treat them more harshly than I should. No marriage takes place without the choice of both people saying "I do." And no marriage lasts unless people continue to making loving choices. It doesn't ride on chemicals forever. In fact, if people just cheat on their spouse as soon as they feel chemically attracted to someone else, the you get what often happens here in America. Is that true love? Hardly. On the other hand, if no choice is involved, what about people who are in love with abusive people? Would you not advise them to break off the relationship? And if they stayed, would you not tell that chooses to stay was a choice as well?
Also, you say: "Example: I trust that if I were to go to Mars without a space suit, I would die."
I would say that that is a belief, not trust. You believe that if you were to go to Mars without a space suit, you would die. You choose trust whoever told you that, for some logical reason perhaps. And if you refused to go to Mars without a space suit, then you would again be trusting what you believe to be true. But I am often overly picky about my own usage of words. I believe that words are to word pictures like paintbrushes are to paintings - and the finer the brush, and the more the colors, the more precise and beautiful you can make the painting. But that is neither here nor there.
"A second problem that arrises is when you trust in X for Y when X has nothing to do with Y."
Well, I never said that all trust, or faith, is good. In fact, I think that most of the trust and faith of this world is false trust. Like someone jumping out of plane, holding a feather rather than a parachute: it only ends in death. But that still is a choice to jump, and to trust that feather. A bad choice perhaps, but a choice nonetheless.
(Peter)
ReplyDelete"Finally, even in the examples you've given, I think you've got the order backwards... Your choice does not cause the trust; your trust causes the choice."
Well, I disagree. I think that most things are "a vicious cycle," as it were. If you choose to be negative about life, that causes you to take less initive, which causes your life to not improve that much, which makes you feel more negative about life, which causes you to take even less initive, which causes you to feel even more cynical! I think that if you believe something is safe, you are more likely to choose to trust it, and then you will feel even more sure that it is safe, and more likely to choose to trust it again, etc. You say that "trust causes the choice," but in my view, choice is part of the trust. You must mean, in my view, that belief causes the choice.
To that I would say yes and no. I would say, yes the belief that the chair is safe will make it more likely that you will choose to trust the chair and sit on it. However, you could also not trust it, even if you believe. Like perhaps you KNOW that a rollar coaster is safe, but you won't trust it enough to get on it.
"I'm not sure if you can define what specific types of actions you refer to without already circularly referencing choice"
I am referring to all actions of humans that are not autonomic. (I think that's the right word to describe things like heartbeat, etc) I include even choices made because of a subconscious fear or whatever. I do not believe that we can completely control desires, but I do that by choices we make, and ways we choose to think about things, we can influence our desires. If I don't want to gain weight, it's going to be in my best interest not to have a chocolate fudge brownie as my desktop wallpaper.
I would love to hear your other thoughts too.
Steve,
ReplyDelete"In other words, Wurmbrand was a crypto-Calvinist or closet Calvinist in practice. A Calvinist of the heart, but non-Calvinist of the head."
Well, if people who evidence their relationship with God, and live a life where they trust and rely on God to the extent that they can with the information that they understand count as "calvinists of the heart," then most Arminians are "calvinists of the heart." Many christians who do not agree with calvinism show practical trust for God in their life. If you extend this olive branch to Wurmbrand, would it not be consistant to extend that same thoughts to others?
And, while I would never call Arminians "calvinists of the heart," I know that what you really mean is "christians in the heart:" people who truly do trust and follow God through our Lord Jesus Christ. And they are that.
"Uh, no. The Arminians I deal with would insist, as a matter of principle, that if God scripted their life, then that would make God culpable for evil."
Well, they believe that if God HAD ALREADY scripted their life, and their life does include sin, then that would mean that God had scripted the sin into their life. What I was saying is that Arminians would be glad if God actually did script their life, because they believe that God, being holy, would never script sin into their lives.
"So you think that God only planned the good things that come your way, but not the bad things.
In that event, you only trust God for the good things that happen in your life. But, of course, it doesn't take much faith to trust God for good things. Anyone can do that.
