Scripture does not speak directly to the question of whether or not it is biblically appropriate to use contraceptive measures. There is no explicit biblical passage that mentions the term "contraception," nor are there any plain texts that specifically address the issue of whether or not it might be appropriate to use contraceptive measures. This said, however, one should not assume that Scripture is completely silent on the matter.
The Question of the Legitimacy of Contraception in General
As noted above, Genesis 1:28 identifies procreation as a primary end of the marital union, while Psalm 127 describes children as a blessing from God. Thus, when considering the question of whether or not to use contraception, one must start from the perspective that having children is the expected norm for marriages and should be understood as a good gift from a loving heavenly Father. In the words of Albert Mohler, "We must start with a rejection of the contraceptive mentality that sees pregnancy and children as impositions to be avoided rather than as gifts to be received, loved, and nurtured. This contraceptive mentality is an insidious attack upon God's glory in creation, and the Creator's gift of procreation to the married couple."
Having recognized the important connection between sexual expression and childbearing, however, does it follow that every act of sexual intercourse must "be open" to conception? Those who answer this question in the affirmative will often cite the Genesis 38:6-10 account of Onan and Tamar in support of their position. In this passage, God takes the life of Er, the oldest son of Judah, because he was "evil in the sight of the Lord" (NASB) leaving his wife Tamar a widow. The Hebrew custom known as levirate marriage (Deut. 25:5-10) stipulated that when a married man died without leaving offspring, his widow should marry the dead man's next closest male relative. The first child from that subsequent marriage would then take on the name of the older brother and become his heir so that the name of the first husband "will not be blotted out from Israel" (Deut. 25:6, NIV).
In the present instance, Onan, as Er's next oldest brother, therefore was to take on the responsibility of providing Tamar with a child. According to Genesis 38:9, however, while Onan did indeed have sexual intercourse with Tamar, he prevented her from conceiving a child by withdrawing from her prior to ejaculation. Instead of providing her with an heir for her first husband, Scripture indicates that he "wasted his seed on the ground" (NASB). As a result, his action was "displeasing in the sight of the Lord," and God took his life as well (v. 10, NASB).
Roman Catholics typically cite this passage to suggest that what particularly displeased the Lord was the interruption of the sexual process for the purpose of preventing procreation. Every act of sexual intercourse, it is argued, ought to be open to procreation. Thus, the interruption by Onan, as well as any form of interruption or use of artificial means to prevent conception during sexual intercourse, is morally reprehensible. In their view, all means of contraception that interrupt the natural process of procreation are contrary to God's will.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, it appears that the Lord's displeasure in Genesis 38:10 ought not to be equated with the prevention of pregnancy per se but with the particularly exploitive, abusive, and wasteful way in which Onan carried out his sexual relations with Tamar. Deuteronomy 25:5-10 indicates that if the brother refuses to complete his "duty" to provide an offspring, the penalty is not death but shaming (vv. 9-10). It would appear, then, that the severity of the punishment indicates that reasons beside the refusal to provide an offspring for his deceased brother prompted God to take Onan's life.
How, then, ought oneo reason biblically with regard to contraception? Scripture indicates that, in addition to procreation, God created marriage to meet other ends as well. Companionship through the development of a sacred marital bond (Gen. 2:18, 24), sexual pleasure (Prov. 5:15-23, Song of Songs), and fidelity (1 Cor. 7:1-9), to name but a few, are all biblically appropriate purposes for which God created the marital sexual union. Therefore, while it seems clear that over the course of their marriage a couple ought to seek to have children (perhaps even many, see Ps. 127:5), it does not follow that in every particular sexual encounter the couple need to refrain from the use of contraception. The sexual encounter in marriage retains a high value for the purposes of union, pleasure, fidelity, and so on, even in the event that a couple uses contraception as a part of their family planning. Indeed, "[t]he focus on 'each and every act' of sexual intercourse within a faithful marriage that is open to the gift of children goes beyond the biblical demand."
Morally Permissible and Impermissible Forms of Contraception
Concluding that the use of contraception is morally permissible in general, however, does not mean that any and every particular form of birth control is morally acceptable. Indeed, because passages like Exodus 20:13 specifically prohibit the taking of innocent life, the "profound respect for life in the prenatal stage" found in the Judeo-Christian ethic must also influence one's perspective on which forms of birth control are biblically permissible.
Acceptable Forms of Birth Control
Which forms of birth control are morally acceptable? In short, the answer is that it is only those that are contraceptive in nature, that is, those that exclusively prohibit conception. Resting on this foundational principle, one can then fairly easily evaluate which forms of family planning are appropriate and which are not.
Acceptable forms include natural methods such as abstinence (the only biblically legitimate option for those who are not married) and the rhythm or calendar method (in its various forms such as relying on the body temperature cycles or timing of ovulation and fertility periods).
In addition, artificial methods that exclusively seek to prevent conception are also morally acceptable. These include "barrier methods" such as a diaphragm, a cervical cap, and condoms and spermicides such as foams, creams, sponges, or vaginal suppositories.
Unacceptable Forms of Birth Control
Unacceptable forms of family planning include all forms of induced abortion. Thus, the intrauterine device or "IUD" is an unacceptable method, because its primary function is to create an unstable environment for the fertilized egg to implant in the uterine wall by depleting the endometrial lining, making it incapable of supporting the life of the child.
RU-486 or the so-called "abortion" or "morning after" pill is likewise morally unacceptable since its primary function is to prevent the implantation of a new fetus in the uterine wall. The drug works to directly prohibit the establishment and continuation of the pregnancy by blocking the body's natural secretion of progesterone, the vital hormone that prepares the uterus to receive a fertilized egg and to help maintain the pregnancy once it occurs.
Methods Requiring Special Mention and Extra Care
Special mention needs to be made at this point about two forms of birth control widely practiced by Christians and non-Christians alike: sterilization and the use of "the pill."
