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Tuesday, February 05, 2008

Retrocausation

Jason said:

“Our current choices do not determine the past. My posting a response to your post is not the cause of your creating the post in the first place.”

How do you think the status of retrocausation is relevant to the issue at hand? Most determinists and indeterminists don’t subscribe to retrocausation, so that doesn’t distinguish one position from another.

“Of course you might say that I have no choice but to write the sentences above, because I have no choice (free will). If so, why do you post blog entries? Are you trying to convince people of something(s)? What does it mean for someone to be convinced ( change their mind, etc. ) if they do not have free will? How would you describe your own actions given that you do not have free will?”

You seem to equate determinism with fatalism. How do you imagine that follows?

Most versions of determinism have a strong commitment to causality. Causes and effects. Necessary and sufficient conditions.

Something causes me to do a post. My post might, in turn, cause you to change your mind. Convincing someone would be an effect of something I wrote. My words can function as determinants, affecting what you belief.

Causes effect changes. How do you think that is at odds with determinism? Determinism is, itself, a causal category.

Ironically, the question you raise is a problem, not for determinism, but indeterminism. If you deny causality, then why are you trying to change someone’s mind? Unless something you said or wrote could *cause* another man to reconsider his position, then what does it mean to you, as a libertarian, to use persuasion in order to make another man change his mind?

14 comments:

  1. "Unless something you said or wrote could *cause* another man to reconsider his position, then what does it mean to you, as a libertarian, to use persuasion in order to make another man change his mind?"

    Steve, how does this argument fit in with the noetic effects of sin? Say you present an argument for Christianity to a non-Christian. Presumably you believe that, apart from the grace of God, a non-Christian cannot become a Christian - that needs regeneration. Therefore presumably you do not believe you can, by your argument alone, cause a non-Christian to become a Christian.

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  2. Anonymous said:

    "Steve, how does this argument fit in with the noetic effects of sin? Say you present an argument for Christianity to a non-Christian. Presumably you believe that, apart from the grace of God, a non-Christian cannot become a Christian - that needs regeneration. Therefore presumably you do not believe you can, by your argument alone, cause a non-Christian to become a Christian."

    I'm just responding to the suggestion that persuasion is incompatible with determinism. It isn't.

    Yes, it takes more than persuasion to convert the unregenerate. That's an important point, but it's a different issue.

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  3. "Unless something you said or wrote could *cause* another man to reconsider his position, then what does it mean to you, as a libertarian, to use persuasion in order to make another man change his mind?"

    To piggy back off Steve's response, bringing up another angle, one could persuade a non-Christian to admit that Christianity is true, or that God exists, by argument alone (well, perhaps not *alone,* maybe your winsomeness plays into it, etc) yet that person might not profess faith in Jesus. So it isn't necessarily the case that your arguments ('alone') couldn't persuade someone of God's existence or Christianity's rationality, yet that person remain a non-Christian. My brother is case in point.

    So, persuasive arguments can provide *reasons* for belief but they don't cause regeneration. Put differently, they may cause a change in mind while not heart.

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  4. I understood your original post to argue that the idea of free will necessitated the view that a choice results in the creation of a new world-line (including the past), and that would conflict with the choices made (and pasts created) by others. I don't believe that a free will choice does anything to the past, just that we can make choices in the present.

    As for determinism, how is our conversation (which you, apparently, view as determined) any different from the collision and reaction of billiard balls (which also are determined). If our behavior and beliefs are deterministic, like the billiard balls, then our lives would be controlled by fate (what other thing could happen with the billiard balls other than what the laws of physics say should happen?).

    When saying that someone has free will I don't mean that they are disconnected from reality and not influenced by it, just that someone can choose to agree or not agree with an argument given. In short: we are more than automata.

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  5. As for determinism, how is our conversation (which you, apparently, view as determined) any different from the collision and reaction of billiard balls (which also are determined).

    1. Billiard balls are not people.
    2. People have wills and desires.

    If our behavior and beliefs are deterministic, like the billiard balls, then our lives would be controlled by fate (what other thing could happen with the billiard balls other than what the laws of physics say should happen?).

