Mathematical possibilities and live possibilities

Continuing with Dan:

http://www.arminianchronicles.com/2009/06/impersonal-vs-personal-possibilities.html

“The first statement (that I am faulting determinism because it isn’t libertarianism) is somewhat true, but it would be better to say I fault determinism because I suspect it is libertarianism. I suspect determinists are inconsistent and retain libertarian notions. They say 'choose' meaning what everyone else does (selection between possible alternatives).”

Notice how many times I’ve corrected Dan on this equivocation: “selection between possible alternatives.”

That could either denote a psychological process of deliberating between hypothetical alternatives, and deciding on one–or else involve that metaphysical claim of an open future in which we have the power to choose which alternate timeline to instantiate.

The question at issue is not which position Dan believes is true. The question is Dan’s refusal to clarify his usage, Dan’s refuse to acknowledge basic conceptual distinctions.

When I repeatedly correct him and he repeatedly repeats the same mistake the next time around, and the next, and the next, there are only two explanations:

i) He’s dishonest.

ii) He lacks the intellectual aptitude to absorb basic conceptual distinctions even after someone spells them out.

Whichever explanation is the case, it’s not a good use of my time to keep debating somebody who never advances the argument, who never takes into account what his opponent says.

“It seems Calvinsits use the normal ‘dictionary’ definition of choose but don’t follow this definition through to its logical conclusions.”

Since I’ve had to devote an unnecessary amount of time to this issue, this is another false attribution on Dan’s part.

“The second statement (that I can’t bring myself to evaluate Calvinism on its own terms) is also somewhat true. The Calvinist concept of choice does not make sense to me – I await a clear and precise explanation as to what it is. So I keep looking for Calvinism to make sense; to explain what choose means. But I fail to see how Steve's card player example explains things. Meanwhile (absent a way of understanding the Calvinist concept of ‘choose’), I am beginning to suspect Calvinists are simply inconsistent - confusing themselves and others.”

People can fail to see things because they lack the intellectual aptitude, or else because they lack the motivation.

“If the card player example wasn’t intended to support Steve's claim regarding the ability to choose otherwise, what’s its purpose?”

Once again, what’s there left to say in the face of an opponent who is that clueless? It’s not as if I haven’t explicated the purpose of my illustration in some detail.

Did I cite the example of the gambler to illustrate the ability to choose otherwise? No.

As I explicitly said, I cited the gambler to illustrate the fact that human agents can deliberate over hypothetical possibilities, and decide on one–even though only one of these hypothetical possibilities is a live possibility–and the gambler knows this at the time he’s deliberating and deciding what to do next.

In a deck of cards, many different combinations are mathematically possible. Yet there is only one actual sequence per shuffle. It’s not metaphysically possible for the next card to either be an ace of spades or a king of hearts.

But for all the gambler knows, it could be one or the other. Even though the order of the cards is predetermined by the shuffle, the gambler still deliberates over the mathematical possibilities, and decides on one. And he does so knowing that only one mathematical possibility is a live possibility.

How many times do you need to explain the argument to Dan before he gets it? Dan’s problem seems to be that he’s incapable of even grasping any position that doesn’t agree with his own.

The question at issue is not whether Dan agrees with my argument. Rather, the preliminary question is whether Dan is even capable of grasping it.

“The explanatory power of Steve’s card player example seems dependent on a dissanalogous aspect of the example. The ‘possibility’ Steve talks about is downstream and doesn’t make direct contact with the choice, yet Steve uses the example to explain choice. Steve isn’t talking about the player drawing or not drawing, but rather the outcome of the draw. As Steve notes, the player's choice doesn’t alter the order of the deck, so while he chooses to draw or not, he doesn't choose the outcome.”

And why did I use that example? As usual, Dan can’t follow his own argument. I was responding to Dan’s intuitive appeal. He said: “I reject the switcheroo as common sense, since it seems to be motivated by deterministic assumptions and it rules out some intuitive underpinnings of LFW. It may well be true that we don’t have imperial proof of libertarian freewill, but that doesn’t mean LFW isn’t intuitive. Normally we think we can choose the options we contemplate. Perhaps we are deceived and it’s an illusion, but believing so seems counter-intuitive.”

I then cited an obvious counterexample:

And, at the risk of stating the obvious, I can imagine many “possibilities” which are impossible for me to realize.

For that matter, we often make choices on the basis of what we thought were possible outcomes which, in hindsight, turn out to be beyond our reach.

I may decide to become a med student. At the time I think I can afford med school. But due to an economic crisis after I enroll, I’m forced to drop out of med school before I graduate.

I though that alternative was a live possibility. I was wrong.

Surely the “common man” has extensive experience in overestimating his abilities. How many middle-aged men come to the uncomfortable realization that they will have to lower their expectations. That they will be unable to achieve all the goals they set for themselves when they graduated from high school?