Sterilization as a means of contraception involves a surgical procedure designed to permanently terminate a person's fertility. For the male, a vasectomy blocks the vas deferens (ejaculatory duct) and thus prevents the sperm from leaving the body during ejaculation. For the female, "tubal occlusion" is the procedure that effectively blocks a woman's fallopian tubes in order to prevent sperm from coming into contact with the woman's eggs, thereby preventing fertilization.
There are several important considerations with sterilization that may caution us against its use. For instance, it is an elective procedure that involves the intentional and permanent setting aside or inactivation of a bodily function. The permanence of the procedure makes it a different case from the use of a condom or other temporary measures. In addition, we might ask whether it is ever right to remove a part of one's body (cf. Lev. 21:20; Deut. 23:1; 1 Cor. 6:19) simply for convenience's sake, and whether this is the proper way to treat the body as the "temple of the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 6:19).
In both Old and New Testaments, Scripture indicates that while care for the physical body is not to be of primary concern, it should be treated with honor and respect (cf., e.g., Gen. 2:7; Ex. 21:22-25; 1 Cor. 6:12-20). As ethicist John Jefferson Davis contends,
The apostle's point is that the believer does not have the right to exercise unlimited dominion over his or her body but should view the body as a trust from the Lord, to be cared for in ways that are glorifying to God. And surgical operation -- such as sterilization -- is not merely a personal "choice," but a decision that needs to be seen within the biblical framework of stewardship of the human body. Given the fact that our human bodies are a trust from God, and in light of the positive valuation placed on human procreative powers and large families in the Old Testament, these powers should not be rejected or surgically destroyed without compelling justification.While the subject has yet to receive adequate attention among evangelicals, some might respond that the same reasoning adduced above regarding the appropriateness of using certain forms of contraception applies here as well. God has given us intelligence and powers of judgment to fulfill his command to "be fruitful and multiply" in our individual personal circumstances in keeping with scriptural commands and principles (such as the sacredness of human life). In light of our conclusion that it is fallacious to interpret this command to mean that every act of marital sexual intercourse must be open to procreation, it would seem appropriate that a given couple could determine that they have reached the point where they believe God would not have them conceive any more children. The question, then, becomes whether or not sterilization is a legitimate means of ensuring that no additional children are conceived. Indeed, while not every Christian would agree that sterilization involves an improper violation of one's body as the temple of the Holy Spirit, it is vital that believers submit their personal desires to a prayerful consideration of what is scripturally permissible.
While arguments can be made both against and in favor of sterilization as a form of birth control for Christians, therefore, since Scripture does not directly address the various forms of modern sterilization practices, it seems appropriate to refrain from dogmatism in this area. Where Scripture does not directly address a given matter, biblically informed principles must be applied to specific issues with wisdom and care. We have known godly couples who assured us that they pursued sterilization in an attitude of prayer and trusting the Lord. We have also known other, equally godly, couples who later regretted having followed through with this procedure and sought to reverse it in order to have more children. Both cases suggest that it is imperative that a couple who would use a given method honestly search their hearts and motives during the process of making such a decision and be certain that pragmatic considerations and personal desires do not override scriptural principles or unduly shape what they perceive to be the leading of the Holy Spirit.
Another birth control method requiring special mention and extra care is what is popularly known as "the pill." Because of its wide acceptance in the culture, some Christians may be surprised to learn that the moral acceptability of "the pill" (and the many various applications of the same basic chemical products) is under question by Christian ethicists. Yet, while the convenience and effectiveness of this form of birth control have certainly commended it to many, there are serious moral questions that must be addressed before a decision is made as to whether or not "the pill" qualifies as an acceptable form of contraception.
There are two basic categories of hormonally based chemical contraceptives: combined and progestin-only contraceptives. Combined contraceptives (containing both estrogen and progestin) come in both an oral form (usually referred to as COCs -- combination oral contraceptives -- such as Ortho Cyclen or Ortho-trycyclen) and an injectable form (CICs -- combined injectable contraceptives -- such as Cyclofem and Mesigyna). Progestin-only contraceptives likewise are produced in oral and injectable form. Progestin-only pills (POPs) contain the hormone progestin and are taken daily, while progestin-only injectable contraceptives (PICs) such as Depro-Prevara and Noristerat require an injection roughly once every two to three months. Norplant is another version of progestin-based birth control involving a surgical procedure to insert small tubules containing progestin under the skin. This method is said to be effective for years.
According to the Physician's Desk Reference, all of these versions of both combined contraceptives and progestin-only contraceptives work by employing the same three basic mechanisms of action. The first of these is to prevent ovulation (a contraceptive mechanism). The second is to alter the cervical mucus buildup which increases the difficulty of the sperm entering the uterus and thereby fertilizing the egg (a contraceptive mechanism). The third mechanism -- in all forms of both combined contraceptives and progestin-only contraceptives -- whether intended or not, is to inhibit the endometrium (uterine lining), thereby making it incapable of supporting the life of the newly conceived child should fertilization take place. This third mechanism, then, is not a contraceptive measure but an abortifacient, that is, the mechanism works as a "fail safe" means to control birth if the other two mechanisms do not prevent contraception.
PDRHealth.com, a web service provider which bases its information on the material from the Physician's Desk Reference, describes these three mechanisms in the following manner:
Suppression of ovulation is the main mode by which OCs, Depo-Provera, and Lunelle prevent pregnancy; the implant system causes ovulation suppression about 50 percent of the time. However, throughout each pill cycle, and continuously with Norplant implants and Depo-Provera, the mucous covering the cervix -- the site where sperm enters the uterus -- stays thick and sticky, making it very difficult for sperm to get through. This gooey impediment also acts on the sperm cell itself. It prevents fertilization by interfering with chemical changes inside the sperm that allow it to penetrate an egg's outer coating.To summarize, with regard to both the combined contraceptives and progestin-only contraceptives the main moral problem occurs when the first and second mechanisms of action fail (prevention of ovulation and of fertilization due to mucus buildup) and fertilization of an egg takes place. At this point these methods cease to be contraceptive in nature and function as abortifacients. While the chances of the first two methods failing are admittedly low (more so with combined contraceptives), given the fact that so many women are using these forms of birth control there is no question that for some "the pill" or its equivalents are functioning at least at times to terminate the life of a conceived child. Indeed, if the "profound respect for life in the prenatal stages" of a child's development discussed earlier holds the moral authority it ought to, then perhaps it is right to reevaluate whether a low chance of aborting one's child is worth the risk at all.
