Introduction: What follows is a response that I offered to a fellow who was asking why the Christian God should be considered the sufficient precondition for the intelligibility of the laws of logic. I have shown how an internal tension develops when such a one seeks to account for uniformity and regularity autonomously via the route of scientific rationalism, whereas a harmonious and complimentary accounting for said regularity is found to be inherent within the Christian worldview."Hey, I still don't understand why someone cannot choose non-christian presuppositions and establish a "coherent worldview".
Theoretically you can, but: (1) it can’t be atheism because atheistic worldviews are internally self-contradictory and (2) if you can, please bring forth *that* particular theoretical, self-consistent worldview and show how it contains within itself the sufficient preconditions for the intelligibility of reality.
"Why can't I just presuppose the existence and correctness of absolute laws of logic?"
This is a good question and I will take time to offer a response. You can simply presuppose the existence and correctness of absolute laws. However, if you do (presuming that you’re an atheist, please forgive me if I have you labeled incorrectly) you will be irrational and internally contradictory. Please let me explain.
I. I believe that irrationality will follow because you’re simply presupposing without epistemic warrant the uniformity of logical laws via a vicious circularity. We can presuppose the uniformity of logical law (hence appealing to rationality contained with creation) because God Himself declared that there will be uniformity found within the created order, including the laws of logic (Gen. 8:22 – an appeal to mystery as contained within the mind of God). If you are an atheist, you have no such authoritative declaration, but must assert with mere probability that future instances of past events will occur in the future as they have in the past. This is a fine example of circular reasoning. Also, you will show that you are working off of a type of faith as well (albeit a drastically different one from the Christian conception thereof) because you are merely assuming that the laws of logic will behave in the future as they have in the past without any epistemic warrant.
As an aside, I took note that you used the descriptor, “the correctness of absolute laws” to refer to logical laws. Assuming that we try to understand the universe through the worldview of philosophical materialism, it is logically impossible to have both absolute, unchanging, and immaterial logical laws being derived from a non-absolute, continuously changing, material universe consisting of only particular entities.
"How do you account for the existence of God? I'm sure you will say you don't need to because it’s your presupposition, ie. what you take for granted. Why can't I do the same maneuver with the laws of logic?"
II. Again you can (and do) take the laws of logic for granted, but you have no rational reasons for expecting the uniformity of logical law. If you are a naturalist, you’ll simply presuppose it a priori in a similar way that we presuppose the Triune God a priori because he is the final locus of authority for us as Christians. The final locus of authority for you will consist of your own brain. From our drastically different perspectives, we have no higher authority upon which to turn. We turn to the authority of the Triune God, you turn to the authority of your finite brain.
III. We have continually asked the materialist to give an account for the most basic laws of nature to which you have essentially responded, “I can’t. No explanation exists for the most fundamental, presupposed, and ultimate regularities of life and reality. There is no regularity about the most basic regularity because there is no law in terms of which the basic law can be accounted for.” So, you are assuming that the laws of logic and the laws of nature are the most basic, presupposed, foundational principles of reality in an atomistic sense, meaning that there is nothing more ultimate that you can turn to other than the basic laws of nature because there is nothing at the base of them. This rational maneuver of atomizing things, that is, analyzing things in terms of their most basic components or laws by which the universe operates has to end somewhere for you, and when it ends, your basic laws have no explanation at all. Given your position, the most basic laws themselves cannot be accounted for because they are ultimate. This is certainly understandable given your atomism.
So, how do we know these basic laws and how do we explain them at all? Why are they the way that they are? In answering questions like these an atomistic rationalist will end up doing the very thing he is trying to avoid, which is appealing to mystery. Why is this a problem for you? Because when you make an appeal to mystery it ruins your entire worldview, for you desire to rest your views on what you perceive to be a rational, empirical explanation, yet at the base of it, it is rooted in mysticism, the very thing you seek to avoid and the very opposite of what scientific rationalism claims to be. Here is the rational system of scientific, empirical explanation ultimately resting on a foundation of mysticism, the thing which is the very opposite of what it claims to be. Science and mysticism are supposed to be poles apart, but it turns out that scientific rationalists are mystics at base. So, when you are asked to account for the existence of logical laws/scientific laws apart from God, your response ultimately reduces to this answer: “They just are as they are”. Hence, you show that you believe that the basics just are as they are. According to your understanding, it’s just some kind of mystical, positive, reality that cannot be explained.
