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Scripturalism I: Knowing the Axioms and Giving an Account
According to Scripturalism, we must distinguish between statements that are axioms and statements that are (valid) deductions from axioms. For the Scripturalist, the axioms are the statements of Scripture, or to be more precise, the axioms are those statements of Scripture that cannot be deduced from any of the other statements of Scripture. Furthermore, according to the Scripturalist, knowledge is limited to the explicit statements of Scripture and what may be validly deduced from these statements. Scripturalists also maintain that "knowledge is a true opinion with an account of its truth" (John Robbins, "An Introduction to Gordon Clark", Trinity Review, July, August, 1993, p. 5).
Apart from the fact that I've yet to see any Scripturalist validly deduce the above claims from Scripture, there's another serious problem with the Scripturalist position. The idea that knowledge requires "giving an account" or "citing reasons" does not cohere with this axiomatic-deductive model to which Scripturalists adhere. The conclusion of a deductive argument can only be known if the premises are known. Similarly, theorems can only be items of knowledge if the axioms from which they are deduced are items of knowledge. But it's at best unclear whether the axioms of Scripture are the sort of statements for which "an account" can be given. But even if this is possible (in principle it's possible to offer reasons for any statement) belief in the axioms must constitute knowledge independent of the activity of citing reasons.
The whole point of an axiomatic-deductive system is to terminate the giving of reasons with statements that are basic or foundational, which do not stand in need of any proof or demonstration. But then such statements must constitute knowledge independent of our ability to cite reasons for them or give an account of their truth. Scripturalism needs the category of immediate knowledge, but there can be no immediate knowledge if knowledge requires the activity of giving an account, citing reasons, demonstrating, proving, etc. And without immediate knowledge, we end up with some form of coherentist justification or an infinite regress of justification. It's hard to see how any belief can be justified if we're committed to either of these options. And the Scripturalist needs to show why his position isn't committed to either of these options.
My suspicion is that some Scripturalists have fallen victim to a basic conceptual confusion. For example, on the one hand they say that "knowledge needs to be accounted for." On the other hand, they say that "knowledge requires giving an account." This at least gives the impression that they are confusing what is required for knowledge claims to be justified and what is necessary for a true belief to constitute knowledge. Perhaps they don't see the distinction here at all. It's a fairly common epistemic level confusion to suppose that in order for one's belief to count as knowledge a person must know something about the epistemic status of one's belief. Perhaps Scripturalists can bring greater clarity to their position by specifying what exactly we are supposed to be giving an account of? The truth of the belief that p? S's belief that p constitutes knowledge? And what precisely does it mean to give "an account"?
Historically, the Platonist conception of knowledge as justified true belief refers to providing an account of the truth of some belief that p. "The account" does not consist of an epistemological theory but simply citing reasons or having grounds for the truth of a specific belief, or more precisely, reasons or grounds that rule out a belief's being true by epistemic serendipity. Hence, S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified in a way that rules out accidentally true belief. Of course, in speaking of knowledge as "true belief with an account" (Meno 97e-98a) Socrates was doing epistemology, but it's a conceptual confusion to conflate this higher-order activity and the conditions of knowledge.
I discuss such confusions in connection with Reformed epistemology in "Alstonian Foundationlism and Higher-Level Theistic Evidentialism" (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (February 1995)).
Scripturalism II: On Being Doxastically Challenged
(1) All men are sinners.
(2) Michael Sudduth is a man.
Therefore
(3) Michael Sudduth is a sinner.
Regarding this syllogism, Scripturalist Sean Gerety recently wrote:
"Yes. And I believe the minor premise is true, but since I have no idea how to account for the truth of the statement, Sudduth is a man, I have no reason to raise my belief to the level of knowledge. To do that I would have to redefine what I mean by knowledge. It would be more like an opinion. In that case I would probably be a so-called “Reformed Epistemologist.”Gerety says that he believes that "Michael Sudduth is a man", though he is unable to give an account of the truth of the belief. Now it isn't clear what precisely "giving an account" of the truth of the belief amounts to for Gerety, but it's clear that Gerety's belief that "Michael Sudduth is a man" is unjustified by his own epistemic standards. Moreover, this is not an anomaly in Gerety's doxastic life. I suspect that Gerety holds a lot of beliefs that do not rise to the level of knowledge because he can't account for the truth of those beliefs. For example, presumably Gerety believes that he's more than two feet tall, weighs less than four hundred pounds, has two arms, and is neither a Visa card nor the Great Pumpkin that comes to visit every Halloween. Yet he continues to hold these unjustified beliefs while recognizing that they are unjustified. Seeing that Gerety can't provide an account of the truth of these beliefs, why does he continue to hold them? Perhaps he can't rid himself of these epistemically unjustified beliefs. He is doxastically challenged, but he's no less irrational for continuing to hold such beliefs given that he recognizes that they are unjustified.
One wonders what epistemic principles, if any, guide the Scripturalist in the adoption or retention of extra-biblical beliefs. The Scripturalist begins with the fairly conservative epistemic notion that we can know only those propositions for which there is a justification from Scripture, that is, that can be deduced from Scripture (or which are explicitly stated in Scripture). But the Scripturalist ends up in practice with what appears to be a fairly liberal view of what we are actually permitted to believe and utilize in syllogistic inferences. At any rate, the Scripturalist concedes that much of what he believes amounts only to an opinion, but there's only so much mileage to be had by saying, "Well, this is just my opinion. I admit it isn't knowledge, but it's my opinion." They must admit that such beliefs are not knowledge because they are unjustified. I fail to see how a person can be epistemically rational in holding beliefs he recognizes have no epistemic merit whatsoever. His recognition gives him a defeater for his belief. Consequently, Gerety is irrational to believe that he weighs less than four hundred pounds. He's irrational to believe that he has a right arm, that his head is not made out of blown glass, and that he does not regularly consult the Ouija board to divine the beliefs of authors he's never read.
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