Even if ovulation and fertilization do take place, hormonal methods provide another measure of protection: changes to the uterine lining. Normally, estrogen initiates the thickening of the lining of the uterus in the first part of the cycle, while progesterone kicks in later to help the lining mature. Since both hormones are present throughout the pill cycle, and progestin is supplied continuously by implants and the shot, the usual hormonal variations are masked and the lining rarely has a chance to develop enough to nurture a fertilized egg. [Emphasis added by author.]
Finally, due to the somewhat enigmatic use of terminology relating to this subject, those who wisely seek advice from a primary care physician and/or OB/GYN ought to ask questions with precision and care. For example, a young couple may ask their doctor whether or not a particular form of oral or chemical contraceptive runs the risk of causing an abortion. Depending on how that doctor defines "abortion" and "pregnancy," the answer may vary. For some the word "abortion" is understood to mean the termination of a pregnancy. The term "pregnancy," however, may be understood to mean that the fertilized egg has already implanted in the uterine wall. If this is how the doctor defines pregnancy, he or she may indicate that combined contraceptives and progestin-only contraceptives do not cause abortion because they do not terminate the growth of a fertilized egg once it has become embedded in the uterine wall. What is left unclear to that couple, however, is that "the pill" may indeed function to terminate the life of a newly conceived child by preventing the fertilized egg from implanting in the uterine wall where the "pregnancy" would otherwise begin.
For this reason, then, instead of inquiring as to whether or not a certain form of combined contraceptives and progestin-only contraceptives "can function to cause an abortion," the wise couple will seek to determine whether or not the combined contraceptive or progestin-only contraceptive functions to inhibit the growth of the endometrial lining. If so, it could then prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterine wall and thereby cause the death of a newly conceived child. Other points of clarification that might prove helpful when discussing this issue with one's physician or OB/GYN are: (1) whether or not the method of birth control prevents fertilization of the egg 100 percent of the time; (2) whether or not there are any products on the market that have been proven by clear documentation to prevent fertilization of the egg 100 percent of the time; and (3) whether or not there are any forms of combined contraceptives or progestin-only contraceptives that do not change the endometrium (the lining of the uterine wall) so that it cannot sustain a fertilized egg that might otherwise implant and grow toward birth. To date, this author has not been able to substantiate an affirmative answer to any of these questions.
By way of conclusion, with regard to sterilization it is important to reiterate the need to take great care in avoiding dogmatism on matters that Scripture either does not prohibit or does not directly address. It is the principle of honoring "the temple of the Holy Spirit" that one must seriously consider before deciding whether or not to employ such a method. With regard to the use of "the pill," moral justification for its use is much more tenuous due to the simple fact that the principle of the sanctity of life directly applies. In both cases, however, it would seem that the consideration of scriptural principles ought to lead one away from employing sterilization of "the pill" with its many variations as a means of family planning.
I want to add a comment about "the Pill", to head off some counterargument that would miss the point.
ReplyDeleteYou referred to the Pill's third function--inhibiting the endometrial wall, interfering with the implantation of the fertilized egg--as an abortifacient rather than a contraceptive.
Well, the current convention treats implantation as the beginning of pregnancy. Anything that ends the pregnancy after implantation is thus an abortifacient, but anything before that is still classified as a contraceptive. So even if the Pill does prevent implantation, the technically-correct medical term is still "contraception". They would say that an abortion had not taken place.
But if someone makes a point of that, they're playing word games. If conception happens at fertilization, then the Pill would be an abortifacient. That's how most people think. And more importantly, that's what we're concerned about.
So if advocates of the Pill try to tell people who are worried about the Pill that it only acts as a contraceptive, they're deceiving. They may be using the terminology with technical correctness, but they're using it to conceal the facts, not reveal them.
It's not clear to me that an egg at pre-implantation stage represents a human life. Consider the following scenario. You take such a fertilized zygote and split it up into 10 parts. In theory all 10 parts could be implanted and grow up into 10 different human beings, 10 identical twins.
ReplyDeleteNow consider that you take these 10 parts and you join them back together. Nothing has died, all the cells remain alive, but now they are together they will grow up into one person only. Have you just "killed" 9 babies, without actually killing anything at all?
Imagine this split happens naturally prior to implantation. Then imagine you take some chemical that causes one of the parts not to implant. Did you kill a baby? What if instead you took that part and joined it back to the other half thus causing only one baby to be born. Did someone die?
It seems to me there is an argument that until it grows to the point that it can't be split, it is not a human being.
Consider another example. You take a cell sample from a zygote for medical tests, the same way you would get a skin sample from a human being. In theory that sample, being the special cells they are, could grow up into an identical twin. If you kill a few cells to do a test, is that killing a person? What if the original set of cells died somehow through accident, is the sample now that original person, because it could grow up into the same person the main bit would have? Or is it a different person to the original bit? Or is it no person at all, if your intention was just to take a sample?
ReplyDeleteI agree with most of this (and Kostenberger's book is a must-read) but I have doubts about the less-than-100%-safety argument.
ReplyDeleteI know full well that I cannot drive a car with 100% safety. There's always a non-zero chance (however small) that someone will be killed as a consequence of my driving a car: either me, or a passenger, or another driver, or a pedestrian. Does it follow from Christian ethical principles (including the sanctity of life) that I should never drive a car?
Any number of parallel arguments could be constructed with reference to common everyday practices.
Moreover, one can ask further questions about the natural circumstances of conception and implantation (i.e., leaving contraceptive methods out of the picture). If there are certain activities (e.g., kinds of physical exercise) that are known to increase -- however slightly -- the probability of a fertilized egg not implanting properly, is a sexually active woman morally obliged to strictly avoid them? What about foods or drinks that increase that probability?
