"[Libertarian Free Will is not] The ability to create ex nihilo."
But God's free will has this ability.
"[Libertarian free will is] Being able to choose either option implies both options are possible, which implies neither option is necessary."But choosing evil, for God, is impossible. It is necessary that he choose good because he is necessarily good. Choosing evil is not a possible option, for God.
If God doesn't have LFW, and man is made in his image, why think man has LFW?
Great point!
ReplyDeleteHi Paul,
ReplyDeleteJust to be clear, I am not denying God has LFW. My point about ex nihilo creation is that one doesn’t have to have this ability to have LFW. I don’t think it follows that because God can create ex nihilo, therefore He doesn’t have LFW. That would be like arguing, one doesn’t have to have a Predator avatar to be a triablogger, but Paul has a Predator avatar, therefore Paul isn’t a tiablogger.
As for choosing between good and evil, I specifically said LFW does not imply the ability to choose between good and evil. God’s impeccability means that He can only choose good, but He can choose between many good options. Imagine you dig $20 out of your couch cushion. With that $20 you could A) give it to church, or B) buy your mom flowers for mother’s day. If you were impeccable, you couldn’t C) buy pot to get high. But you could still choose between the good options: A & B.
God be with you,
Dan
Hi Dan,
ReplyDeleteI didn't think you were explicitly denying it. hence, the question mark.
Your second point invalidates libertarianism, it seems to me. At least if common definitions from the specilaists are allowed in.
It sounds like you're saying that one's *nature* determines what he will choose.
Furthermore, what if there were only two options: a = good and b = bad.
Sounds like PAP would be denied.
Furthermore, sounds like I'd be able to *predict*, every time, what the impeccable agent would choose.
That's a no-no according to standard accounts of libertarianism.
Furthermore, you're definitions are at odds with many libertarians, and so it's not as if liberrtarians present a united, alternative front to compatibilism.
It's not as "clear" as some pretend.
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
ReplyDelete"As for choosing between good and evil, I specifically said LFW does not imply the ability to choose between good and evil."
That admission destroys the freewill defense, which is predicated on some version of transworld depravity.
Hi Paul,
ReplyDeleteYour statement assumes that A & B are options, even though B is impossible. If someone is predetermined to do something, such that everything else is impossible, then he doesn’t have options.
I am not too concerned about “specialists” or “united fronts”, but out of curiosity, who do you think I am contradicting? I believe my view is in line with Arminius’.
God be with you,
Dan
Hi Steve,
ReplyDeleteDo you mean the freewill defense against the problem of evil? Like Calvinists, I think God permits evil to accomplish a greater good. This greater good required not just LFW, but also LFW with good and evil options.
Unlike Calvinists, I think there couldn’t have been possible evil to permit, if God couldn’t give LFW.
God be with you,
Dan
Hi Dan,
ReplyDeleteIf you want to say that God doesn't have options, and just does what he does because his nature determines what he will do, then it seems you've undermined libertarian arguments for what is required to ascribe praise (or blame) to an individual.
Frequently us Calvinists are told that because we were able to do only that which was decreed, then we are not responsible for what we do.
At any rate, I'm assuming comon understandings of libertarian free will such that "nothing whatever" determines what an agent will choose.
That freedom requires one has alternative possibilities.
If God has no alternative possibility, then his choice isn't free.
Seems to me like you're allowing that determined humans can be free and proper subjects of moral responsibility even if we don't "have options."
So it's not clear to me how you're explicating *libertarian* free will.
If your understanding of free will is such that one can be free and morally responsible even if his nature determines what he will do and if he only has one option, then you've simply made the case for the Calvinist.
Hi Paul,
ReplyDeleteYou gave me a hypothetical, in which God has two options, one of which was impossible. My point is that if we (or God) have only one possible action, we don't have options and are not choosing. Why not? Choosing requires two options.