    1. You're defining "deterministic/ism" as if the only thing that determines an outcome is an external force of some sort, like God.

    2. You're equating the personal (people, God) with the impersonal (laws of physics). Where's the supporting argument? What you've done is try to draw an analogy that is disanalogous to the state of the question.

    3. "Determinism" in the context of our theology and with respect to agent causation refers not simply to God having predetermined an outcome, but the agency of the agent. In short, our desires, motives, etc. "determine" our actions/reactions. They are sufficient conditions for us to act. Ergo, when we say "John stole the pencil." We affirm that he did so because he wanted to do so.


    4. Consequently, your statement about "fate" is utterly off the mark. "Fate" and "determinism" are not convertible principles here. In fate, the outcome that has been determined will occur regardless of what you do. In predestination, the outcome is determined (the end) but so is the means (the agency). The outcome is determined, but so is the means to the outcome, such that the outcome will only obtain consequent to your actions, which are themselves things you actually want to do.

    Determinism means that all events are rendered unavoidable by the causes, which include our choices. Fatalism says all events will happen, regardless of our choices. Calvinism is not the same as fatalism. In fatalism, Oedipus cannot escape his fate, try as he might. Indeed, he fulfills his fate by trying to avoid it. He is at the mercy of the impersonal forces of the universe. In Calvinism, the reprobate are not trying to escape their fate. Indeed, they regard themselves as masters of their own destiny. In short, fatalism says that God accomplishes his purpose apart from the will of man. In other words, the ends occur regardless of the means. God fulfills his plan regardless of the will of man. But this is not Calvinism. Calvinism, however, states that God accomplishes his will through the will of man; God controls both the ends and the means.

    Ron Hanko rightly notes:

    The [fatalist], then, makes the same mistake as the Arminians and free-willists, only he draws a different conclusion. Both think that to command or demand repentance and faith of dead sinners must imply that such sinners are not dead and have in themselves the ability to repent and believe. The free-willist says, then: "To command must imply ability, therefore, men have the ability." The [fatalist] says: "To command must imply ability, therefore we will not command any but the elect."

    This is fatalism:
    • If it is fated for you to recover from your illness, then you will recover whether you call a doctor or not.
    • Likewise, if you are fated not to recover, you will not do so even if you call a doctor.
    • So, calling a doctor makes no difference.

    Calvinism looks like this:
    • If it is determined for you to recover from your illness, then you will call for a doctor.
    • Likewise, if you are fated not to recover, you will not call a doctor.
    • So, calling a doctor makes a difference.

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  6. Jason said:

    "As for determinism, how is our conversation (which you, apparently, view as determined) any different from the collision and reaction of billiard balls (which also are determined). If our behavior and beliefs are deterministic, like the billiard balls, then our lives would be controlled by fate (what other thing could happen with the billiard balls other than what the laws of physics say should happen?)."

    There are varieties of determinism. The key question is what lies behind the determinism: God or some mindless force of nature.

    That makes quite a difference.

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  7. I have a friend, a physicist, instead of calling himself anti-Calvinist, he says that he is anti-necessatarian. By this he means that while some things in nature are necessitated by the laws of nature: this necessitation does not apply to human persons. I read what Jason said:

    As for determinism, how is our conversation (which you, apparently, view as determined) any different from the collision and reaction of billiard balls (which also are determined). If our behavior and beliefs are deterministic, like the billiard balls, then our lives would be controlled by fate (what other thing could happen with the billiard balls other than what the laws of physics say should happen?).

    When saying that someone has free will I don't mean that they are disconnected from reality and not influenced by it, just that someone can choose to agree or not agree with an argument given. In short: we are more than automata.

    And Jason seems to get it, that human actions are not necessitated as are billiard balls which behave according to the laws of nature. So we are not like billiard balls when it comes to causation. And like Jason says, we are not automata.

    Gene Bridges on the other hand doesn’t seem to get it as he writes:

    1. Billiard balls are not people.
    2. People have wills and desires.

    What Bridges does not get is that if God predetermines everything (including the acts of the will, desires, beliefs, everything involved when we do something), then everything is necessitated just like those billiard balls. You can attribute to people wills and desires, but if their every action (including their wills and desires) is necessitated, then it doesn’t matter, they are no different than billiard balls. My physicist friend understands this quite well which is why he rejects Calvinism and calls himself an anti-necessatarian.