The acid test of faith is trusting God when evil befalls you."
Oh, I trust God in the good times and the bad. Arminians generally do. God allows bad things, and yet takes care of us, and is with us even through the most painful of times. He exploits bad and uses the effects of it to accomplish bigger things. There is no question of trusting God when bad happens TO us - He allowed it. Just like God allowed the devil to hurt Job - nothing bad happens to us without His permission. And if He gives permission, then we trust His wisdom, and trust His grace to be enough for us to get through it, and pray that the hurt will draw us close to Him. That's one thing I love about trials.
But you misunderstand. When I say that Arminians don't believe that God would caually determine evil, we mean first of all that God may allow sin to happen, but that He, being holy, would never cause it. He may allow pain and trials to come into our lives, but He would not decree that we cannot choose otherwise but to sin. God never allows us to be tempted beyond what we are able, through His grace. When I say God doesn't decree evil, I do not mean that He does allow disaster, but that He does not causally determine that people have no other possible choice but to sin against his revealed will.
(Steve)
ReplyDelete"If an agent acts according to plan, in what sense is he being forced?"
In the sense that some force outside of himself determined his actions.
"For one thing, you're tacitly assuming that there was something else he was going to do instead, but the plan prevents him from doing what he would have done–absent the plan. Where's the argument?"
Well, I do not argue that there was something else he was going to do instead. To argue that anything would have happened if things were other than they are is completely hypothetical. A man does what he does. The question is: did a force internal to him or external to him causally determine his action?
"You also need to define 'cause.' I'd add that 'causally determining' seems redundant. Does that stand in contrast to an indeterminate cause? If so, what's an indeterminate cause?"
I will try my best to define what I mean by "cause" and "causally determine." A cause is something that causes something else. But that something else was not caused by just one cause, but a whole chain of previous causes. For the light to turn on, many things are part of that chain of causation. The chain starts with God creating light, creating physical matter, creating laws of physics, creating people, the chain includes the person who invented the lightbulb, and the person who installed the light, and the person who flipped the switch, and the wires, and the electricity, which causes the heat, which causes the light. Something like that. It's a long chain of causes! But there are three dimentions of causes: Direct VS Indirect, Determining VS non-determining, and Intentional VS unintentional.
I know this is a bit abstract. I'll try to give examples. Direct VS indirect is pretty clear, I think. I can direct cause something - I directly cause these keys to be pushed down, and I can indirectly cause something - I indirectly cause these words to be posted on the web. Now, in a whole chain of causation, there is only one determining factor. In the case of the lightbulb, the inventor of the lightbulb, though a cause, did not determine that I would turn on the light tonight. The electricians did not determine it either. I determined it by flipping the switch. I was the determining cause, and therefore responsible for it. Does responsibility imply culpability? That depends on the intentionality of the situation. If I accidentally hit another car on the freeway, and kill a kid, then it is manslaughter. I causally determined the death of the kid, yet unintentionally. On the other hand, if I intentionally and causally determine the death of the kid, that's very wrong, and I am culpable for it to the nth degree.
I hope that my meaning is clear. If I haven't explained well, I'll be happy to clarify further.
SKARLET SAID:
ReplyDeleteIn the sense that some force outside of himself determined his actions.
Well, that's not what we normally mean by "forced."
And since God is an "outside force" no matter how you slice it, your objection to Calvinism borders on atheism.
Skarlet said:
ReplyDeletewe mean first of all that God may allow sin to happen, but that He, being holy, would never cause it
Take Job 2:6 which reads: "And the Lord said to Satan, 'Behold, he [Job] is in your hand; only spare his life.'"
On your reading as an Arminian, how does God "allowing" Satan to harm Job substantially differ from God causing it? After all, God could have prevented Satan from harming Job, but God chose not to. Instead God "allowed" it. God's "allowance" here is just as effectual as if he had caused it, isn't it?
Skarlet said:
ReplyDelete---
But see, if you think that love is little to nothing more than a chemical response, you are much mistaken.