We have to have options to be able to choose. Even if both options are good (in God's cases as well as man's case in heaven) or if both options are bad (as in the case of man without grace) or if we can choose between good and evil (as in man under grace or prefallen man). As long as God can pick between good options, He is free. As long as fallen man can pick between evil options, he's free... Go back to the $20 example. Even if you were impeccable, you could still choose between donating the money and buying your mom flowers. You still have 2 possible options.
God be with you,
Dan
Perhaps the question is not whether one has options to choose from, but how one chooses what he/she does. Dan would you say that a person has "free-will" if they have choices, but that they make those choices based on their nature. Seems this is where LFW diverges and believes that no antecedent conditions or natural laws are the ultimate source of our choices. That seems to go counter even common intuition though, after all we choose what we most want or desire and our very nature is what drives us to choose what we do.
ReplyDeletePraise be to God
Dear Mitch,
ReplyDeleteIf our natures determine our actions, such that one action is necessary and everything else is impossible, we don’t have choices or options. Also, if our natures operate deterministically, then something outside of us determines what we will do. Finally, our strongest desire seems indistinguishable from choices. What do you see as the difference between choosing and coming up with a strongest desire?
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Dan,
ReplyDeleteI believe that our natures do determine what we eventually will do. When you write that
such that one action is necessary and everything else is impossible
I confess I do not see it that way. Our choices are only necessary because that is who we are (you know the leopard and his spots) and the only reason that something would be impossible is because that is the way we make it by being who and/or what we are.
How do I see the difference between choosing and my strongest desire? I would say that all the choices are the options and that my strongest desire speaks to my nature. The thing that puzzles me about LFW is that it means if I had same choice, same environment, same conditions then I would choose differently. That seems odd and I have not been able to wrap my mind around that for a long time. You see I believe that if al things stay the same and nothing is changed that I would pick the same way *every time*.
How do you choose Dan? I ask because from the little that I know you seem to be the closest to true Arminianism compared to most out there in the blog world and I would like to know how you answer that question. It seems I always see the argument be about do we have choices and such, never about how one goes about making the choice between the different options, which is always a shame because LFW does not mean that we have choices. It seems that LFW speaks more to how we make choices and that never gets addressed.
Praise be to God
Hi Dan,
ReplyDeleteBut in my example, God would still be a proper subject for ascriptions of praise. This grants a major compatibilist point.
Also, I'm afraid I don't understand the conflation of "options" and "actions."
Furthermore, say God has two good options, but one good is better than the other. One is a greater good. God's nature determiens that he goes with the greater good.
Lastly, if we only have options between evil things, and choosing good is *impossible* (like you said evil is for God), then it appears that we *do not* have a choice to choose Jesus. Another Calvinist point.
"Furthermore, you're definitions are at odds with many libertarians, and so it's not as if liberrtarians present a united, alternative front to compatibilism."
ReplyDeleteI don't think his definitions are as at odds with as many libertarians as you might think, but let's say that your right. So what? Do you think compatibilists present some sort of united front? They don't. The only thing that compatibilists tend to be united on (besides a rejection of PAP) is that classical forms of compatibilism (such as Edward's compatibilism), are dead.
"Furthermore, what if there were only two options: a = good and b = bad. Sounds like PAP would be denied."
Why think that? God surely has more than one option. To bring up one example: Create or don't create? Creation isn't necessary or else God isn't self sufficient. But if creation is essential for God to be God, then God isn't self-sufficiet, he needs creation. Thus, God has libertarian free will. He chose to create rather than not to.
It follows from creation being necessary that it must be an eternal procession from God because if it is necessary, then there could never be a time in which God was without it. If that's true, then you ought to be able to notice the obvious parallelism between creation and the eternal begetting/procession of the Son and Spirit.
Thus, you are forced to make two very unhappy choices. One is a type of Pantheism. You must affirm that creation is divine, or risk the second option. The second option is that you deny the Divinity of the Son and Spirit because the process in which they come from God is basically the same in which Creation comes from God.
