Pages

Thursday, March 18, 2010

Porcine philosophy

A few days ago, Victor Reppert posted one of his morally and intellectually muddleheaded musings on abortion.

“If Roe v. Wade is a mistake, what is the mistake?”

Basically, two mistakes:

i) It was a mistake for the proabortion justices to pretend that our Constitution even speaks to the issue of abortion, one way or the other. The Constitution is silent on abortion.

ii) It was also a mistaken for justices to think they have the prerogative to set social policy for the nation. The Constitution doesn’t accord them that prerogative.

“Conservative jurisprudence says Griswold went wrong in affirming a right to privacy, since it doesn't say p-r-i-v-a-c-y in the constitution.”

Where does Reppert come up with these rampant caricatures, anyway? Does he get his information from reading what the Huffington Post says about conservative jurisprudence? But, of course, Reppert is incapable of honestly representing a position he disagrees with.

i) The issue is not whether a specific word occurs in the Constitution. In theory, the concept of a right to privacy could be present in the Constitution even if the Constitution never used the word “p-r-i-v-a-c-y.”

ii) In theory, a right to privacy could be logically implicit rather than explicit in the Constitution.

iii) In addition, conservative jurisprudence takes legislative intent into consideration when ascertaining original intent, such as floor debates at the Constitutional Convention. Or the Federalist/Anti-Federalist papers.

iv) Moreover, conservative jurisprudence would take into account the cultural assumptions of the day, such as preexisting Colonial statutes.

v) Furthermore, conservative jurisprudence would also consider the intent of the states which ratified the Constitution. Their ratification was contingent on a particular understanding of the document.

vi) Finally, even if the Constitution teaches a right of “privacy,” that hardly entails a right to abortion. For one thing, what was the scope of privacy in view? After all, privacy is a very flexible notion. Does a right to privacy mean that every child is Constitutionally entitled to his own bedroom and bathroom? Can’t put two brothers or sisters in the same bedroom?

“I'm skeptical of the anti-privacy argument, so even if I were thoroughly pro-life, I would have a problem with voting for politicians who would nominate justices who were going to overturn Roe via the anti-privacy arguments, since to my mind that would be to use a bad argument to reach a good end.”

Well, that raises an interesting question, although Reppert typically fails to pursue the ethical implications of the question he raised. Since he can’t be bothered to do the work of a professional philosopher, I guess a layman like me will have to do it for him:

i) To begin with, he conflates the reason a voter might vote for a candidate with the reason a candidate might try to overturn Roe. But that’s simpleminded.

Both a voter and a candidate might share the same goal, but have different reasons for their common objective. Suppose a voter has a good reason, while a candidate has a bad reason. The voter can vote for the candidate based on the voter’s rationale rather than the candidate’s rationale. In that event, the vote is justified by the voter’s rationale instead of the candidate’s rationale. Why is Reppert too intellectually indolent to draw this rudimentary distinction?

ii) In addition, while it’s better to do the right thing for the right reason, it’s still better to do the right thing for the wrong reason than to do the wrong thing.

Suppose a serial killer refrains from murdering a particular woman because she reminds him of his mother. Well, that’s a bad argument. It’s not as though he’d be entitled to murder her as long as she didn’t remind him of his mother.

So, by Reppert’s logic, he should go ahead and murder her.

iii) Or, to take another example, suppose a hostage negotiator uses a bad argument to talk a bank-robber out of executing his hostages. By Reppert’s logic, it would be better to let the bank-robber execute the hostages rather than persuading him to release the hostages on the basis of a bad argument.

At the risk of stating the obvious, one of the things that philosophers are supposed to do is to anticipate counterexamples to their position. Why doesn’t Reppert bother to do that? Does he lack the intellectual aptitude?

“There also seems to me to be a severe moral cost in outlawing abortion and enforcing those laws.”

Does he also think there is a severe moral cost in outlawing murder and enforcing those laws? Should we have laws against euthanizing everyone with brown eyes? Or would that carry a severe moral cost?

“Government has to get really intrusive in order to prevent abortions, and has to intrude into areas which we are inclined to think of as private.”

That’s very funny coming from an outspoken champion of Barak Obama.

“Further, while in my father's day, a working class family could survive on one income, in today's economy this won't work.”

So we should have abortion on demand since children are too expensive? Like culling the litter?