    Bridges tries to make a distinction between us and billiard balls with the following comments:

    3. "Determinism" in the context of our theology and with respect to agent causation refers not simply to God having predetermined an outcome, but the agency of the agent. In short, our desires, motives, etc. "determine" our actions/reactions. They are sufficient conditions for us to act. Ergo, when we say "John stole the pencil." We affirm that he did so because he wanted to do so.

    Again Bridges does not get it, if our motives desires necessitate/determine our actions/reactions, then again we are no different than billiard balls.

    In explaining what he means by determinism Bridges again states that every event is necessitated:

    Determinism means that all events are rendered unavoidable by the causes, which include our choices.

    All events are unavoidable? Can anyone say necessitated? If all events are unavoidable (or necessitated) then how are we different than billiard balls?

    Anti-Necessitarian’s friend

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  8. I have a friend who is a nucleotide. He says that philosophy is for morons. Anti-Necessitarian’s friend (Hi Henry/Robert/Arminobot!) doesn't get it.

    Since we're in the business of boosting our credentials by making vague appeals to unnamed sources of authority, a Greek god told me that the tortoise is fated to win the race against Achilles because otherwise literature would be wrong. However, another friend (who was a Mayan priest) thought the world would end before that day arrived.

    Since my two friends are obviously smart people, my conclusions are valid. Therefore.

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  9. God delivered Jesus by a determined purpose and perfect foresight "of all the steps which that involved".

    And our Lord knew this and two days before He was to be crucified, he told His disciples just that (Matt 26:2).

    Yet Jesus said to His disciples in the Garden, "My soul is exceedinging sorrowful, even unto death". Then He prayed, "O My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me, nevertheless, not as I will, but as You will."

    Also Jesus told Peter that he would deny Him 3 times. Not one, or a couple, but three, and before the rooster crowed. Amazing.

    And Peter did all this and yet his heart was torn asunder, and he cowered, and all his emotions were real, and his will was under attack. Then he went and wept with bitter tears.

    This is a good discussion. I like a lot what Genebriges says, very well done.

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  10. "Again Bridges does not get it, if our motives desires necessitate/determine our actions/reactions, then again we are no different than billiard balls."

    False Antithesis.

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  11. I have a friend, a physicist, instead of calling himself anti-Calvinist, he says that he is anti-necessatarian.

    Yes, Robert, Henry, Anonymous, and whatever other names you've posted under in a variety of different identities ranging from a seminary professor to a minister in a prison ministry...

    You know, I don't think you're any of these. Rather, because you lack the integrity to get your own blog, despite repeated requests, and your continued posting of the same arguments once answered, and your further emails to other persons outside of the staff of Triablogue complaining about your treatment, I think you are, in reality, not only a chronic liar but a prisoner in the facility.

    What Bridges does not get is that if God predetermines everything (including the acts of the will, desires, beliefs, everything involved when we do something), then everything is necessitated just like those billiard balls.

    You, dishonest false teacher that you are, keep conflating causality and providence, means and ends. The question is "how are these 'determined.'" We have a doctrine of primary and secondary causality that you keep ignoring. You simply waive your hand and dismiss it.

    I'll let Dr. Dagg answer you:

    http://founders.org/library/dagg_vol1/bk3c3.html#sec5


    The problem for you, Robert, is that if God's future foreknowledge is CERTAIN, then there is one and only one future. Why aren't you an Open Theist. You have, if you'll recall defended them on this very blog, so committed to libertarianism are you.

    You sir, are a will worshipper. Your idol is your own self-vaunted free will. I have news for you, Robert, there is but one God in this universe, and that is the God about which we write on this blog.
    By the way, Dr. Dagg would call you to repent for your sin in failing to delight in God's will and works. I agree, you have complained so many times that you are clearly in sin.

    Again Bridges does not get it, if our motives desires necessitate/determine our actions/reactions, then again we are no different than billiard balls.

