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Wednesday, April 16, 2008

You're Irrational!

I recently reviewed James Anderson's Paradox in Christian Theology.

Here is one critique of the book that purports to show that if you believe a set of theological claims that together entail a paradox (note: X is paradoxical if X amounts to a set of claims which taken in conjunction appear to be logically inconsistent), and you do not resolve the paradox, then continued belief in the set is irrational. Here's why:

My argument is fairly straight forward. In order for one to claim propositions appear to be contradictory, you have to show why you believe it is apparent that the truth of one proposition implies the falsity of the other. That’s simply the definition of a contradiction. So if it appears to you that both propositions can not be true at the same time, then it’s irrational to believe both propositions are true at the same time … unless you can provide a reasonable resolution to the apparent contradiction.

There’s no escape from the charge of irrationalism simply by saying that you don’t believe the contradiction is real, even though it seems real - if you can not demonstrate that there is an reasonable solution to the appearance of a contradiction. Which is what Van Til said we could not do. And which brings us full circle. What do you say? Is there a reasonable solution to the “apparent” paradoxes?

Now, this is addressed by following the argument in the book, mainly in chapters 5 and 6. The import of the Creator/creature distinction, the doctrine of incomprehensibility, the doctrine of analogy, our epistemic situation, etc., all bear on the answer.

Nevertheless, it won't hurt to answer this briefly since it comes from one who says he has read the review. So perhaps I did a poor job at communicating how a simple grasp of a few basic points undercuts this objection without further thought on the matter.

The fastest way around this objection is that on the model Anderson presents, one doesn't take it that the component propositions are false.

Anderson views theological paradox (with the constraints Anderson sets on what kind of doctrines make the cut) as merely apparent contradictions, MACs. Thus they are not real contradictions.

They result from unarticulated equivocations in the metaphysical expressions of the doctrines (though they can be expressed formally in an non-contradictory way). Hence they are merely apparent contradictions resulting from unarticulated equivocations, MACRUEs.

Now, granting that Anderson shows that we are warranted in taking the paradoxical doctrines as MACRUEs, then it follows that we do not believe that any of component the claims are false. We can believe all of the component claims are true. (How we can be warranted in our beliefs of the component claims is demonstrated in chapter 5.)

We can write the doctrines out in such a way as to avoid explicit or formal contradictions. We can even think about them in a formally or explicitly consistent way.

Anderson uses the example of the two-dimensional Flatlander FL and the three-dimensional Spacelander SL. Say that FL gets propositional revelation from SL regarding a cone (which is a three-dimensional object). FL cannot grasp the entire truth of the matter; indeed, FL's very conceptual limitations mean that he can only conceive of the object (cone) two-dimensionally. SL wants to reveal to FL about the nature of the cone. SL thus does it this way:

[1] The object O is shaped triangularly.

[2] The object O is shaped circularly.

This is not an explicit contradiction, but when FL conjoins the above with this other belief:

[3] No object is both such that it is shaped triangularly and circularly, he obtains his apparent contradiction because he can only think two-dimensionally.

But say that FL is independently warranted in believing both [1] and [2] (how the Christian can be was shown in ch.5). For example, say that FL knows that SL cannot lie and cannot make errors and would not deceive FL about something like this. Given that, then FL is warranted in believing [1] and [2]. If he is, then he is rational in believing [1] and [2]. This is based on the tradition of warrant Anderson stands in.

So, FL also has this belief:

[4] [1] and [2] are both true.

Thus, though they appear to contradict for FL, he can nevertheless believe that they are not contradictory (because two propositions that are really contradictory cannot both be true, and given what FL knows, they cannot be false because a being that can‘t make an error told him they are true…just not the whole truth, perhaps!).

So he takes it that because of his limitations, the vast distinction between a three-dimensional being and a two-dimensional one, the accommodated or analogical language SL employs, etc., there is a term he doesn't fully understand. So, he takes this as an instance of a MACRUE. In so doing he does not believe any of the claims are false. Now, in so doing he realizes that there is some sense in which the object is both triangular and circular, even though he can't grasp how this can be. He might nevertheless be humbled at his epistemic situation and grant that this is all possible in a three-dimensional world.

FL can also render the doctrine formally consistent. Say he had other revelation where he knew that terms were being used differently. So, he would write it out like this, for instance:

[1*] The object O is shaped1 triangularly.

[2*] The object O is shaped2 circularly.

The 1 and 2 might indicate horizontal and vertical, respectively.