And yet, at the time they were setting these goals, they honestly thought these were realistic objectives. That’s one of the humbling aspects of real life. The rude recognition that you’ll be unable to make good on all your ambitious plans.

If intuition is Dan’s criterion, then LFW is false since LFW is counterintuitive. Just ask the guy who’s having his midlife crisis.

How did Dan respond? He said: “I believe ‘failed attempts’ wouldn't qualify as choices under the dictionary method, since the belief that X was possible was false. Semantically, I can see a case for that. It's a bit awkward to say I choose something, when I wasn't able to execute the choice. If a linebacker stops him, we might say ‘Romo wanted to cross the goal line’, but we wouldn't normally say ‘Romo chose to cross the goal’”

So, as Dan defines it, a real choice includes the power to realize the outcome of choice: otherwise, it doesn’t qualify as a real choice. He offered an outcome-based definition of libertarian freedom.

I then bring in the illustration of the card player. The card player is deliberating over what to do next. He has no control over what the next card will be. No control over that future outcome.

The identity of the next card is determinate. Predetermined by the shuffle.

But he doesn’t know the outcome before it unfolds. He only knows the odds. He therefore deliberates over the mathematical possibilities–even though he knows that only one mathematical possibility is a live possibility.

“The point is that the ‘possibility’ in the card player example is impersonal, and nor something the card player can effect. That's why this type of possibility isn't suitable for explaining choice.”

That’s a completely arbitrary restriction on Dan’s part:

i) Human beings typically make choices in light of their concrete circumstances. And their circumstances are often impersonal.

ii) If Dan doesn’t think the freedom to do otherwise or choose otherwise includes the power to effect the outcome, to get what we chose, then what does libertarian freedom amount to?

Consider the choice of a career. I choose to either be a doctor or baseball player. At the time I think I can do either one.

Suppose I choose to become a doctor. Unbeknownst to me, I’ll be unable to complete med school because my finances are going to fall through.

Suppose I choose to become a baseball player. Unbeknownst to me, I’ll suffer an injury which prevents me from realizing my dream.

Did I have the ability to make good on either choice? No.

On the one hand, does this mean my choices don’t qualify as real choices?

On the other hand, what’s the value of the ability to do otherwise or choose otherwise if I have no control over the outcome?

“The card player has some notion of what choice means.”

Which misses the point. Does Dan go out of the way to miss the point?

The gambler goes into the game knowing in advance that his choices have no effect on the order of the cards. And yet his choices are made with a view to the order of the cards. He doesn’t know the order. And he can’t control the order.

But he knows the odds. He considers the mathematical possibilities–even though only one mathematical possibility is truly open at the time of play.

“While two actuals are impossible, alternative possibilities are not. Steve seems to be speaking about two actuals, but my statement was about alternative possibilities.”

Which card is the next card? Are there alternate possibilities? In this case, only one logical alternative was ever in play (at that particular time).

“It’s difficult to see how Steve’s comment is responsive or undermines my argument that one cannot positively assert twofold possibilities (even in the epistemic sense of possibility) without undermining determinism.”

Talking to Dan is like talking to a brick wall. Did I say a determinist is asserting twofold possibilities? No.

What I said, rather, is this: there may be several abstract possibilities, but only one live possibility. Since a determinist can’t anticipate which abstract possibility is a live possibility in advance of his deliberations or decisions, that metaphysical restriction doesn’t prevent him from making choices.

A gambler plays his cards as if the future were open even though he knows the future is closed–insofar as the order of the cards is predetermined by the shuffle.

Playing the cards as if the future were open is entirely consistent with the determinate order of the deck since several different sequences are mathematically possible, and the gambler doesn’t know which mathematical possibility is the live possibility. But he knows the odds. So he takes a calculated risk. (I believe the technical term for this deliberation is “carding”.)

“The only way I could see Steve’s comment as being at all relevant would be if he is stressing the negative aspect – not knowing which is impossible (as opposed to thinking that given what I know this is logically possible).”

Which is exactly what I said.

“The problem is that Steve himself has used ‘possibilities’ in positive assertions, not just negative assertions. Using possibilities in positive assertions undermines determinism; as we have seen. The card player can't form a positive assertion like: ‘given what I know these two things are possible’ or ‘my information about these two things logically reconcile without contradiction’. As soon as he does, he undermines libertarianism.”

What the card player can do is to figure the odds. That figures in his process of decision-making, even though the outcome (i.e. the next card) is determinate.

“What does that have to do with the card player’s abilities? This really highlights the problem noted above. The ‘possibility’ in the card player example is impersonal, and nor something the card player can effect. Choice is a power of the agent, we choose what is within one's power.”

As usual, Dan can’t keep track of his own argument–much less the argument of his opponent. It goes to his definition of choice. What “counts” as a real choice.

