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Tuesday, July 28, 2009

Walking on water

Recently, Perry Robinson has been critiquing Calvinism in two different places–on his own blog, as well as Articuli Infidei.

His critique merits a reply. At the same time, a reply is complicated by the redundancy of the multiple coverage as well as the fact that he’s responding to specific arguments of specific individuals. I’ll try to excerpt the major objections as best I can.

“Whatever disagreements I have with Craig, he is a genuine scholar and a good philosopher.”

I generally agree, although he also has some really quirky positions, like his fictionalism, or his suggestion that God will erase our memories of our lost loved ones.

“He is an effective communicator and has done quite a bit for the cause of Christ.”

Once again, I agree. Of course, I’d say the same thing about James White. And White has an added advantage. Craig is one of those individuals who can do both harm and good. So while he’s very useful, some of his erroneous positions subtract from the good stuff he’s doing.

Craig suffers a bit from the Dr. Strangelove Syndrome. Shrewd advice, but he needs to keep that wayward limb under much tighter rein.

By contrast, White’s theology is consistently sound. Therefore, White isn’t undoing with one hand the good he’s doing with another.

“I don’t think James White really means this.”

I also doubt that White meant libertarianism in the elaborate sense that Perry defines it.

“Now that is a thumbnail sketch of what Libertarianism is. Is that what James White thinks God has? I don’t think so, but he said it nonetheless.”

This was a two-paragraph blog post, not an article for Faith & Philosophy. Likewise, his remarks were pitched to a general audience.

Also, unlike Craig, White is not a research professor with access to an academic library. Rather, White is a busy, popular apologist who has to be broadly conversant with a number of different challenges to the Christian faith. He covers some of the same ground that Craig, but he also takes on some issues that Craig ignores, and vice versa.

So I don’t think Perry can extrapolate from this example to White’s position in general, much less Calvinism’s position in general.

“But the real gift from White was claiming that the Bible teaches it. That just warms my little libertarian heart. That means that White thinks that Libertarianism is a coherent concept, since after all, nothing directly contradictory or incoherent can be ascribed to God or taught by the Bible. That excludes all of the arguments from White’s apologetic arsenal all of the arguments from critics of Libertarianism that it is an incoherent concept. You can kiss Martin Luther’s Bondage of the Will, Jonathan Edwards On Free Will, and Harry Frankfurt’s Covert Counter-Factual Controllers, bye bye, Dorthy.”

Of course, I seriously doubt the philosophical literature on Frankfurt examples was even on the mental horizon of White’s brief remarks, one way or the other.

“The disagreement then is not over whether Libertarianism is a coherent concept or even if it is true. If its true of God, then its true and a coherent concept. It is not even if the Bible teaches the concept.”

Both of those disagreements are still in play. Taking issue with White’s formulation is hardly the same as, say, talking on a Calvinist with a doctorate in philosophy who specializes in the finer points of action theory. Perry is burning a straw man if he’s trying to extrapolate from a little blog post by White to Calvinism in general.

“The underlying reasoning is fairly common among Calvinists-the actions of human persons is determined by human nature.”

That characterization is highly ambiguous. The claim is not that nature selects for a particular action. Rather, nature selects for a range of action. The kind of nature selects for the kind of action. Actions of a certain type, consistent with the moral character of the nature.

Put another way, it’s more of an exclusionary principle.

What selects for particular actions is not the nature, but the decree.

Indeed, Perry will introduce some similar qualifications. But he acts as if his qualifications are at odds with Calvinism.

“More directly it isn’t a metaphysical truth in the first place that natures determine the actions of agents. It is certaintly not true in the case of the Trinity.”

Since God is a se, the case of God is sui generis.

“It also seems not to be true in the case of pre-fall angels and humans. Their natures were entirely good and yet they fell. In order to get from the idea of circumscribed options to determined option we’d need to add some other thesis. But even with circumscribed options being according to nature, this doesn’t always seem to be true, particularly in the case of pre-fall angels and humans. Their natures were good, but some of their options were evil. To get circumscription of options relative to nature we’d need to add some other thesis.”

Here, Perry raises a valid issue. However, it’s not just an issue for Calvinism.

