Apparently Vic Reppert wasn't satisfied with "those in the Reformed tradition" pointing out that Talbott's b-rated parody was a straw man attack. Allegedly the straw man loses his strawiness when "those in the reformed tradition" chew on the straw in the field of broader context. "I'm sure those in the Reformed tradition understand the importance of context in interpreting sacred texts," says Reppert. It is said that the debacle now known as "the Nivlac cataract" must be piloted by a skipper salty enough to avoid the downward plunge by navigating his course by following the light of context.
So, I guess we have to look at Talbott's opening salvo in order to consign his straw man to the flames. This must be done because the parable's "proper argumentative role is to be seen in the context of the larger paper" ... "a longer piece entitled 'On False Prophets and the Abuse of Revelation.'" So let's look at "On False Prophets and the Abuse of Revelation:"
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"A generalization about religious belief to which there are, I believe, few exceptions is this: The more confident one is in one's religious beliefs, the more willing one is to subject those beliefs to careful scrutiny; the less confident one is in them--the more one unconsciously fears that they cannot withstand such scrutiny--the more eager one is to find a device that would appear to protect them from careful scrutiny. And, more often than not, such a protective device will include an assault upon human reason."
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This is a vague and ambiguous claim. First, what is meant by being "confident ... in one's religious beliefs..."? Does that mean that you take those religious beliefs R to be true? Does it mean that you have a high degree assurance that R is probably true? Does it mean that you are certain of R - either psychologically or epistemically? Does it mean that you strongly believe R?
Next, what does it mean to "subject them to careful scrutiny?" Does that mean that you always do so? That you did so once, but no longer need to? That you treat R with skepticism? That you stand over R as the authority of its epistemic status? That you are always on the look out that R fits with the rest of your stock of R; R1 - Rn. That if you ever think R is false you cease to hold it? That R is always capable of being revised? That you actively try to prove them false?
And, what does being "more confident" and thus "more willing" to "subject R to scrutiny" mean? Is there such a thing as being over confident? Can we be too willing to subject R to scrutiny? What if subjecting some R to scrutiny (whatever that means) was sinful? Would this be the wisest thing to do?
Lastly, what is meant by "human reason?" Does it mean beliefs that are delivered by "the deliverances of reason?" Means-end rationality? The faculty that distinguishes us from other animals, viz., Aristotle? What we find acceptable? What we like or dislike? Who is "we?" Proper-function rationality? And, how do these people "assault" it? What are their arguments? Are they good ones? Was Kierkegaard "unconfident" in his "religious beliefs?" Did he seek to "protect them" by "faith?" How about Tertullian? Was he unconfident? How does Talbott know?
Leaving terminological questions aside, let's ask about how Talbott came to this generalization. Is his opening claim merely a veiled ad hominem argument that seeks to discredit those who hold a more austere view (or even any positive view) on the authority of Scripture than does Talbott? If one does not subject R to scrutiny (whatever Talbott means by that!) in the way Talbott approves, has he automatically prejudiced someone against them because they "lack confidence" in their religious beliefs? They are softies. Intellectual cowards.
Has the above been empirically verified? What is the sample used to draw the generalization? How many people who are "less confident" in their religious beliefs has Talbott studied? How does he know that, say, John Calvin was "less confident" in his "religious beliefs?" Has he read the psychologists report from Calvin's day? Since he's attacking Calvinists, many who reason similar to how Calvin did in his institutes, how many does he personally know? Is he basing his belief off what Bill and Jim once said, the two Calvinist students he had at one time? Or is this what he thinks of, say, Paul Helm or John Frame? James White or Roger Nicole? James Anderson or Greg Welty?
Next, is the above a "religious belief? Does Talbott subject it to scrutiny? Or, is he saying that this generalization applies equally across the board? How about to one's mathematical beliefs, say, 2+2=4? Should one "subject that to scrutiny?" How about one's moral beliefs? Does Talbott suggest that we should "subject to scrutiny" our belief that molesting little children for the fun of it is immoral to "scrutiny?" If so, should we take Talbott seriously? If not, why the bias? How does "human reason" feel about such prejudices?
Moving on....
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"Now I have no desire to glorify human reason. Some of the most careless thinkers I have known, and even some of the most irrational, have worshiped at the shrine of human reason. We have no choice, however, but to employ the faculties we have when we "test the spirits to see whether they are of God"; indeed, only by reasoning carefully can we exhibit the limits of reason itself. That is also why an all-out assault upon human reason inevitably undermines and defeats itself: If we cannot trust our reasoning powers at all, then neither can we trust that reasoning which supposedly exhibits the limits of reason itself."
