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Monday, September 07, 2009

Revenge of the Sith

Perry Robinson responded to something I wrote:

http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2009/08/17/more-jedi-mind-tricks/

It’s quite revealing that Perry so often uses “Jedi mind tricks” as a derogative descriptor. In the Star Wars franchise, the Jedi Knights were the good guys. Heroes. By using this phrase pejoratively, Perry reveals his Sithian sympathies–maybe even his Sithian identity. Time to recall Luke Skywalker to active duty.

“As of today I am still waiting for any of White’s toadies to defend White’s claim that G0d has libertarian free will and that the Bible teaches it.”

“Toady?” Does Perry mean the team members at aomin? What about the team members at Energetic Procession? Are they his toadies, too? Is monkpatrick a toady for Perry Robison? What about NeoChalcedonian, apotheoun, or ochlophobist? Toadies one and toadies all?

“To say that White’s theology is “consistently sound” is to preach to the choir at best.”

Yes, I preach to the choir at Triablogue. And Perry preaches to the choir at Energetic Procession. So what?

“Second, Steve makes the mistake of thinking that I am engaging Calvinism as a position, but I am not. I am engaging White and so for as White is concerned, Libertarianism is not an incoherent concept.”

So Perry is only attacking White’s statement, and not using that as a reference point to attack Calvinism in general? We’ll see.

“Secondly, even if he weren’t, any Calvinist worth his salt is familiar with Edward’s work on free will or Luther’s Bondage of the Will. If he thinks that God fulfills the libertarian conditions on free will, then the arguments given by Edwards and others that are quite popular that Libertarianism is incoherent are still out the window.”

“Steve claims that the position is not that nature selects for a specific action, but rather circumscribes the possible options. I agree that the Reformed are logically forced to that weaker position, but that is not how it is presented in a good number of representative sources. Edwards for example goes to great pains to argue for a necessary connection between cause and effect, where the cause singles out a specific effect in the sphere of agency.”

i) To begin with, I assume White simply meant that God had the freedom to do otherwise–to choose to create a different world had he decreed otherwise, or create none at all. If so, that’s entirely consistent with Calvinism. The Westminster Confession grants that God has counterfactual knowledge. And the supra/infra debate presupposes the existence of possible worlds (as divine ideas).

ii) Let’s also remember that Edwards was an 18C Calvinist, responding to 18C Arminians. His formulations are keyed to the state of the debate at that time and place. But action theory, both in its libertarian and compatibilist forms, has undergone many refinements since the 18C–not to mention the 16C (a la Luther). His arguments were more that adequate to deal with his contemporaries. But it would be quite anachronistic to deploy his compatibilism against the libertarianism of, say, Robert Kane. They have different opponents. Different conceptual resources.

iii) On a related note, Perry suffers from an inability to distinguish dogmatic theology or systematic theology from polemical theology. Polemical theology is not, itself, an article of faith. Dogmatic theology or systematic theology details the articles of faith. Polemical theology marshals a range of arguments to defend the articles of faith. But the supporting arguments are not, themselves, articles of faith. Polemical theology may draw upon arguments from science, history, psychology, philosophy, sociology, and so on. Such lines of evidence don’t amount to articles of faith. Rather, they’re thought to be consistent with, and supportive of, such articles.

“If Steve wishes to move to the weaker position of mere circumscription, then compatibilism and soft determinism will require further argument. And that will be rather difficult given that we now have an indeterminstic relation between nature and action.”

He’s disregarding the fact that I ground the outcome in the decree.

“Steve then objects to my counter example of God to the thesis that natures determine actions by arguing that the case of God is sui generis. The case of God is unique and so I can’t reason from it to agents in general. But on the contrary, the fact that God is unique would only be relevant in this case if there was something about the nature of God that altered the nature of freedom that he enjoys. I can’t see that there is and Steve hasn’t given me a reason to think so”

There are obvious discontinuities. God is not contingent or dependent on anything. He causes things to happen (directly or indirectly) without himself being caused by anything–whether in his being or actions.

