If a “historian” or “scholar” chooses to apply methodological naturalism to the Bible, he will have to pay for that move in two respects:
1.Remember that methodological naturalism allows for the possibility of miracles. What it disallows is making allowance for miracles in the interpretation of a natural or historical event.
It cannot rule out the occurrence of the miraculous because it’s a purely methodological principle. To declare miracles impossible would amount to a metaphysical claim.
But this, in turn, generates the following dilemma. Since methodological naturalism must make room for the possibility of miracles while, at the same time, ruling out a miraculous interpretation of a natural or historical event, then methodological naturalism must take the position that a naturalistic explanation is always preferable even if a naturalistic explanation is false.
That is to say, by making allowance for the possibility of miracles, it must also allow for the possibility that a miraculous explanation might sometimes be the true explanation. And yet it cannot permit a miraculous explanation for any event. Hence, it cannot permit a miraculous explanation even if the miraculous explanation happens to be the best explanation of the event. Happens, indeed, to be the correct explanation.
Why would any responsible historian or scholar commit himself to a methodology that automatically precludes or excludes the true interpretation of a natural or historical event? What’s the value of a methodology that forbids you from ever considering an interpretation which may, in fact, be the correct interpretation?
Isn’t the value of a historical or scientific method to arrive at a true explanation?
2.But methodological naturalism generates yet another conundrum. If a “historian” or “scholar” adopts methodological naturalism, then he thereby forfeits the right to classify miracles as improbable. For probability is a metaphysical concept. It involves a claim about the nature of the world. Yet what supposedly distinguishes methodological naturalism from metaphysical naturalism is the ontological neutral of methodological naturalism.
In that event, methodological naturalism is debarred from treating supernatural events as any less probable than natural events. There can be no antecedent presumption one way or the other.
But in that case, a “historian” or “scholar” who applies methodological naturalism to the Bible can’t very well claim that any other explanation, however unlikely, is still more likely than a supernatural explanation. To do so would smuggle in metaphysical naturalism under the guise of methodological naturalism.
Yet if methodological naturalism can’t properly treat a supernaturalistic interpretation of events as any less likely than a naturalistic interpretation of events, then what conceivable warrant does it have to invariably favor a naturalistic interpretation to over a supernaturalistic interpretation? Logically speaking, it should be equally open to both possibilities.
It appears to me that this is where the conversation stops. Methodological Naturalism (MN) breaks down into Ontological Naturalism (ON). I am not so sure that the distinction is of any use for the Christian.
ReplyDeleteMaybe at the end of the day there is no "hard" and fast historical method. Maybe it is more like science where more subjective elements determine interpretation than we realize.
I think the best treatment of this was done by Craig. Ehrman claimed that historians cannot say anything about the existence of God. Craig pointed out that if according to him historians cannot say anything about whether God exists thenn historians could never make any claims about whether miracles are probable or not.
ReplyDeleteMethodological naturalism is a recent concept and an arbitrary one at that.
I know this isn't relevant to this article but could triablogue respond to this post or just post a link where you have already responded to posts like this (because I'm sure you have!) . Thank you for your time!
ReplyDeleteWhy Christian Morality Scares Me
http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=1201
Here's a question for anyone.
ReplyDeleteWebster.com wasn't much help, and so I ask...
By convention and popular usage which word, "probable" or "plausible" implies a stronger case for belief? If I listed the following words into a spectrum (from weakest to strongest), which list would be more accurate.
impossible, possible, probable, plausible
Or
impossible, possible, plausible, probable?
www.webster.com wasn't much help.
I ask because in my apologetical encounters I often paraphrase Bahnsen when he said something like "Possibility/impossibility, plausibility/implausibility, probability/improbability are both a function OF and ratted BY one's worldview."
Good points well put, Steve.
ReplyDeleteMethodological naturalism is just metaphysical naturalism trying to wriggle out from under the burden of proof.
I'm finding your claims rather confusing. You seem to deny that miracles happen frequently, but seem to also object to giving preference to a mundane explanation over a miraculous one, all other things being equal. I personally have no problem allowing for the possibility of miracles, but I have yet to see a case where it was obvious that the occurrance of a genuine miracle was beyond doubt the best, or perhaps even the only, explanation.
ReplyDeleteAnd so I look for mundane explanations, not least because, if we were to ever find the need to leave room for miracles, presumably it would be by trying and failing to explain certain events in other ways.
