Arminians like to trot out various prooftexts which, to their own way of thinking, imply or presume human choice–defined as the freedom to do otherwise.
They then castigate Calvinists for disregarding the “plain sense” of Scripture (or words to that effect). We do this because we allegedly begin with our a priori commitment to predestination, which we then impose on the Scriptural data.
The funny thing about this allegation is that Arminians are actually in a parallel situation. While they don’t believe in divine foreordination, they do believe in divine foreknowledge.
Now, even though foreknowledge doesn’t actually determine the future, foreknowledge does assume the future is determinate. If God knows the future, then the future cannot be otherwise.
Therefore, an Arminian really can’t take any of his own prooftexts at face value (i.e. what he takes to be the “plain sense”). Since God foreknows what the agent will do, the agent lacks “real” freedom (as the Arminian defines it). The agent’s freedom is “illusory” (as the Arminian defines it).
Some Arminians have shifted to Molinism. But that move simply relocates the problem. In the actual world, an agent doesn’t have the freedom to do otherwise. Rather, the actual world (or world-segment) represents only one human choice–the one that God instantiated, to the exclusion of other possible choices.
Only an open theist can consistently interpret Arminian prooftexts to establish libertarian freedom.
This is a silly argument.
ReplyDeleteLet's say for the sake of argument that God doesn't know the future, perhaps by choice, who knows. But let's say he has engineered a universe where it is possible to build a device to observe the future via a space/time warp.
So then apparently everyone has free will until such point in time as someone observes the future by creating the time warp, at which time libertarian free will disappears in a puff of logic because it is now "determinate".
That's the first problem, that it is fallacious that you could destroy freedom with a thought experiment.
Secondly, while God may have perfect knowledge of everything outside himself, including over time itself, I don't think we can know if he has perfect knowledge of himself and what he is going to do. God might have perfect knowledge of the future IF he HIMSELF does not interfere. But does God have perfect knowledge of what he is in fact going to do? Is God's interaction with the world ALL planned from the beginning, or does he prefer to keep the universe as a work in progress?
So to take it back to the analogy, the person looks into the time warp, and sees the future. The trouble is, having seen the future and how to build those flying cars, I MAY decide to build my own flying cars. And then that will end up changing the future. So the future didn't turn out to be determinate after all. And not because my time warp was flawed at seeing the future. But because I chose to do something different.
This is not the same as open theism where God hasn't got perfect knowledge over his creation. Rather it is just acknowledging that God has libertarian freedom. Because if you don't grant this, then God himself is constrained by his own knowledge of his future. Then God becomes a victim of losing his freedom through his own foreknowledge.
So in summary, the future may not be determinate, and I don't have to be an open theist to say so.
DAVID SAID:
ReplyDelete“That's the first problem, that it is fallacious that you could destroy freedom with a thought experiment.”
My argument wasn’t predicated on a thought-experiment. Rather, it was predicated on a theological premise supplied by classic Arminianism.
“Rather it is just acknowledging that God has libertarian freedom. Because if you don't grant this, then God himself is constrained by his own knowledge of his future. Then God becomes a victim of losing his freedom through his own foreknowledge.”
You mean freedom to be irrational, indecisive, and mistaken? What God do you believe in, exactly? Zeus? Thor?
“So in summary, the future may not be determinate, and I don't have to be an open theist to say so.”
If you want to treat paganism as a live theological option, then, yes, open theism is not the only alternative.
"Rather, it was predicated on a theological premise supplied by classic Arminianism."
ReplyDeleteYour unproven premise was that mere knowledge of the future robs the present of true freedom, assuming there is such a thing. That premise is shown to be absurd because mere knowledge cannot determine freedom, otherwise non-deities could kill freedom through mere knowledge.
"You mean freedom to be irrational, indecisive, and mistaken? What God do you believe in, exactly? Zeus? Thor?"
Are you on drugs? What is this about? Nobody mentioned Thor. Try and make a comment that isn't a complete non-sequitur.
"That premise is shown to be absurd because mere knowledge cannot determine freedom, otherwise non-deities could kill freedom through mere knowledge."
ReplyDeleteGod has infallible knowledge, not mere knowledge. That's a different animal.
"Because if you don't grant this, then God himself is constrained by his own knowledge of his future. Then God becomes a victim of losing his freedom through his own foreknowledge."
ReplyDeleteBut if God's knowledge is based on his will (like Calvinism, and even Molinism says), then he hasn't lost freedom by deciding what he will do in time before time.