Still FL might not be able to concretely conceive of how this cone looks, or could exist. This cone-doctrine is rendered formally consistent, not metaphysically or concretely.

At any rate, say the Christian is in a situation like this with the doctrine of the Trinity. Say that they are warranted in believing the doctrine to be a MACRUE. In this case he does not need to believe that any of the component claims are false.

Now, this removes the fangs of the objection. the objection received was that the Christian was irrational because he had to believe the one of the component claims were false. I have shown that this is not the case.

So, the only other move the objector could make is this:

[5] Even if you can believe the paradoxical doctrine to be a MACRUE, and even if you don't have to believe any of the component claims are false, you still have to be able to specify where, precisely, the unarticulated equivocation lay. Which term it is, otherwise you are irrational.

Well, given that 'irrational' or 'rational' hasn't been defined, I totally deny the intuitions behind [5] and don't see why I must accept it, at all.

One more thing. The above objection doesn't really help matters out much. If Anderson has shown the orthodox expressions of the doctrines to indeed be paradoxical, then the only choice for the objector is to embrace what he calls irrationality, or to embrace heterodoxy.

Without overcoming the objections and analysis made in chapters 1 and 2, then by the objector claiming that belief in the paradigm paradoxical doctrines is irrational, and he will not be an irrationalist, he has just said he's going to opt for heterodoxy. This is hardly a consolation prize for orthodox Christians.

7 comments:

  1. The objection you quote isn't so much an argument as an assertion in search of an argument. The objection makes an implicit appeal to some epistemic principle like this:

    (IP) Necessarily, if S believes some set of claims P that appear to be inconsistent, but S is not aware of any way to remove the appearance of inconsistency without abandoning one or more of the claims, then S is irrational to continue to believe all of the claims in P.

    Now that's a pretty strong claim. It's not trivially true, if true at all. Why should we accept it without any argument to support it? (No supporting argument is given in the quotation.) Is it supposed to be self-evident? An indubitable truth of reason? A universally held intuition?

    As you say, I give a bunch of reasons not to accept IP (or anything close) in the latter chapters of the book, all with respect to defensible accounts of epistemic warrant and rationality.

    One point the objection misses, for example, is that if S is strongly warranted in believing the individual claims of P, then S thereby has a reason to believe that the apparent inconsistency is merely apparent and not real.

    As for Van Til, I believe he would say that there are reasonable solutions to the paradoxes, and these solutions are known by God (of course), but that we do not presently have access to those solutions, either because of a lack of information or because of limitations in our cognitive apparatus (or both). Whether we will ever have access to such solutions is an open question, I think; although perhaps Van Til has some insight into the question now that he didn't have in this life. :) In any event, I don't commit myself one way or the other in the book on that issue.

    Thanks again for the review, Paul, and your interaction with some of the critics!

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  2. Paul,

    I appreciate your posting my argument to your blog. It seems that you believe my argument was compelling enough that you should to respond to it. Even Dr. Anderson felt it warranted a response. I'll take that as a compliment.

    I would prefer you cite the source of your quote. I make a point of putting my name to my posts to keep myself accountable for whatever I write. You might want to also add a link back to the original comments section of Rev. Lane Keister's "Green Baggins" blog so people can read all of our discussion. However, what you quoted covers it fairly well and I think it still holds up.

    In Christ,

    Anthony Coletti
    Jonesborough, TN

    (I'm a member of Midway Presbyterian Church and a "Clarkian" (Gordon H. Clark ).

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  3. Anthony,

    If my rule was that I could only respond to arguments I felt were "compelling,' then I would probably have 1 or 2 posts on atheism, Arminianism, etc., rather than the few hundred I have.

    I'm not an argumentist. That is, I'm not prejudiced towards only "good" arguments. I believe in equal treatment refutation.

    Further, it is a fact of history that people get swayed by bad arguments all the time. So, those willing to address said bad arguments are needed lest the bad arguments obtain a following.

    Finally, I can't stop you from thinking the argument still "holds up." But since I have directly rebutted your main point viz. we must believe one of the propositions to be false, then you must think your argument is suspended in mid-air. Abracadabra.

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  4. Wow! Sorry. My mistake. However, my argument still stands. I can add more, but it's still simply the case that it's irrational to believe what you also believe is contradictory. You can't have your cake and eat it too.

    Dr. Anderson said it: "As for Van Til, I believe he would say that there are reasonable solutions to the paradoxes, and these solutions are known by God (of course), but that we do not presently have access to those solutions, either because of a lack of information or because of limitations in our cognitive apparatus (or both).