---
I don't think it is "little to nothing more than a chemical response" but this isn't what I was talking about anyway. My focus was fairly narrow. It was on whether or not a relationship requires choice.
The typical opposition to Calvinism is that choice requires the ability to have done otherwise (the Principal of Alternative Possibilities, or PAP). But having re-read some of your comments here, it appears that you do not define choice in terms of PAP (I refer to your statment: "Whether she choose freely or not, you can debate, but it is a choice"). If your definition of choice doesn't require PAP, then my rejoinder didn't address your position anyway. Although I would still be confused as to how relationships would require "choice" even if choice doesn't require PAP.
Perhaps we should try to work out a definition of "choice" first. I would say a choice is simply a selection between two or more perceived options (note: "perceived options" need not be actual options, it is enough that the one making a choice believes there are options). A "free" choice is a choice made absent coersion, where "coersion" is when an external agent restricts available options to those you would not typically choose. (Note: I distinguish between an agent and "accidental" restriction of choices, such as when you're at the top of a mountain and there are only a limited number of ways you can get down--that is not coersion; but when a robber says "Give me your wallet or I'll shoot you" that is coersion.)
Would you agree? If not, how would you alter the above to match your view? Once we get that, perhaps more fruitful progress can be made.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteI had said: "In the sense that some force outside of himself determined his actions."
You said: "Well, that's not what we normally mean by 'forced.'
And since God is an 'outside force' no matter how you slice it, your objection to Calvinism borders on atheism."
I would answer that... if I knew what you were talking about. Arminians are clearly theists.
Are you saying that if God (a force outside of us) doesn't causally determine (rather than just allow) everything we do, that He isn't really a God at all? And that, by logical necessity, if we don't believe that God causally determines everything, but rather allows sin, that we don't really believe in a God at all?
Is that the logic? I'm just trying to understand... Wouldn't that mean that all the godly men throughout history who didn't believe in calvinism weren't really saved and didn't really believe in God at all?
Patrick,
ReplyDeleteYou say "After all, God could have prevented Satan from harming Job, but God chose not to. Instead God 'allowed' it. God's 'allowance' here is just as effectual as if he had caused it, isn't it?"
Hmm. This topic seems to have come up several times recently. Perhaps I should blog about it.
Anyway, my short answer would be that the one who causally determines sin is to blame. The one who does not causally determine that sin is not to blame for that sin. (Though they may be sinning if they do not intervene, when they know they ought, because of a lack of love or selfishness - but that's a separate sin)
I allow my 15-year-old brother to get behind on homework. I know that he needs to learn to keep himself on track, and not rely on us constantly nagging him to work. I could prevent him from getting behind, but out of love, I choose not to. This allowing is not the same as Causing and Determining that he will get behind on homework. If I caused him to get behind, that would be wrong of me.
Now, I've also intervened in situations. I've disarmed people holding knives before. If I had allowed them to go on out of cowardice, and not out of love, then I would have wrong to allow it. However, that sin would have been different from their sin of threatening people with knives (or hurting them, if I hadn't stepped in)
God allows people to sin, but it is never out of a lack of love, but rather out of wisdom. Therefore, not only is He not responsible for the sin itself, but He also does not sin Himself in allowing it.
That's my take.
Peter,
ReplyDelete"I don't think it is "little to nothing more than a chemical response" but this isn't what I was talking about anyway. My focus was fairly narrow. It was on whether or not a relationship requires choice."
Well, I understand what point you were making, but I was not responding to the point as a whole. I was responding to your particular argument in favor of your point; I was responding to your particular analogy. I think that the analogy falls short because it essentially proposes that there is no difference between chemically induced "love" and true selfless love. I reject that proposition based on what I see in the Scripture, and what I see in real life. There is a difference between acting according to chemicals, and actually loving someone.
"But having re-read some of your comments here, it appears that you do not define choice in terms of PAP"
Okay, I'll try to clarify. I do think that any REAL choice is an action that is internally, rather than externally determined. But, I generally also allow the word choice to be used to mean merely a perceived choice. That way, after we agree there is some perceived choice, we can go on to discuss whether that choice was internally or externally determined. It usually seems to eliminate more confusion that way.