DAVID SAID:
ReplyDelete“Your unproven premise was that mere knowledge of the future robs the present of true freedom, assuming there is such a thing. That premise is shown to be absurd because mere knowledge cannot determine freedom, otherwise non-deities could kill freedom through mere knowledge.”
I see you’re illiterate. Did I ever say that knowledge of the future determines the future? No. I explicitly denied that. I drew a distinction which you ignore: “Now, even though foreknowledge doesn’t actually determine the future, foreknowledge does assume the future is determinate. If God knows the future, then the future cannot be otherwise.”
Try to interact with what I actually said, rather than your illiterate misstatement of what I said.
“Are you on drugs? What is this about? Nobody mentioned Thor. Try and make a comment that isn't a complete non-sequitur.”
Try to put your Marihuana butt down for just a moment and clear your mind. Your conception of “God” is no better than Zeus or Thor. Zeus has libertarian freedom. He doesn’t know from one hour to the next what he’s going to do.
"Now, even though foreknowledge doesn’t actually determine the future, foreknowledge does assume the future is determinate."
ReplyDeleteHave you watched Back to the Future lately? It will show you that this may not be true.
"If God knows the future, then the future cannot be otherwise.”
But again, one of the flaws in this, is that you can't necessarily constrain God's knowledge of his own future will. God may have perfect knowledge of his creation, and a certain degree of knowledge about what he intends to do, but we don't know if he has perfect knowledge about what he intends to do. If he did, then God wouldn't have libertarian free will.
"Zeus has libertarian freedom. He doesn’t know from one hour to the next what he’s going to do."
You're going from one extreme to the other. I can have a pretty good idea what I might be doing in one hour, one day, or one year, but I have the ability to not finalize by decision about what to do in an hour until that hour actually arrives. You apparently want to deny God that level of freedom, and thus your God is less than Thor. Your God is a mechanistic robot constrained by his own nature and own foreknowledge.
David said...
ReplyDelete“Have you watched Back to the Future lately? It will show you that this may not be true.”
Pointing to a Hollywood movie is not an argument. You’re not even attempting to offer a philosophically serious reply to the issue at hand. Time-travel scenarios are notoriously incoherent (e.g. the grandfather paradox).
“But again, one of the flaws in this, is that you can't necessarily constrain God's knowledge of his own future will.”
Since I stated the proposition in conditional terms (if/then), the logic holds.
“God may have perfect knowledge of his creation, and a certain degree of knowledge about what he intends to do, but we don't know if he has perfect knowledge about what he intends to do.”
What’s your source of information for believing in a “God” in the first place?
“If he did, then God wouldn't have libertarian free will.”
So what? Should God also have the freedom to be evil?
It’s unintelligent to take versions of action theory which have been adapted to finite human beings, and then apply those without modification to God. God is sui generis.
“Your God is a mechanistic robot constrained by his own nature and own foreknowledge.”
And you’re resorting to stale rhetoric in lieu of a real argument.
Not knowing what you’re going to do next is not an epistemic excellence. Rather, that’s a limitation. Limited wisdom. A God who doesn’t know what’s best. Doesn’t know the best course of action. Doesn’t know the right thing to do.
Don’t try to turn that into some sort of virtue.
" Time-travel scenarios are notoriously incoherent (e.g. the grandfather paradox)."
ReplyDeleteRIght, because one is left wondering about what happened to that alternate reality. But here we are discussing only a potential reality that God foresees, so that isn't an issue.
"Since I stated the proposition in conditional terms (if/then), the logic holds."
That depends what you mean by determined. Assume I am a creature with libertarian freedom. Assume I have settled absolutely in my mind I will have pizza tomorrow. You can't rob me of my libertarian freedom with the thought experiment that my future is determined by my own decision. Otherwise God doesn't have libertarian freedom. If God doesn't have freedom, then your whole argument disappeared in a puff of logic.
"What’s your source of information for believing in a “God” in the first place?"
What's that got to do with it?
If you are going where I think you intend to go, I can believe God knows a lot about what he intends to do without having to assume he knows every last detail of what he intends to do.
"So what? Should God also have the freedom to be evil?"
It's not a necessary component of libertarian freedom that it entail freedom to engage in every conceivable set of behaviour.
"It’s unintelligent to take versions of action theory which have been adapted to finite human beings, and then apply those without modification to God. God is sui generis. "
But you are doing something very similar in making claims that humans have lost their freedom by virtue of what God knows. If God is a sui generis, you can't make logical deductions about such things.