    And I think it is self-evident, that as Dr. Anderson said: "(IP) Necessarily, if S believes some set of claims P that appear to be inconsistent, but S is not aware of any way to remove the appearance of inconsistency without abandoning one or more of the claims, then S is irrational to continue to believe all of the claims in P."

    But I did not assume it was evident to all, so I gave a reasonable and clear argument for it. It is difficult sometimes to explain what seems apparent, but it appears also that it takes thousands of words (a whole book even) to "refute" self-evident truths. And asserting that my argument was an assertion is not an argument. :) We've been over that.

    Dr. Anderson, you said "if S is strongly warranted in believing the individual claims of P, then S thereby has a reason to believe that the apparent inconsistency is merely apparent and not real."

    I'd say if S believes that component parts of P appear to be contradictory, and he does not have a reasonable (or even a non-heterodox) way to resolve this apparent contradiction, then S is "warranted" in believing that the component parts of P can not be true. Correct? You say you did not "commit" on this in your book, but I it seems critical for defending the rationality of believing paradoxical statements. A reasonable solution has to be conceivable, even if not provable, for you to show that believing P is not irrational.

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  5. Hi Civbert,

    Saying your arguments stands doesn't mean it does.

    Where's the argument that it is irrational to believe what you believe is not a real contradiction?

    If you think IP is self-evident, then you don't know what self-evidency is.

    Your argument for IP was rebutted since we don't believe that the claims are false. I showed this.

    "I'd say if S believes that component parts of P appear to be contradictory, and he does not have a reasonable (or even a non-heterodox) way to resolve this apparent contradiction, then S is "warranted" in believing that the component parts of P can not be true. Correct?"

    Incorrect, for the reasons spelled out in this post, the review, and the book.

    "A reasonable solution has to be conceivable, even if not provable, for you to show that believing P is not irrational."

    What does this mean?

    Anderson did point out possible solutions. So, I could conceive of how P might be resolved. It's just that, presently, we have no revelation to this effect. So, they are unresolved for me.

    Thus, no solutions are endorsed since I have no warrant to endorse any...and remain orthodox or avoid paradox.

    Furthermore, as Anderson said, they are resolved in the mind of God. So, they are *in fact* resolvable and resolved, even if *I* don't know how that is.

    Thus I believe in paradoxical doctrines that are in fact resolved..in God's mind.

    God reveals P to me. God says all the component parts are true. I trust God. I take his word for it. I don't believe the component claims are false. I don't believe we have a real contradiction. I believe they are ultimately resolved in his mind. I believe all of this with warrant. Where's the irrationality?

    Lastly, I might as well point out that on your Scripturalist assumptions, you don't *know* that:

    1. IP is self-evident.

    2. if S believes that component parts of P appear to be contradictory, and he does not have a reasonable (or even a non-heterodox) way to resolve this apparent contradiction, then S is "warranted" in believing that the component parts of P can not be true.

    3. A reasonable solution has to be conceivable, even if not provable, for you to show that believing P is not irrational

    On Scripturalist assumptions you don't *know* 1 --> 3.

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  6. Paul,

    When I say my argument still stands, it means I have confidence that my argument, as given, is sufficient for making my case - even in consideration of your "rebuttal". Simply saying you have refuted me, does not mean your refutation was effective. It's a fairly common tactic to claim X has refuted Y, as if it is a given that X has clearly proven Y is wrong, when it is more often the case that X has simply given a counter argument that may or may not have been an effective response.


    So I believe my argument still stands. That is my opinion. You disagree. That is your opinion. OK?

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  7. Paul,

    You said "God reveals P to me." How do you know that P is what God has revealed?

    Also, if P implies ~Q, and you think God has revealed both P and Q, then is it not true that your solution involves some doubt of either P or Q? In fact, the solution you seem to give is to say (P & Q) is not the case, but rather (P1 & Q), or (P & Q1), or (P1 & Q1), or some combinations that is not exactly P & Q.

    Given that, then it remains irrational to assert (P & Q) when you also believe that
    Q->~P and P->~Q.

    Now if Anderson's book is not saying we have warrant to believe P & Q when they are contradictory, then why go through the trouble of "making the explicit the equivocation". Doesn't that step really cast doubt on our understanding of P and Q simple because they are contradictory as given.

    So you're now claiming a reasonable solution is possible, but your hedging at bit on saying that a reasonable solution is also reasonably conceivable (believable because it is logical, non-contradictory, understandable, and not so ambiguous to be meaningless). And what ever the solution, it still means we can only reasonable believe other than P & Q is the case.

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