But the Christian is not reduced to a dialectical tension consisting of a rationalism and a mysticism that are at odds with each other within the same worldview. When we appeal to mystery, it’s mystery because we say, “Our finite minds cannot account for it” and “It’s mystery because we only know this because we are depending upon the special revelation of God.” The sense of mystery, or if you will “irrationalism” in Christianity is that it appeals to that which goes beyond the finite human mind. You do the same thing, you just don’t appeal to God. You stop short of that by appealing to a lucky mystery based upon the chance happenings of the evolved universe. So, the rational/irrational internal tension remains strong within your worldview. However, when we appeal to the revelation of God we don’t do so at the expense of our rationalism, but instead this becomes the very foundation of our rationalism. Because God is the divine regulator and orderer, His mind is reflected in creation, and as a result, He has given us a mind and the necessary laws by which we *can* reason in the first place (i.e., the laws of logic, etc.).
And so, the atomistic, scientific rationalist, has to explain his basic laws in terms of just the “mystical positive of chance”, but that’s just the very antithesis of scientific rationalism and empiricism. However, the Christian, by appealing to the mind of God as understood in the Scriptures, can account for all the regularities and order of the universe without giving up his rationalism. And so, if you compare the two worldviews, you see the dialectical tension of the one, and the harmony of the other, and by way of conclusion, I think that such internal contradictions within the unbelieving systems of thought reveals what the Apostle Paul had in mind when he said that the unbeliever continually “opposes himself” (2 Tim. 2:25).
Dusman,
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure your argument is quite right. It may be that believe in the uniformity of logical laws (ULL) is a properly basic belief. It may be that our cognitive faculties function in such a way that person S forms the belief in the ULL under circumstance(s) C.
Also, it may be that S has animal knowledge that ULL but not reflective knowledge. For more, see Sosa's work.
Of course, if you're correct, and I'm inclined to agree depending on qualifications, that doesn't really help the atheist.
ReplyDeleteFor the above, and comments on animal knowledge and Sosa, see Plantinga (esp. Naturalism Defeated: Reply To Beliby's Cohorts).
Paul,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the response. I was wondering what you actually thought of Plantinga's argument.
Coming back to Dusman's argument, he was talking about rationality. I took that as proper function rationality. And Plantinga does not believe that N&E is a proper-function rationality defeater against R. Supose I say that the atheist does not have animal knowledge of ULL. It does not mean that she does not have justification for ULL. It may be that she is just short of warrant. But short of warrant does not necessarily mean that she is not justified.
Now here is an example where an atheist may still have animal knowledge of ULL. Suppose that S comes to believe in ULL through virtue (I'm using virtue epistemology rather than proper function but you can substitute whatever). And now we show that P(ULL/N&E) is low. It does not necessarily mean that S does not have animal knowledge of ULL. N&E may even be a defeater for S, but it may not take away justification nor knowledge. Suppose that the way S forms ULL, with regards to evidence (used broadly), she has .8 degree of belief or justification towards ULL. Given E at t1, her justification is .8. Now suppose N&E is low given R. It is a defeater. But suppose that S also has nonpropositional evidence for ULL (see Bergmann's article in Naturalism Defeated?). E at t2 would include N&E, but it does not necessarily mean that S has no justification for ULL at all. It may be that given new evidence, N&E, she just has to lower her degree of credence or belief to, say, .56. But it may be that .56 is just enough for knowledge. So S can have knowledge. In other words, if N&E is a defeater, it may simply show that S has a lesser degree of justification. It does not mean she is not justified or irrational, but her degree of justification or rationality just dropped.
What do you think?