"It's not clear to me that an egg at pre-implantation stage represents a human life. Consider the following scenario. You take such a fertilized zygote and split it up into 10 parts. In theory all 10 parts could be implanted and grow up into 10 different human beings, 10 identical twins."
ReplyDeleteWell, the pre-implanted fertelized egg has its own 46 chromosomes, different from both the mother and father, it is growing, taking in nutrients, and oxygen. This satisfies criteria for life. That is, no one doubts that this entity is *living.* So, what species is it a member of?
Also, why can we not say that the fertilized egg, the conceptus, is a person that, at that stage in life, *has the potential of* becoming two (or more) people? Everyone one of us had that potential latent in us at that stage in our life. Just like we all had the potential to develope a brain, heart, lungs, etc. Most of us just don't fulfill that potential.
So it's not clear to me that potential to develope into more persons implies that the fertilized egg isn't a person. I don't see how that follows.
Anonymous said:
ReplyDelete---
It seems to me there is an argument that until it grows to the point that it can't be split, it is not a human being.
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What is "it" then?
To whom it may concern...
ReplyDeleteaaplog.org/decook (dot) htm
*add "www." and replace the (dot) with a "."*
This is the reported findings of a a more recent handful of studies by Pro-life Christian ob/gyns who believe life begins at fertilization.
They argue that in hormonal contraceptives, the third preventative measure in preventing conception, the thinning of the uterine lining, does not affect the post-fertilized egg. The egg itself produces hormones to thinken the lining when it is fertilized. So, if an egg happens to get fertilized, the pill does not prevent a healthy pregnancy. Therefore, it is not an abortificant.
The report sites many resources. It is well documented.
Still thinking throught this subject, but I thought this report was good food for thought.
BTW, you may get lost if you are not very familiar with the medical terms for the various parts of the female reproductive anatomy, the stages of the hormonal cycle, etc.
" it is growing, taking in nutrients, and oxygen. This satisfies criteria for life. That is, no one doubts that this entity is *living.* So, what species is it a member of?"
ReplyDeleteWhat species is it if you take a cell sample from your skin and grow it in a pietrie dish? They grow, they take in oxygen and nutrients etc. I don't think it's any species, it's just a group of cells from the human species, that are not in themselves a human being.
"Also, why can we not say that the fertilized egg, the conceptus, is a person that, at that stage in life, *has the potential of* becoming two (or more) people?"
Well, you didn't interact with the example. If I split it in half, have I now got two people? If so, have I killed someone by putting them back together?
If you say no, then presumably there is no harm killing one of the halves, either for good reason (medical test) or not. If I can kill half, then which half. Imagine I give half to two different scientists. They both know WHAT they've got, but they don't know what the other scientist intends to do. If you can kill half, then each scientist has no objective way of deciding if he has a human being or not. This is not good for the theory that it is a human being.
On the other hand, if you put the cells back together, not killing a single cell, have you killed a human being?
Anonymous is engaging in a lot of obvious philosophical errors here, including trafficing in ambiguity and attempting to use an extremely rare possibility to determine morality for the norm.
ReplyDeleteFirst, notice that anon has never bothered to define what a human being is. However, it is obvious that s/he (from here on out, since anon is too cowardly to present a name, I'll refer to him as a universal "he") has some kind of definition of a human being, for he maintains:
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It seems to me there is an argument that until it grows to the point that it can't be split, it is not a human being.
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There was a reason I asked if this zygote is not a human being then what exactly is it? I don't think anon has an answer to this because anon hasn't thought it through.
Ambiguity can be found when anon says:
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If I split it in half, have I now got two people?
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And later:
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On the other hand, if you put the cells back together, not killing a single cell, have you killed a human being?
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So is he talking about people or he talking about human beings? Assuming "people" means "person", does anon even know what the difference between a person and a being is? My first guess is that he does not.
But perhaps he is just saying "People = human being." In which case we're not looking at personhood at all, which actually makes his argument even weaker. In fact, it's the opposite of the common argument (which is that sure, human zygotes are human beings but they aren't human persons and therefore it's okay to kill one of them).
In any case, should anon care to define his terms I'd be happy to engage him in a discussion. But I don't feel like defining his terms for him because he's too lazy to.
"What species is it if you take a cell sample from your skin and grow it in a pietrie dish? They grow, they take in oxygen and nutrients etc. I don't think it's any species, it's just a group of cells from the human species, that are not in themselves a human being."
ReplyDeleteTypical of the anti-scientific mindset if pro-choicers. Probably believes in the theory of macro-evfolution too. :-)
Let's analyze your claim:
1) Skin cells? Whose cells? You said a sample from *my* skin. So, those cells are *my* cells. Now, what about the zygote? You speak of those cells. Since they have a *dostinct* genetic code, they are thus not the father's or the mother's cells. So, *who* do they belong do? A "group of cells" belong to people. There are no ownerless cells! So, who ownes *this group* of cells? DNA is unique. No one else has the same sequence. So, *who* has this particular sequence.
2) No new genetic information is needed for this "group of cells" (its actually a single cell at this stage of the debate) to develope, naturally, into an adult. Not so with some of my skin cells.
3) The vast majority of geneticists agree that a brand new human life begins at conception (they may not grant *personhood* though).
4) If the conceptus isn't a human, then you were never a conceptus. That seems counter-intuitive.
5) I don't know how your cultured skin cells grow? What do they grow into? If you are talking about cloning, then does this mean that *you* are not a person? If the argument is that the zygote can become another zygote by cell division - cloning, basically - then this argument would bear against *your* being a human!
6) On physicalist assumptions, *you* are just "a clump of cells." Can we "kill" you? Whta makes you different? You *look* different? Are a biggot? Prejudicial? You judge others by how they look? If not, then what?
7) I deny what you said about a clump of cells detached from the body. Furthermore, *those* cells are not the offspring of two parents. Two parents create offspring of the same kind.
8) If you're the same person as who I was responding to, what is the difference between the pre-implanted human and the 1 day old implanted human? Thus if you're the same person, you undercut your argument. If not, you're not responding to the question I was addressing.