Perhaps the X-Files might provide an illustration. The appropriate procedure in criminal investigations if a guilty individual is not identified is to leave the case open. Lots of unexplained cases would leave room for a metaphysical claim about the possibility of miracles, extraterrestrials and much more, but would not simply arise out of the normal criminological methods used. Why should history be any different? And what would it mean to revise not just historical study in the way you propose but also criminology? Why shouldn't we be leaving room for miracles there too?
But of course, the issue of just what a miracle is comes up. If a man of God curses some kids and a bear mauls them, is that a miracle, even though bear maulings are not impossible to explain in natural terms? Aren't you asking history not simply to describe what happened, but to also answer questions about what history means and what God's will in it was? If so, I think you're blurring an appropriate distinction one can make between historical study and theology.
James,
ReplyDeleteI understand your point about method in crime scenes. Of course we do not want detectives attributing grusome murders to ghosts, or aliens unless they have some irrefutable evidence (not sure what that would be).
However, there is a certain disanalogy to your point. The Christian because of the testimony of the Holy Spirit knows God. He knows a few things about God in fact:
1) That God is good
2) That he is truth itself
and
3) That Scripture is God's word. This the inner attestation of the Holy Spirit.
The Christian also believes that God can reveal himself, and imbue events with meaning by telling us why he did activity x, or brought about event y. Now without a divine revelation of intent in a given situation we are free to use natural methods to get at what happened. However, in the case of Revelation we are not free to look for some explanation that would conflict with God's word. Of course this hinges on the classic argument for inerrancy, that God does not lie, and scripture is infallible.
Of course the Christian must show that scripture is not inconsistent, or at odds with the facts (where this is possible). This is no different from assuming naturalism as an approach to history. You simply have a different set of operating assumptions about the way the world is.
I expect that you will retort that you studied the bible and found contradictions etc., I would have to say you are wrong. Kind of like the example of Elijah calling down bears to kill the "little childer", in actual fact they were not children, but probably unruly teenagers bringing shame upon Elijah. To phrase it as if they were little children serves to heighten the emotions of the reader. So, I guess we are supposed to infer some moral defect in the God of the OT. I have seen other contradictions trotted out at your blog, and they impress me no more than Chris Tilling's "inerrancy".
James McGrath: "I personally have no problem allowing for the possibility of miracles, but I have yet to see a case where it was obvious that the occurrance of a genuine miracle was beyond doubt the best, or perhaps even the only, explanation."
ReplyDeleteI think the physical, factual, historical resurrection of Jesus Christ is a genuine miracle that is the best explanation. James, do you whole-heartedly and unequivocally affirm the physical, factual, historical resurrection of Jesus Christ?
JAMES F. MCGRATH SAID:
ReplyDelete“I'm finding your claims rather confusing. You seem to deny that miracles happen frequently, but seem to also object to giving preference to a mundane explanation over a miraculous one, all other things being equal.”
i) My post is not about the relative frequency of miracles. My post is about the logical implications and logical limitations of methodological naturalism.
ii) I’d also note that you’re moving the goalpost. Your original objection wasn’t based on the relative frequency of alleged miracles, but on what you claim to be the hiatus between the alleged occurrence of miracles in Bible times and their nonoccurrence modern times.
But these are two different issues. There could be miracles that are both modern and infrequent. So you need to clarify your thinking.
iii) For the record, I do believe there’s credible evidence for modern miracles.
“I personally have no problem allowing for the possibility of miracles, but I have yet to see a case where it was obvious that the occurrance of a genuine miracle was beyond doubt the best, or perhaps even the only, explanation.”
i) Of course, that’s just a vague assertion, so there’s nothing for me to respond to.
ii) You’re also playing games with the rules of evidence. A historian doesn’t demand the best explanation “beyond doubt.” Likewise, the fact that a given explanation may not be the only conceivable explanation doesn’t mean that any conceivable explanation is equally good.
“And so I look for mundane explanations, not least because, if we were to ever find the need to leave room for miracles, presumably it would be by trying and failing to explain certain events in other ways.”
i) You’re missing the point of methodological naturalism. A methodological naturalist is free to prefer a mundane explanation over a miraculous explanation if the mundane explanation happens to be the best explanation of the event. What he is not free to do is to treat a mundane explanation as inherently better than a miraculous explanation. He can’t treat a miraculous explanation as less likely simply because it’s miraculous. He can treat a miraculous explanation as less likely on other grounds, but not because it’s miraculous.
