A classic example of Steitfeld's inability to think through the implications of his arguments can be seen in this post, Proof That Presuppositional Apologetics Cannot Produce Valid Arguments:
http://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2008/12/proof-that-presuppositional-apologetics.html
(Note: Streitfeld flies into emotional rages if you don't hyperlink to his posts. He asks us to hyperlink to him, but we ask him to reason cogently. If he won't do that, I don't see why I should bend over backwards to accommodate his desires.)
So, in the above post Streitfeld "demolishes" presuppositionalism qua apologetic methodology. Here's the result of what he calls "his thinking" on the matter:
Presuppositional apologists make the following two claims:Yeah, I know; embarrassing, right?
1. All valid arguments do not beg the question.
2. All knowledge presupposes the existence of God.
Atheism may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of the existence of God.
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of God in an argument, one begs the question against atheism.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of God.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against atheism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts the first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, presuppositional apologists must abandon one of their two claims.
As many of you know, one way to check the validity of an argument is to offer a logical counter-example. You simply use the same form of the argument, just switch around terms. If the argument is valid, then all arguments of the same form, no matter the terms, should be valid.
Before I offer a counter-example to Streitfeld's "argument," I'll make a couple of other brief observations.
Factual Inaccuracies
1. Presuppositionalists do not claim that "all valid arguments do not beg the question," depending on how this is understood. This denial actually is enough to undercut Streitfeld's entire argument.
2. This claim isn't unique to presuppositionalism. Take atheist Douglas Walton. Walton says, "Circularity: A sequence of reasoning is circular if one of the premises depends on, or is even equivalent to, the conclusion. Circularity is not always fallacious, but can be a defect in an argument where the conclusion is doubtful and the premises are supposed to be a less doubtful basis for proving the conclusion." (Douglas Walton, Oxford Companion To Philosophy, p. 135.)
3. Many presuppositionalists will claim that Streitfeld does know that God exists and is engaged in self-deception. So, atheists presuppose God's existence.
4. Streitfeld is under the illusion that if one doesn't admit to a presupposition, or even denies it, one can't know. Say 'knowledge' presupposes some kind of post-Gettier constraint, X. So, to know that p is to presuppose X. But take epistemic minimalist Crispin Startwell. Startwell holds that to know one only needs "true belief" and not the X - whatever X is, it could even be Xs. So, Startwell denies X like the atheist denies God. Yet this doesn't mean that Startwell can't or doesn't know anything. I'll make another point from Startwell's minimalism below.
5. His claim that all valid argument presuppose knowledge is vague.
1. All goob is gluberfield.
2. Crangor is goob.
3. Crangor is gluberfield.
I don't know what any of that means.
Perhaps he means that one must know the rules of validity. But this is clearly false because people offer valid arguments all the time without knowing the first thing about logic.
We can grant his claim here but note its extreme vagueness.
Test For Validity by Logical Counter-example
Assume Streitfeld knows at least one thing. Some may claim that I am being too generous here. But we here at T-blog treat our interlocutors with charity. So, we will assume it. At least Streitfeld believes that he knows at least one thing. Assume further that Streitfeld holds these two claims:
A. Counter-example #1
[1*] All valid arguments do not beg the question.
[2*] All knowledge presupposes the existence of knowledge.
Global skepticism (e.g., the former Unger) may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of the existence of knowledge.
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one begs the question against global skepticism.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of knowledge.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against global skepticism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts Streitfeld's first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.
B. Counter-example #2
Assume that Streitfeld holds these two claims:
[1**] All valid arguments do not beg the question.
[2**] All knowledge presupposes one has a true belief along with some extra post-Gettier constraint - call it epistemic maximalism.
Epistemic minimalists (e.g., Startwell, see above) may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of epistemic maximalism.
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one begs the question against epistemic minimalism.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of epistemic maximalism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against epistemic minimalism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts Streitfeld's first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.
C. Counter-example #3
Assume that Streitfeld holds these two claims:
[1***] All valid arguments do not beg the question.
[2***] The Atheological premise: No knowledge presuppose God.
Presuppositionalists (e.g., the ones Streitfeld attacks)) may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of [2***].
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one begs the question against presuppositionalists.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of [2***].
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against the presuppositionalist.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts Streitfeld's first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.
Drawing Out the Inference
[1] Either Streitfeld must admit that some arguments can beg the question in the sense his argument draws out, or he must admit that he is guilty of being a filthy, naughty, dirty little question beggar.
[2] If he admits that some arguments can beg questions, then he doesn't have an argument against presuppositionalism.