"Well, you didn't interact with the example. If I split it in half, have I now got two people? If so, have I killed someone by putting them back together?"
7) If that was *your* example, then you beat yourself. See (6).
8) You didn't deal with my argument. You were trying to prove that the pre-implanted being *was not* human life. I tried to show that it was. Those arguments stand regardless of your argument from non standard cases.
9) Since this could happen *to you,* then you're not a human. Reductio.
10) If you cut an earthworm in half, and then a new one grows and you step on it, did you kill it?
11) Yes, if you twinned the conceptus and brought forth genetically distinct individuals all with the capacities to develope into adults, and then you recombined them, those individuals would have been killed.
12) Philosopher Robert Wennberg provides the following story:
"Imagine that we lived in a world in which a certain small percentage of teenagers replicated themselves by some mysterious natural means, splitting in two upon reaching their sixteenth birthday. We would not in the least be inclined to conclude that no human being could therefore be considered a person prior to becoming sixteen years of age; nor would we conclude that life could be taken with greater impunity prior to replication than afterward. The real oddity -- to press the parallel -- would be two teenagers becoming one.
However, in all of this we still would not judge the individual's claim to life to be undermined in any way. We might puzzle over questions of personal identity... but we would not allow these strange replications and fusions to influence our thinking about an individual's right to life. Nor therefore does it seem that such considerations are relevant in determining the point at which an individual might assume a right to life in utero."
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDelete"They argue that in hormonal contraceptives, the third preventative measure in preventing conception, the thinning of the uterine lining, does not affect the post-fertilized egg. The egg itself produces hormones to thinken the lining when it is fertilized. So, if an egg happens to get fertilized, the pill does not prevent a healthy pregnancy. Therefore, it is not an abortificant."
ReplyDelete1) Well this is ignorant, I think. Some woman do not produce progesterone EVEN AFTER implantation. This happened we my wife and me. We lost one implanted baby. The next time she got pregnant, her progesterone levels started to fall, she was put on progesterone pills for the first trimester, we have this baby.
2) Next, it is misleading to refer to the baby (conceptus) as a "fertilized egg." The "egg" is a part of the mother. The "fertilizer" is a part of the father. Bothe cease to exist. The "fertilized egg" is a *new individual entity that is genetically distinct from both the mother and father.* To call it an "egg," even a "fertilized one," is to prejudice the case by implying that it is still part of the mother's body, genetic code, etc.
3)
(3.1) The geneticist who discovered that down syndrome children had an extra chromosome said, "To accept the fact that, after fertilization has taken place, a new human has come into being is no longer a matter of taste or opinion. The human nature of the human being from conception to old age is not a metaphysical conception. It is plain experimental evidence."
(3.2) professor of medical genetics and a physician at the prestigious Mayo Clinic, give a perspective from science: “I think we can now also say that the question of the beginning of life–when life begins–is no longer a question for theological or philosophical dispute. It is an established scientific fact. Theologians and philosophers may go on to debate the meaning of life or purpose of life, but it is an established fact that all life, including human life, begins at the moment of conception.”
(3.3) Ronan O' Rahlly and Fabiola Muller, Human Embryology & Teratology (3rd
ed.)(New York: Wiley-Liss, 2001): "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization ... is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is formed when the chromosomes of the male and female pronuclei blend in the oocyte."
(3.4) Frank Beckwith, Defending Life, 2007, p.69. "The U.S. Senate Subcommittee, which cited four of the above authorities in its report, made the observation that 'No witness [who testified before the subcommittee] raised any evidence to refute the biological fact that from the moment of conception there exists a distinct individual who is alive and a member of the human species. No witness challenged the scientific consensus that unborn children are human beings, insofar as the term is used mean lving beings of the human species.'"
4) The conceptus of a white baby can be inserted in the womb of a black mother and brought forth. The conceptus is not "part of" the black mother's body, nor the white mother's body. So, whose body is the unified cell part of?
5) The ability to transmit hormones is a *functionalist* account of persons. What does this have to do with the *essence* of a person? One could just as arbitrailly say that those humans that don't *function* as sports stars aren't really human.
6) If human life doesn't begin at conception, then we were not conceived.
"Since they have a *dostinct* genetic code, they are thus not the father's or the mother's cells. So, *who* do they belong do?"
ReplyDeleteI question the assumption that a unique genetic code is equivalent to a human being. For one thing we know that identical twins have the same genetic code. If I take a cell from an identical twin, whose cells are they? What if I take the sample before they are split? You can't identify who "owns" those cells. For another, one can change one's genetic code through gene therapy, and yet nobody would therefore claim you were thereafter a different person.
"No new genetic information is needed for this "group of cells" (its actually a single cell at this stage of the debate) to develope, naturally, into an adult. Not so with some of my skin cells."
The same goes for a split zygote, which one joins back together with its other half. Is this killing a human being without killing?
"3) The vast majority of geneticists agree that a brand new human life begins at conception (they may not grant *personhood* though)."
Obviously they are at least partly wrong, because you cannot say at this stage how many human lives may or may not result. If you are an identical twin, when did your unique life start? At conception, or when you split?
"5) I don't know how your cultured skin cells grow? What do they grow into?"
They grow into more cells of the same kind. Skin cells beget more skin cells, etc.
" If the argument is that the zygote can become another zygote by cell division - cloning, basically - then this argument would bear against *your* being a human!"
I wasn't talking about cloning. That is something entirely different.
You do raise another problem though. If I take my genetic material and insert it into an egg (i.e. Cloning), have I now created a human being? What if I take the material back out of the egg again? Have I killed a human being? What if I put it in and out 10 times, have I killed 0, 1 or 10 human beings? What if I take the genes out of one egg and put them in another egg? Have I killed the human being, or did I save the human being when I put the genes in the new egg? Or did I create a second human being when I put it in the 2nd egg?
All these problems arise when one considers life at this stage to be a human being. Can you solve them all?
"6) On physicalist assumptions, *you* are just "a clump of cells." Can we "kill" you? Whta makes you different?"