“Our view is in short that for agents that have a begining, namely Adam and Eve their use of the their natural faculties, namely their will and intellect are not yet fixed in the natural goodness. So while good and innocent, they are not yet righteous. That is acquired through practice. So while it is possible for them to fall here, once fixed in virtue, it is impossible for them to sin in heaven.”

i) How does that succeed in severing the connection between nature and choice? Isn’t Perry still operating within that framework? All he’s done is to change the natural output by changing the natural input. He has a different definition of what constitutes the Adamic nature. Depending on what he puts into the definition of Adam’s nature, that allows for a different outcome, or possible outcome.

But on his view, as he explicates his own position, Adam’s nature still circumscribes the range of viable options or live possibilities.

ii) And it doesn’t really explain how a good agent can do evil. The underlying conundrum of how to transition from good to evil remains unresolved. So I don’t see that he’s succeeded in solving the problem he posed for himself.

iii) At most we have a stalemate. Let’s assume that Calvinism has no way of resolving this dilemma. But if this is the best that Perry can do, then he’s in the same boat.

“If on a Calvinist reading, no person is able to choose against nature, if Adam’s nature was good, how is it that he sinned against nature?”

That’s a valid question. But it’s equally valid against Perry’s position. He just said that, on his own view, Adam’s nature was good. He said Adam’s “natural faculties” were “good.”

He also said that while Adam’s nature was good, his nature wasn’t “fixed” in goodness.

But, of course, a Calvinist would say the same thing. Don’t the Westminster Divines make the equivalent claim?

“If Adam and Eve were predestined to fall, then it is hard to see how they lost free will. They never could have refrained from sinning.”

That would depend, in part, on whether we define freewill in libertarian or compatibilist/semicompatibilist terms.

I’d also add that that’s a philosophical debate.

“If Adam was predestined to fall, then he never was in a position where he could have refrained from sinning.”

True. On the other hand, Perry thinks that Adam had the freedom to do otherwise, but fell anyway. So the result is the same.

“All men are raised in Christ, even the wicked. 1 Cor 15:19-22.”

We’d need to see Perry’s exegesis.

“If they weren't then they were never dead. 2 Cor 5:14. Christ died for all since all were dead. If they weren't dead, then Christ didn't die for them.”

Of course, that begs the question of who the universal quantifier denotes. What’s the reference class in 2 Cor 5? If you apply it to every human being, then the logic of Paul’s argument requires you to go all the way with universal salvation–which Perry rejects.

“An sure God knows all things that will transpire according to his counsel, but that doesn't mean be determines the actions of agents but only that he directs their intentions to fulfill a different goal than the one they had in mind. (Gen 50:20).”

To say that Gen 50:20 is not a prooftext for universal predestination is beside the point. Scripture can teach that elsewhere.

“Jews were elected too and are to be considered elect according to Paul yet they are enemies of Christ. Rom 11:28. You are confusing election with salvation, which is contrary to Paul's point in Romans 9-11. Election doesn't ensure salvation.”

Perry fails to distinguish between national election and soteric election. Paul draws that distinction in Romans.

“Second, if agents perform actions determined by desires, how is it that Adam having a good nature had an evil desire? On the assumption that his nature is good, evil should have been impossible for him and the same goes for satan too.”

i) To begin with, Scripture uses a tree/fruit, cause/effect metaphor. Even if Adam is an exception to the rule, should we use that exception to overthrow the Scriptural principle in general?

ii) I myself recently offered my own solution.

“Throwing up your arms to claim mystery at just the point that your system is inconsistent is ad hoc and fallacious. Why is that when Arminians exclaim that agents just do will one option over another, Calvinists howl that they believe in chance, deny providence or are irrational, but when Calvinist's do the same thing, its ‘oh what a wonderous mystery!’ Sorry, your claim to mystery is fallacious because it is ad hoc. You are just trying to save your system from an obvious inconsistency.”

Aside from the fact that I’ve offered my own solution, there’s a difference between philosophy and revealed theology. Libertarianism is a philosophical position. Arminians are appealing to philosophical arguments to support their contention. Philosophical arguments are fair game for rational scrutiny. Philosophical arguments are only as good as the intuitive reasons in their favor.

But revealed theology doesn’t rise or fall on intuitive reasoning.

“As for the fullness of salvation in a more narrow sense, God creates us without our will doesn't save us without our will. So yes, we are a terminus for our free choices. That seems no more mysterious than the free choice of other agents like the Trinity. If we require an antecedent causal explanation for every choice, what is the explanation for God's choice to create or redeem?”