Does Reppert think we should put excess babies in a rock-laden sack and toss them in the nearby canal?

What about aborting prenatal philosophers? After all, philosophers are consumers rather than producers. Can we really afford philosophy profs.?

“There is also the fact that while lawmaking bodies are mostly male, the burden imposed by pregnancy, for obvious reasons, falls on women and not on men.”

A classic example of liberal male chauvinism masquerading as compassion. Women can run for public office. Women can vote for women who run for public office. And, to my knowledge, female voters outnumber male voters. So women are in a position to achieve parity or dominance in the legislative branch if they choose to.

If male lawmakers out number female lawmakers, then that says something about the priorities of most women. Why doesn’t Reppert respect that?

“Feminist concerns that outlawing abortion will push women in the direction of barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen are legitimate and would have to be addressed.”

Yet another example of Reppert’s liberal male chauvinism masquerading as compassion. Does he think women don’t know where babies come from? Is pregnancy an unforeseen consequence of sex (without contraception)?

But, of course, in Reppert’s world, it’s okay to be a male chauvinist pig as long as you’re a liberal pig.

“We can't rely on the law to be our moral compass. Strict constructionists have to be open to the possibility that a moral outrage might exist, but the Constitution doesn't provide a way of addressing it.”

He acts as if this has never crossed the mind of a conservative. Once again, where does he get his information about conservatism? From the Daily Kos?

“In the area of marriage, for example, it's perfectly legal to commit adultery, leave your spouse and marry the person you were committing adultery with. It's also horribly immoral. But the law shouldn't be involved in preventing it.”

There’s a distinction between prevention and deterrence. Even if you don’t think that should be illegal, there’s nothing wrong with legal deterrents or impediments to that behavior. There ought to be civil disincentives to certain types of socially destructive behavior. For the social fabric is only as strong as the family.

23 comments:

  1. “Government has to get really intrusive in order to prevent abortions, and has to intrude into areas which we are inclined to think of as private.”

    i. Abortions are not private. They occur in clinics, hospitals, and other places accessible to the public. Or they are performed in "back alleys" where other murders occur.

    ii. If you're just talking about Roe, then you're not talking, strictly speaking, about banning abortion. You're just talking about allowing state governments to ban, or regulate, or restrict, or even permit abortion as they see fit.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Victor Reppert gets an "A":

    Arminian

    Abortion

    Allegiance to Obama

    ReplyDelete
  3. iii) In addition, conservative jurisprudence takes legislative intent into consideration when ascertaining original intent, such as floor debates at the Constitutional Convention. Or the Federalist/Anti-Federalist papers.

    What is "conservative jurisprudence?"

    Is it what conservatives do?

    Those who call themselves conservatives are not even remotely close in their jurisprudence. In fact, the most conservative member of the court (Antonin Scalia) would dismiss consideration of legislative intent by searching floor debates, etc. as faulty jurisprudence. The only real sure way (constitutionally speaking) of knowing the "intent" of the legislative body is by examining the specific text that was passed into law. I would argue that this is the most conservative way of approaching jurisprudence.

    ReplyDelete
  4. The problem is that if I am want to see the door opened for states to outlaw abortion, but I don't like the kinds of arguments that are going to be used to get to that result, I have to be prepared to accept the enshrinement of those legal principles into judicial precedent as well as the result. I may like what it might do in the case of abortion, but I might think that a denial of the right to privacy will have consequences which go far beyond the issue of abortion. If I use a bad argument to talk a hostage-taker into surrendering, I don't create any precedents. If I use a bad legal principle to oppose abortion, then I preforce open the door for that principle to be used in other cases.

    ReplyDelete
  5. You are right in supposing that I have somewhat oversimplfied that conservative jurisprudential view on indirect arguments supporting privacy.

    The Constitution is silent on abortion. May I remind you that so is the Bible? Yep, the word a-b-o-r-t-i-o-n ain't in either document. But of course, there is all sorts of indirect arguments that go from Scripture to a stand on abortion, and could there be Constitutional arguments that go from Constitutional principles to a stand on abortion. In fact, the Roe court thought they had done just that.