I'm an identifiable human being. I'm not maybe zero, one, or ten human beings. I'm exactly one.
"8) If you're the same person as who I was responding to, what is the difference between the pre-implanted human and the 1 day old implanted human? Thus if you're the same person, you undercut your argument. If not, you're not responding to the question I was addressing."
What is the difference between one egg and one sperm and the later resulting egg? Similar question. The process has moved a bit further on, that is the difference.
"10) If you cut an earthworm in half, and then a new one grows and you step on it, did you kill it?"
As far as I know, worms have one head, and if you cut one in half, the best you can hope for is one half survives.
"11) Yes, if you twinned the conceptus and brought forth genetically distinct individuals all with the capacities to develope into adults, and then you recombined them, those individuals would have been killed."
Uh, when you "twin" a zygote by splitting it, they are not genetically distinct, they are identical. That is the point.
"Imagine that we lived in a world in which a certain small percentage of teenagers replicated themselves by some mysterious natural means, splitting in two upon reaching their sixteenth birthday. We would not in the least be inclined to conclude that no human being could therefore be considered a person prior to becoming sixteen years of age; nor would we conclude that life could be taken with greater impunity prior to replication than afterward."
The other question: if teenagers split, and took 9 months to grow another half back, would it be killing someone to join them up again?
Of course, such a conception of human beings, that they could split after becoming unique mental individuals, would be a radically different conception of human beings.
Anonymous sez,
ReplyDelete"I question the assumption that a unique genetic code is equivalent to a human being. For one thing we know that identical twins have the same genetic code. If I take a cell from an identical twin, whose cells are they? What if I take the sample before they are split? You can't identify who "owns" those cells. For another, one can change one's genetic code through gene therapy, and yet nobody would therefore claim you were thereafter a different person."
1) I never made the assumption that a genetic code = a human being. I said a lot more.
2) You said twins *have* the same genetic code? That's odd. So, *who/what* HAS the genetic code of the conceptus. Not the mother. Not the father. So....
3) If you take a cell from a twin, they are the cells that twin owns. Try to make your analogy work. Like give me an example of taking ownerless human cells.
4) If the sample is before they split, then they belong to that individual who is present at that time. Splitting either brings forth one new person, or two new persons, not settled on that yet.
5) Your last point still shows that you have to make assumptions contrary to your position. You said that they can change *your* genetic code. That implies it *belonged* to *you.* Second, if they change it, it is still owned. You've not cited any ownerless codes. And, lastly, I never said a genetic code was sufficient for a human life, just necessary. So you're misrepresenting me.
"The same goes for a split zygote, which one joins back together with its other half. Is this killing a human being without killing?"
6) Same problem for you goes.
7) This didn't answer my point. I pointed out an obvious difference between skin cells and the conceptus.
8) Yes, one individual dies. You began this discussion thinking that this was an absurd conclusion. Reductios only work if your opponent takes it as absurd. I also “absurdly” think that if you split an flatworm, there are two worms and one (or both) can be killed.
"Obviously they are at least partly wrong, because you cannot say at this stage how many human lives may or may not result. If you are an identical twin, when did your unique life start? At conception, or when you split?"
9) Not obvious to me or them.
10) Also, you might be guilty of the beard fallacy. When does a beard become a beard? When is a heap of sand not a heap of sand anymore.
Tough questions don't disprove what I've said.
11) Some geneticists argue that twinning is a form a asexual reproduction, if this is the case, then the twin's life started at conception!
12) Again, you're confusing necessary and sufficient conditions. Being conceived is sufficient for life, not necessary. You'd be correct in saying that a clone would be brought into being without being conceived. Or, if the twin is not conceived via asexual reproduction, then we could say that he wasn't conceived (he was cloned, twined, etc). But, here's the point. Conception is sufficient for human life. That is, every human being that is the result of conception come to be at conception, but not all human beings result from conception. So, even if you're right, you haven't offered a defeater for me (and you've still not overcame my defeaters for you).
"They grow into more cells of the same kind. Skin cells beget more skin cells, etc."
13) Well I'd like to see the evidence behind all of this. See precisely what you're talking about and if it's analogous to what I'm talking about.
14) And, they belonged to someone. They don't just pop out of nothing. Ex nihilo, nihilo fit. So you're still begging the question.
15) I pointed out relevant differences between skin cells and concepti.
"I'm an identifiable human being. I'm not maybe zero, one, or ten human beings. I'm exactly one."
16) I don't see what "looks" has to do with *essence.*
17) Since it could be possible to clone you from your cells, why aren't you "potentially ten human beings?"
18) I'm not getting the argument that "if one being has the potential to become another being, that being is not a being." It seems to me that you must say that flatworms are not Platyhelminthes because they have the "potential" of becoming two, four, etc.
19) Some geneticists have argued that the ability to twin is a potential that is inherent in only *some* concepti. Though this could be done *artificially.* There is evidence that twinning has a genetic cause. It doesn't happen willy-nilly. But even if all concepti had this ability, that proves nothing. It would be capacity that becomes latent later on, after a certain stage of development. Like your ability to debate and argue.
"What is the difference between one egg and one sperm and the later resulting egg? Similar question. The process has moved a bit further on, that is the difference."
20) This is an evasive non-response to my question. I'll tell you the difference(s), though. The sperm, as such does not have the potential, if left undisturbed and allowed to develop, into an full grown human. Same for the egg. The sperm does not have its own distinct genetic code. One could match my sperm to me. Who/what is the conceptus matched to? This still doesn't tell me why the implanted embryo is a human. It's just "a different stage." So, you've totally avoided my question, and had yours answered.
"As far as I know, worms have one head, and if you cut one in half, the best you can hope for is one half survives."
21) Let's talk about flatworms:
**********
"If you take a planarian flatworm and chop it in half, something extraordinary happens: One section grows a new head, the other a new tail, and soon you have two new flatworms. Chop it into quarters, or eighths, and you'll see the same thing."
http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2005/worm-tissue.html
**********
Thus according to your line of argument, the original flatworm was not a a member of Platyhelminthes. Reductio ad absurdum.