And that, in turn, goes to question of whether a determinist can make choices. When a gambler plays cards, is the sequence of the deck open-ended? Could the next card either be an ace of spades or a king of hearts?

In terms of mathematical possibilities–yes. In terms of metaphysical possibilities–no. Even though the outcome is a done deal, this doesn’t prevent the gambler from making choices with a view to the outcome.

“We can’t transplant the epistemic sense of ‘possible’ in the card player example into the definition of choice. Steve can’t shift from third person to first. You can’t move from ‘chocolate is possible’ to ‘I can choose chocolate’. While you can move from 1st to 3rd, you can’t move from 3rd to 1st person. In other words; “I can choose chocolate’ entails that in light of my abilities ‘chocolate is possible’. But ‘chocolate is possible’ in an epistemic sense does not entail ‘I can choose chocolate’ and has nothing to do with the agent’s abilities.”

i) Choice takes an object. It often takes an impersonal object.

If Dan is going to restrict choice to the psychology of the agent, then that’s entirely consistent with determinism.

ii) But libertarian freedom is normally defined by Arminians as an ability effect one timeline or another. You choose between alternate future timelines. Whichever alternate timeline you choose will become the actual timeline for you.

“Again, I am not sure if Steve is attempting to describe Molinism or present a reductio ad absurdum argument. If he’s describing it, the description is inaccurate.”

I see that Dan is powerless to actually deal with the logic of what I said.

“While it’s true God is choosing the whole world, that world includes us choosing some small part of it”

Dan is equivocating. In Molinism, God knows what we would do in any situation. That’s not the same thing as what we will do. What we would do is not synonymous with what we will do. The possibility does not entail its actuality.

What we will do has reference to the actual world. And that is up to God. In Molinism, the agent doesn’t choose what he will do–only what he would do.

God chooses what the agent will do by choosing which possible world to make the actual world. So in the actual world, the future is not open-ended.

“On the other hand, if Steve was providing a reducto ad absurdum argument against Molinism, it’s hard to tell just what it might be. When Steve says ‘the actual world actualizes either A or B’ he substitutes ‘the actual world’ for people’s choices. It's like he's personifying the actual world. What are we to make of such an argument? The world doesn’t possess us, nor force our wills.”

Is Dan trying to be obtuse? It’s not as if I didn’t specify exactly what I meant. The actual world is God’s choice of which possible world to actualize.

“Freedom to do otherwise in the very same situation isn’t a conventional definition of LFW, the normal definition is the ability to choose otherwise.”

It isn’t possible to have a rational conversation with Dan when he doesn’t even know the standard terminology of libertarianism. When he hasn’t even mastered his own side of the argument. To take one example:

“Two features of free will were mentioned earlier that seem to imply its incompatibility with determinism–(a) it is ‘up to us’ what we choose from an array of alternative possibilities and (b) the origin or source of our choices and actions is in us and not in anyone or anything else over which we have no control. Most modern arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism have proceeded from feature (a)–the requirement that an agent acted freely, or of his or her own free will, only if the agent had alternative possibilities, or could have done otherwise. Let us refer to this requirement as the AP condition (for ‘alternative possibilities) or simply AP. (It is also sometimes called the ‘could have done otherwise’ condition or the ‘avoidability’ condition),” The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 10.

“The case for incompatibility from this AP (or could have done otherwise’) condition has two premises:

1. The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent’s power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely, or acting ‘of one’s own free will.’

2. Determinism is not compatible with alternate possibilities (it precludes the power to do otherwise),” ibid. 10-11.

Continuing with Dan:

“I agree with Steve’s premise (two possible worlds), but the conclusion does not follow. God enables us to choose, so while we ultimately depend on His power, He can’t force us to choose something.”

This is just a straw man argument. Did I say or imply that, according to Molinism, God is “forcing” us to choose something? No.

What I said, rather, is that, according to Molinism, a human agent lacks the freedom to do otherwise in the actual world.

“God knows the future, not by it being predetermined, but rather directly. We should not denigrate God's epistemology to our level.”

This is a rhetorical evasion rather than a rational counterargument. And I’m merely considering the implications of Dan’s own epistemology.

“A possible person is more than God’s conception in the same way an actual person is more than God’s actual power. So unless we embrace pantheism, we are in some way distinct from God.”

Once again, this is simply obtuse. It fails to distinguish between a possible person and an actual person–even though I’ve repeatedly drawn that very distinction.

A merely possible person is not distinct from God. A merely possible person is a divine idea.

An actual person is distinct from God. Why is Dan unable to comprehend the most elementary and obvious distinctions?

“Whether choice relates to multiple mental resolutions or multiple outcomes or both; in any case determinism is undermined.”

Notice the fatal equivocation. How does he define choice? In terms of mental resolutions or multiple outcomes?