    As I understand the Roe court's reasoning, they thought that just as laws against contraception undercut a right to privacy that they considered to be implied in the Bill of Rights, they also thought that laws against abortion undercut those same rights. However, if a countervailing right, the right of a fetus to life, could be shown to exist, then they would have had grounds for saying that a woman's privacy rights stop where the nose of the fetus she carries begins. However, they thought that the right of the fetus to life was dubitable from a legal standpoint, but the right of a woman to privacy in matter concerning her own body was clear, and based on the precedent of the Griswold case.

    I do think that there are a lot of untoward consequences involved in the prohibition of abortion. These considerations could be set aside if we could prove the right to life with some degree of certainty. Because we aren't clear on what it is like to be a fetus, we may have to put up with we may have to up with legal abortion, even though consideration from what I call the deer hunter argument give us a good moral case against most abortion.

    ReplyDelete
  6. I said: "In addition, conservative jurisprudence takes legislative intent into consideration when ascertaining original intent, such as floor debates at the Constitutional Convention. Or the Federalist/Anti-Federalist papers."

    To which Alex responds:

    "What is 'conservative jurisprudence?' Is it what conservatives do? Those who call themselves conservatives are not even remotely close in their jurisprudence. In fact, the most conservative member of the court (Antonin Scalia) would dismiss consideration of legislative intent by searching floor debates, etc. as faulty jurisprudence. The only real sure way (constitutionally speaking) of knowing the 'intent' of the legislative body is by examining the specific text that was passed into law. I would argue that this is the most conservative way of approaching jurisprudence."

    Well, this is how Robert Bork defines it:

    "Originalism simply means that the judge must discern from the relevant materials--debates at the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers and Anti-Federalist Papers, newspaper accounts of the time, debates in the state ratifying conventions, and the like--the principles the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting. The remainder of the task is to apply those principles to unforeseen circumstances, a task that law performs all the time. Any philosophy that does not confine judges to the original understanding inevitably makes the Constitution the plaything of willful judges."

    http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007424

    As for Scalia, note the range of sources he draws on to arrive at his majority opinion regarding the right to bear arms:

    http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/07-2901.pdf

    ReplyDelete
  7. Victor Reppert: "I do think that there are a lot of untoward consequences involved in the prohibition of abortion."

    Can you develop your slippery slope argument in a little more detail? At this point it's mere assertion.

    ReplyDelete
  8. "I have to be prepared to accept the enshrinement of those legal principles into judicial precedent as well as the result."

    That is the very argument against Roe v. Wade. The 'right to privacy' was based on what the court called "penumbras and emanations" from the Bill of Rights. That's some legeal principle, isn't it? It started out protecting the sale of contraceptives, moved on to cover abortion, and was later applied to protect nude dancing in a bar (although that one was ultimately reversed).

    Judicial decrees based on "penumbras and emanations" (rather than actual constitutional provisions) are wonderful -- as long as you agree with the judges who are making those determinations. But if your political and moral views are different from theirs, then you have a problem.

    For an example of this, refer back to Justice Thomas' confirmation hearings. People who had been advocating for penumbra-style judicial activism suddenly had a heart attack when they heard that Thomas believed in "natural rights". They did a complete 180 and became judicial conservatives for one shining moment, with one notorious activist saying, "I like my constitutional rights written down, thank you very much".

    When your legal principle is the principle that judges can determine "rights" based on anything other than what the people voted on and wrote into law, then you no longer have a judiciary that simply interprets and applies the law, but one that makes it. Judges become legislators; court decisions get evaluated by whether or not you like the result; and we all fall mercy to the political and moral decisions -- rather than the legal competence -- of an unelected judicial elite. That is your legal principle of Roe v. Wade.

    ReplyDelete
  9. Steve,

    You would do much better for yourself if you studied a little more on how the court actually works.

    Using Scalia's majority opinion for the court would not be as beneficial to your position as it might seem. Anyone who has even a passing understanding of how the court operates understands quite well that the author of the majority opinion might strategically use tactics and approaches which will better serve in keeping the majority than he would otherwise use were he to write a dissenting opinion, free to express his views in the manner he wishes. It would be entirely fruitless for me to go through the Heller case with you to explain what Scalia is doing. The easiest approach would be for me to quote to you Scalia’s own words regarding the use of legislative history, but even then I will not hold my breath that you will treat them with intellectual honesty.

    For starters, you can read A Matter of Interpretation; Federal Courts and the Law, p.g. 31-32.