“Further, since God is the source of all things, including freedom, God is the paramount case and paramount counter-example. If it is not true in the case of the paragon of person-nature relations, then there is substantial reason for thinking that it isn’t true with other agents.”

That’s like saying that if God is omniscient or omnipotent, then the creature is omniscient or omnipotent.

“And this is why Jesus as a divine person does not have a gnomic will because he never has a beginning to his use of his faculties.”

Notice that Perry can’t apply his human action theory to Jesus. So, by his own admission, the analogy breaks down.

“Adding sin to the mix won’t help since sin doesn’t alter the nature of humanity or personhood per se.”

Another one of Perry’s problems is thinking that we have to begin with labels. Affix the right label, as if that’s the starting point. However, the Bible teaches us that sin imposes various impediments on what sinners are able to do. And sin also induces them to do certain things.

We don’t have to begin with labels like “person” or “nature,” to acknowledge that fact. Rather, we first acknowledge that fact, then find a label that best describes the fact.

But, for Perry, theology and philosophy are reducible to mixing and matching labels. Attach a preexisting label to a corresponding position. If there is no preexisting label that does the job, then stretch a preexisting label.

I suppose this is not surprising. Perry belongs to a ritualistic church. So what matters is intoning the right words in the right order–along with prescribed vestments and gestures. The magic doesn’t work if you drop a line.

“I also noted that it isn’t true in the case of angels and humans. Steve argues that while this is a legitimate issue it isn’t a problem specific to Calvinism. On the contrary, even if this were so, it is still a problem that Calvinist’s must address nonetheless.”

Which I have:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/05/fall-of-lucifer.html

“And as I noted before in the case of pre-fall angels and humans their natures didn’t circumscribe their options to only good ones since they actualized evil options. So even if I were to grant Steve that a Calvinist is only committed to nature circumscribing of options relative to nature, this is still a problem for them. And if its possible that natures do not circumscribe options prior to the fall, it is also possible that it does not after the fall.”

It’s a problem if we limit ourselves to that framework. Which doesn’t mean the framework is worthless by any means–anymore than a flashlight is worthless because you don’t need to use it in broad daylight.

“I gave my standard line that readers here are by now familiar with, that our first parents as contingent agents have not yet had the personal use of their natural faculties fixed in their natural goodness. Steve asks how this succeeds to sever the connection between nature and choice. I wouldn’t say it severs the connection, but rather the connection is something accomplished through personal action. Steve has the cart before the horse.”

i) Contingent agents can have a fixed course of action. If they’re contingent on other factors, then other factors can predetermine the outcome–like the domino effect.

(I’m not saying a row of dominoes is the best way to model human action. But just a way of making a general point.)

ii) Does Perry think that choice is what sets nature in concrete? Even if we accept that claim, then once the concrete is dry, there’s no freedom to do otherwise.

“Then Steve claims that on my gloss of pre-fall anthropology I am still left with the problem of Adam’s nature circumscribing his range of options. But this is a mistake. Adam like all agents that have a beginning have a gnomic will. The gnomic will as outlined here numerous times is a specific personal use of the will that is not fixed either in virtue or vice. This is so, so that the agent can be responsible for the kind of character that they end up having. Their personal use of their faculties can be evil or good. Consequently, I am not left with the problem of Adam circumscribing his actions because his hypostatic employment is not yet fixed and hence not yet circumscribed…So it does explain how a creature created naturally good can do evil whereas the Reformed model does not.”

That fails to explain the transition from good to evil. For goodness (“created naturally good”) is still the initial condition. So how, on Perry’s view, did Adam ever find evil appealing in the first place? How does a good and sinless agent ever become attracted to evil? Give in to evil?

His initial bias is good rather than evil. So how does he change his inclination?

“So it isn’t an equally valid question of why Adam with a good nature sinned since I do not adhere to the premised view that no person is able to choose against their nature. Adam was naturally good, but morally innocent. Given his inexperience and his gnomic mode of willing it is perfectly understandable how he and his wife could be duped and manipulated and yet still bear a good measure of moral responsibility.”