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What does it mean to "employ the faculties we have when we test the spirits to se whether they are of God?" Is this an unquestionable prescription? But 1 John 4:1 is a religious belief. Does Talbott subject 1 John 4:1 to scrutiny? How does he do so? Perhaps we shouldn't test the spirits to see if they are from God? This seems like a recipe for disaster! Can you imagine. A man says the true and all-knowing creator God has told him to kill his parents, and bathe in their blood. If we shoulnd't, or couldn't, "test the spirits," then what religious, and moral (say he believes only theism can justify moral prescriptions), argument could we give him? But on Talbott's terms, we should subject this belief to scrutiny. Does Talbott do so on a regular basis?
Also, which Calvinist disagree with this? Indeed, even in the section Talbott quotes from Calvin's institutes (Bk. III, Ch. XXIII, Sec. 2) where he tries to derive his claim that Calvin undermines "human reason," Calvin argued for his position before, and then for roughly 40 pages after, Talbott's quote mining assault. It should also be noted that Calvin never undermined "human reason." Talbott even allows for "limits of our reason." Calvin simply points out one such limit. Certainly if Calvin is right, when finite reason clashes with infinite, infallible wisdom, the former loses. That's something like a truism. If you think you're right, and someone who knows everything tells you that you're wrong, guess who wins? In fact, it would seem that the rational thing to do would be to bend the knee and admit that you're wrong when faced with that epistemic situation.
Furthermore, what if we take revelation as something like knowledge from testimony? Should we treat all such knowledge "with scrutiny?" This principle might get us into trouble. Thus Thomas Reid: "I believed by instinct whatever my parents and tutors told me, long before I had the idea of a lie, or a thought of the possibility of their deceiving me. Afterwards, upon reflection, I found that they had acted like fair and honest people, who wished me well. I found that, if I had not believed what they told me, before I could give a reason for my belief, I had to this day been little better than a changeling."
If the speaker, in this case Jehovah, is justified or warranted in His beliefs -- and surely on the Christian story God has maximal, supreme, super warrant or justification, or, fill in the appropriate terminology -- and if the Christian takes the say-so of God as a source for his/her beliefs, then isn't the Christian entitled to "know" these things?
On this theory, if one starts out trusting God, as indeed s/he should, then one never undermines the credibility of the testifier. In debates about knowledge by testimony, one can say that if the testifier has been shown to be unreliable, then that might issue a defeater for a belief you have obtained by his testimony. But, if the honesty was never called in to question in the first place, taking his word, especially about, say, the color of his mother's hair, would be quite natural. And, if his mother's hair was blonde, and that's what he told you, then you knew it. (At this point Plantinga would admit warrant, but he would say that you would have more warrant if you verified what was testified to you. I think that fine as far as it goes, but in our case, surely the word of an omniscient being who cannot lie carries more weight than my "checking up on" the testimony. My own verification would seem to be ranked lower on list of epistemic authorities in a situation like this.) And, wouldn't knowledge gained in this kind of way -- the testimony of God -- constitute a belief that had such warrant that if you remained in the natural state of faith, i.e., trusting the word of God, taking things on His say-so, it would be a defeater-deflector for challenges to the above types of beliefs? That is, a person does not have an automatic defeater for his/her belief that God exists since the warrant of the belief that is the subject of attempted defeat is such that it deflects the defeater.
Which Calvinists have "launched an all-out-assault on human reason" in the sense Talbott means it? The self-refuting sense? Just because someone says that, "we also deny that we are competent judges to pronounce judgment in this cause according to our own understanding," that does not mean that he has waged an all-out-assault on human reason! To deny that human reason (and I'm granting Talbott's mischaracterization of Calvin) is not competent in one or two areas is hardly to wage an "all-out" war on human reason. Talbott is grossly overstating his case. I find one generalization that almost never fails. When you run across someone who must overstate his case, he's arguing from a weak position. One could say that he overstates his case because he hopes no one will want to defend the other side because he has made it look so bad. But this "find a device that would appear to protect them from careful scrutiny." I know of no Calvinist that taught that we "cannot trust our reasoning powers at all."
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"When religious people emphasize the limits of human reason, moreover, they sometimes draw the wrong moral. They may begin with some true observations about the finite character of our human minds, the historically conditioned character of much of our reasoning, the lofty and mysterious character of God, or perhaps even the corrupting power of moral evil or sin. But instead of concluding, as they should, that a loving God, who understands our limitations better than we do, would never require more of human reason than it can deliver, they draw a very different moral: namely, that we must set aside our critical faculties altogether and blindly accept some proposition which, according to the best judgment we can muster at the time, seems unworthy of human belief or perhaps even morally repugnant."
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This is not an attack on Calvinists, it's an attack on all those who believe that the Bible is God's word to man. Talbott's claim flatly contradicts Scripture. For just one example I cite Abraham:
Hebrews 11:
11 By faith Abraham, even though he was past age—and Sarah herself was barren—was enabled to become a father because he considered him faithful who had made the promise. 12 And so from this one man, and he as good as dead, came descendants as numerous as the stars in the sky and as countless as the sand on the seashore.