This is called the Origin Problematic. This is why the Church has affirmed that Creation is a free choice. God is not creator essentially, but by a libertarian free choice. If you hold that God did not have a real choice between these two equally good possibilities then you will either have to be a pantheist or a Eunomian.
Dear Mitch,
ReplyDeleteIn your view, given our nature, doesn’t the presence of external variables determine our actions? I.E. if we are “apple eaters”, and we are hungry, if we spot an apple won’t it invoke the eat apple desire within us, causing us to eat it?
Regarding being in the same spot twice and picking the same thing… LFW says you could choose differently, not that you would. But yes, you would be able to choose differently.
Regarding my question on the difference between choosing and coming to a strongest desire, I think you might have switched our choosing with the objects we choose.
As for how I choose... Choosing seems to be our soul’s action. Since it’s: A) non-physical and B) first in the chain of sufficient causes, we can’t “get behind it” and figure out where it comes from. It’s first. If you could figure out where it's coming from, it wouldn't be first.
God be with you,
Dan
Mark,
ReplyDeletei) I said that precisely to undercut the pretended united front libertarians put forth while complaining that compatibilists can't get their act together.
ii) You don't know that there could be cases where God has only one option.
iii) I don't think creation was necessary, and I also don't think the "freedom" of God in it is libertarian freedom. So the rest of your post is irrelevant.
Dear Paul,
ReplyDeleteI don’t recall granting that praise is due unchosen actions. I am not conflating options and action. Options come in pairs, otherwise they are not options. Actions can be all by their lonesome. Not being able to choose Christ (without grace) is one of the 5 points of the Remonstrants.
I think you hit on a key difference, philosophically, between Arminians and Calvinists. You said:
God has two good options, but one good is better than the other. One is a greater good. God's nature determiens that he goes with the greater good.
Let’s get something out of the way so we can get to the interesting part… IF one of actions was greater, the other would be impossible for God, because of His nature. Therefore, He wouldn’t be choosing.
The assumption that I think needs some attention here is the idea that there’s always one greatest good. Why can’t there be two or more equivalently good options for God? Calvinists and Arminians disagree about what would be better for God. Calvinists say it’s maximal glory, Arminians say it’s maximal love. But couldn’t there be two scenarios with an equal amount of _____? Why assume one greatest good vs. two or more equivalently good options?
Seems to me if there’s one greatest good out there, and God’s nature predetermines Him to act on it, A) God’s not free and B) that greatest good determines God and C) the greatest good is in some sense greater than God.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Dan,
ReplyDeleteIf you are the first cause, and I agree that is necessary for most definitions of LFW, then why can’t you choose good over evil? Could you not get to a point of such realization that you see the difference between good and evil and being the first cause choose good?
When it come to being hungry and seeing an apple, yes if you were hungry and you were an apple eater and you saw an apple you would choose the apple. How is that a problem? Is this not how marketing works in our world?
When it comes to all things being the same and choosing the other choice, how is that different than mere chance? Sometimes I will choose a and other times I would choose b for no contingent conditions or natural laws, might as well just flip a coin. When one were to ask why you chose a over b you could give no reason whatsoever seeing as that if placed in same circumstance with same conditions you would choose b over a.
Praise be to God
"i) I said that precisely to undercut the pretended united front libertarians put forth while complaining that compatibilists can't get their act together."
ReplyDeleteI'm not aware of libertarians who pretend to this united front, but perhaps it's just something you've encountered in your experience that I have.
"ii) You don't know that there could be cases where God has only one option."
Oh, there may be. That doesn't mean that God doesn't have libertarian freedom. One doesn't have to have alternative possibilities in every given instance in order to be classified as having libertarian freedom. I don't know anyone who thinks that.
"iii) I don't think creation was necessary, and I also don't think the "freedom" of God in it is libertarian freedom. So the rest of your post is irrelevant."
Well, I wasn't trying to say that you thought creation was necessary, rather, that your beliefs commit you to think this. If all God does directly follows from His Divine Nature, then Creation is necessary because it must be an essential attribute just as much as mercy, justice, and love are (Incidently, this is just true if you believe in Absolute Divine Simplicity anyways).