Actually, that sounds like a case of diminished responsibility–like the actions of a 5-year-old. In that event, couldn’t Adam and Eve blame God for dropping them into an environment which they were ill-equipped to negotiate? By Perry’s own admission, Adam lacked the practical experience to exercise reliable moral discernment. Why doesn’t that let Adam off the hook?

On his view, the devil is like a grown-up who cheats a five-year-old. Hardly an even match.

“Simply because I said that Adam’s nature was good as were his faculties, it doesn’t follow that his use of what he has will be good. Persons aren’t natural attributes. (And I don’t believe I wrote that Adam’s nature wasn’t fixed in goodness, rather I wrote that his personal use of his nature wasn’t yet fixed according to the good of his nature.) So Steve’s tu quo que does no work here.”

We don’t have to begin with the label. Whether you say good “nature” or “person” or “agent” or whatever, you’re beginning with goodness. How does Perry explain the transition from good to evil if there was no prior inclination to do evil, but, to the contrary, a prior disinclination to do evil? Throwing labels around does nothing to relieve the conceptual problem.

“And no the Westminster theologians do not make the same claim. If they did, they wouldn’t be monergists and they wouldn’t hold to the Christology that they do either.”

The Confession says that Adam and Even had the power to fulfill the law of God, but were under the possibility of transgressing the law, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject to change” (WCF 4:2).

Of course, that doesn’t solve any problems, but a confession of faith isn’t that type of document. It’s just a statement of faith. Defending the claim is the job of polemical theology.

“Either predestination to sin must go or posse non pecare must go. It is in part a philosophical debate, but it is also a theological debate.”

That’s simplistic. When we talk about what human beings can and can’t do, or will do, there’s more than one factor in play. Agents can be free in one respect, but not in another. Take the accidental necessity of the past.

“I perfectly grant to Steve that even with libertarian freedom, the result was the same in so far as the event occurred, but whether that event rises to the level of action under the conditions of soft determinism is not granted. In order for it to be an act and an act for which Adam was blameworthy, he would need to fulfill the conditions on libertarian freedom. It is true that Soft Determinists disagree, but that is where the line is drawn. We simply don’t agree that the result was the same, because by Libertarian lights, if Adam only fulfilled Soft Determinist conditions, it was no act at all, but an event.”

Once again, we don’t have to begin with labels. Begin with concepts. If, by Perry’s own admission, Adam, as a libertarian agent, would have done the same thing anyway, apart from predestination, then how does decreeing the same outcome which he would have done anyway, apart from predestination, rob him of responsibility? Can Perry remove his training wheels long enough to walk through the issue without recourse to his preprinted labels?

“If we take ‘all’ to mean only persons relative to a group so that all in Adam die, but some other group in Christ are made alive, then we will have to find some other basis than the person and work of Christ to explain the resurrection and persistence of the wicked in eternity and their apparent sharing in immortality.”

That isn’t exegesis. Perry isn’t exegeting 1 Cor 15. Rather, he’s positing what he takes to be an unacceptable consequence, then “interpreting” the passage to avoid that consequence. Of course, that procedure is completely extraneous to the passage, in terms of its wording, context, &c.

“(It will also imply that it is possible for some men not to have been in Adam.)”

Logically possible or exegetically possible?

“Christ isn’t their Lord by virtue of his resurrection on such a view.”

He’s their Lord by virtue of his Creatorship.

“If we make it a legal relationship such that they have to be punished for their sins and so God perpetuates their existence, not only have we made divine justice dependent on the wicked’s existence, since God would cease to be just if they were extinguished.”

Well, that’s a rather odd way of putting things. If an offender deserves punishment, and if there’s an obligation to punish him, then he must exist to get his just deserts. So what?