    Judge Bork is: A.) Not a Justice, and B.) has a different jurisprudential philosophy, although very similar.

    This has been a waste of my time, as always.

    ReplyDelete
  10. Alexander,
    If, "This has been a waste of my time, as always," is true, then it seems you consistently choose to waste your time.

    If this is the case, and Triablogue is always a waste, then aren't you demonstrating poor decision-making abilities by constantly choosing to read these posts?

    And if that's the case, why should anyone take your criticisms seriously?

    So, either it isn't a waste because you're getting something out of it (no matter how small or negative) which would make your last comment a lie, or you don't value your time the way a reasonable person should...

    Which is it?

    ReplyDelete
  11. ALEXANDER SAID:

    “You would do much better for yourself if you studied a little more on how the court actually works. Using Scalia's majority opinion for the court would not be as beneficial to your position as it might seem. Anyone who has even a passing understanding of how the court operates understands quite well that the author of the majority opinion might strategically use tactics and approaches which will better serve in keeping the majority than he would otherwise use were he to write a dissenting opinion, free to express his views in the manner he wishes.”

    i) To my knowledge, Scalia has never been afraid to vote with the minority, and write minority opinions which express his true views.

    ii) You initially seemed to endorse conservative jurisprudence: “The only real sure way (constitutionally speaking) of knowing the 'intent' of the legislative body is by examining the specific text that was passed into law. I would argue that this is the most conservative way of approaching jurisprudence.”

    But now you tell us, in your spin on Scalia’s opinion, that originalism is a paper theory which can’t be put into actual practice. Instead, Scalia has to compromise his own principles by introducing various “tactics” into the opinion in order to secure a majority opinion. Scalia has to resort to arguments he doesn’t believe in.

    “Judge Bork is: A.) Not a Justice, and B.) has a different jurisprudential philosophy, although very similar.”

    You don’t get to artificially narrow and arbitrarily refine the terms of the debate for your own convenience. Bork is a representative spokesman for conservative jurisprudence. And his summary dovetails perfectly with what I said.

    “This has been a waste of my time, as always.”

    Your entire life is a waste of time. But hell is full of lawyers, so you should feel right at home when you run out of time in the here-and-now.

    ReplyDelete
  12. "Your entire life is a waste of time. But hell is full of lawyers, so you should feel right at home when you run out of time in the here-and-now."

    Dear Steve,

    You're better than that.

    ReplyDelete
  13. i) To my knowledge, Scalia has never been afraid to vote with the minority, and write minority opinions which express his true views.

    Once again, this is a clear indication that you do not know what you are talking about. There is an abundance of academic literature supporting the view that justices do vote strategically, as well as adjust their language in order to secure the majority vote. You comment indicates that you are ignorant of how the judicial process works. If Justice Scalia did not find himself among the majority, then of course if he were to write a dissenting opinion he would be freer to express himself without reserve. There would be no need to avoid divisive language. Granted, he seldom avoids divisive language, but he has admitted that sometimes he adjusts his opinion in order to retain the majority. Some Justices do this more than others; however, there is no need to do so when writing dissents. To point to these as examples of opinions expressing his true views begs the question. A justice is often constrained in how they express the majority when writing opinions.


    ii) You initially seemed to endorse conservative jurisprudence: “The only real sure way (constitutionally speaking) of knowing the 'intent' of the legislative body is by examining the specific text that was passed into law. I would argue that this is the most conservative way of approaching jurisprudence.”

    But now you tell us, in your spin on Scalia’s opinion, that originalism is a paper theory which can’t be put into actual practice. Instead, Scalia has to compromise his own principles by introducing various “tactics” into the opinion in order to secure a majority opinion. Scalia has to resort to arguments he doesn’t believe in.


    My point was that there isn’t a “conservative jurisprudence” per se. Conservatives approach the science of jurisprudence in quite different ways. The end result might be the same, but the avenues taken to get there are not. Even the idea of “originalism” is not the same for each individual who claims it.



    You don’t get to artificially narrow and arbitrarily refine the terms of the debate for your own convenience. Bork is a representative spokesman for conservative jurisprudence. And his summary dovetails perfectly with what I said.