"Not knowing what you’re going to do next is not an epistemic excellence. Rather, that’s a limitation."
It's not about "not knowing" what you are going to do next, it is about not being constrained by ones foreknowledge what one must do next. As a human being I have both options - the ability to know what I will do next, and the ability to postpone deciding what to do next. Why would you make God less than human?
In the Calvinist system, it is all about God's CHOICE. Choice involves being able to contemplate alternative options and selecting one. If you have perfect foreknowledge, you can't select and choose an option, you are constrained by the inevitable outcome of your foreknowledge. Or so goes your foreknowledge argument anyway.
And besides which, the scriptural record has God changing his mind:
Ex. 32:14 And the LORD changed his mind about the disaster that he planned to bring on his people.
Jer. 26:13 Now therefore amend your ways and your doings, and obey the voice of the LORD your God, and the LORD will change his mind about the disaster that he has pronounced against you.
And then we could talk about when Jesus changed his mind.
So now your sola scriptura is set up in opposition to your philosophising and notions of epistemic excellence. Who will win that fight?
DAVID SAID:
ReplyDelete“RIght, because one is left wondering about what happened to that alternate reality.”
No, ignorance of what happened in the alternate timeline is not what renders time-travel scenarios incoherent. Rather, retrocausation generates logical antinomies (e.g. the grandfather paradox).
You lack a rudimentary grasp of what your own illustrations entail.
“But here we are discussing only a potential reality that God foresees, so that isn't an issue.”
A potentiality must still be coherent to be potential. What is incoherent is incompossible.
“That depends what you mean by determined. Assume I am a creature with libertarian freedom. Assume I have settled absolutely in my mind I will have pizza tomorrow. You can't rob me of my libertarian freedom with the thought experiment that my future is determined by my own decision.”
You still don’t get it, do you? Probably because you haven’t bothered to do any serious reading on the subject.
This is not a thought-experiment. Rather, this is a point of logic. If the future can be known, then the future cannot be otherwise.
You can deny that the future is knowable, but if the future is known, then it cannot be otherwise.
You are confounding hypothetical futures with an actual future. Divine foreknowledge has reference to the actual future, not hypothetical futures.
“Otherwise God doesn't have libertarian freedom. If God doesn't have freedom, then your whole argument disappeared in a puff of logic.”
I’m not the one contending for divine libertarian freedom, you are.
If the future is a known quantity (e.g. divine foreknowledge), then the future cannot be open-ended.
You can reject the premise, but given the premise, the conclusion logically follows.
“What's that got to do with it?”
You keep talking about this imaginary “God” who doesn’t know what he’s going to do next. Is this just a thought-experiment?
“If you are going where I think you intend to go, I can believe God knows a lot about what he intends to do without having to assume he knows every last detail of what he intends to do.”
You can also believe in Zeus, Tinkerbell, the tooth fairy, and Godzilla.
“It's not a necessary component of libertarian freedom that it entail freedom to engage in every conceivable set of behaviour.”
So it’s okay for God to be a “robot” as long as he’s programmed to be a do-gooder robot.
“But you are doing something very similar in making claims that humans have lost their freedom by virtue of what God knows.”
They can’t lose something they never had.
“If God is a sui generis, you can't make logical deductions about such things.”
I’m not the one who’s defining God by generic categories like libertarian freewill. I don’t have to deduce his nature from generic categories.
“As a human being I have both options - the ability to know what I will do next, and the ability to postpone deciding what to do next.”
You assume, without benefit of argument, that human beings have libertarian freewill, and you then extrapolate that claim to God.
Not only is your argument invalid, since the conclusion isn’t entailed by the premise, but the premise is tendentious. The argument is both fallacious and unsound.
“Why would you make God less than human?”
Not less, but more–better. The only reason to postpone a decision is if you don’t know the best course of action to take next. That makes us inferior to God.
“In the Calvinist system, it is all about God's CHOICE. Choice involves being able to contemplate alternative options and selecting one. If you have perfect foreknowledge, you can't select and choose an option, you are constrained by the inevitable outcome of your foreknowledge. Or so goes your foreknowledge argument anyway.”
That’s a completely ignorant and illogical characterization of Calvinism. God’s foreknowledge is a knowledge of which alternate possibility he will instantiate.
“And besides which, the scriptural record has God changing his mind.”