If you mean what classic compatibilists mean by freedom which is just something along the lines of freedom from constraint: great. That's the kind of freedom Origen thought God (The One) had too (good Neoplatonist that he was).
So, all that to say, the dilemma is applicable to what you're saying. It follows from believing that all God's actions are determined by the Divine Essence/Nature. Thus, I'm afraid you have a problem.
Dan,
ReplyDeleteIt is not my position that there must be one greatest good.
Anyway, if you've granted that if there is only one good option, and we grant the basic point that God should be praised for his actions, then you've granted that praise can be given to an agent who only has one option.
Furthermore, as Plantinga and Hasker have pointed out, freedom is such that:
Plantinga: Significant freedom involves the agent being free to perform or refrain from an action because no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine what the agent will do.”
Hasker: “By libertarian freedom is meant freedom such that the agent who makes a choice is really able, under exactly the same circumstances, to chose something different from the thing that is in fact chosen [...,] this means that there is nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made
But you've granted that in some instances God's moral nature would determine his action.
Furthermore, with the "free to refrain" constraint (cf. also, libertarian definitions of PAP as ability to refrain), and God cannot refrain from doing some good acts, then we have some problems with libertarian notions of freedom and moral responsibility.
I don't need to prove that God never has libertarian freedom (though I don't believe he does in that I think its incoherent), or that that kind of freedom isn't even his usual, one example of a made choice (there's a distinction between *having* and *making* choices) that has implications for ascribing praise or blame, is enough to undermine libertarian assumptions of what is necessary and sufficient for ascriptions of moral responsibility.
This undercuts a major argument on behalf of libertarians.
Furthermore, since Christ was "tempted" as we are, and since Christ was impeccable, then this also proves compatibilist notions. Seems that if S is tempted to X, then X and ~X are options on the table, yet (say X is an evil), Jesus' nature determined he would do ~X. Seems odd to me to include the story of Jesus temptation in the wilderness if, as you say, he didn't have options or choices.
Mark,
i) Yes, that has been my experience. Search the archives too, you'll see that point brought up by Arminians (e.g., Robert and Henry).
ii) Yet he would be praised. Thus praise could be ascribed to an agent whose nature determined what he would do and there was only one option. This isn't necessarily against libertarian free will, just libertarian notions of moral responsibility.
iii) My beliefs don't commit me to that, see Frame's Doctrine of God on this point. I never said *all* God's actions flowed from his nature. What I do say is that (at least) his *moral* actions do. And this gives me what I need when libertarians try to undermine compatibilist accounts of responsibility. So, you're picking on a straw man. Whatever freedom God had in creation wasn't compatibilist or libertarian. But I do think it was free at least in the sense that he wasn't constrained.
Dear Mitch,
ReplyDeleteIf you are the first cause, and I agree that is necessary for most definitions of LFW, then why can’t you choose good over evil?
Your nature acts like guard rails. You can choose within the boundaries, but not outside them.
When it come to being hungry and seeing an apple, yes if you were hungry and you were an apple eater and you saw an apple you would choose the apple. How is that a problem?
You have objected to my: “such that one action is necessary and everything else is impossible” comment. I just wanted to see if I was missing something.
When it comes to all things being the same and choosing the other choice, how is that different than mere chance?... When one were to ask why you chose a over b you could give no reason
Normally, we ascribe the indeterminate cause as the reason. I.E. I thought choosing X, thought it would be good for Y and I valued Y…. Also, since our choice is for something contemplated, we wouldn’t say it was chance. But we can’t find a sufficient cause outside of ourselves.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Paul,
ReplyDeleteIt is not my position that there must be one greatest good.
Glad to hear that. So how does God choose between good options? Could God have chosen Esau, and if He could have, why didn’t He?
Plantinga: Significant freedom involves the agent being free to perform or refrain from an action because no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine what the agent will do.”