Since God is a necessary being, whereas a human agent is a contingent being, there’s an obvious disanalogy in Perry’s argument from analogy. By definition, creatures are subject to antecedent conditions. Creatures are the caused. The effect of a prior agent or agency.

“So one chose salvation and the other redemption. Full stop.”

That’s hardly where the Bible stops.

“Second, we have sufficient data that Adam was created good, as was Satan.”

So Perry is in the same boat. In that case, he should stop poking holes in the bottom of the boat. He’s trying to sink the opposition at his own expense. Mutual drowning.

“Third, I simply plugged in your theory for a clear test case and it fails.”

And I simply did the same thing with Perry’s own theory.

“Fourth, if you wish to focus on the information we have about human nature then we had best start with the humanity of Christ since there is far more information about his human nature than we have about human nature in general. Furthermore, Christ is the model for all of humanity and all of humanity is summed up in him. And so the proper relation between humanity and divinity is set forth in Christology, not anthropology.”

Well, Christ could walk on water, turn water into wine, multiply bread, heal the sick, and raise the dead. I’ve never got the knack of that myself, and I somehow doubt that Perry’s thaumaturgic powers, or lack therefore, exceed mine. So if Christ is our metaphysical role-model, then Perry and I seem to be failing the course.

17 comments:

  1. "Rather, nature selects for a range of action. The kind of nature selects for the kind of action. Actions of a certain type, consistent with the moral character of the nature.

    Put another way, it’s more of an exclusionary principle.

    What selects for particular actions is not the nature, but the decree.
    "

    The Bible does say that God "cannot lie". In some sense, he cannot lie.

    Isn't that because it's not in his nature to do so? He's compatibilistically free, but not libertarianly free?

    And however a libertarian explains "God cannot lie", couldn't we apply the same definition to say that mankind "cannot choose Christ"?

    If they attack compatibilism on free-will grounds, aren't they saying that God doesn't have free will?

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  2. P.S. I'm curious if Dr. White spoke hastily, when he said, "The Bible teaches absolute libertarianism---the free will of God."

    He definitely intended to say that the freedom of God is above the freedom of the creature, but I wonder if he really intended to apply LFW to God. (Along those lines, I wonder what he thinks about the impeccability of Christ.)

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  3. I'll respond to the rest later,

    First let me note that I appreciate Steve's more dispassionate tone.

    Second, whatever the problems with libertarianism or my position are, White used the term to denote conditions on freedom he ascribes to God. White may be a pop apologist, but he has been arguing this stuff long enough to know better. What I layed out as libertarianism is hardly elaborate. It's a thumbnail sketch found across the literature for well over twenty or thirty years. This is not a finer point of action theory, its a term to dnote a major position, not some specialized take on it. If that basic definition plus the material on Frankfurt examples wasn't in White's mind, isn't that the point? Either White doesn't know what he is talking about as evidenced by his misuse of the term "libertarianism" or he does know what it meant and now bears some responsibility to support his claim that the bible teaches it. Are we really to believe he has been arguing with Arminians for all this time and really doesn't know what the term "libertarianism" means and how Arminians have been using it?

    So where does the bible teach "libertarianism" with respect to God? I'd love to see White support his own claims. So far he's been quiet as a church mouse on this.

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  4. "And it doesn’t really explain how a good agent can do evil."

    The gnomic will which is a product of being a *created hypostasis* and not 'fallen hypostasis*, involves deliberation, doubt, and uncertainty of the good. This hesitancy of the good is so because of having a beginning in which virtue hasn't been practiced by a created hypostasis. Evil can come about by the attempt to attain the goal for hypostases with a beginning. This 'mode of willing' which is fittingly called the gnomic will by the Fathers, which is OF the hypostasis and not a principle of nature, is eliminated in Christ's Hypostasis since He has no beginning, and the Saints in the Eschaton because of the fixity of virtue between their person and nature, AND (you'll like this) because of the psychology of the will is determined by the new set of circumstances: many good things of the divine will are the predeterminations and 'objects of will' for the person(i.e. the operations of God) with opposition between good and evil eliminated. All the choices are for good things.

    The other two (dialectical) routes are Origenism such that a fall is inevitable based on prior acts done before genesis OR Augustinism that multiplicity that exists in being a composite being results in an inevitable fall.