You say "A "free" choice is a choice made absent coersion, where "coersion" is when an external agent restricts available options to those you would not typically choose." I would agree with you, but only under a different definition of free. I wrote a blog about the different meanings of "free": http://christiancompletely.blogspot.com/2009/09/bondage-of-will_03.html
I would say that a free choice, in the context of free agency, is a choice that is internally determined rather than externally determined. If someone puts a gun to my head and demands I do something, the choice is still mine. I can choose to give my money and save my life. Or, if they demand I renounce Christ, I can choose to die instead. The choice is still mine.
Does that help?
Peter,
ReplyDelete"1) Suppose Adam wants to make Emily fall in love with him, so he produces a love potion that will permanently alter Emily and gives it to her. Emily does, indeed, fall in love with Adam because the potion makes her find Adam desireable and makes her care for him, etc. She will never change from this state because of the way the potion is made. Adam and Emily live happily ever after."
I just had a random thought about this. Many calvinists are under the impression that people naturally like to clamor and demand to have a choice. While to a certain extent that is true, the opposite is also true. People also naturally like to not have a choice.
In a book on Game that my older brother lent me, called "The Mystery Method" (By the way, if you are unfamiliar with the idea of game, its what guys do to get women. Game is different than just giving flowers, though. In fact, it's more effective to make the girl jump through hoops for the guy, rather than the guy jumping through hoops for the girl, to make the girl actually like the guy)... Hold on, let me try that sentence again.
Anyway, as I was saying, in that book, one of the suggested techniques was to take all the responsibility for the relationship. Women don't like a boring date, and they will blame YOU and not themselves for it being boring, even if they are the ones being a bore. The gentlemen, then, should redirect conversation to interesting topics. Also, in taking the relationship further physically, the more the guy makes it seem that the girl didn't really CHOOSE to go further, but that it "just happened" or they got "carried away by feelings" the better chance he has of convincing her to do more stuff.
In that way, then, the book puts forward the idea that girls rather like to believe that they DONT have a choice in relationships, but that it is chemicals and destiny. Is this guy credible? Well, he's bedded dozens of women.
So, natural and carnal people (or women, at the book may suggest) also clamor to not have a choice. Though they wouldn't use the term "not have a choice," but would use sneakier ways to say the same thing.
Skarlet,
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure if the distinction between internal and external determination of a choice gets you where you want. For one thing, it can often be tricky to see what the determining factor actually is. Someone might take a drug, for instance, that causes him to become highly susceptible to external suggestions. Someone then tells him, "You should go running down the street barking like a dog." The person internalizes this and, after the drug wears off, decides to run down the street barking like a dog. Can you tell whether this is an internal or external choice? Would it make a difference if the man decided to take the drug himself or not? For that matter, what if he is just naturally susceptible without the drug, in which case this is akin to anyone giving any information to another person, i.e. teaching.
Additionally, it's quite possible to have a decision made that is partly interal and partly external, as most decisions are complex.
But regardless of all that, I think it also fails to recognize the fact that the very origin of the will is itself not an internal thing, but is created by God--an external agent. Thus, the very "thing" that does the choosing was designed and created by an external agent, and nothing that someone chooses is ever independent of that fact. Indeed, no matter what your view, without God there is no choice because without God there are no people, universe, or existence.
In any case, I will look at your referenced article on "free" before responding further. Lord willing, I will get to that no later than tonight, but it might be tomorrow.
Skarlet,
ReplyDeleteI've read over your essay on the different views of free, and aside from the bad use of Joshua 24:15 as a proof text (because the only options Joshua gives them to "choose" are false idols) I have but a few other quibbles :-)
First, there is my previous statement regarding the dubious nature of knowing what precisely is internal and what precisely is external.