I’ve discussed neotheist prooftexts and neotheist hermeneutics on many occasions. Try raising an objection I haven’t dealt with before.
“And then we could talk about when Jesus changed his mind.”
Yes, we could, but that would be irrelevant to the issue at hand. Since Jesus was human as well as divine, the fact that he could change his mind is irrelevant to the question of whether God qua God can change his mind.
“So now your sola scriptura is set up in opposition to your philosophising and notions of epistemic excellence. Who will win that fight?”
Now you’re being dishonest. It’s not as if you began this discussion by appealing to the Bible. Instead, you resorted to science fictional thought-experiments.
I didn't say what happened IN the alternate reality, I said what happened TO the alternate reality. As in, would that mean there are multiple realities, or would that mean the other reality vanishes.
ReplyDeleteThe problem with the grandfather paradox is what happened TO the reality where the person was born, but then mucked up that reality by killing his grandfather. Some have proposed this would result in multiple universes. Some suggest the other reality would vanish, and you would vanish with it. Others suggest the other reality would vanish, but you would live on as a child of the other reality in a foreign reality.
None of this has anything to do with the topic at hand. There is nothing incoherent about God foreseeing multiple potential realities. Since God doesn't exist in our reality, he cannot be subject to a grandfather paradox.
"This is not a thought-experiment. Rather, this is a point of logic. If the future can be known, then the future cannot be otherwise."
The point you are missing is that the future is subject to God's own actions in his own creation. Thus the future is only knowable to God to the extent that God has finalized what he is going to do. God has libertarian freedom, thus he doesn't have to make up his mind until he wants to make up his mind. Thus you can't be sure when God knows the future. He knows it when his own mind is made up. He may not know it when he is still pondering his choices.
If I as a creature with libertarian freedom decide to have pizza, then the future may be determined (although *I* determined it, so it hardly impact my freedom). However as a creature with libertarian freedom I don't HAVE to make up my mind what I'm going to eat tomorrow yet if I don't want to. Then I have the total freedom to know, or not to know what I am going to eat, as I so choose. I can partly know if I want to (I'm going to have pizza, but I haven't decided if I'm having pineapple on it yet).
Nobody should be absurd enough to accuse this libertarian creature of being limited, because he CHOOSES to delay decisions about what he will eat. If he couldn't choose or couldn't decide in advance, that would be a limitation, but to reserve the right to delay making a decision is well within the power of a powerful being.
So then, God knows the future in THIS reality, BUT that future is subject to his own will, which is NOT in this reality, and which may not be fully finalized. God knows the future to the extent it is finalized, and we don't know how finalized it is.
"So it’s okay for God to be a “robot” as long as he’s programmed to be a do-gooder robot. "
Why would we apply the term robot to someone with say, total liberty within 50% of possible behavior?
"You assume, without benefit of argument, that human beings have libertarian freewill, and you then extrapolate that claim to God. "
So is it your contention that God doesn't have libertarian freedom?
"The only reason to postpone a decision is if you don’t know the best course of action to take next. That makes us inferior to God."
Ah huh! You are applying your human experience to a sui generis! Shame on you.
People can delay decisions for all sorts of reasons. One reason is that people revel in the process of making decisions. Prior to making a decision is a different feeling to having made a decision. Not all decisions are a matter of better decisions. Some are equally good but different. Pineapple on your pizza isn't better than ham.
"That’s a completely ignorant and illogical characterization of Calvinism. God’s foreknowledge is a knowledge of which alternate possibility he will instantiate. "
Again, do you deny God's libertarian free will?
If that characterization is ignorant and illogical, then it is equally so for your characterization of human free will with your "is the future determined" thought experiment. God's foreknowledge is a knowledge of which alternate reality that MEN will instantiate. So destroy your own argument with your argument against me.
"Try raising an objection I haven’t dealt with before."
No, you try raising an objection I haven't dealt with. Bluster is a game we can both play.
"Since Jesus was human as well as divine, the fact that he could change his mind is irrelevant to the question..."
It's not completely irrelevant because Jesus was a divine person. If a person who is the divine being can change his mind (and even not know things, cf Matt. 24:36), then all this nonsense over whose God is epistemologically superior is a load of nonsense, because God doesn't have to fit in your box of epistemological superiority.
"It’s not as if you began this discussion by appealing to the Bible. Instead, you resorted to science fictional thought-experiments."
Hello, there's not a single scripture reference in this blog article. Responding to your philosophising in kind is appropriate, and when I brought some scripture into it, you just brushed it off.