    Of course, Robert, the dishonest false teacher who posts under a new identity all the time while complaining about his treatment here and, the whole while, trying to pawn himself off as a prison minister who is, ironically, trying to teach his people to have some moral integrity (can we say "hypocrite"?) has been answered time and again in the archives of this blog. Here he simply repeats the objection without interacting with a word of what I wrote.

    I'll ask him, what at least the sixth time if not the tenth: Please provide an exegetical basis for your action theory. We've been waiting for it for months. You keep saying you'll provide it, but you never do.

    You say we're "just like billard balls," but you don't demonstrate it. We've been over this before in replying to your "robot" analogy.

    All events are unavoidable? Can anyone say necessitated? If all events are unavoidable (or necessitated) then how are we different than billiard balls?

    We've answered this beforehand. When you actually have something new we'll reply.

    Oh, and one more time, the blogger software if FREE. Get your own blog and use it to your heart's content and stop cooptng ours. You are an inch from being banned. If you don't shape up, you can expect it soon.

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  12. steve...i've nothing negative to say about your post, just a Christian student of philosophy looking for some help. I'm sure your very busy, but would it be possible for you to e-mail me so that I can ask you a few questions. No worries either way, the e-mail is gregschnee (at) gmail . com. i'm curious about your background (even after having read your profile) and where you stand with Van Til. No desire to fight, just to learn.

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  13. Genembridges said:

    "3. "Determinism" in the context of our theology and with respect to agent causation refers not simply to God having predetermined an outcome, but the agency of the agent. In short, our desires, motives, etc. "determine" our actions/reactions.
    ...
    Determinism means that all events are rendered unavoidable by the causes, which include our choices.
    ...
    Calvinism, however, states that God accomplishes his will through the will of man; God controls both the ends and the means."

    Does this mean that God controls our will or choices? Are our current choices the unavoidable results of earlier causes/choices?

    I agree that fatalism, as you describe it, is not what I've seen advocated on this blog. It sounds like you and Steve are advocating the point that our own wills are constrained. Wouldn't this be a deeper form of "fatalism" (not only are we doomed, but we actively seek our doom and we have no choice but to want to seek it).

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  14. Does this mean that God controls our will or choices? Are our current choices the unavoidable results of earlier causes/choices?

    Actually, I've presented a a general exegetical argument here:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/09/when-all-means-some.html

    Now, the objection that the libertarian makes is generally, as Dr. Dagg I believe rightly notes, made without regard to the means that God employs, so they leave the impression that we say God does all of this by His direct power.

    Calvinism draws a distinction between a decree itself and providence, which speaks to the means by which the decree is executed.

    A decree is like a blueprint. It does nothing itself, but it does render an outcome certain. (eg. they speak to certainty).

    God works out his decrees by providence. Providence speaks to the means by which the decrees are executed (causality).

    From the Second London Baptist Confession:

    Chapter 3: Of God's Decree
    1._____ God hath decreed in himself, from all eternity, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably, all things, whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby is God neither the author of sin nor hath fellowship with any therein; nor is violence offered to the will of the creature, nor yet is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established; in which appears his wisdom in disposing all things, and power and faithfulness in accomplishing his decree.
    ( Isaiah 46:10; Ephesians 1:11; Hebrews 6:17; Romans 9:15, 18; James 1:13; 1 John 1:5; Acts 4:27, 28; John 19:11; Numbers 23:19; Ephesians 1:3-5 )

    2._____ Although God knoweth whatsoever may or can come to pass, upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything, because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.
    ( Acts 15:18; Romans 9:11, 13, 16, 18 )

    3._____ By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated, or foreordained to eternal life through Jesus Christ, to the praise of his glorious grace; others being left to act in their sin to their just condemnation, to the praise of his glorious justice.
    ( 1 Timothy 5:21; Matthew 25:34; Ephesians 1:5, 6; Romans 9:22, 23; Jude 4 )

    4.______These angels and men thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed, and their number so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished.
    ( 2 Timothy 2:19; John 13:18 )

