Things to remember:
* Reppert argued against Calvinism by appeal to moral intuitions.
* Reppert claimed he could ignore our philosophical arguments because his moral intuitions to the contrary were so strong.
* Reppert claimed he could deny any exegetical argument, even if he didn't have a better interpretation, because his moral intuitions were so strong that "the text couldn't mean that."
Now, Reppert claimed he had strong moral intuitions against God being a liar. However, he found that a three-step argument was good enough to undermine said strong intuitions. But if we're gonna toss moral intuitions out of windows this easily, what happens to Reppert's appeal to immovable intuitions when it comes to reprobation?
I just pointed out that Reppert seemed inconsistent in his tactics, that's all.
This argument was powerful enough to undermine his intuitions:
1. God always does what is morally right, and never does what is morally wrong. (The doctrine of divine moral perfection).
2. Possibly, lying is morally obligatory, and truthfulness is morally reprehensible.
(I will call this position anti-Kantianism about lying.)
3. Therefore, possibly God lies.
However, if this is enough to overturn Reppert's "strong intuitions" then why isn't this:
1. God always does what is morally right, and never does what is morally wrong. (The doctrine of divine moral perfection).
2. Possibly, reprobation for some is morally obligatory, and universalism is morally reprehensible.
(I will call this position anti-reppertism about election and reprobation.)
3. Therefore, possibly God reprobates.
Apparently, it is because Reppert can "think of beneficial reasons for God lying" but he is "as blind as a bat" when it comes to reprobating.
But how does this cash out? I have yet to see a "beneficial reason" offered by Reppert that makes sense. Reppert claims that:
The kinds of lies that I have in mind have fairly transparent beneficent purposes behind them, and the overall effect is of course has to be for the eternal benefit of human beings.
But there's (at least) two problems here:
1. Give the specifics. This should be easy since it's "transparent" that you're correct.
2. Dealing with his specific point about inerrancy, give a transparent reason why God lying in his revelation to his people would have "eternal benefit of human beings" as its target.
If Reppert can't answer either of these questions (and especially 2 when it comes to proving his claims about inerrancy), then he is indeed "blind as a bat" when it comes to reasons for God to lie. His one example, lying to Nazi's looking for Jews, was rather ridiculous, so that one is off the table.
Indeed, we gave Reppert many reasons. But to every single one of them he just says, without showing, that they "just don't wash at all."
But then he says, "But I wish people would at least take a shot at the argument I provided."
Okay, none of your reasons "wash at all."
Furthermore, the Bible certainly gives the impression that God doesn't lie in his revelations. Think of the tests for prophets. Think of the passages where it says God can't lie. Think of passages where it says "your word is truth." And Jesus is described as "the truth." It is the height of irony that thinkers like Reppert will run as far as he can, maximizing to the nth degree, passages like "God is love," but then he has no problem minimizing the "truth" passages. At the very least, then, Reppert defeats a powerful reason for his views against reprobation and unlimited atonement based on God's "love." Indeed, one might argue:
1. God always does what is morally right, and never does what is morally wrong. (The doctrine of divine moral perfection).
2. Possibly, hating is morally obligatory, and loving is morally reprehensible.
(I will call this position anti-Kantianism about lying.)
3. Therefore, possibly God hates.
So, Reppert doesn't do himself any favors.
Reppert says:
There are the wide range of difficulties, however, in God's getting his message across to prescientific peoples, so that it isn't always perfectly obvious to figure out what would constitute an errantist interpretation and what would not.
Apparently, Reppert thinks the Bible is a science text book. If not, what is the problem getting "his message" across to "pre-scientific people?" Furthermore, James Anderson has recently summed up some of the basics of the inerrantist position--which Reppert seems slightly confused about.
Anyway, the point here is that Reppert gives no reasons to suppose that he hasn't undercut his number one argument against Calvinism. I just want to see how he is consistent.
First, my primary argument against Calvinism is semantic rather than moral. I think that there are biblical passages that say that God loves all persons, that God wants all persons to be saved, that God is grieved by sin, etc. etc., that Calvinists in the main don't simply use "reference class" arguments to criticize these positions, but rather accept them and reconcile them with Calvinism. Yes, God loves everyone, but no, that doesn't mean God is out to save everyone. An analysis of the ordinary usage of these terms (and if you accept a verbal special revelation you are bound by ordinary usage) suggests that to say this is to distort the use of those terms beyond all recognition. This argument, you will notice, requires no appeal to moral intuitions.
ReplyDeleteTo defend this objection, I would have to answer the standard "two wills" argument that comes down from Dabney through Piper. But for various reasons, I don't think that argument washes.
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2008/08/calvinism-love-and-biblical-jigsaw.html
Yes, of course, my moral intuitions tell me that a loving God would not choose a world containing reprobates over a universalist world, assuming there is no need for libertarian free will. That objection is, however, in principle defeatable, although, because of the considerations I presented in the paragraphs above, not in fact defeated.
The "divine noble lie" case I had in mind was the fact that, at least on some readings of Scripture, Christ places a short time limit on his return. He leads the church to believe, perhaps by saying so directly, that He will return within the generation. These sorts of considerations have led exapologist to abandon Christianity. Exapologist mentions one Christian biblical scholar (Allison) who takes this position and says "so what?" and I was trying to see if Allison's position could be defended. The scenario I sketched was one in which God wants people to spread the gospel, giving them the belief in an immanent parousia is the way to do that, as a result the gospel is spread and salvation maximized, even though the claim of an immanent parousia is false.
The point is often raised in the pro-inerrancy literature (at least when I read a lot of it back when Pinnock was a traditional inerrantist), that God cannot lie. And I have been wondering what sense to make of that claim, given that most of us would agree that lying is sometimes morally justified for humans. Pointing out that there is a argument that could support the claim that God cannot lie is different from actually saying that God did. So don't overstate what I am claiming here.
I'm soorry I meant, supporting the claim that God can lie.
ReplyDeleteReppert: "An analysis of the ordinary usage of these terms (and if you accept a verbal special revelation you are bound by ordinary usage) suggests that to say this is to distort the use of those terms beyond all recognition."
ReplyDeleteMe: First of all, the New Testament writers sometimes use words as specialized terminology (e.g. Paul's use of 'sanctification'). Secondly, the New Testament should be read in its historical context, not through the lens of 21st century modern American English.
Reppert: "He leads the church to believe, perhaps by saying so directly, that He will return within the generation."
Me: The "Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven" should be interpreted as Christ's enthronement in Heaven (at the moment of His Ascension), not His Second Coming.
Reppert: "The point is often raised in the pro-inerrancy literature (at least when I read a lot of it back when Pinnock was a traditional inerrantist), that God cannot lie. And I have been wondering what sense to make of that claim, given that most of us would agree that lying is sometimes morally justified for humans."
Me: Have you tried consulting Scripture (i.e. Titus 1:2, Hebrews 6:18)?
Reppert: "To defend this objection, I would have to answer the standard "two wills" argument that comes down from Dabney through Piper. But for various reasons, I don't think that argument washes."
Me: Then how do you deal with texts like 2 Thessalonians 2:11, 1 Peter 2:8, Revelation 17:17, etc.?