The scriptures have no conflict with Craig’s use of middle knowledge in the same way the scriptures have no conflict with reason.According to Craig's theory of Middle Knowledge, God infallibly foresees any number of possible universes in which libertarian agents make particular choices and then decrees this and only this universe into existence.
Every so often, Molinism comes up on the Arminian side, so it's helpful to review it's many problems.
If the Scriptures do not conflict with Craig's use of MK, then the Scriptures should teach LFW as an action theory. Where, pray tell, may we find this teaching in Scripture?
I'd add that Scripture isn't very friendly to LFW.
Norma Jean said:
Try reading the scriptures through the lens of someone other than Calvin, perhaps Paul or an early Jew.
I choose Christ, and here's what He said about LFW:
You are of your father the devil, and you want to do the desires of your father He was Whenever he a murderer from the beginning, and does not stand in the truth because there is no truth in him speaks a lie, he speaks from his own nature, for he is a liar and the father of lies.The devil speaks from his nature.
He's a liar.
So, he speaks lies.
He's evil, so he speaks evil.
He's a murderer, so he seeks to commit murder.
You (Jewish leaders) are of your father,the devil.
So, you share his nature
So you want to do what your father the devil wishes ( "lie and murder Me" are implied)
So, Scripture not only doesn't teach LFW, it explicitly denies LFW right here, from the lips of Jesus Himself.
Craig's Molinism is predicated on LFW. Scripture denies LFW by explicitly contradicting LFW, so it can't "have no conflict with Craig's use of LFW."
Maybe one of these days advocates of LFW who name the name of Christ will actually take their Bibles seriously here. If Jesus didn't believe in LFW, why should we?
Moving on...
God instantiates this and only this universe. So how does this give Libertarian Freedom to the agents? Their acts are being determined beforehand, since no other outcomes will ever obtain.
And how does God know the outcomes of these indeterminate "possibilities" without them ever being instantiated? At least the Simple Foreknowledge folks appeal to God's timelessness on the idea that He's already there. Granted, this means He knows the outcomes because they actually instantiate - but that's the point, how can God know "possibilities" if all they are are indeterminate "possibilities?" At least in the other view,they actually happen, so God "sees" them as real outcomes.
All Craig uses Scripture to show is the existence of counterfactuals. However that doesn't select for a theory of Middle Knowledge. Calvinism doesn't deny the existence of counterfactuals. The issue isn't the existence of counterfactuals, but what grounds God's (fore)knowledge of them. In our theology, the knowledge of them is a function of God's self-knowledge. He knows what will obtain, because He decreed it,and He knows what won't obtain, because He knows what He did not decree, the way an author knows the contents of the book He wrote and the book He thought of writing but chose not to write.
Finally, here's what Craig actually says about Scripture and Middle Knowledge in Four Views of Divine Foreknowledge, p. 125:
Since Scripture does not reflect upon this question, no amount of proof-texting can prove that
God’s counterfactual knowledge is possessed logically prior to his creative decree. This is a
matter for theological-philosophical reflection, not biblical exegesis.
So, the reason that Scripture has no such conflict, by his own admission, is that Scripture doesn't talk about it. By his own admission, it's a philosophical argument, not an exegetical argument.
Molinism is a lot of bark with very little bite. It can take some convoluted forms, but in the end, there's very little to it, and it's quite easy to formulate a rebuttal.
Polemics is ugly, so I’ll be brief Craig’s quotation points out what you should point out when you assert that God only knows because he decrees. As no amount of exegesis necessarily entails Craig’s appeal to Molinism, no amount of exegesis necessarily entails your boastful conclusion. But the oddity here is that your conclusion spoils God’s omniscience. Molinism preserves it. You folks are wading in deep waters. Don’t drown.
ReplyDeleteYou quoted "Norma Jean" without citing it. Where is this from?
ReplyDeletePolemics is ugly, so I’ll be brief Craig’s quotation points out what you should point out when you assert that God only knows because he decrees.