Hasker: “By libertarian freedom is meant freedom such that the agent who makes a choice is really able, under exactly the same circumstances, to chose something different from the thing that is in fact chosen [...,] this means that there is nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made
Thanks for providing these. I prefer Hasker’s definition, as he focus on choice, not action.
Anyway, if you've granted that if there is only one good option
I followed the hypothetical through to its logical conclusion without granting the truth of the premise. However, God’s existence is necessary, and He is worthy of praise for who He is. But this isn’t praise for His choices, it praise for who He is. We also praise Him for what He chooses.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Dan,
ReplyDeleteWhen you write-
Normally, we ascribe the indeterminate cause as the reason. I.E. I thought choosing X, thought it would be good for Y and I valued Y…. Also, since our choice is for something contemplated, we wouldn’t say it was chance. But we can’t find a sufficient cause outside of ourselves.
Would not Y be an antecedent condition here that determined how you went about choosing? Also, if you were in the same circumstances (conditions, nature, knowledge, desire, etc.) would you not always pick X since you would think that would be good for Y and you value Y?
Would you not have to say that given same situation, rather than choosing X you would choose Z-even though you thought it would be good for Y if you pick X and you value Y, yet you still would pick Z?
That seems illogical and rather counter intuitive to me.
Praise be to God
Dan,
ReplyDeletePlantinga expresses the contrary of your position:
According to Plantinga, libertarian free will is a morally significant kind of free will. An action is morally significant just when it is appropriate to evaluate that action from a moral perspective (for example, by ascribing moral praise or blame). Persons have morally significant free will if they are able to perform actions that are morally significant. Imagine a possible world where God creates creatures with a very limited kind of freedom. Suppose that the persons in this world can only choose good options and are incapable of choosing bad options. So, if one of them were faced with three possible courses of action—two of which were morally good and one of which was morally bad—this person would not be free with respect to the morally bad option. That is, that person would not be able to choose any bad option even if they wanted to. Our hypothetical person does, however, have complete freedom to decide which of the two good courses of action to take. Plantinga would deny that any such person has morally significant free will. People in this world always perform morally good actions, but they deserve no credit for doing so. It is impossible for them to do wrong. So, when they do perform right actions, they should not be praised. It would be ridiculous to give moral praise to a robot for putting your soda can in the recycle bin rather than the trash can, if that is what it was programmed to do. Given the program running inside the robot and its exposure to an empty soda can, it's going to take the can to the recycle bin. It has no choice about the matter. Similarly, the people in the possible world under consideration have no choice about being good. Since they are pre-programmed to be good, they deserve no praise for it.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/evil-log.htm
I can only go off what libertarians tell me.
I'd also add that I don't even know what it means to say that libertarianism says that someone only has good options to choose from.
ReplyDeleteLike, in heaven there's no heroine or porn movies and so those options aren't there? There's only puppy dugs and butterflys?
Since I'll have a body, why couldn't I haul off and sock another person in the face? For the fun of it?
My guess is once this is spelled out we'll be headed for compatibilist answers on these things.
heroin
ReplyDeleteHi Dan,
ReplyDeleteYou've claim you agree with Hasker.
I'll stipulate.
So, what does Hasker claim:
"Let me put it like this: God takes risks of he makes decisions that depend for their outcomes on the responses of free creatures in which the decisions themselves are not informed by knowledge of the outcomes. For if he does this, the creatures' decisions may be contrary to God's wishes, and in this case God's intentions in making those decisions may be at least partly frustrated. ... God is a risk-taker if he endows his creatures with libertarian freedom; otherwise not" (Hasker, Contemporary Debates on Philosophy of Religion, p.219).
LFW, for Hasker, clearly implies the ability to choose *contrary* to God's desires,
God desires we choose good.
The contrary of good is not-good.
Thus LFW, according to Hasker, implies that we have the ability to choose not-good.
I've only argued using principles I've taken from libertarians *temselves*.
So, it seems that to keep your view you'd not only have to disagree with Plantinga, but with Hasker as well. Same with Kane as far as UR goes.