    5._____ Those of mankind that are predestinated to life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any other thing in the creature as a condition or cause moving him thereunto.
    ( Ephesians 1:4, 9, 11; Romans 8:30; 2 Timothy 1:9; 1 Thessalonians 5:9; Romans 9:13, 16; Ephesians 2:5, 12 )

    6._____ As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so he hath, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained all the means thereunto; wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually called unto faith in Christ, by his Spirit working in due season, are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through faith unto salvation; neither are any other redeemed by Christ, or effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.
    ( 1 Peter 1:2; 2 Thessalonians 2:13; 1 Thessalonians 5:9, 10; Romans 8:30; 2 Thessalonians 2:13; 1 Peter 1:5; John 10:26; John 17:9; John 6:64 )

    7._____ The doctrine of the high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care, that men attending the will of God revealed in his Word, and yielding obedience thereunto, may, from the certainty of their effectual vocation, be assured of their eternal election; so shall this doctrine afford matter of praise, reverence, and admiration of God, and of humility, diligence, and abundant consolation to all that sincerely obey the gospel.
    ( 1 Thessalonians 1:4, 5; 2 Peter 1:10; Ephesians 1:6; Romans 11:33; Romans 11:5, 6, 20; Luke 10:20 )

    Chapter 5: Of Divine Providence
    1._____ God the good Creator of all things, in his infinite power and wisdom doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, to the end for the which they were created, according unto his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his own will; to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, justice, infinite goodness, and mercy.
    ( Hebrews 1:3; Job 38:11; Isaiah 46:10, 11; Psalms 135:6; Matthew 10:29-31; Ephesians 1:11 )

    2._____ Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly; so that there is not anything befalls any by chance, or without his providence; yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.
    ( Acts 2:23; Proverbs 16:33; Genesis 8:22 )

    3._____ God, in his ordinary providence maketh use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them at his pleasure.
    ( Acts 27:31, 44; Isaiah 55:10, 11; Hosea 1:7; Romans 4:19-21; Daniel 3:27 )

    4._____ The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God, so far manifest themselves in his providence, that his determinate counsel extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sinful actions both of angels and men; and that not by a bare permission, which also he most wisely and powerfully boundeth, and otherwise ordereth and governeth, in a manifold dispensation to his most holy ends; yet so, as the sinfulness of their acts proceedeth only from the creatures, and not from God, who, being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin.
    ( Romans 11:32-34; 2 Samuel 24:1, 1 Chronicles 21:1; 2 Kings 19:28; Psalms 76;10; Genesis 1:20; Isaiah 10:6, 7, 12; Psalms 1:21; 1 John 2:16 )

    5._____ The most wise, righteous, and gracious God doth oftentimes leave for a season his own children to manifold temptations and the corruptions of their own hearts, to chastise them for their former sins, or to discover unto them the hidden strength of corruption and deceitfulness of their hearts, that they may be humbled; and to raise them to a more close and constant dependence for their support upon himself; and to make them more watchful against all future occasions of sin, and for other just and holy ends. So that whatsoever befalls any of his elect is by his appointment, for his glory, and their good.
    ( 2 Chronicles 32:25, 26, 31; 2 Corinthians 12:7-9; Romans 8:28 )

    6._____ As for those wicked and ungodly men whom God, as the righteous judge, for former sin doth blind and harden; from them he not only withholdeth his grace, whereby they might have been enlightened in their understanding, and wrought upon their hearts; but sometimes also withdraweth the gifts which they had, and exposeth them to such objects as their corruption makes occasion of sin; and withal, gives them over to their own lusts, the temptations of the world, and the power of Satan, whereby it comes to pass that they harden themselves, under those means which God useth for the softening of others.
    ( Romans 1:24-26, 28; Romans 11:7, 8; Deuteronomy 29:4; Matthew 13:12; Deuteronomy 2:30; 2 Kings 8:12, 13; Psalms 81:11, 12; 2 Thessalonians 2:10-12; Exodus 8:15, 32; Isaiah 6:9, 10; 1 Peter 2:7, 8 )

    7._____ As the providence of God doth in general reach to all creatures, so after a more special manner it taketh care of his church, and disposeth of all things to the good thereof.
    ( 1 Timothy 4:10; Amos 9:8, 9; Isaiah 43:3-5 )

    Generally speaking, I also like the old distinction between God's absolute and ordinary power, as applied to direct actions and ordinary providence. God can bring an outcome about by direct action. For example: miracles, regeneration, the virgin birth, etc.

