Since, in modern times, Calvinism is generally associated with compatibilism, and since that term is frequently used at T-blog, it might be helpful to offer some basic definitions. According to classical compatibilism:
“To be free, most compatibilists have insisted, means in ordinary language (1) to have the *power* or *ability* to do what we will (desire or choose) to do, and this entails (2) the absence of *constraints* or *impediments* preventing us from doing what we will, desire, or choose. The constraints or impediments they have in mind include physical restraints, lack of opportunity, duress or coercion, physical or mental impairment, and the like.”
“What do they say about the freedom *to do otherwise*? It is also defined by classical compatibilists in terms of (1) and (2). You are free to do otherwise than meet your friend when you (1) have the power or ability to avoid meeting him, and which entails in turn that (2) there are no constraints or impediments preventing you from avoiding the meeting (e.g., no one is forcing you at gunpoint to meet him)."
"It does mean you *would* do it, *if* you wanted or desired to do it. Thus they hold that (1) and (2) entail a third feature of classical compatibilism, namely, that terms such as *can*, *power*, *ability*, and *freedom* should be given a *conditional* or *hypothetical* analysis: (3) that an agent can (has the power, is able, is free, to) do something means that the agent would do it, if the agent wanted (or desired or chose) to do it."
“To say ‘you could have done otherwise’ would only amount to the counterfactual claim that you would have done otherwise, if (contrary to fact) the past (or the laws) had been different in some way, for example, if you had wanted or desired or chosen otherwise."
R. Kane, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford 2002), 12-13.
Contemporary compatibilism has developed a number of further refinements, but that's a place to start.
Compatibilism has always seemed a bit confusing to me, although it seems to be the most reasonable, biblical way of avoiding fatalism.
ReplyDeleteLet's say we take the case of Joseph's brothers for example. Weren't they foreordained to sell their brother Joseph into slavery? But then was their choice a real choice? Even though they didn't know God's will at the time, were they not set up to take that course of action? Same thing could be said of Judas. J.I. Packer once said, "if one iota of chance is allowed in the universe, then God's sovereignty is denied, and God is not God." But compatibilism almost sounds as though it does allow some sort of element of chance in the world. Maybe it's the difference between what God allows and what God causes?
There is also at least one defender of classical compatibilism today: Bernie Berofsky. He has a paper in the Wideker / McKenna book on alternate possibilities called, "Classical Compatibilism Not Dead Yet," or something like that (that is the name of the article, not the book).
ReplyDeleteMathetes, I took a stab at answering your question. It's towards the end of this post.
ReplyDeleteThanks, Paul! I'll give it a read.
ReplyDeleteCompatibilism most certainly does not allow an element of chance. It's specifically designed not to allow that. In a deterministic system, there is no chance, and compatibilism is designed to offer an account of freedom that could still be true with determinism. The only sense in which there is chance is in saying that things happen that you have no control over, but that's not chance in that it happens for no reason. Compatibilism is about free will having to do with things that have a complete explanation why they happen. It's just that the explanation has to do with something about you, indeed something about how you see yourself and what's central to being you. It's just that it's consistent with all that's central to you being caused by things outside your control (eventually; if it's immediately not in your control, then you're not free even on compatibilism).
ReplyDeleteI prefer David Lewis' approach to free will and possibility rather than the conditional approach. You can be free with respect to some set of facts and not free simpliciter. This explains why some people think of the past as necessary. With respect to the fact that it did occur, it is impossible that it not be that way. With respect to metaphysical possibility, the past could have been different. If determinism is true, we aren't free with respect to the past and the laws of nature, but we are free with respect to the choices that appear to us and the reasons we might consider for doing various things.
What this allows is that in one sense all the options are available to you and genuinely possible, and in another sense they aren't. It's then the sense in which they are possible that we say we are free and morally responsible. It's the sense in which they're not possible that libertarians define freedom. But on this compatibilist account, you can define possibility according to a sense in which the options really are all possible, and then you can even say that you could have done otherwise (in that sense; you still couldn't have done otherwise in the sense the libertarian means).
Jeremy thank you for your post, it was thought provoking, so much so, that I want to ask you some questions so that I can properly understand your view.
ReplyDelete“Compatibilism most certainly does not allow an element of chance. It's specifically designed not to allow that. In a deterministic system, there is no chance, and compatibilism is designed to offer an account of freedom that could still be true with determinism. The only sense in which there is chance is in saying that things happen that you have no control over, but that's not chance in that it happens for no reason.”