    No, you “don’t get to artificially narrow and arbitrarily refine the terms of the debate for your own convenience.” It is not my fault that your conception of this topic is burdened with ignorance. If you were to do some research (I’ve provided a source you could start with), you would find that Justice Scalia does not accept legislative history as an authoritative approach for determining what the law is. The fact that Judge Bork does consider legislative history in interpreting the intention of the lawgiver does not indicate that all conservative jurists must take this approach. I agree with Steven Calabresi (co-founder of the Federalist Society, and former law clerk for Justice Scalia) who said in addressing Judge Bork’s position:
    Judge Bork’s argument is powerful, but in my humble opinion it suffers from some imprecision because technically it is the words of the Constitution that are law, and not the intentions of those who wrote the document, that are the supreme law of the land...there is no reason to think that the un-enacted, idiosyncratic intentions of particular Framers are law.

    You seem to hold the view that “conservative jurisprudence” is whatever Judge Bork says that it is. While Judge Bork does espouse a variant of originalism, it is simply erroneous to believe that this is the only possible conservative view. Clearly those in the know do not believe this.

    ReplyDelete
  14. If, "This has been a waste of my time, as always," is true, then it seems you consistently choose to waste your time.

    Consistently? Really? Aren't you being a tad dramatic here?

    So, either it isn't a waste because you're getting something out of it (no matter how small or negative) which would make your last comment a lie, or you don't value your time the way a reasonable person should...

    It really has been a waste of my time. I do not pretend to operate at full efficiency every moment of every day. I am happy for you that you’ve never wasted your time. I do find that responding to someone who clearly has no regard for truth to be a waste of time. I could be allocating my time more productively elsewhere.

    ReplyDelete
  15. It is important to realize that our country's was founded on something of a moral contradiction. On the one hand we have the Declaration of Independence, (all men are created equal), and the Bill of Rights, which suggests that we all are supposed to have rights, and yet large portions of the country practiced Negro slavery (including the author of the Declaration), and women were denied the right to vote until the 20th century. Because the South dropped out of the body politic through secession, we were able to amend the Constitution in order to end Negro slavery. Thus, through amendment, we were able to make our laws more morally consistent. But the Supreme Court didn't help reach this, it produced the dreadful Dred Scott decision. Women got the right to vote through constitutional amendment. But separate but equal held sway until Brown vs. Board of Education. At that time there were certainly enough Southern states who would have prevented a school desegregation amendment had one been proposed, since you need 3/4 of the states to amend the Constitution. Under those circumstances, the originalist slogan "if you don't like the Constitution as it is written, amend it," would never have worked. Now maybe a originalist argument could have been made for school desegregation, but the actual jurisprudence in Brown seems not to have been that. The originalist has to be prepared to tolerate what they perceive as a deep injustice, hoping for a future amendment, if they can't pull the required change out of the text of the constitution. And to my mind, that is a price to pay.

    On the other hand, an out of control judiciary can maybe make the wrong decision, and a lot of people think that that is what happened in Roe. But when I was a kid people talked about an out of control judiciary, but when they did they usually complained about decisions like Miranda, which protected the rights of the accused? Was "You have the right to remain silent," now a staple of every cop show going as far back as Hawaii Five-O, a misguided decision? Unfortunately, I think I want the court system protecting the rights of the accused. I can't trust the body politic, who is generally motivated by "law and order," and can be swayed by such things as the Willie Horton ad, to provide sufficient political will.

    And then you've got to ask if judicial activism started with Marbury vs. Madison. After all, judicial review isn't even specified in the Constitution.

    I think I want my judiciary to be able to strike down injustice even if that means stepping beyond the borders of original intent, even if that leaves the door open for the judiciary to make some wrong decisions.

    There's a lot to think about when you select a judicial philosophy. There's a lot more to it than getting the right decision on abortion.

    I wonder who was making the originalist arguments at the Council of Nicaea. The Arians were arguing that you couldn't find homoousion in the text of Scripture, so you couldn't define orthodox Trinitarianism as Christian doctrine.

    ReplyDelete
  16. ALEXANDER SAID:

    “You comment indicates that you are ignorant of how the judicial process works. If Justice Scalia did not find himself among the majority, then of course if he were to write a dissenting opinion he would be freer to express himself without reserve. There would be no need to avoid divisive language. Granted, he seldom avoids divisive language…”

    So you just refuted yourself.

    “If you were to do some research (I’ve provided a source you could start with), you would find that Justice Scalia does not accept legislative history as an authoritative approach for determining what the law is.”