    I don't see the problem of saying that God decreed the fall or the Cross. I don't see God's decree and man's free will in dialectical opposition, such that if one is true the other is false. Both X and non-X can be true, just as Christ is both predestinating God, and verily predestinated man, both contained in His singular hypostasis.

    "He also said that while Adam’s nature was good, his nature wasn’t “fixed” in goodness."

    His PERSON wasn't fixed in goodness.

    Hope that helps.

    Photios

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  5. Perry,

    "I don't see God's decree and man's free will in dialectical opposition, such that if one is true the other is false."

    Particularly, do you mean that you don't see God's decree and man's libertarian free will in dialectical opposition?

    Because compatibilists usually say the same thing--where "free will" is defined in compatibilistic terms. But compatibilists will say that LFW does conflict with God's decree. I assume that's what you're disagreeing with.

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  6. Jugulum,

    I'm Photios not Perry.

    I'm transcending both those two crummy 'contemporary' categories, because I don't think either of those dialectical opposites have much to do with the God of the bible or Patristic Christianity.

    On that score, I prefer to stick to the categories of Person and Nature as understood from Christology and Triadology, and pursue those categories rigorously.

    I would suggest understanding clearly the dialetheism of the proposition that I stated about the Incarnation, and then work out from there to understand my objection. For further reading consult my 'Synergy in Christ' paper on my blog.

    Photios

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  7. ENERGETICPROCESSION SAID:

    "I'm transcending both those two crummy 'contemporary' categories, because I don't think either of those dialectical opposites have much to do with the God of the bible or Patristic Christianity."

    Okay, but your Jedi brother (aka Perry Robinson) uses both crummy categories and identifies his own position with one crummyin particular (libertarianism). So has he succumbed to the dark side of Augustinian/Origenistic dialectical opposites?

    Can we use the womanly charms of Padmé Amidala to win him back to the side of goodness and light?

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  8. I dialogued with Perry a while back on Romans 5 on the topic of 'all' being raised in Christ.

    Basically, his argument was that since the Son added a human nature to Himself, then all were affected by his Resurrection. Thus, all men (read: every last human being) are in some sense divinized (though not all to eternal life). His exegesis is typical of Eastern Orthodox exegesis down through the centuries in that He reads Scripture through a Platonic framework (though not a full Platonic worldview).

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  9. "His exegesis is typical of Eastern Orthodox exegesis down through the centuries in that He reads Scripture through a Platonic framework."

    Well that's real cute.

    What exactly is Platonic about being consubstantial with Christ? Is the Reformed adherence to Chalcedon Platonic? Was the anti-Platonist Athanasius, the great defender of Christ Platonic, that all men are saved from going back into nothing by dint of Christ recapitulating humanity?

    Where exactly does Platonism make careful distinctions between Person and Nature that the Orthodox Fathers make?

    Have you read 'God, History, and Dialectic'? I'd encourage you to do so.

    It has to do with the doctrine of Recapitulation then it has anything to do with Hellenization.

    Photios

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  10. Well since I never said that it was Platonic but that it has a Platonic *framework*, your argument against me is a straw-man.

    Several historical scholars (J.N.D. Kelly, Alister McGrath, etc.) have recognized the influence of Hellenistic thought in the Church fathers. While Athanasius may have been against the specifics of Platonism, he kept the framework of forms.

    This is especially true with regard to icons. If we use the Ancient Near-Eastern background for interpreting Scripture (you know, the place where it was ACTUALLY WRITTEN), then there is absolutely NO REASON why Christ's Incarnation should now allow the veneration of icons. Of course, if you read the Bible through a Platonic framework (a framework COMPLETELY FOREIGN to the Bible's background) where Christ's entering creation somehow divinizes it, then it would make sense. But of course, that's complete nonsense.

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  11. Jugulum,

    I agree that it is impossible for God to lie, but that doesn’t imply any incompatibility with libertarian freedom. It only does so if you think there is only one good option available to God and one bad one to choose between. And that requires the belief that goodness is simple. I reject that assumption and hence I reject the idea that libertarianism entails choosing between a plurality of objects that are opposing moral value. It doesn’t. Logically the AP condition only entails that the agent be able to choose between a plurality of options.