Secondly, I would presume that you would pray for Christ to change your heart and make you more like Him as part of your devotions, etc. Yet is this not asking God to externally alter your internal being? Even if you "permit" this action, if we say the change itself is wrought by God then that is an external force working on you. And since you've acknowledged that one is either a slave to sin or a slave to righteousness, then surely changing one's state via salvation, which requires God to actively change you, must of necessity be a non-free act under your definition, right?
In other words, you stated in your sixth point that someone who is being controlled by another is not free; yet I think you would probably say that if one gave control of one's self over to someone else in the first place, then one is still responsible. But if that is the case then it doesn't seem that your idea of responsibility requiring the ability to respond is correct either.
One other thing regarding responsibility. I don't view responsibility and freedom as being coextensive; however, I would suspect you do since most Arminians do. Because of that, I could add the special case of the insane man to the mix. The guy who shouts obscenities at the imaginary soldiers outside Wal-Mart is not externally compelled to do so. All his actions spring from internal choices. I doubt you would consider him responsible for what he does, but is he free?
Peter,
ReplyDeleteGood thoughts! I like how thoroughly you think these things through. First of all, you say that "I'm not sure if the distinction between internal and external determination of a choice gets you where you want." But what is it that I want? I want truth to be known. If my own theory is contrary to truth, then I would be glad to forsake it in an instant. But, I know that you mean you don't think it proves my point, so I shall go on to answer your objections.
You say that "it can often be tricky to see what the determing factor actually is." Well, according to the Bible, we are held accountable all our actions. I believe that we internally determine ALL our non-autonomic actions. If I do something dumb when I'm drunk, it was still my choice. Many things may influence me, preference, teachings, expereriences, drugs, but I am the determinent of my responses to those things in every case. But, even if it were impossible to see if actions were internally or externally determined, we are talking about the general rule of the matter. If we first say that one is responsible for all internally determined actions, then it becomes important whether an action is internally determined. But right now, we are still discussing whether one can be morally responsible for externally determined actions.
In what way do I claim that the will is not from God? Every part of us is from God: Our soul, body, and spirit; our mind, will, and emotions. Everything good in then is from God, and everything evil in them is from the fall(which is when Adam internally determined, in responce to external influence, to sin) And who tempted Satan? There was no external influence to make him do evil - but he caused his own action of rebelling against God. Satan internally determined what he did. God, an external force, did give us everything that is now "internal" to us. Does that make it no longer internal to us? No. Without God, we would not have free agency. It is only because of God that we do. And if He designed us to have free agency and to make true choices - how would you respond against that? If God is sovereign, has He not the right to make people as He sees fit and still be God? I ask you that. It's a very good question.
Steve,
ReplyDelete"First, there is my previous statement regarding the dubious nature of knowing what precisely is internal and what precisely is external."
Well, if you accept that we are responsible only for what we internally determine, then it follows naturally that we internally determine every moral choice, because we are held morally responsible by God for every moral choice we make. Otherwise, you can look through the Bible, and read God commanding men to make good moral choices, even when things externally influence them. Peter determined to deny Christ, in response to the external pressure of people killing the Person he follows. Those things influenced him, but he could have determined to do otherwise (though Christ, of course, knew that he would not)
1 Corinthians 10:13
"No temptation has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and He will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation He will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it."
That verse first is addressed to us, as though we can actually do something about our choices, as though our choices are not entirely externally determined, as calvinism teaches. Also, the verse makes no sense if we have no internal ABILITY to resist temptation. Third, God does not credit Himself for decreeing or causing us to resist temptation, but rather for providing a way of escape that we can determine to choose, instead of having no option but to give in to temptation. I may be wrong, but that seems to me, and to most christians I've ever known, to be the obvious meaning of the verse.
"Secondly, I would presume that you would pray for Christ to change your heart and make you more like Him as part of your devotions, etc. Yet is this not asking God to externally alter your internal being? Even if you "permit" this action, if we say the change itself is wrought by God then that is an external force working on you. And since you've acknowledged that one is either a slave to sin or a slave to righteousness, then surely changing one's state via salvation, which requires God to actively change you, must of necessity be a non-free act under your definition, right?"