[3] If he admits that he is guilty of being a filthy, naughty, dirty little question beggar too, but he doesn't think refutes Streitfeldianism, then he's guilty of special pleading.
[3] Therefore, either Streitfeld must admit he doesn't have an argument against presuppositionalists, or that he is guilty of special pleading.
[4] If one's "argument" against another implies that you either have to admit you don't actually have an argument against the other, or that you are guilty of a fallacy in virtue of making your argument, then you should drop your argument and publicly repent in sack-cloth and ashes, showing that you're at least intellectually virtuous.
[5] Streitfeld's argument does have those implications.
[6] Therefore, Streitfeld needs to repent in sack-cloth and ashes and show us he at least has a modicum of intellectual integrity by posting a publicl retraction of his argument on his blog.
QED
Streitfeld, if you were wondering why you’re not taken seriously ‘round these parts, the above is but one example of many.
Manata,
ReplyDeleteYou're going to have to try harder.
Let's go point by point.
1. You say: "Presuppositionalists do not claim that "all valid arguments do not beg the question," depending on how this is understood. This denial actually is enough to undercut Streitfeld's entire argument."
Manata, if you want to embrace the claim that "some valid arguments beg the question," be my guest. It would make this all much easier for me.
2. You say, quoting Walton: “Circularity is not always fallacious, but can be a defect in an argument where the conclusion is doubtful and the premises are supposed to be a less doubtful basis for proving the conclusion.”
I don’t have the Oxford Companion To Philosophy, so I can’t check the context of that quote. However, it is not clear if Walton was talking about begging the question specifically, or if he was using the term “circularity” to talk about something more general. I’m guessing he was talking about something more general.
3. You say: “Many presuppositionalists will claim that Streitfeld does know that God exists and is engaged in self-deception. So, atheists presuppose God's existence.”
You could assert that “Streitfeld does know that God exists,” but why should anyone take that seriously? My whole point is that your philosophy makes it impossible for you to argue for such an assertion without begging the question. And if I find your assertion doubtful, your circular reasoning will not in any way change that fact.
4. You say: “Streitfeld is under the illusion that if one doesn't admit to a presupposition, or even denies it, one can't know.”
That doesn’t look like an accurate interpretation of my views. If you think I am under such an “illusion,” make a case for it.
5. You say: “His claim that all valid argument presuppose knowledge is vague.
1. All goob is gluberfield.
2. Crangor is goob.
3. Crangor is gluberfield.
I don't know what any of that means.”
Not so fast. If you know that is a valid argument, then you know that “If all goob is gluberfield, and all Crangor is goob, then all Crangor is gluberfield.” So, no, I don’t think my claim was vague.
Next you offered three “counterexamples” which, I suppose, we meant to force me into some kind of uncomfortable intellectual position. Sorry to say that you succeeded in doing no such thing.
Counterexample #1 rests on the premise that “All knowledge presupposes the existence of knowledge.” I reject that premise, so the counterexample is ineffective.
Counterexample #2 rests on the premise that “All knowledge presupposes one has a true belief along with some extra post-Gettier constraint - call it epistemic maximalism.” I reject that premise, as well. So much for “counterexample” number two.
Counterexample #3 rests on the premise that “No knowledge presuppose God.” I reject this premise, as well, because I see no meaning attached to the term “God.” (I similarly reject any premises which presuppose that the term “God” is understood.)
Since you haven’t built a valid case against me yet, there's no reason for me to retract my argument. But try again. Maybe you’ll do better next time.
Streitfeld,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the laughs, keep 'em coming:
"However, it is not clear if Walton was talking about begging the question specifically, or if he was using the term “circularity” to talk about something more general. I’m guessing he was talking about something more general."
Yeah, it's clear your knowledge of this subject among philosophers of logic is limited. You never specified the sense presuppositionalists mean. They certainly don't mean it anything like:
The conclusion is one of tghe premises, i.e.,:
[1] The Bible is the word of God and so cannot err.
[2] Ergo, God exists.
rather, presuppositionalists accept it in a "general sense." That is, in the sense of a transcendnetal or ultimate authority. For example, you can't "prove" logic without "assuming it."
So, you're already in over your head. You didn't do the proper research.
"You could assert that “Streitfeld does know that God exists,” but why should anyone take that seriously?"
You don't have to. But it's a relevant premise that defeats your claim. or, were you begging the question against the presuppositionalist? Keep 'em coming.
"That doesn’t look like an accurate interpretation of my views. If you think I am under such an “illusion,” make a case for it."