"Uh, when you "twin" a zygote by splitting it, they are not genetically distinct, they are identical. That is the point."
22) Uhhhh, genetically distinct from their parents. Try to pay attention. So, to who/what do their genetic code belong? And, there'd be other factors that separate these two individuals. One being the *interaction* between genes and their development, phenotypes. They'd have different fingerprints, for one.
23) Some twinning can/has occurred after implantation. There goes your argument!
"Of course, such a conception of human beings, that they could split after becoming unique mental individuals, would be a radically different conception of human beings."
24) A refresher course on essence and accidents would help out here....
"4) If the sample is before they split, then they belong to that individual who is present at that time. Splitting either brings forth one new person, or two new persons, not settled on that yet."
ReplyDeleteOf course, this assumes what you want to prove that there was an individual present, and one new individual comes into being after splitting. But if you split in exactly half, which was the individual, and which is the new person?
See, you won't answer the critical question: what if you join them back together again? Or is that what you were trying to answer at (8) that one dies? How can somebody have died when not a single living cell has died? That contradicts the basic definition of death. If someone has died, where is the corpse? There is none. Where is their body to be resurrected on the last day?
"You've not cited any ownerless codes."
You assume what you wish to prove. Because if what I suggested is correct, it is an example of ownerless codes.
What is the significance of ownerless codes? DNA is a chemical molecule. It's not hard to synthesise "ownerless codes" as you describe it. There are machines that can synthesise codes. In theory I could synthesise an ownerless human DNA code.
""The same goes for a split zygote, which one joins back together with its other half. Is this killing a human being without killing?"
6) Same problem for you goes."
No, the same problem doesn't apply to what I'm saying.
If I define a human as something that has all the regular attributes of humans: skin, a head, heart and so forth. A lump of skin isn't a human. Neither is a lump of liver, or bone. It's the whole lot growing together that makes a human. That's why the skin growing in the petrie dish is not a human, and a foetus is a human. I suggest that the zygote at the stage when its cells have not specialised into skin, bone, liver etc, doesn't have all the components of being human. It's more comparable to skin in a petrie dish. They are cells of an undeterminate nature, not belonging to an identifiable individual.
10) Also, you might be guilty of the beard fallacy. When does a beard become a beard? When is a heap of sand not a heap of sand anymore.
I'm not falling for that fallacy, because the stage where cells specialise is a very identifiable stage. After this splitting cannot occur because different parts identifyable as the parts of a human are identifiable.
They grow into more cells of the same kind. Skin cells beget more skin cells, etc."
13) Well I'd like to see the evidence behind all of this. See precisely what you're talking about and if it's analogous to what I'm talking about.
You put skin cells in a petrie dish, and they grow more skin cells. No high-tech here. Put liver cells in a dish, they grow more liver cells.
17) Since it could be possible to clone you from your cells, why aren't you "potentially ten human beings?"
I would think this is a problem for you and not for me. I'm one human being because I have all the bits human beings have by definition. A bit of my skin isn't a human being, despite the possibility of taking the DNA, putting it in an egg and growing it into a human being. If I did that, and it took on all the specialised cells corresponding to the organs and parts a human being has, I suggest that is the point at which there is a new human being.
18) I'm not getting the argument that "if one being has the potential to become another being, that being is not a being." It seems to me that you must say that flatworms are not Platyhelminthes because they have the "potential" of becoming two, four, etc.
I don't know much about flatworms, but one would want to have a miniumum definition of such a creature, whether it be having a head, a brain, a digestive tract, or whatever other bits flatworms have. Otherwise, according to you, one cell of a flatworm IS a flatworm. That of course would be rather silly, even though potentially it could be cloned into a new flatworm.
There is evidence that twinning has a genetic cause. It doesn't happen willy-nilly.
In nature, it possibly may be more likely according to genetic causes. But it is always possible, even if only by intervention.
The sperm, as such does not have the potential, if left undisturbed and allowed to develop, into an full grown human. Same for the egg.
A fertilized egg cannot develop undisturbed unless implanted into a womb. What you are now arguing for is conception upon implantation.
24) A refresher course on essence and accidents would help out here....
I see. Should I pull out the council of Trent?
Anonymous sez,
ReplyDelete"Of course, this assumes what you want to prove that there was an individual present, and one new individual comes into being after splitting. But if you split in exactly half, which was the individual, and which is the new person?"
I told you in my last response to try and keep up. You need to pay attention. Otherwise you're wasting both of our time. For example, I'm not assuming anything since I (a) offered an argument above for life starting at conception. I appealed to (i) the consensus of the scientific community, (ii) philosophical arguments from identity, and (iii) scientific arguments for the individual and distinct human life the conceptus possessed. (b) You never offered any real rebuttal other than to make a bad analogy about liver cells &c. So (c) I'm allowed to reap the reward of my toil from now on. If you have a response, feel free to offer it.
But, it gets worse. It is your question that assumes positions not shown. Since my first response I have questioned, and asked you to argue for, your assumption that: If the conceptus can split or split and recombine, the conceptus (concepti) are not human beings.
"See, you won't answer the critical question: what if you join them back together again? Or is that what you were trying to answer at (8) that one dies? How can somebody have died when not a single living cell has died? That contradicts the basic definition of death. If someone has died, where is the corpse? There is none. Where is their body to be resurrected on the last day?"
I answered your question twice, now.
But furthermore, am I to take it that you've left the "splitting" argument and now argue that splitting + a subsequent recombining logically/scientifically imply that the conceptus (concepti) are not human(s)? Your argument is all over the place. If the idea is *just that the possibility of splitting* counts against the humanness of the conceptus (concepti), and so humanness is granted after implantation I (c) argued that even the fertilized baby can split and (d) flatworms can be split and grow into whole flatworms. Furthermore, it is possible for an implanted baby to split and then partially recombine, giving rise to Siamese twins. I thus take it that your argument has been refuted.