    Otherwise, he acts by ordinary means for example in nature, the laws of nature, in nature and with respect to men's choices by letting things fall out according to their nature, leaving things alone, inaction, withholding constraining grace (as in the Fall), etc. This is what we mean by "permission."

    The difference between the Calvinist and the Arminian/Libertarian with respect to permission isn't over the fact of permission but the nature of it.

    The Arminian will say that God permitted the Fall - ineffecaciously. Alternatively, he might say, "God decreed the fall by permitting the possibility of it."

    The Calvinist simply says, "God decreed the Fall efficaciously." However, even the old Supralapsarians will deny that God decreed the Fall by putting fresh evil in men's hearts. Rather, He simply let it happen, and, yes, He planned it that way from the beginning which is why it is effacious. That's why Hebrews speaks of an ETERNAL covenant from before the foundation of the world. See also Romans 11:32.

    Wouldn't this be a deeper form of "fatalism" (not only are we doomed, but we actively seek our doom and we have no choice but to want to seek it).

    Well, no, because in fatalism, you're a victim of impersonal forces and/or the outcomes happen no matter what you do. See also:

    Determinism, Chance and Freedom
    by John M. Frame
    [“Determinism, Chance and Freedom,” for IVP Dictionary of Apologetics.]I believe this is online too. Check Monergism.com



    The issue, like Steve said, is what lies behind your choices. God is not putting fresh evil in men's hearts. He is,however, allowing them to go their own way, and, since He is under no constraint to give them the grace not to do so (that's why it would be grace, He's not obligated), they are to blame for their own evil.

    This will get us back to the Fall, and the fact of the matter is simply this: Adam was the best of us. God chose him and not you or me, but if it was you or me, we would have made the same choice, so we are still responsible for our predicament (sin).


    What God decrees for His glory, men do with their own motives. For example, God hardened Pharaoh’s heart in order to judge Egypt’s gods. Pharaoh’s will was not violated, in that God allowed Pharaoh’s love of evil, which was his natural state, to increase, keeping Israel from leaving. Pharaoh did not keep them from leaving in order to glorify God and worship Him. He did it because he hated God, Moses, Aaron, and the slaves. What God did for a righteous motive, Pharaoh did out of hatred for God. The motive behind an act, therefore, determines whether or not it is truly sinful. In theory, if Pharaoh had done what he did to glorify and worship God, he would not have been condemned, however, a man that does such a thing is, in reality acting in faith and love for God and would have to be regenerate. Such a man would not hold Israel back; he would have released Israel and taken down Egypt’s gods. That was not God’s purpose for Pharaoh. For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, "FOR THIS VERY PURPOSE I RAISED YOU UP, TO DEMONSTRATE MY POWER IN YOU, AND THAT MY NAME MIGHT BE PROCLAIMED THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE EARTH." So then He has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires.
    God is the author of evil, in the sense that He is first cause of all things. This simply goes with pay grade. His decrees, through either action or inaction render events necessary, but, evil is the result of permission, not His direct causation, or a result of His judicial hardening of sinners, an act of justice Scripture supports repeatedly, as in the above text and in Romans 1. Nothing happens that compels a man or demon to act in a way it does not wish to act or against its nature. He may withhold constraining grace, as in the fall, in order to render a thing certain, but the agent of the evil, in this case Adam simply acts in accordance with his nature as a second cause, for reasons and motives sufficient for himself and arising from his own nature. Men thus do what God decrees, but for motives all their own. In so doing, they may incur judgment. In this way men act as infallibly as if they had no liberty, yet as freely as if there was no decree rendering their acts certain. See, for example, the predestination of Judas betrayal and Jesus crucifixion. These men did, with evil desires, what God desired and planned to happen since before creation, for Jesus is the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world itself.

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