I did. Just because you avow denial of God's existence doesn't mean you don't presuppose it in virtue of the fact that if presuppositionalists are right, you do. A child may disbelieve in logic, he nevertheless presupposes it by denying it. Keep 'em coming.
"Not so fast. If you know that is a valid argument, then you know that “If all goob is gluberfield, and all Crangor is goob, then all Crangor is gluberfield.” So, no, I don’t think my claim was vague."
Yes, your claim was vague. It didn't specify *what* had to be known. And, someone might not know that that is a valid argument and still know the above. Keep 'em coming, king of comedy.
"Next you offered three “counterexamples” which, I suppose, we meant to force me into some kind of uncomfortable intellectual position. Sorry to say that you succeeded in doing no such thing."
I explained what they did. They tested your argument by counter-example. That you can't or won't admit defeat here shows me you have no desire to learn. This is the most obvious case of refutation I have seen in recent memory.
"Counterexample #1 rests on the premise that “All knowledge presupposes the existence of knowledge.” I reject that premise, so the counterexample is ineffective."
Then you're stupid. Stupidity isn;t a valid defeater. If there is knowledge, then knowledge exists. There is knowledge. Therefore knowledge exists. QED. If there is knowledge then someone knows something, i.e., that there is knowledge. Do you not know that there is knowledge? That's absurd, because you think you do 'cause you think you is smart. But the global skeptic denies this. To say "there is knowledge" is to say "someone knows something." To say "someone knows something" is to beg the question against the global skeptic.
This is enough to refute you since my examples were all variations on a single theme.
Since you have been refuted, there's no need to continue.
"Counterexample #2 rests on the premise that “All knowledge presupposes one has a true belief along with some extra post-Gettier constraint - call it epistemic maximalism.” I reject that premise, as well. So much for “counterexample” number two."
You think waiving your hand and saying "I reject that" counts as a defeater. it doesn't. If you deny any and all post-gettier analysis of knowledge then what is your analysis. This should be interesting. Furthermore, you is so smart to be able to figure it out: just readjust my argument. When you say 'knowledge' you presuppose ... well, whatever. But this begs the question against all those who give a post-Gettier analysis.
"Counterexample #3 rests on the premise that “No knowledge presuppose God.” I reject this premise, as well, because I see no meaning attached to the term “God.”
What is your theory of meaning? Oh yeah,you refuse to answer.
Anyway, I don't see how what i said isn;t true. You still don't think knowledge presupposes God BECAUSE you don't thinbk the term God is meaningful.
You've been defeated. Admit it.
Since Paul is getting antsy about me not responding to his post here, I'm gonna post segments of my response one at a time.
ReplyDeleteHere's the first segment, where I dispense with his three proposed counterexamples.
Counterexample 1:
I said I reject the premise that “all knowledge presupposes knowledge.”
You replied: “Then you're stupid.” You then went on to point out that knowledge is knowledge.
It does not make sense to say “all knowledge presupposes knowledge.”
A proposition cannot presuppose itself. That is, if X presupposes Y, then Y does not equal X. So the statement “knowledge presupposes knowledge” is just wrong.
Perhaps the idea you had in mind was more like this: For every true proposition X, there exists some true proposition Y, such that X presupposes Y. Let’s call this idea A.
Maybe you don’t want to postulate A. Maybe you do. But let’s say you do, for the sake of argument.
I could list a number of reasons why A is not a valid defeater for my argument, but I will mention only one—one which your own position binds you to accept
First, let’s go over the logic of presuppositions for a moment.
Again, as I noted, a proposition cannot presuppose itself. That is, if X presupposes Y, then Y does not equal X.
Furthermore, if (X presupposes Y) and (Y presupposes X), then X and Y are identical.
As a presuppositionalist, you maintain that all propositions presuppose that God exists. In other words, for all propositions X, X presupposes that “God exists.”
Of course, X cannot contain the proposition “God exists.” So, we can restate it as follows: For all propositions X (such that X is not “God exists”), X presupposes that “God exists.”
We can also add that the proposition “God exists” does not presuppose any other proposition. For, if it did, it would be equivalent to that proposition, and so would presuppose itself—an impossibility.
Now, you say that you know God exists. This means there is some proposition, the knowledge of which does not presuppose any other proposition. This means you cannot use A as a defeater for my argument.
So much for your “all knowledge presupposes knowledge” counterexample.
Counterexample 2:
As I noted, this counterexample rests on the premise that "All knowledge presupposes one has a true belief along with some extra post-Gettier constraint - call it epistemic maximalism."
