Does God take pleasure in the fate of the damned?

One of the most popular objections to Calvinism is the allegation that, according to Calvinism, God takes pleasure in the fate of the damned.

The critic of Calvinism treats the specter of divine pleasure in the fate of the damned as though that were self-evidently abhorrent. As if that’s the worst possible thing you could say about God. As if that besmirches the character of God.

Now, one superficial problem with this objection is that it seizes upon emotive language. But unless we’re going to become Mormons or open theists, we have to make allowance for anthropomorphic usage in emotive ascriptions to God. “Pleasure” is a loaded word, and it’s loaded with very human connotations. What is more, human connotations in a fallen world.

But there’s a deeper problem. Let’s take a comparison. Suppose a terrorist devises a bioweapon. He plans to test that bioweapon on a room full of kindergarteners. But before he has a chance to infect the little boys and girls, he accidentally infects himself, and dies a horrible death in a matter of minutes.

In terms of Christian theology and ethics, is it wrong for you and me to take satisfaction in the fate of the terrorist? Is it wrong for you and me to take “pleasure” in the fact that he suffered the fate he intended for others? That he accidentally killed himself before he could kill anyone else?

Is that a sinful emotion? An evil feeling? Or is that a righteous emotion?

Put another way, would it be sinful not to take satisfaction in the outcome? If an evildoer gets his comeuppance, why shouldn’t we rejoice in that denouement? Isn’t it a good thing when villains come to a bad end? Isn’t that something to applaud?

For that matter, doesn’t Scripture contain a number of scenes involving the fate of the wicked in which the Bible writer adopts a gleeful tone? They escaped justice in this life, but justice awaits them in the afterlife!

Where did some professing Christians ever come around to the notion that it’s wrong to take satisfaction in the just deserts of the wicked? By what inversion of moral values do they treat their moral repugnance as self-evidently true? As a reason to disbelieve in such a God?

But if it’s proper for Christians to applaud God’s just judgment of the wicked, then why would it be wrong for God to be “pleased” with that outcome? Why can’t a just judge take satisfaction is doing good? In righting the scales of justice?

What this tells me is that many Arminians share the same value system as the universalist. Deep down, they don’t believe the damned get exactly what they deserve.

For if they did think the damned get exactly what they deserve, then why would they be so repelled at the specter of God taking pleasure in the fate of the damned?

Once again, I’m not saying that emotive language is the best way to frame the issue. But I’m just addressing the objection on its own terms.