Yes, you might say that God’s action is “dependent” on the existence of the offender, but God voluntarily created that relation in the first place. Likewise, God makes promises. That obligates him to keep the promise. But no one made him make the promise.

The relation doesn’t have to be “strong” (whatever “weak” and “strong” are supposed to mean here). It only has to be adequate to the demands of the situation. Contractual relationships are weaker than blood ties, but they are still genuine relationships.

“But we make the relation much weaker than that in the hypostatic union.”

Morality doesn’t require ontological relationships.

“On my view Christ takes up all of human nature, not any or all human persons, into his divine person at the incarnation, thereby securing the eternal existence of all humans, even the wicked. Consequently, immortality at the level of nature is conveyed to all men and why Christ is Lord over even those who deny him. (2 Pet 2:1) The relation there is inherent, intrinsic and metaphysically robust.”

Notice that he isn’t exegeting 1 Cor 15. Remember, this was his prooftext, not mine. All we’re getting from Perry are his tendentious, theological stipulations. That isn’t exegesis. Speaking of which:

But if we make it matter of an extrtinsic relation such as that of law, will and efficient causation then we open up exactly the kind of space that permitted not only Annihilationalism but modern forms of Arianism as well as Universalism. These are how the possibilities fall out.

Christ is related to the redeemed and wicked by an extrinsic act of will. Either the act of will is necessary or contingent.

Christ is related to the redeemed and wicked by an extrinsic act of will so that divine justice is in part constituted by the existence of the wicked such that if they ceased to exist, God would cease to be just. The same holds for divine mercy.

Hence the act of will is necessary.

So that he wills the salvation of all on pain of losing the attribute of mercy. (Universalism)

Or

So that he wills the damnation of some on pain of losing the attribute justice. (Calvinism)

On the other hand, if the act of will is contingent, Christ is related to the wicked by an extrinsic and contingent act of will because Christ himself exists contingently. (Arianism)

If Christ exists contingently then his willing of the wicked is contingent and so their existence in hell is contingent and can come to an end. (Conditional Immortality)

If Christ exists contingently then his willing of salvation for the redeemed is also contingent and so multiple falls are possible. (Origenism)


Perry has no inkling of how to do exegesis. All his does is to bring some prefabricated categories to the text (intrinsic/extrinsic relation; Calvinism, Arianism, annihilationism, universalism), then superimpose that grid onto the text. While that makes for an elegant, symmetrical analysis of various logical alternatives, it’s entirely extraneous to his prooftext.

How do we determine the scope of the universal quantifier in 1 Cor 15:22? Here’s the relevant context:

18Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ are lost. 19If only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are to be pitied more than all men.

20But Christ has indeed been raised from the dead, the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep. 21For since death came through a man, the resurrection of the dead comes also through a man. 22For as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive. 23But each in his own turn: Christ, the firstfruits; then, when he comes, those who belong to him. (vv18-23).


The “all” who are made alive in v22 are the same as “those who belong to him [Christ]” in v23. Who would that be? Those who fell asleep in Christ (v18). Which has reference to deceased Christians. That’s reinforced by vv19-20. The basis of the Christian hope is the Resurrection of Christ. For his resurrection is the firstfruits of their own resurrection to come.

And that’s the point of 1 Cor 15 generally. It’s a distinctively Christian hope (cf. 1 Thes 4:13-14). For detailed exegesis, see Fitzmyer’s recent commentary on 1 Corinthians (564-71)–as well as Fee’s recent commentary on 1 Thessalonians (164-73).

“This is why I can take Rom 5:18 for example as applicable to all of humanity without implying universalism. The justification of life is in fact given to all men at the level of nature.”

But, of course, Paul didn’t say that in 5:18. You can’t derive that distinction from 5:18 or the surrounding context.

“Further the question isn’t necessarily of whom the universal quantifier denotes but rather what is Adam and Christ’s relationship to the respective groups.”

True, which is quite consistent with my own interpretation. Perry then introduces another prooftext:

2 Cor 5:14. Much the same could be said here. But,

If all are dead, Christ dies for all
Christ does not die for all
Therefore not all were dead.