And that’s because, as I already discussed, questions of probability are ultimately metaphysical questions: questions regarding the way in which reality is structured. For example, we can compute the odds in a game of chance because a game of chance involves a fixed set of variables, such as the number of cards in the deck, or sides on a pair of dice. The nature of the world constrains the possible combinations.
But methodological naturalism, precisely because it’s methodological naturalism rather than metaphysical naturalism, can’t assign probabilities to different kinds of events. The moment it does so it thereby transgresses the intrinsic boundaries of methodological naturalism and covertly crosses over into the realm of metaphysics.
ii) And, for that reason, it’s methodologically erroneous of you to treat a miraculous explanation as a fallback explanation after we’ve exhausted every mundane explanation. That reflects a metaphysical bias which, by definition, methodological naturalism can’t justify.
You’re tacitly assuming that we would only resort to a miraculous interpretation as a last-ditch explanation in the absence of more plausible explanations. You’re free to argue for that, if you can, on metaphysical grounds, but as a methodological naturalist you are not at liberty to prejudge the relative probability of miraculous and mundane explanations.
“Perhaps the X-Files might provide an illustration. The appropriate procedure in criminal investigations if a guilty individual is not identified is to leave the case open. Lots of unexplained cases would leave room for a metaphysical claim about the possibility of miracles, extraterrestrials and much more, but would not simply arise out of the normal criminological methods used. Why should history be any different? And what would it mean to revise not just historical study in the way you propose but also criminology? Why shouldn't we be leaving room for miracles there too?”
i) That’s irrelevant to methodological naturalism. Remember, I’m simply answering you on your own grounds. You say that methodological naturalism is unavoidable in historical studies. Yet when I begin to point out the logical implications and limitations of your own position, you veer off into a tangent.
ii) You are also treating the argument from miracles as if it were equivalent to the argument from silence. How you come up with that equation, I don’t know. The reason a Christian will sometimes prefer a miraculous explanation is not due to lack of evidence for a mundane explanation, but due to positive evidence for a miraculous explanation. If you disagree, then you need to argue your point.
iii) The problem with your parallel is that I’m happy to call your bluff. I do allow for the possibility that some crimes are the result of paranormal or occultic factors, such as black magic. And if the evidence points in that direction, I will go with the evidence.
“But of course, the issue of just what a miracle is comes up. If a man of God curses some kids and a bear mauls them, is that a miracle, even though bear maulings are not impossible to explain in natural terms? Aren't you asking history not simply to describe what happened, but to also answer questions about what history means and what God's will in it was? If so, I think you're blurring an appropriate distinction one can make between historical study and theology.”
i) No, the problem is that you’re blurring an appropriate distinction between methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism.
ii) Realty isn’t compartmentalized into historical and theological domains. A historian should concern himself with what happened, as well as who or what did it. A historian shouldn’t begin with an a priori typology of what events are mundane, what events are miraculous, and then confine historical study to mundane events. Such a classification isn’t based on observation, historical investigation, or historical evidence. Rather, that classification would amount to a presumptive meta-historical judgment which, in the nature of the case, cannot be justified by direct observation or testimonial evidence.
iii) The identification of an event as a miracle does not, in the first instance, demand the identification of divine intent, but merely personal intent. Was the event in question the type of event that we‘d chalk up to personal agency rather than natural forces? That’s a distinction we draw all the time. The remaining question is what sort of agent could account for this effect.
I suppose ycould claim it’s naturally possible that an orchard arranged itself into rows of trees. But it’s far more likely that a gardener was responsible for that arrangement.
iv) An agent can also reveal his intentions. Verbalize his intentions. Historians often take a cue from the stated motives of the agent.
v) If you reject out of hand the role of divine revelation in the interpretation of certain historical events (e.g. the Resurrection), then you’re treating atheism as the default position in historiography. You’re acting as if God doesn’t exist–in which case no event ever requires an explanation which makes reference to divine agency.
But in order to justify that procedure, you have to argue for atheism. The only good reason a historian should assume an atheistic viewpoint when reconstructing the past is if there is no God.
Annoyed Pinoy,
ReplyDeleteBy convention and popular usage which word, "probable" or "plausible" implies a stronger case for belief?
I would say "probable" is stronger than "plausible." "Plausible" implies creditibility, i.e., it's believable. Whereas "probable" implies a positive likelihood, i.e., it's likely.
By the way, "creditibility," while plausible as an English word, simply isn't actually valid.
ReplyDelete