    Second, Compatibilism is a thesis about what is possible with respect to determinism and freedom both being true. It merely says it is possible for them both to be true. If they are in fact true, that is Soft Determinism, which is what you are advocating. If you think that Soft Determinism explains God’s impeccability and choices so that God cannot lie because of his nature, is God creator by nature too?

    And the explanation I will give and haven given for why it is impossible for God to lie will not be transferrable to why humans supposedly cannot choose Christ because it turns on God not having a beginning which is not applicable to an other agent.

    As for divine providence I don’t take it to be incompatible with LFW.

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  12. SandS,

    I am not clear on what you take to be specifically Platonic in Orthodox theology. I don’t read Scripture through a Platonic lens. And while some of the fathers were influenced by Platonism to some degree or another, this is true with the Reformers, the Puritans and plenty of theologians in the Reformed tradition. Shall we discuss Calvin’s remarks on the body as the prison of the soul? Or perhaps the predestinarianism and the arguments to show that determinism and moral responsbility are compatible from Plotinus that show up again and again almost verbatium in Reformed sources. And then there’s the docteine of divine simplicity and the mutual identification of all the attributes in God along with the belief that the One and the Logos together produce the Spirit, which is just the same thing as the Filioque. Funny how all of those Platonic positions and arguments end up in Reformed theology with little or no scriptural warrant. So please spare me the influenced by pagan philosophy line.

    As for Athanasius, his understanding of logoi isn’t completely isomorphic with Platonism. Read a specialist like Anatolios on Athanasius. And Reformed theologians have pretty much imbibed a Platonic view of Forms in their adherence to the doctrine of the divine ideas in God taken from middle Platonism through Marius Victorinus and Augustine.

    You speak of the ANE context as if it excluded Hellenism, which is just to posit the same old sharp line of the “Hebraic mind” and the “Greek Mind” that was disposed of long ago. What is Sirach or Maccabees? It matters not that you don’t think they are inspired, they are still products of Judaism nontheless.

    Secondly, there isn’t simply one ANE context to employ in any case. And even if we were to do so, you are positing a frame of reference outside of Scripture to nail down Scriptures meaning, which is an implicit denial of the formal sufficiency of Scripture in case you didn’t take note.

    The Church of councils which produced Chalcedonian Christology which you profess to adhere to was part of the context of Late Antiquity and not ANE. Frankly I have yet to see you accurately put forward either the theology of the incarnation or the theology of icons. And you seem to have confused fist pounding and asserting your position with an argument to demonstrate that there is no reason from Christ’s incarnation that would license the making of images.

    In point of fact, as I pointed out before, it was the Iconoclasts who rejected images on the basis of Platonism since matter could not be redeemed. This is why they spoke of the resurrection of the body, but never the flesh since matter could never bear the divine presence since it was “worthless” and “opposed” to God.

    If you think that Christ’s incarnation has no divinizing effects, then was the light the apostles saw on Mt Tabor that shone from Christ’s flesh the uncreated glory of God or a created earthly light? And is the immortality of Christ’s flesh a divine or human property, given that God alone is immortal?

    I don’t mean to be rude, but I don’t perceive evidence that you have even read seriously about the issue which you so easily dismiss.

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  13. Acolyte,

    I was focused in on one aspect of limitations on the will--a subset of compatibilism, basically. And I forgot the broader definition. Thanks. :)

    Specifically, choosing only in accordance with your nature. That's the kind of limitation that Calvinists have in mind when we say that fallen mankind cannot choose God. We are bent toward rebellion, and won't ever choose him, without the work of the Spirit. That's one aspect of compatibilism--that we are genuinely choosing, but bound by our nature.

    And I was comparing that to the way that God cannot lie. If the explanation for "God cannot lie" has to do with it being against his nature, then the comparison could work.

    And by your (correct, I think) analysis, "God cannot lie" does not preclude LFW in general, because God can still decide between multiple good options. (And similarly, "fallen mankind cannot choose God" doesn't preclude LFW in general, because we choose between multiple rebellious options.) But this does still deny that God has LFW in the decision to lie.


    You're right to point out that compatibilism also has to do with compatibility between our choices and God's predetermining decree. And by that definition, Dr. White's statement makes sense. God has LFW about what to predetermine, and man does not have LFW to do other than what God predetermine. (And however God enforces his decree, our choices are still meaningful & morally culpable, ala Acts 4:27-28.)

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  14. "While Athanasius may have been against the specifics of Platonism, he kept the framework of forms."