Best,
Paul
Dear Mitch,
ReplyDeleteWould not Y be an antecedent condition here that determined how you went about choosing?
No, Y is necessary for choosing X, but insufficient. We still say Y was the reason we chose what we did, because Y was the factor we valued.
God be with you,
Dan
Hi Paul,
ReplyDeleteArminius states God is necessarily good in Article 22.
Arminius on God being necessarily good
Freddoso says the same here.
Maximal Power
I didn’t say I agreed with everything Hasker ever said. I believe he’s an open theist, no?
In heaven, you won’t be able to sin, because you won’t have sinful desires. Desire is a necessary condition (but not a sufficient cause) for choosing.
So how does God choose between good options?
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Dan,
ReplyDeleteYou would still have to say that if you were in the exact same spot and all things were exactly equal that you would not pick X, even though Y was the factor that you valued. Yet to me it seems that 10 times out of 10 you will pick X.
Also, when you say that in heaven we will not have a sinful desire why not just have that at the beginning for Adam?
Praise be to God
Hi Dan,
ReplyDeleteBut I argued that your view of things was inconcsistent with almost all libertarians. So my bringing up Plantinga, Hasker, Kane, etc., has been to that end.
I think it speaks volumes when you have to disagree with almost every libertarian - theist or not - in order to provide a definition of libertarianism.
I believe God is necessarily good.
In Brave New World the people didn't have certain desires either. They choose only what they desired. So your conception of things doesn't remove the charge of non-libertarianism.
Choosing in accord with your desires is very Edwardsian of you. Very classically compatibilistic. :-)
I don't know what you mean, "how does God choose between good options?" He exercises his will? he has a better reason to do one over the other. WHat's the alternative? He has no reason for choosing one good over another? What I will say, though, is that if God reasons all the way to choosing A over B, then given those reasons he will always choose A over B.
Anyway, my goal was to show you at odds with the majority of libertarians. Your admissions imply I did that? As I said above, I can only go off what I'm given. Libertarians tell me to read libertarians. They come here and drop names like: Hasker, Kane, Plantinga, etc., and tell me to read them. I read them, and then it seems like people have been wanting to deny them.
I also find your claims inconsistent with "could do otherwise" and libertarian maxims like "ought-implies-can." Virtually all libertarians hold to it. So, if man ought to not sin, that means he can not sin.
I'd also add that the FWD for the problem of evil depends on the claim that LFW has the trade-off that evils could be committed.
ReplyDeleteSo why didn't God just create us without those desires in the first place?
Clearly you'd have to agree that it is possible for God to create a world where everyone has LFW and no one does evil.
So why this world?
Would you admit that Calvinists don't have a problem of evil? The problem Arminians constantly force on them, viz., God could have determined things such that no one would sin. Et tu. God could have made us without the desire. Besides, Adam was not created with the desire to sin. So, how did it arise?
Dan,
ReplyDeleteHere's another claim you made:
"7) The ability to falsify God’s foreknowledge – We can, but will not do the opposite of what God foreknows."
So, you admitted that we *can* do the *opposite* of what God foreknows.
In heaven, God will foreknow that we will always make good choices. On your analysis, in heaven we *can* do the *opposite* and make bad choices.
Dear Mitch,
ReplyDeletewhen you say that in heaven we will not have a sinful desire why not just have that at the beginning for Adam?
God wanted us to have choices between good and evil, so He could bring about a greater good. In this life, when we are faced with good and bad options, we are able to improve our eternal estate. In the next, when we face only good options, we can no longer improve.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Paul,
ReplyDeleteSorry I was unable to explain things clearly enough.
God be with you,
Dan
Dan,
ReplyDeleteNo worries. Perhaps my comprehension was the problem. I promise to familarize myself with your view and I'll post on it at a later date.
Thanks for the warning, er I mean I look forward to it.
ReplyDeleteI appreciate your thoughts and civil tone.
God be with you,
Dan