Yes, the process of regeneration is am external being changing my internal being. I do believe that God saves us by His power and His alone. We do not work together with Him in regeneration. Is this a "non-free act" on my part? No. How so? Because it is not an action on my part at all! My choice to pray to God was my free action. His choice to respond to that prayer is His free action. My brother just walked outside... was that a "non-free" act on my part? No, because it wasn't my action at all. It was his action, and for him, it was a free act. Does that answer your question?
Woops - my last comment was for PETER, not Steve. This one is also responding to Peter.
ReplyDelete"In other words, you stated in your sixth point that someone who is being controlled by another is not free; yet I think you would probably say that if one gave control of one's self over to someone else in the first place, then one is still responsible. But if that is the case then it doesn't seem that your idea of responsibility requiring the ability to respond is correct either."
I do agree that someone who is being controlled by another is not free. I would also say that if you gave control of one's self to someone else, you are responsible for that decision, but no subsequent decisions. Now, if your choice to give complete control of yourself (which you cannot take back) to another results in you harming people, then that choice was a bad choice, and you are culpable for making that decision. However, if you choose to give complete and irrevocable control to someone else who is good, and it results in massive good, you are still only responsible for that one initial good choice to put yourself under their control. In all, the person is only responsible for the choice they made while not controlled by the other person. If they choose to become controlled, that choice is their responsibility.
"One other thing regarding responsibility. I don't view responsibility and freedom as being coextensive; however, I would suspect you do since most Arminians do. Because of that, I could add the special case of the insane man to the mix. The guy who shouts obscenities at the imaginary soldiers outside Wal-Mart is not externally compelled to do so. All his actions spring from internal choices. I doubt you would consider him responsible for what he does, but is he free?"
I see responsibility and free agency as synonymous. However, you can be responsible while not free in other senses of the word. For example, if I was a slave, and would be beaten for preaching the gospel, I could still choose to preach the gospel. I would not be free because I was a slave, but I would still have free agency and be responsible for my decisions.
The insane man. I've actually dealt with insane people. People with schizophrenia, and so-called Multiple Personality Disorder (DID). For me, then, it is not a special case. I would consider the insane man responsible for what he does for several reasons. First of all, it is possibly through bad choices on his part that he has become insane. (I don't mean that in a judging way, but just objectively) That is not always the case, though. Also, though their mind may be deluded, they still make moral choices according to their spirit.
...
(cont)
ReplyDeleteIt's the same way with dreams - I am responsible for the choices I make in a dream, even though the dream isn't real life. One time, in a dream, there were these bad guys with guns taking these other innocent people captive. I didn't have a gun or weapon or even a cell phone to call 911, so I picked up the small rocks on the ground and started throwing them at the bad guys. Needless to say, that didn't work, and pretty soon I was tied up, and they were flipping a coin about whether to kill me or the guy next to me first. My point? If an insane man sees ficitious things in the world, then it's like a dream - he's reacting to non-reality. But he is still responsible for those choices he makes in response to his "dream." His choices are either loving or not - and that's a spiritual, not just mental matter.
Now, suppose he killed a man, because he believed himself to be saving his life. Would he be responsible? Yes, because he causally determined the man's death. Would he be culpable? No. It was unintentional. If my brakes suddenly stopped working completely tomorrow (and they work fine today, so I am not negligent) and I smash into another car, killing the baby inside, I am responsible for driving that day, and I did causally determine the baby's death, but I am not culpable. I did not mean to kill, and I was not negligent.
Hi Skarlet,
ReplyDeleteIt looks like we're reaching the limits where Blogger becomes less useful for conversation! You raise a lot of things I would like to address though. If you would like, we can continue this via e-mail (my address is petedawg34@yahoo.com). That way we can avoid the character limitation that Blogger has.
Although if there DOES happen to be anyone else still reading this thread besides us, I could write a new post on the main page. But I have a feeling that most of the readers on this thread have dropped out by now.