Moreover, I deny your assumption that someone cannot die while not having a living cell die. For instance, God could immediately strike someone dead. Their cells would not be dead *immediately.* Or, since you appealed to theoreticals below, it is theoretically possible (they're working on it now, and are able to do so with single cells) that entire humans may be frozen. I could choke someone to death, he would be frozen, and so he would be dead but his cells technically wouldn't. Third, someone has died because what was a distinct, living entity, that left alone would naturally grow into a birthed baby, and then a teenager, and then an adult, in an unbroken line, had its life ended. Where is the body of those who have been cremated? Again, most of your comments have nothing to do with essentials, only accidents. Oh, and btw, contemporary definitions of death is higher brain death, not "all your cells die."
"You assume what you wish to prove. Because if what I suggested is correct, it is an example of ownerless codes."
That doesn't make any sense to me. Perhaps you could clearly spell it out. Every cell we have ever came across has had an owner. Has been from someone. And, I answered the "assuming to be proved" above.
"What is the significance of ownerless codes? DNA is a chemical molecule. It's not hard to synthesise "ownerless codes" as you describe it. There are machines that can synthesise codes. In theory I could synthesise an ownerless human DNA code."
it's an *actual* cell. And, if you made an entity meeting all the criteria I laid out above, then you'd have a human life. And, it is logically possible that 16 yr. olds could split when they turned 16, and then recombine on their 17th birthday. Are you suggesting this would make them not human?
"I'm not falling for that fallacy, because the stage where cells specialise is a very identifiable stage. After this splitting cannot occur because different parts identifyable as the parts of a human are identifiable."
Are you changing your original argument from implantation now? If not, then you've lost. Second, what do "identifiable parts" have to do with "humanness?" This also denies substance dualism, which you'd have to argue for.
Next, look at 28 days
http://www.orwelltoday.com/babyub2.jpg
doesn't "look like" a human. It's parts are not "identifiable." At best, it looks like many other animals at that stage, and the parts are as identifiable as those animal parts. This is after implantation. Is the 28 day old not a human?
Compare the various implanted fetuses
http://www.millerandlevine.com/km/evol/embryos/Haeckel.html
it's your arguments that have been aborted.
Lastly, Beckwith argues against this position thusly:
*****
There are several problems with this argument. First, though appearance can be helpful in determining what is or is not fully human, it is not a sufficient or a necessary condition for doing so. After all, mannequins in stores resemble humans and they are not even remotely human. On the other hand, some human oddities -- such as the bearded lady or the elephant man, who more closely resemble nonhuman primates -- are nonetheless fully human. The reason why we believe that the bearded lady and the elephant man are fully human and the mannequin is not is because the former are functioning individual organisms that genetically belong to the species homo sapiens. The latter is an inanimate object.
Second, Davis points out that "this objection assumes that personhood presupposes a postnatal form. A little reflection, however, will show that the concept of a 'human form' is a dynamic and not a static one. Each of us, during normal growth and development, exhibits a long succession of different outward forms." An early embryo, though not looking like a newborn, does look exactly like a human ought to look at this stage of his or her development. Thus, "the appearance of an 80-year-old adult differs greatly from that of a newborn child, and yet we speak without hesitation of both as persons. In both cases, we have learned to recognize the physical appearances associated with those development stages as normal expressions of human personhood."[24]
It may be true that it is psychologically easier to kill something that does not resemble the human beings we see in everyday life, but it does not follow from this that the being in question is any less human or that the executioner is any more humane. Once we recognize that human development is a process that does not cease at the time of birth, then "to insist that the unborn at six weeks look like the newborn infant is no more reasonable than to expect the newborn to look like a teenager. If we acknowledge as 'human' a succession of outward forms after birth, there is no reason not to extend that courtesy to the unborn, since human life is a continuum from conception to natural death."[25] Hence, Van Den Haag, by confusing appearance with reality, may have inadvertently created a new prejudice, "natalism." And, like other prejudices such as sexism and racism, natalism emphasizes nonessential differences ("they have a different appearance") in order to support a favored group ("the already born").
http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/cri/cri-jrnl/web/crj0077a.html
*****
"You put skin cells in a petrie dish, and they grow more skin cells. No high-tech here. Put liver cells in a dish, they grow more liver cells."
Where's a link to check this out. How do they do it. What’s the process?
Next, they don't develop into adults. Why not? Why does the conceptus? It does so naturally too. It needs what the rest of us need: food, oxygen, water, shelter.
"I don't know much about flatworms, but one would want to have a miniumum definition of such a creature, whether it be having a head, a brain, a digestive tract, or whatever other bits flatworms have. Otherwise, according to you, one cell of a flatworm IS a flatworm. That of course would be rather silly, even though potentially it could be cloned into a new flatworm."
if you're that interested you can read the link I provided.
other than that, I disproved your assumption. The flat worm has totiopent cells, just like the embryo. Those cells have the potential, if removed, to develop into a ful grown human. Likewise, the flat work has totiopent cells that, if removed, develop into another flatworm - head, tail, 'n all. It is non-sense to say that the entity prior to the removal of a totiopent cell was not a member of that being's species. That is was not living. That it wasn't killed if stepped on [prior to the split.
And, it is not my position that the *unified totipent cell is a human.* That's a straw man.
Prior to any splitting, all the cells work together as a dynamic whole that is progressing, naturally, to its completion as an adult member of that species. We all began as concepti, we all developed into the adults we are now in an unbroken line of life. At conception we needed *nothing extra* to be who we are now. The sperm couldn’t be us. The egg couldn't be us. Once the united, the undirected progress started.
"A fertilized egg cannot develop undisturbed unless implanted into a womb. What you are now arguing for is conception upon implantation."
Yeah, that's its natural environment at the time. You wouldn't develop anymore if we shot you to the moon or sent you down to the depths of the sea. Take any individual out of his natural environment for his appointed time and he won't survive. Environment doesn't determine humanness.
"I see. Should I pull out the council of Trent?"
Assuming that you don't think that if you're hair were another color that would make you a different person, or a non-person, then you already have the basic idea. I can think of other places to go besides Trent. But whatever floats your boat.