    In his dissenting opinion on Lawrence, Scalia cites Colonial anti-sodomy laws. And since this was a dissenting opinion, he didn’t invoke that consideration to secure a majority vote.

    “You seem to hold the view that “conservative jurisprudence” is whatever Judge Bork says that it is.”

    You’re too dense to remember the context of this debate. This got started when Reppert presented a polemical caricature of conservative jurisprudence. I countered. You were foolish enough to challenge me, so it was easy for me to document my claim. That’s sufficient to refute Reppert’s simplistic caricature–as well as your foolhardy challenge.

    “While Judge Bork does espouse a variant of originalism, it is simply erroneous to believe that this is the only possible conservative view.”

    And you act as if Scalia represents the only possible conservative view.

    “Judge Bork’s argument is powerful, but in my humble opinion it suffers from some imprecision because technically it is the words of the Constitution that are law, and not the intentions of those who wrote the document, that are the supreme law of the land...there is no reason to think that the un-enacted, idiosyncratic intentions of particular Framers are law.”

    Needless to say, it’s absurd to divorce the wording of the text from the authorial intent of the framers. For they chose the words they did to express and codify their intentions.

    ReplyDelete
  17. Truth Unites... and Divides said...

    “Dear Steve, You're better than that.”

    Alex is a fanatical apologist for an evil denomination. And he also belongs to an evil profession. So his life work is dedicated to the cause of evil.

    ReplyDelete
  18. I'm unaware of what denomination that Alex is a member of.

    Could you inform me?

    ReplyDelete
  19. So you just refuted yourself.

    Keep in mind that I have used the word “seldom.” There have been times where Justice Scalia lost the majority opinion because he decided not to incorporate the sentiments of his fellow justices. There have been times where he has restrained himself. Seldom indicates that he does at times restrain himself.

    In his dissenting opinion on Lawrence, Scalia cites Colonial anti-sodomy laws. And since this was a dissenting opinion, he didn’t invoke that consideration to secure a majority vote.

    Citing laws is hardly the same thing as citing legislative history. The inclusion of this in your argument does not hold.

    You’re too dense to remember the context of this debate. This got started when Reppert presented a polemical caricature of conservative jurisprudence. I countered. You were foolish enough to challenge me, so it was easy for me to document my claim. That’s sufficient to refute Reppert’s simplistic caricature–as well as your foolhardy challenge.

    My challenge stands. There isn’t a monolithic “conservative jurisprudence.” If there were, then nothing could be more conservative than the Scalia textualist approach. If you knew the history of jurisprudence in the Supreme Court, you would know that searching for intent in legislative history is a novelty. Otherwise, “conservative” could very well regard the desired outcome of cases. This could also include a natural law approach which is very different form of jurisprudence. I find the textualist approach far more convincing, and as Justice Scalia has repeatedly noted on prior occasions, most specifically the flag burning case of Texas v. Johnson, sometimes the textualist approach will lead to decisions where one personally disagrees with the outcome of the case.

    And you act as if Scalia represents the only possible conservative view.

    Oh please. Don’t bore me with this childishness. How could I possibly believe that Justice Scalia represents the only possible conservative view when I am arguing against the perception of a monolithic “conservative view.”

    Needless to say, it’s absurd to divorce the wording of the text from the authorial intent of the framers. For they chose the words they did to express and codify their intentions.

    Needless to say, you still do not get the point. Since it seems that you have not researched Justice Scalia’s position on this like I have suggested, I will quote him here:

    As I have said, I object to the use of legislative history on principle, since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law.

    In making this point, Justice Scalia had cited Chief Justice Taney as saying:

    In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any degree, be influenced by the construction placed upon if by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

    When Justice Scalia cites laws from Colonial times to garner support for his interpretation of the text he is doing just that, looking to the public history of the times. As I have been arguing, this is a far cry from using legislative history.

    ReplyDelete
  20. Alex is a fanatical apologist for an evil denomination.

    I have never claimed to be an apologist. If I am, then my apologetics work is quite small. As to your point on my belonging to an evil denomination (what have we denominated from???), yes I am Catholic, and that you find it to be evil, knowing the positions on morality which you hold, I am not too woried.

    And he also belongs to an evil profession. So his life work is dedicated to the cause of evil.

    What in the world are you talking about? You need to go out and get some sun. Perhaps some milk and cookies will also do you some good.