Here "human reason" would disbelieve that Abrham and Sarah could become parents. Talbott says that God would "NEVER require more of human reason than it can deliver." In this situation, "human reason" would laugh at God. But perhaps Talbott would reply, "but it is not logically impossible that they could have had a baby." But if this is his out, then he must drop his charges against Calvin and Calvin's exegesis. Surely Talbott doesn't think he can show that Calvinism is logically impossible, can he? If so, would he subject this to scrutiny? He would scrutinize the logically impossible? So, according to Talbott, God never told this to Abraham. Thus both Moses and the author of Hebrews is wrong.
Heb. 11
17 By faith Abraham, when God tested him, offered Isaac as a sacrifice. He who had received the promises was about to sacrifice his one and only son, 18even though God had said to him, "It is through Isaac that your offspring will be reckoned." 19 Abraham reasoned that God could raise the dead, and figuratively speaking, he did receive Isaac back from death.
Surely "human understanding" thinks the above is "immoral." Indeed, many atheists argue this exact point. Now, first we have God telling Abraham to do what "human understanding" would consider immoral - kill your own child. Second, "human reason" would not believe in a resurrection from the dead. That's why there's so many atheists and physicalists out there. It seems preposterous to them to believe this. So, what of Talbott's claims? If he is correct, then the Bible is false here. So, since he makes a claim about what God would and wouldn't do, where does he get this information? Did God tell him? Where? If not, where does he get off telling us what God is or isn't like? Who is he to say? Is he a prophet?
This gets so tangled. Why does Talbott believe in a god? Many would argue that "human reason" cannot believe such a thing. Why does theism seem "worthy of human belief?" And, if theism, why something like Christian theism? What does he think of the apostle Pauls' statements about "human understanding?": Where is the wise man? Where is the scholar? Where is the philosopher of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?" [...] “Yet among the mature we do impart wisdom, although it is not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age, who are doomed to pass away. For the wisdom of this world is folly with God. For it is written, "He catches the wise in their craftiness.” Does Talbott deny that we should listen to the wisdom literature:
Proverbs 3:5
Trust in the LORD with all your heart and lean not on your own understanding;
It thus appears that Christianity teaches exactly the opposite of Talbottism! What he says God would not do, we read God doing! Thus without a revelation, he purports to tell us what God would and would not do. But to me this doesn't seem acceptable to "human understanding." If I reason analogously, it would be wrong for me to simply make up - even with good arguments - the internal beliefs and desires of others, especially if he never told them to me and I could not see him! Thus Talbott is irrational on his own terms. "Human understanding" is against him. "Human understanding" doesn't let us make up what other people - especially invisible ones - believe. God didn’t tell Talbott what he would and wouldn't do, and so Talbott doesn't know what he would or wouldn't do. For all Talbott knows, god is the greatest immoral being ever. After all, look at all the evil in the world. What, perhaps he'll reason that his god is impotent to stop it? Michael Martin and others will let theists who have a revelation off the hook with the logical problem of evil because they hold to extended theism. Talbott doesn't get that pass. He's ignorant. he simply makes up the most palpable concept of god, and then sells it to the philosophers.
Lastly, we should also ask about the moral point of view this person has which he can call God's actions "repugnant." If one was, say, a humanist, and thought that anything bad that happened to a human was "morally repugnant," I wouldn't put much stock in his "objection" against God. I have a different moral point of view. I have a different anthropology. So, just because someone finds something morally repugnant doesn't mean that they should reject what they find repugnant. It could just as well mean that they ought to look at their own moral standards! Should not these, too, be "subject to scrutiny?" Talbott is showing his biases. He has no problem dogmatically holding to views in an unquestionable manner. He doesn't think these beliefs - the ones by which we judge God - should be subject to scrutiny. If he does, then he would not have came to the conclusion he has as being the "right" conclusion. It should also be open that our reasoning in these cases, or moral intuitions in these cases, are the problem. Talbott should remain "open" to this claim: Jer. 17:9 "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately sick; who can understand it?" If that is true, perhaps the problems lie in our moral intuitions in some cases? Perhaps the mind of man has an agenda other than, contrary to Talbott's pretended neutrality, following the truth wherever it leads? At the very least, Talbott shouldn't have a religious belief about Jer. 17:9 that is not treated with scrutiny. Talbott's scrutiny argument, and his human reason argument, have both served to undermine him.
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"In an effort to get us to accept such a proposition, they may also identify a humble submission to God with an uncritical submission to some tradition or some sacred text that either endorses, or appears to endorse, the proposition in question. But only a false prophet, I want to suggest, would ask us to accept some proposition, however true, despite the fact that it seems to us, for whatever reason, to be unworthy of human belief."