    God's operations are not Platonic universals. God's operations are not static forms.

    Again, I think you're just trying to be cute.

    On another chuckle, why would you think I'd be moved by what Kelley and McGrath think? I think they have some interesting things to say (and McGrath isn't even a specialist in patristics), but I find their analysis superficial on some of the key understanding of how the crisis came about.

    Photios

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  15. Jugulum,

    I am sufficiently aware of the Reformed view. I was Reformed for a number of years. I have read Boettner, Sproul and the rest of the popular crowd along with more serious authors like Hodge, Warfield, Kuyper, Turretin, etc. I don’t need someone to explain the position to me. Moreover, I make a habit of reading positions that I disagree with.

    Second, being bound by nature isn’t a form of compatibilism. Compatibilism is a thesis about the logical compatability of freedom and determinism. If we have a range of options as sinful agents that we are limited to, that isn’t the idea that we are determined since the latter concept picks out the idea of antecedent states singling out only one option, not leaving a range of them open to them. To get to soft determinism you’d need to add some other thesis than that we are limited by our nature to a range of options. Being bound by our nature to a range of options isn’t a sufficient condition for determinism and so your position as articulated so far isn’t compatabilism.

    By the same token to say that God is bound by his nature wouldn’t imply compatabilism either if God has a range of options. You’d have to add some other thesis to limit the options that God has to one and include the idea that it wasn’t possible for God to refrain from doing so to get theological compatabilism. So no, the comparison couldn’t work since its not compatabilsim/soft determinism.

    As for LFW and divine impeccability, I don’t think you have grasped the point. You think that in the case of lying that the choice is to lie which is bad and do some good and here since God’s options are limited to one good then there are not alternative possibilities. I disagree. As I noted previously, this is only true if the good is simple and I reject that. So the scenario is in fact where there is an evil option and an infinite umber of goods for God to choose between and that is quite compatible with LFW. You are assuming that goodness is one simple thing that permits of no plurality.

    As for White’s statement, he is at odds with a mess of other Reformed writers. Furthermore, he now can’t argue that the concept of LFW is incoherent. Not only that, White claimed that the Bible taught it. What passages do you think White will put forward to prove that God has LFW? So far, I haven't seen one.

    I believe Acts 4, I just don’t agree that it teaches theological determinism. One can say that theological determinism and freedom and moral responsibility are compatible all day long, but that doesn’t amount to a reason to think so. You’d need to provide a demonstration how manipulated agents are free and responsible. I don’t think you can.

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  16. Acolyte,

    I'm not going to make an argument in this thread. I am only going to clarify my previous comment, because you seem to be partially misunderstanding me.

    "I don’t need someone to explain the position to me."

    I wasn't trying to educate you; I wasn't assuming that you were ignorant of what I was saying. I was explaining what I had had in mind. Bringing something to the forefront.

    "As for LFW and divine impeccability, I don’t think you have grasped the point. You think that in the case of lying that the choice is to lie which is bad and do some good and here since God’s options are limited to one good then there are not alternative possibilities. I disagree."

    No, that is not what I said. I said this:

    "And by your (correct, I think) analysis, "God cannot lie" does not preclude LFW in general, because God can still decide between multiple good options. (And similarly, "fallen mankind cannot choose God" doesn't preclude LFW in general, because we choose between multiple rebellious options.) But this does still deny that God has LFW in the decision to lie."

    As far as I can tell, I agreed with you, at least in that I was explicitly recognizing your point about the good not being a single, simple option. I was recognizing that God has LFW to decide between all of the good "non-lie" options.

    But I may need to clarify the last sentence, "But this does still deny that God has LFW in the decision to lie." Maybe that's where you thought I was missing your point.

    I meant that God does not have LFW to choose the "lie" option. I did not mean that he has no LFW to decide between the others. (Again, I had just finished recognizing that he does.) In other words, God has a LFW decision, but it's not a LFW about whether to lie--it's a LFW decision about what to do.

    Now, with that clarification, do you want to change anything about your last comment to me? Or do you still think

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  17. Whoops, sorry about that. To finish my sentence:

    Or do you still think I just failed to grasp your point?

    (And keep in mind. I'm not responding to what you said about the definition of compatibilism, or White, or Acts 4. You don't need to say, "I stand by my arguments on those.")

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