I rejected this premise. Paul says that I have thus denied any and all post-gettier analysis of knowledge. Paul's assertion here is mistaken. I have not rejected any particular analysis of knowledge. I have only rejected Paul's assertion that all knowledge presupposes that one has a true belief with some post-Gettier constraint.
The difference is clear.
Counterexample 3:
Paul says that "Streitfeld knows that God exists" is a defeater for my argument.
That is a lie.
And that's it for now. More to come.
I made a small error in my last post, which I'll just take a brief moment to rectify.
ReplyDeleteI wrote:
"Paul says that "Streitfeld knows that God exists" is a defeater for my argument.
That is a lie."
I stand by what I wrote here. The only error was that I prefaced that comment by introducing as a response to Paul's proposed "counterexample #3."
In fact, that comment was not a response to Paul's third proposed counterexample. My response to that is below.
I said: "Counterexample #3 rests on the premise that “No knowledge presuppose God.” I reject this premise, as well, because I see no meaning attached to the term “God.”"
Paul responded: "What is your theory of meaning? Oh yeah,you refuse to answer."
Paul continues to ask for theories when definitions are sufficient.
Paul: "Anyway, I don't see how what i said isn;t true. You still don't think knowledge presupposes God BECAUSE you don't thinbk the term God is meaningful."
Paul seems to be confused. The force of his third counterexample rests on the force of the premise that "no knowledge presupposes God." I said I rejected that premise, but now Paul says I'm not rejecting it, because I don't think knowledge presupposes God.
What Paul doesn't get is that I reject both the premise that knowledge presupposes God and the premise that no knowledge presupposes God. Both are meaningless premises, and I see no point in embracing either one. Thus, I have no problem rejecting both of them. Thus, Paul's third counterexample is ineffectual.
Now, as for Paul's comment that "Streitfeld knows that God exists" is a defeater for my argument . . .
Again, it's a lie.
Funny how Streitfeld talks about me lying.
ReplyDeleteJason said: I reject the premise that “all knowledge presupposes knowledge.”
You replied: “Then you're stupid.” You then went on to point out that knowledge is knowledge.
It does not make sense to say “all knowledge presupposes knowledge.”
A proposition cannot presuppose itself. That is, if X presupposes Y, then Y does not equal X. So the statement “knowledge presupposes knowledge” is just wrong.
But here's what I actually said.
[2*] All knowledge presupposes the existence of knowledge.
Egg. On. Face.
Moving on...
Stretfeld then thinks this is a response to my second counter example. I quote him in full:
"As I noted, this counterexample rests on the premise that "All knowledge presupposes one has a true belief along with some extra post-Gettier constraint - call it epistemic maximalism."
I rejected this premise. Paul says that I have thus denied any and all post-gettier analysis of knowledge. Paul's assertion here is mistaken. I have not rejected any particular analysis of knowledge. I have only rejected Paul's assertion that all knowledge presupposes that one has a true belief with some post-Gettier constraint.
The difference is clear."
My assertion is that to ascribe knowledge to S is to ascribe to S a true belief with some post-Gettier constraint(s).
If Jason disagrees with this assertion let him come foreward with the argument.
But, let's say that he disagrees. Say he denies my construal, then you just need to fix my argument accordingly. It still works. Streitfeld is stalling, not refuting.
Furthermore, Streitfeld talks a lot about knowledge. But what does knowledge mean for him? If he can't give an analysis, then he's a dead duck. If he gives an analysis, it will either be minimalist or maximalist. if it is, my argument goes through.
I waited this long for Jason's grand rebuttal.
My original arguments still work.
QED
His response to counter-example three was likewise underwhelming.
C'mon Jason, you and your big brain can do better than this. How do I know you have a big brain? Bedcause you have unicorns inside them!
You're a hoot.
"What Paul doesn't get is that I reject both the premise that knowledge presupposes God and the premise that no knowledge presupposes God. Both are meaningless premises, and I see no point in embracing either one."
ReplyDeleteJust adjust my claim accordingly. Stretfeld's position here is question-begging on his own terms.
I don't see how "no knowledge presupposes God" is meaningless. Can he show how it is meaningless? Presumably because god is meaningless. But this means, according to Jason, that there is no referent 'God.' This means God is non-existent. Therefore, no knowledge could presuppose god because God doesn't exist.
Ph, by the way, to claim that "God doesn't exist" is meaningless. Therefore, atheism is meaningless.