ReplyDeleteIn context, Craig is commenting on his own position not ours. He's commenting on the assertion that God has counterfactual knowledge prior to (and therefore without actually) decreeing not because He decrees.
Here's the whole thing:
Unfortunately, this does not answer the question of whether God has Middle Knowledge. For Scriptural passages only show that God possesses counterfactual knowledge, and, as I have said, until modern times all theologians agreed that God possesses counterfactual knowledge. The dispute among them concerned when in the logical order of things this knowledge comes, is it before the divine decree? Since Scripture does not reflect upon this question, no amount of proof-texting can prove that God's counterfactual knowledge is possessed logical prior to His creative decree.
So, it points out only that Scripture doesn't address anything more than the existence of counterfactuals if you are looking for an explanation of how God knows indeterminate objects of knowledge prior to/without decreeing - for Craig assumes, throughout his presentation, indeterminism.
You're trying to make Craig state something he does not state.
As no amount of exegesis necessarily entails Craig’s appeal to Molinism, no amount of exegesis necessarily entails your boastful conclusion.
That's a nonsequitur. No amount of exegesis entails Craig's Molinism because Molinism is exegetically false.
1. Scripture does address God's knowledge of determinate objects of knowledge.
In other words, these biblical passages to which Craig appeals only show us that God knows the nature of the free agent so well
that, were that agent placed in another circumstance, God knows exactly what he would do. However,
this does not reconcile middle knowledge with libertarianism, but with compatibilism, for as soon as you talk about the nature of the agent, you've left LFW. More
importantly, it is certainly possible that God knows this information only logically posterior to
the divine decree—thereby eliminating the need for middle knowledge. Therefore, there is little, if any, biblical warrant for the scientia media - which is precisely what Craig is admitting.
2.The Book of Isaiah does rather clearly teach that foreordination is prior to foreknowledge. Steve went over this quite some time ago.
“There follow in these two verses [Isa 46:10-11] a series of three participles that both substantiate the claim to uniqueness and, at the same time, flow from that claim…Here the three participles make a direct link between predictive prophecy (declaring the outcome at the start) and divine intervention in history (calling from the east a bird of prayer)…As several commentators (e.g., Young) have noted, the three participles move from general to particular to specific. In the first instance, God tells in general what will happen in the future. He can do so because the future is fully shaped by his own plans and wishes. This is the same point that was made in ch. 14 concerning Assyria 9vv24-27). Assyria’s plans for Judah were really of little import. It is the Lord’s plans for Assyria to which that great nation should have paid attention (see also 22:11; 37:26)…The repetition [46:11] serves to emphasize the unshakable connection between promise and the performance, between divine talk and divine action…This parallelism underlines again that the reason God can tell what is going to happen is that what happens is only an outworking of his eternal purposes,” J. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66 (Eerdmans 1998), 236-37.
The dependence of foreknowledge on foreordination in this instance is just a special case of a universal principle.
3. Scripture directly contradicts LFW and supports our own theory of agent causation. I have myself made an exegetical argument to that effect in the archives, not to mention the plain statement I cited above. Scripture is very plain that our desires are sufficient causes for our actions.
So, until a Libertarian can find a way to demonstrate his agency theory from Scripture and can show that ours is false by exegesis, my conclusion stands. The way to begin doing that is to demonstrate that LFW is an agency theory taught by Scripture.
But the oddity here is that your conclusion spoils God’s omniscience. Molinism preserves it.
These are assertions, not arguments.
Now, you have two choices:
a. Actually make a real argument.
b. I can make you disappear by deletion, ala the last comment you left in our previous discussion. I'm tired of playing these insipid games with Libertarians and Arminians.
I wonder if readers really sense relevance of "action theory" here. More, to think "grounding" is an objection is curious considering the God we worship. Let me get this straight, God must decree events in order to know events or He cannot know them at all. Perhaps you would be willing to explain to us the illogic in logical priority. Why do I bother? Tilt on
ReplyDelete