    ReplyDelete
  21. ALEXANDER SAID:

    “Citing laws is hardly the same thing as citing legislative history. The inclusion of this in your argument does not hold.”

    To begin with, you’re the one, not me, who keeps using the restrictive phrase “legislative history.”

    But among other things, I originally said: “conservative jurisprudence would take into account the cultural assumptions of the day, such as preexisting Colonial statutes.”

    So, yes, citing laws is a specific instance of what I mentioned at the outset. Sorry that you’re too senile to keep up with the argument. But by all means, keep advertising your ineptitude to the whole world.

    “My challenge stands. There isn’t a monolithic ‘conservative jurisprudence.’”

    Your challenge is irrelevant since I never said otherwise. Rather, I was countering Reppert’s simplistic caricature of conservative jurisprudence, viz. “Conservative jurisprudence says Griswold went wrong in affirming a right to privacy, since it doesn't say p-r-i-v-a-c-y in the constitution.”

    But don’t let me stop you from doing even more damage to your reputation by posting one obtuse comment after another.

    “It is not my fault that your conception of this topic is burdened with ignorance.”

    It’s not my fault that you’re too illiterate or addlebrained to keep track of what I actually said.

    “If you were to do some research…”

    My citation of Bork, as well as Scalia’s legal opinions, is “doing some research.”

    “I find the textualist approach far more convincing…”

    Irrelevant. The question at issue isn’t which variant of conservative jurisprudence you happen to find convincing. The issue is Reppert’s misstatement of the opposing view. Have you always been this incompetent at following the train of thought, or does this represent the early stages of senile dementia on your part?
    “Oh please. Don’t bore me with this childishness.”

    Then you should begin by spitting that pacifier out of your mouth and learn how to reason at something near an 8th grade level. (I don’t want to set the bar too high for you.)

    ReplyDelete
  22. Cont. “How could I possibly believe that Justice Scalia represents the only possible conservative view when I am arguing against the perception of a monolithic ‘conservative view.’”

    You’re the one who keeps citing Scalia as your standard of reference, to discount Bork.

    “Needless to say, you still do not get the point. Since it seems that you have not researched Justice Scalia’s position on this like I have suggested.”

    Needless to say, you’re too scatterbrained to get the point. Was I expounding Scalia’s position? No. That’s your hobbyhorse. Rather, I was evaluating your hermeneutical position–whether or not Scalia happens to espouse that position. Try to master the rudimentary difference between exposition and evaluation.

    “…comparing it, when ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.”

    Which dovetails with what I previously said: “conservative jurisprudence would take into account the cultural assumptions of the day, such as preexisting Colonial statutes.”

    Are you done making a public fool of yourself, or would you like to get pounded in yet another round.

    “I have never claimed to be an apologist.”

    You spent a lot of time online defending the church of Rome. So you function as a de facto apologist.

    But if you now want to admit that you’re just a hack and a quack when it comes to Catholic apologetics, that’s fine with me.

    “(What have we denominated from???)”

    The NT church.

    “Yes I am Catholic, and that you find it to be evil…”

    Case in point: “The Vatican refused to cooperate with those 2001-09 probes into the Dublin Archdiocese…The investigations, directed by senior Irish judges and lawyers, ruled that Catholic leaders protected the church's reputation from scandal at the expense of children — and began passing their first abuse reports to police in 1996 only after victims began to sue the church….While a cardinal at the Vatican, Joseph Ratzinger, now the pope, wrote a 2001 letter instructing bishops worldwide to report all cases of abuse to his office and keep church investigations secret under threat of excommunication."

    "The Irish investigators forced the church to hand over its copious files on abuse cases dating back to the 1950s. They unearthed a paper trail confirming the Irish bishops' successful acquisition of group liability insurance in the 1980s, a decade before the deluge of lawsuits. And they found cases where Catholic officials in the 1960s reported school employees to police for abusing children, showing they understood even then it was a crime."

    http://www.annistonstar.com/view/full_story/6786775/article-Papal-letter-fails-to-calm-anger-over-Irish-abuses-?instance=breakingnews

    Continuing with Alex:

    “What in the world are you talking about?”

    Hell is full of amoral lawyers just like you. So you’ll feel right at home when the Grim Reaper comes knocking at your own doorstep.

    ReplyDelete