Or

If Christ dies for all, then all are dead
All are not dead
Then Christ does not die for all-he dies for some or none.

This syllogism has nothing to do with exegeting the text. Who does the universal quantifier denote in v14? In principle, there are three logical options:

i) The referent is not the same in each occurrence. Rather, it denotes all men in the case of death, while it denotes all (and only) Christians in the case of life.

ii) It has the same referent in each occurrence. This, in turn, breaks down into either of two options:

a) It denotes all men in each occurrence.

b) It denotes all (and only) Christians in each occurrence.

(ii-a) would implicate universalism. If, however, Paul’s doctrine of eschatological judgment rules out universalism, then that leaves us with either (i) or (ii-b).

For purposes of this discussion, I don’t need to narrow it down any further than those remaining two options.

“Here it is easy to see the connection between Limited Atonement and Pelagianism, that is there are some men who have no need of Christ.”

They do need Christ. However, that doesn’t mean they get what they need. As sinners, they forfeit the right to have their needs supplied.

“Third, an appeal to exegesis isn’t theory neutral. Exegetical principles are part of one’s worldview. And more specifically, exegetical principles are not Christologically neutral. There is no bare fact of interpretation.”

This is not a choice between value-free exegesis and value-laden exegesis. Rather, this is a choice between exegesis and non-exegesis. Perry has given us no exegesis whatsoever of 1 Cor 15:21-22. Instead, he’s slapped his preprinted labels onto some opposing positions.

Perry can’t think on his own. He can only sort and collate various positions into his set of preexisting slots–as if that’s an argument for or against anything.

“Steve then claims that with these passages that if I take the universal quantifier to apply to each and every human being, then you are stuck with universalism, which I reject. So Steve is trying to cut off this line of criticism. But it won’t work for a simple reason. While I reject universalism and affirm that these passages apply to every human being, I deny that this implies universalism since they do not apply to every human person as such.”

And how does he extract that distinction from his chosen prooftext? Where, in 1 Cor 15:21-22, does Paul drive a wedge between “every human being” and “every human person as such”?

“If redemption admits of degrees along the fault lines of the categories of person and nature, then all will be redeemed, but not all will enjoy the fullness of that salvation. That is all will persist forever, but how they persist will depend on how they are personally oriented either to suffering or to bliss.”

But Perry failed to uncover that fault line in his prooftexts. Rather, that’s something he applied to his prooftexts from outside his prooftexts.

“If Steve wishes to concede that this is a prooftext [Gen 50:20] for universal predestination, I am more than happy to concede. But it is a stock passage that Calvinist’s routinely throw up to prove that view. And that is why I used it to remove one verse from their arsenal.”

The fact that it’s not a prooftext for “universal predestination” doesn’t remove it from the Reformed arsenal. Rather, it serves a different–theodicean–function.

“Steve alleges that I fail to distinguish between national and soteric election. I don’t think I do. Pharaoh as an individual is an example of election, how God is free to elect whom he wills through which the purpose is accomplished. The point is that election serves the purpose and not the other way around. The argument that Paul is countering is that if Christ is the messiah and messiah brings about the salvation of Israel, but the salvation of Israel has not been brought about then Christ is not the messiah. Paul maintains the election of Israel, but the election was according to a purpose, to bring about messiah. That election doesn’t guarantee the salvation of those elected. Repentance on their part too is required. Further, God is free to elect through whom his purposes are fulfilled and that election does not guarantee their salvation since God can cut off believers as well should they manifest the same pride as the Jewish nation. So I didn’t fail to draw a distinction between national and soteric. Given that God can cut off those elected qua church (11:21-22) even if we were to gloss the distinction the way Steve suggests, it still doesn’t guarantee salvation. Steve fails to take Paul’s argument and usage of election seriously.”

i) One of his problems is that Perry’s equivocates over the meaning of “election.” Are we using “elect” as a generic synonym for “choose,” or are we using “elect” as a technical term for a particular kind of selection?

