Theological libertarians (e.g. Molinists, Arminians, open theists) accuse Calvinism of making God the cause of sin. I’ve often responded to this charge, so I’ll ignore this for now. Instead, I want to address the question of whether freewill theism makes God the cause of sin.
To answer this question, we need to begin with a theory of causation. Let’s try a counterfactual theory of causation.
A libertarian theist should hardly object to a counterfactual theory of causation. After all, the freedom to do otherwise (or choosing between alternative possibilities) is, itself, a counterfactual concept.
Here’s a simply statement of counterfactual causation:
“If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred.”
And here’s a more nuanced statement of the same:
“Where c and e are two distinct actual events, e causally depends on c if and only if, if c were not to occur e would not occur.”
On this definition, God causes sin and evil–regardless of whether you espouse Molinism, Arminianism, or open theism.
If the divine creation of man had not occurred, then the moral evils of human history would not have occurred.
The antecedent is true for Molinism, Arminianism, and open theism alike. Therefore, the consequent holds good for all three libertarian alternatives.
"If the divine creation of man had not occurred, then the moral evils of human history would not have occurred.
ReplyDeleteThe antecedent is true for Molinism, Arminianism, and open theism alike. Therefore, the consequent holds good for all three libertarian alternatives."
Looks like a reasonable syllogism to me. I wonder how the honest Molinist or Arminian would respond to it. Would abandoning molinism or arminianism be a consideration for them?
TUAD,
ReplyDeleteOf course, they don't think that that kind of causing is problematic (they'll provide links to molinists explicating concurance, which doesn't remove God from being a cause, though it takes a lot of words to say that). It's just a case of people thinking that if they're not as bad as the next guy, then they don't have anything to worry about. It's all rather arbitrary, actually.
I ask this sincerely:
ReplyDeleteWhy is it a problem for God to be the cause of sin? I'd be interested in links to any previous posts or an argument.
Thanks,
Andrew
It depends on how we define our terms. I'm responding to stock objection to Calvinism by Arminians. It's really up to the Arminian to define his terms and explain how that's objectionable.
ReplyDeleteHi Steve,
ReplyDeleteI would be interested in a link to where you discussed "authorship of sin" in the past - especially if you also discussed the responsibility/blameworthy distinction.
God be with you,
Dan
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ReplyDeleteSteve--
ReplyDeleteYou wrote:
"Where c and e are two distinct actual events, e causally depends on c if and only if, if c were not to occur e would not occur."
This seems like a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions, and not a definition, of something's being a cause. But regardless...
According to the definition of cause that you've employed here, how is my knowing that the sun will rise tomorrow not the cause of the sun rising tomorrow? If there were no event of my knowing that the sun will rise (c) there would be no event of the sun rising (e).
This would also seem to make my parents the cause of all of my sins. In fact, a lot of strange consequences follow.
It seems like the definition given above is really an analysis of necessary conditions for the occurrence of an event. But that doesn't seem the same as causation. I don't think any non-Calvinist would dispute that God's act of creating us is a necessary condition for us to sin. But that's far from the same as God being the cause of sin.