By the way, when I say,
"[2**] All knowledge presupposes one has a true belief along with some extra post-Gettier constraint - call it epistemic maximalism." and you reject [2**], can you cite any contemporary philosopher besides the minimalist who agrees with you?
While we're at it, let's throw another shrimp on the barby!
ReplyDeleteJason Streitfeld says he's a proud atheist.
But that's meaningless.
He says the term 'God' is meaningless.
He says that even to say that 'no knowledge presuppose God' is meaningless, so he denies it.
But, 'atheism' states that God does not exist, or that one lacks a belief in God.
Both those claims, according to Streitfeld, are meaningless. Hence, atheism is meaningless.
Also, if he rejects the claim that 'no knowledge presupposes God' because 'God' is a meaningless term, then he must also reject the claim that 'God is a meaningless term.' Atheist theodore Drange states, "[theological] noncognitivism declares atheism to be flat-out meaningless."
But a key premise of one of his "devistating" arguments against theism was this:
"Atheism may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of the existence of God. Thus, if one presupposes the existence of God in an argument, one begs the question against atheism."
But he must deny these statements! All statements that say 'God' in any way (atheism or theism) are meaningless.
In fact, if Streitfeld is right, he should never have written his post. He should stop blogging. He can never mention the word 'God' again otherwise that means he will have to "reject that claim," because he told me that he "reject all claims that have the word God in them."
I'm starting to feel bad for Streitfeld. This has been a bad week for him.
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ReplyDeleteStrfeitfeld, new rules. You will actually respond with arguments.
ReplyDeleteI do not consider quoting me and then saying "Absurd." Or quoting me and then saying, "You just don't get it, do you," worthy of bandwith.
So, repost if you musdt, but you will make substantive points.
E.g., when your only comeback is to say something along these lines,
ReplyDelete"Nonsense. Paul, you have no understanding of the issues here, do you? You're completely clueless. It's really astounding."
Then you've lost the debate and are just trying to "get in the last word." That's not allowed in my comboxes.
Streitfeld is clueless. Now, I will back that up, unlike the clueless one:
ReplyDelete"If you want to know how I understand knowledge, read those links."
None of this matters. Call your conception of knowledge X. Now, since you deny post-Gettier analysis, then X is not post-Gettier.
Thus, when you say 'knowledge' you presuppose 'X' as the analysis.
But post-Gettier analysis understand the term differently, call it Y.
So, everytime you say "knowledge' you beg the question against Y.
This is the *same* thing you did to the presupps.
What's funny is that you are denying basic rules of logic. I took the same form of argument and implied conclusion you don't like, you then throw a hissy fit.
And, if you think saying, "I deny that presmise" is sufficient to defeat my argument, I already ntold you what presmises presuppositionalists deny. So, if you are consistent you must say your argument has been defeated.
You may not like that they deny that premise, and think it problematic, BUT THAT WOULD REQUIRE ANOTHER ARGUMENT. The one you gave is clealry defeated. It's not only defeated by my counters, its defeated because you attribute to them a premise they do not hold.
Your argument has been defeated either way, then.
Posts that do nopt acknowledge this and clearly lay out your response in a logical way will be deleted. That means, you can't respond to this post by saying, "You're an idiot." You must *show* it like I do to you.
1. All valid arguments do not beg the question.
ReplyDelete2. All knowledge presupposes the existence of knowledge.
2 is analytic.
It is true. It cannot be denied unless one wants to hold to an absurdity. I cannot be denied by flying into a rage and calling the other person stupid.
Since 2 begs the question against the global skeptic, Streitfeld's argument has been given a valid counter-example that renders it invalid.
All knowledge presupposes that there is a knower. Gloabal skepticism denies that there are knowers.
Jason can't get around this, no matter how much he stomps his feet and thumps his chest.
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
ReplyDeleteJason stuill wants to post rubbish and name calling.
ReplyDeletea) I established his argument was meaningless, per his own rules. This point is not mine. Atheists Drange, Martin, Lowder, and Alex Fisher, author of a logic text for Cambridge, all make the same point. Acting like a pompous idiot and disagreeing with every single expert in the field, even those on your side, is the mark of a deranged man at the level of an Islamofacist.
b) Jason refuses to admit that his argument has been refuted. Pope-like dogmatism is not allowed here, especially by atheist English teachers. The very claim that there is knowledge, as Jason claimed, presupposes the falsity of global skepticism.
Ergo, Jason begs the question against gloabal skeptics..
I used the SAME FORM as he did. Therefore, IF his argument against presuppositionalism is valid, then so is mine.