Perry is committing the word=concept fallacy by acting as though he can infer the concept from the word.

However, the fact that some of the “Chosen People” (and their ecclesiastical counterparts) can fall away doesn’t mean the “elect” can fall away. If “election” is used as a technical term to denote unconditional election, then the concept of election, in that specialized sense, does guarantee the salvation of the referent.

ii) On a related note, Paul distinguishes between two different kinds of Jews: inward and outward Jews (Rom 2:28-29; 9:6), which foreshadows his discussion of election and reprobation in Rom 9-11. The “election” of the “inward” Jew does guarantee his salvation.

“Of course there are a couple of problems here. Matt 7:18 makes it clear that a good tree cannot bring forth bad fruit. Is Adam not a good tree? Is there some better example excepting Christ?”

So how did a good tree like Adam bear bad fruit? Perry’s appeal to the gnomic will won’t relieve the tension, for according to that theory, a good tree can bear bad fruit–contrary to the dominical axiom.

“Second, we’d need a reason to think that Adam was an exception other than the ad hoc move to save the Calvinist view from obvious inconsistency. So far I see no reason to think so. And it also seems just a tad too convenient that at just the point that the Reformed principles meet an inconsistency that we should take cases of clear counter examples as exceptions. If it is not true in paradigm cases, why think that it will be true in non-paradigmical cases?”

Calvinism didn’t invent the fruit tree metaphor. Everyone who takes the Bible seriously has to harmonize this with the fall of Adam.

“Second, Steve assumes that the tree refers to natures rather than persons. It is ironic that Pelagius took the passage this way and that it was Augustine who took the good trees to refer to good persons. Just as those who set their minds on the things of God can’t fulfill the desires of the flesh as long as they continue to do so, the same is true in this case.”

Notice how Perry can’t think outside his box of preprinted labels. I don’t have to begin with labels. Whether you say the tree stands for the nature or the person, you still have to explain how a good agent (be it at the natural or personal level) can bear bad fruit.

“Then we are back to the ad hoc appeal to mystery made by the Reformed.”

I haven’t appealed to mystery. I’ve offered a solution.

However, there’s nothing inherently wrong with an argument from authority as long as the authority is truly authoritative. An appeal to divine revelation is sufficient to establish the truth or falsity of a proposition.

“Steve argues that Libertarianism is a philosophical position and is only as good as the undergirding intuitions. But revealed theology is a different story. However true that may be, the difference isn’t as hard and fast as Steve makes it out to be. Revealed theology isn’t lacking in philosophical content. And that content doesn’t rise or fall on the strength of the some non-biblical intuitions.”

And if libertarianism were a revealed truth, then it would rate a higher epistemic status than is actually the case.

I don’t deny that revelation can have philosophical implications. That’s why scriptural doctrines like predestination and original sin rule out libertarianism.

“(Steve is begging the question since he is assuming that the intuitions that drive Libertarianism aren’t biblical.)”

I don’t need to reinvent the wheel every time I debate an issue. I’ve shown on multiple occasions that libertarian freedom is contrary to Scripture.

“And this is especially germane since White claimed that the Bible taught Libertarianism.”

How is that germane to my position, or Calvinism in general? Didn’t Perry tell us “Steve makes the mistake of thinking that I am engaging Calvinism as a position, but I am not. I am engaging White”?

Moreover, Perry is simply imputing his definition to White, then accusing White of inconsistency. That’s a straw man argument.

“But there are good reasons for thinking that Steve is wrong. First, I don’t take God to be either a necessary or contingent being since God is beyond being ad intra.”

Of course, that objection turns on a very esoteric definition of “being.”

