Modus Ponens and Incompatibilism
The argument for incompatibilism is really very simple.
1) I am not responsible for the eternal decrees of God (or the laws of nature and the condition of the universe at the big bang).
2) I am not responsible for the fact that, given the decrees of God, I sinned at 2 PM yesterday.
3) Therefore, I am not responsible for the fact that I sinned at 2 PM yesterday.
Or formally:
Not Responsible for A
Not Responsible for If A then B.
Therefore, Not Responsible for B.
How can I be responsible for that which is the modus ponens consequence of that for which I am not responsible.
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2008/05/modus-ponens-and-incompatibilism.html
Modus Ponens and Apathy
The argument for moral indifference is really very simple.
1) I am not responsible for five-year old boy next door (or the laws of nature and the condition of the universe at the big bang). After all, I didn’t beget him. He’s not my son.
2) I am not responsible for the fact that a reckless driver came hurtling through our neighborhood while the five-year old was playing in the middle of the street. I’m not the driver. It’s not my car.
3) Therefore, I am not responsible for the fact that the boy was run over even though I saw it coming and could have rescued him at the last minute.
Or formally:
Not Responsible for A
Not Responsible for If A then B.
Therefore, Not Responsible for B.
How can I be responsible for that which is the modus ponens consequence of that for which I am not responsible.
You miss the point. Given that the boy is there and the car is speeding toward him, it is not inevitable that he boy will be hit. The premises don't entail the conclusion. Try again.
ReplyDeleteVICTOR REPPERT SAID:
ReplyDelete“You miss the point. Given that the boy is there and the car is speeding toward him, it is not inevitable that he boy will be hit. The premises don't entail the conclusion. Try again.”
Victor,
I’m not responsible (pardon the pun) for your sloppy formulation. You wanted a “simple” argument. I was responding to your original formulation.
You are now attempting to retrofit your original argument with qualifications you didn’t introduce at the time.
At that point your “simple” argument quickly loses its deceptive simplicity and begins to reveal its fatal ambiguities. Try again.
Your problem is that you want a “simple,” knockdown argument to disprove Calvinism. This constantly induces you to trot out one simpleminded objection after another.
VICTOR REPPERT SAID:
ReplyDelete“Given that the boy is there and the car is speeding toward him, it is not inevitable that he boy will be hit.”
That’s simplistic. You can’t affirm or deny the inevitability of an outcome absent consideration of various factors which might impinge on the outcome. The odds of the boy being hit by the car are affected by whether or not I intervene to save him.
Let's take the case of Calvinism.
ReplyDelete1) If the decree occurs, the sin occurs.
2) The decree occurs.
3)Therefore the sin occurs.
There are no other conditions that affect this outcome.
1)If the boy is in the street at t, and the car comes toward him and doesn't stop, he will be hit.
2) The boy is in the street at t and the car doesn't stop.
3) Therefore, the boy is hit.
Only, in your scenario, you are responsible for the boy's being in the street. You had it in your power to prevent it. The boy was in the street at t - 1, that was given, but he need not have been there at t. That was up to you. So the parallel fails.
The parallel “fails” because you’re changing the terms of your original syllogism. You are now substituting the concept of ability for responsibility. In your original syllogism, you framed the “simple” argument in terms of the absence of responsibility. Now, however, you have recast the argument in terms of the absence of ability—to alter the outcome. Is the outcome inevitable or preventable?
ReplyDeleteI realize that, as a libertarian, you probably regard ability as a precondition of responsibility, but in that case your original, “simple” argument was invalidated by a suppressed premise.
For your “simple” argument to get off the ground, it even leave the hanger, you need to furnish a supporting argument to justify your unspoken assumption that ability is a precondition of responsibility. And at that point your simple argument for incompatibilism will lose its deceptive simplicity. It was simple because you were glossing over some key, question-begging assumptions.
Can you still present an argument for incompatibilism which is both simple and sound?
"I realize that, as a libertarian, you probably regard ability as a precondition of responsibility,"
ReplyDeleteIn which case if I make a promise to someone, but then handcuff myself to the bed and throw away the key right before I'm supposed to leave to go meet her, I dissolve my moral responsibility!
Or, the Bible's take on ought implies can:
"Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard its spots? Neither can you do good who are accustomed to doing evil" (Jer. 13:23).
I guess they don't have am *obligation* to "do good."
I may be wrong, but I don't buy the formulation. It's wrong to assume the antecedent is the cause of the consequent. Often the consequent is the cause of the antecedent.
ReplyDeleteFor example:
If the light is on, then the light switch is up.
The light is on.
Therefore the light switch is up.
The light switch being up actually causes the light to be on, but the light being on is the antecedent because the status of it being true is sufficient to determine the consequent.
However, the fact that God decrees is not sufficient to determine that He has decreed sin. As it is, sin as something that can be decreed has yet to be determined. In other words, an action occurring can have two separate interpretations based on intent. For example, Joseph being sold into slavery. God decreed this, but He didn't decree sin. His intentions were good. The brothers, on the other hand, intended evil. Therefore, it is perhaps intention rather than decree that makes an act evil (or a sin).
Because of these things I question the formulation of the syllogism.