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But without a "sacred text" there's scant few beliefs about God that Talbott can hold with warrant.
Also, this is odd. Not only is it vague to talk about something "unworthy of human belief," why is a prophet a false one if he tries to get us to accept a true proposition?
Lastly, this seems to be unworthy of human belief. Humans should believe what god tells them to. They should, "lean not on their own understanding." They should not "put the Lord thy God to the test." They shouldn't reason "hath God said?". And so for Talbott to push this concept, which is unworthy of human belief, makes him a false prophet. But he thinks it is worthy of human belief. Who says? What makes a proposition "worthy of human belief?" If we like it? If the majority agrees on it? But, not only that, it is not even that said proposition actually contradicts "human understanding," it only must seem to us to contradict it!
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"A false prophet is someone who speaks falsely in the name of God, and here I shall be concerned with a particular kind of false prophet: one who, more often than not, comes in the name of orthodoxy."
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Notice the contradiction. Above he said a false prophet may even speak truly in the name of God. Now he says they speak falsely.
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"The false prophets I have in mind are those who use the Bible (or some other sacred text) as a weapon of fear, or as part of an assault upon reason and good sense."
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Like writing papers to consign those who disagree with you as diffident in their beliefs? Like claiming that they are "false prophets?" Who wants to be that? Is Talbott trying to scare us into accepting his conclusion? Does he think committing the same errors he attributes to others is really something that should persuade the rational man?
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"At one time or another, they have appealed to the Bible in defense of slavery, racism, the exploitation of women, the burning at the stake of young women (charged with witchcraft), the murder of heretics, and even protracted torture."
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And it can equally be shown, if not more so, that those Talbott calls "false prophets" have used the Bible to argue against the above practices.
Also, many have appealed to "human reason" to justify all sorts of atrocities, much like the above.
Talbott isn't scoring any points here.
Lastly, since Talbott can't appeal to the Bible, where is he getting his ethic from?
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"We find it easy today, perhaps, to appreciate the specious character of at least some of these appeals. But we can also imagine how easily such appeals might confuse a simple peasant farmer who believes fervently that he must bow before the Scriptures. There is perhaps no better way to confuse him and to persuade him to ignore his own conscience than to spout Scripture at him. "
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But if he "believes" that, and since he is human, then is Talbott asking him to go against what "seems to him, for whatever reason, to be unworthy of human belief."
Also, not many respectable orthodox theologians that I know simply "spout Scripture." Calvin &c argued, exegeted, and applied the tests of Scripture to the men they spoke to.
Lastly, what of human reason? We find it easy today, perhaps, to appreciate the specious character of at least some of these appeals. But we can also imagine how easily such appeals might confuse a simple peasant farmer who believes fervently that he must bow before the bar of human reason. There is perhaps no better way to confuse him and to persuade him to ignore his own conscience than to spout logical fallacies and rules of inference at him. What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If Talbott argues thus: But rules of inference necessarily lead us to truth," then he's (a) ignorant of the state of the debate within the philosophy of logic, and (b) the farmer reasons that God's word leads him to truth. In fact, since one can presuppose, or take as basic, the reliability of our cognitive faculties, what stops one from doing that with what he takes to be God's word? If one does that, why is he irrational for bowing before the one who speaks and cannot lie? Seems perfectly reasonable to me.
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"For if God says something, he will reason, then it must be true, however morally repugnant or logically absurd it may appear to us as fallible human beings."
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What problem does Talbott have with modus ponens? If God says X, then X is true, no matter what we may think. God says X. Therefore, X is true, no matter what we may think. It seems logically absurd to deny modus ponens.
Also, where are Talbott's arguments for the apparent logical absurdity of much of reformation doctrine? I'm not aware of accepting either morally repugnant or logically absurd beliefs. Perhaps Talbott means that my beliefs are morally repugnant to his view of morality. But since when am I boot strapped by Talbott's views on morality? In fact, I find his humanism and arrogant, flippant attitude towards the God of Abraham and the Fear of Isaac, morally repugnant.
So, Dr. Reppert, I have looked at the broader context - as those in the reformed tradition are wont to do - and found Talbott's opening piece to be rather simplistic, vague, over generalized, misleading, and downright undercutting in many parts. Not only that, there was nothing in here which absolved Talbott of the charge of straw man burner. Where did he offer anything defending his construal of Calvinism as a system that says God predestines men to hell for amoral reasons? I could find none. It thus appears that you have not read our comments, but yet you call us on the carpet for not reading Talbott. Had you read our comments you would have known that mentioning Talbott's opening piece was actually irrelevant to our charge of straw man burner.
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