“Second, it is not our contingency as such that motivates the search for further causes, but rather the mistake of treating persons as natural causes like any other. In so far as we are both persons then there is no disanalogy. Personal action qua personal action resists analyses that seek to reduce personal acts to natural events. So even though created agents are caused to exist this leaves untouched their being persons who are genuine causes themselves for which they are the sufficient terminus for those actions.”

i) To say that personal actions are irreducible to natural events doesn’t mean that personal events are insulated from external causes.

ii) Moreover, the question at issue is the relation between the “supernatural event” of divine creation and the mundane effect of finite persons.

iii) Furthermore, to say that human beings “genuine causes themselves for which they are the sufficient terminus for those actions” takes for granted the very issue in dispute.

“This is why I noted that the explanation for why one believes and the other does not is to find its end in the person and nowhere else. The person so chose, full stop.”

That’s not an explanation. Rather, that’s a tendentious assertion. Perry needs to explain why his terminus is not an arbitrary terminus. And you don’t have to be a Calvinist to think that. Many action theorists would take issue with Perry’s ad hoc denouement. It’s hardly something he can toss off as obvious or uncontestable. Far from it.

“This doesn’t mean that there weren’t contributing causes or reasons for their action. But it does imply that persons are something distinct. To claim that the Bible doesn’t stop there is a claim that needs an argument. I think that is where the Bible does stop. Agents are the source of their actions, even if those actions find a place in a wider intentional grid.”

Well, to touch on a few examples, Exodus ultimately attributes the actions of Pharaoh to divine hardening. Likewise, John ultimately attributes Jewish unbelief to divine hardening (Jn 12:37-40. And I can offer an exegetical defense for these examples, if need be.

“Steve seems to wish to construct a problem Was there a time when Christ lacked the property of righteousness? And second if so, before he acquired it, did he acquire it by trial and error?
I thought it would be clear that since Christ is a divine person and hence lacks a beginning, his personal use of those natural faculties does not entail or imply a gnomic use of them.”

Perry misses the point. He acts as if my question to him presumes that Christ is not a divine person. But my question works perfectly well on the assumption that Christ is a divine person. Perry said that righteousness could only be acquired through practice. But he has to admit that his claim breaks down in the case of Christ. Yet he also treats Christology as paradigmatic for anthropology.

“Then Steve asks does this mean that there was a time before Jesus was impeccable? And was he able to do good or evil until he acquired impeccability? The answer is clear and obvious. Those conditions of gnomic willing only apply for persons who have a beginning. I don’t think Jesus is a human person and so I don’t think he has a beginning. Steve’s question only makes sense on the Nestorian assumption that Jesus was a human person. So it was impossible for Jesus to sin. But Steve does think that Jesus was a human and divine person so he has to posit a subordinating and predestinating relationship within the divine-human person of Christ in order to stave off the possibility of Christ sinning.”

Perry doesn’t seem to grasp the function of questioning your opponent in a debate. He acts as though a question assumes the viewpoint of the questioner when, in fact, the questioner may be assuming the viewpoint of his opponent to press a point of inconsistency. Do we really need to explain that to Perry? Hasn’t he ever heard of an argumentative question?

Another problem is that Perry wants to use this as a pretext to take his Cyrillian hobbyhorse on another ride around the track. So he diverts the original issue to something he’d rather talk about.

“Then he argues that I can’t invoke Christ’s divinity as a differential factor to ground the intrinsic righteousness or impeccability of Christ, without also implying that all humans are also made impeccable. This would follow if I thought Christ was also a human person or if I thought that Christ’s divine nature was his person, but unlike the Reformed, I adhere to a Chalcedonian Christology and so reject both outcomes. Since Christ takes up all human nature but no human persons in the incarnation, a personal property of his won’t translate at the level of nature necessarily to every member of that nature. Steve’s argument turns on a confusion of person and nature in Christ.”

Notice how consistently clueless Perry is about this entire line of questioning. My argumentative questions are not a window into my own position. Rather, they expose a tension in Perry’s position.

If righteousness can be an innate property of agents, then why is God unable to create Adam and Eve as righteous agents? After all, since they were created as adults, they already have other properties which would ordinarily be acquired through maturation and experience–but, in their case, were innate.

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