I look at “chance” as having three meanings: (1) an event occurred which was not caused by the intentionality of God, angels, humans, or other creatures capable of having intentions (e.g. a rock bouncing down a cliff after an earthquake which then goes through the window of your home, if no intentions were involved is a “chance” event, it just happened absent intentionality; (2) an event occurs which though you personally did not intend, nevertheless has some influence either good or bad on you (e.g. I do not play the lottery but a friend bought me a ticket and the ticket is the winning ticket and I just won a million dollars, my winning the lottery was “chance”) what you are taking to be events happening which you have no control over; (3) an uncaused outcome that just happens (“it happened by chance . . .”).
If God predetermined every event, then (1) cannot be true as every event will minimally involve the intentionality of God. (2) may occur if God predetermined for you to win the lottery ticket. (3) is not possible in this world because events occur due to the actions of agents or by means of physical causation, or a combination of both kinds of causation. Every event that occurs in this universe is caused in some way.
“Compatibilism is about free will having to do with things that have a complete explanation why they happen. It's just that the explanation has to do with something about you, indeed something about how you see yourself and what's central to being you. It's just that it's consistent with all that's central to you being caused by things outside your control (eventually; if it's immediately not in your control, then you're not free even on compatibilism).”
If all of our actions are predetermined by God, is it proper to say that we have “free will”? In what way is our will free in such a world?
You speak of “all that’s central to you being caused by things outside your control”. Do you mean a person’s character being caused by things outside their control? Or are you saying that when we perform our actions these actions are caused by things outside of our control? (here Van In Wagen’s consequence argument would come into play).
“I prefer David Lewis' approach to free will and possibility rather than the conditional approach. You can be free with respect to some set of facts and not free simpliciter.”
Peter van Inwagen in his essay HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL in the last paragraph, says that if you want to be a compatibilist then, Lewis’ approach is ***the way*** to go, to do so. So perhaps you have taken your cue from van Inwagen here.
Could you elaborate on this Lewis approach? It sounds very intriguing and from reading your post here seems to suggest that we are freely choosing our actions while at the same time our actions are completely determined, so that would mean that we can hold something like a libertarian notion of free will and at the same time maintain that everything is determined.
“This explains why some people think of the past as necessary. With respect to the fact that it did occur, it is impossible that it not be that way. With respect to metaphysical possibility, the past could have been different.”
Different because people made different choices or different because God predetermined a different world than the actual one we are now a part of?
“If determinism is true, we aren't free with respect to the past and the laws of nature, but we are free with respect to the choices that appear to us and the reasons we might consider for doing various things.”
Now I do not understand how this works. It seems to me that if exhaustive determinism is true, then the past, present and future all consist of **necessary** events, events of which it is **impossible** that they could have, could be, or will be, different than the predetermined plan of God. Can you explain how all events could be determined by God and you could still have the reality of choices? You state that “we are free with respect to the choices that appear to us and the reasons we might consider for doing various things”, that is my position in regards to events that are not predetermined, and I am not a compatibilist, or am I? :-)
“What this allows is that in one sense all the options are available to you and genuinely possible, and in another sense they aren't.”
The libertarian would say that indeed “all the options are available to you and genuinely possible”. But then you say that “in another sense they aren’t”. Your statement sounds just like something a libertarian would say, and yet you must mean something very different by your words here. What do you mean here?
“It's then the sense in which they are possible that we say we are free and morally responsible. It's the sense in which they're not possible that libertarians define freedom.”
Well now you sound like a straight on compatibilist.
“But on this compatibilist account, you can define possibility according to a sense in which the options really are all possible, and then you can even say that you could have done otherwise (in that sense; you still couldn't have done otherwise in the sense the libertarian means).”
Fascinating, please do elaborate on this Lewis version of compatibilism that you apparently espouse. I would really like to better understand your view. Thanks.
Henry
Jeremy Pierce made comments suggesting that he holds to a view of compatibilism that is similar to that of David Lewis. I remain curious about this view, so I would like to hear Jeremy present his view. So Jeremy could you present your version of compatibilism? Thanks for your cooperation in advance, if you choose to do so.
ReplyDeleteHenry
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ReplyDeleteI just found this post again after all this time. My discussion of compatibilism is found in several recent posts in this series.
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