Paul,
ReplyDeleteOh and with regards to Sosa and the distinction between animal/reflective knowledge, I gave reference to him so that people will know what I mean by that distinction. He's pretty much the only one who uses that distinction (although he told me that Lehrer uses that too). I found it helpful. I don't know what Plantinga thinks of that distinction. I don't think he minds. In fact, their epistemology is really alike. Sosa just does not speak of "design", although he speaks of virtue.
I think we may be able to argue that the naturalist does not have reflective knowledge for R or ULL or at least, that the theist is on higher ground than the naturalist. The theist has an account where we can say that he has reflective knowledge of R or ULL (ex. one can use Swinburne's argument).
Dusman,
ReplyDelete"[I]t is logically impossible to have both absolute, unchanging, and immaterial logical laws being derived from a non-absolute, continuously changing, material universe consisting of only particular entities."
It seems to me, most clearly in this statement, that you consider the "logical laws" as something real, created/developed and possibly malleable. A result, rather than an inherent constraint. But to this atheist, and no doubt many others, the later is correct and the former nonsensical. Such that the above statement has no relevance to the atheistic world-view. (It's accurate, but nobody's making that claim.)
I don't consider regularity of nature to be a necessary part of logic, and so will leave that aside for the moment. I suspect you've heard the comparison to Mathematics before; you can't have an isosceles triangle without a 2-D space, but once you do then Pythagoras' theorem is unavoidable. This absolute comes not from any thing, and is not "derived" from 2-D space, but it is the inherent consequences of the relationship between the three lines and their environment. Similarly, if a brick is 10cm wide it is not 2m wide; logic doesn't make it not 2m wide, its own properties make it so. You couldn't change logic to make it 2m wide, because it's 10cm wide, you'd have to change the brick, or at least some physical constants. Most likely this is a language problem, ie. logic doesn't exist, it is simply a name that helps us to categorise inferences.
By my view then, irregularity would not then cause any difference in "logic" except that the premises might change: time, space, matter, the relationships between things could all go, or be, quite different instant by instant.
"If you are an atheist, you have no such authoritative declaration, but must assert with mere probability that future instances of past events will occur in the future as they have in the past. This is a fine example of circular reasoning. "
I don't see how that is circular, nor where probability comes into it. (Even assuming logical laws.) Clearly there is a need in the basic atheist world-view (in any) to presume regularity, since there is no means to test it other than to live it. The basis is necessity and uncontradicted observations. But if regularity doesn't exist or stops, and maybe it will, then A) the universe falls to bits, B) we survive it or C) we don't notice it. Whatever way it were to happen doesn't contradict atheism. Nor is it irrational except in the sense that it is not comprehensively supported by reason.
Assuming you meant it was circular reasoning because it is necessary to assume logic to argue, then the circular nature is acceptable. (Although not sound.) Try defining "dictionary" or "it" without using any circular language. Unless you seek to deny regularity/uniformity then no problem arises. Even for your position you must presuppose logic in this manner, in order to make your arguments and other presuppositions. Although you do give a reason to support uniformity, you must presuppose much in order to do so, which places you in no better an epistimolgical position.
Although I think you may intend it to be your main conclusion, I won't go into your mysticism/harmony arguments, for several reasons. Part of it is that you are basically talking up the positive angles of a fallacy. Part of is the speculation about what we will or won't discover. But also I think you fundamentally misread the intellectual basis of scientific/empirical investigation, and finally because I do not see a lack of definitive answers about the nature of universe as being devastating to atheism.
And to others, no, I'm not the unnamed person.
Deuc,
ReplyDeleteI am not speaking for Dusman, but maybe I can answer some of your rebuttal points.
First of all, no one is saying that logic was created. Rather, the Christian view is that logical laws are the result of how God thinks which is part of His eternal, changeless nature. The orderliness of creation (i.e. uniformity of nature, consistency of logical laws, etc.) reflects his thinking.
Second, just because you have to use logical laws to prove logical laws doesn't establish them. Even Bertrand Russel admitted that not even the consistency of mathematics could be established without major presuppositions:
“I wanted certainty in the kind of way in which people want religious faith. I thought that certainty is more likely to be found in mathematics than elsewhere. But I discovered that many mathematical demonstrations, which my teachers expected me to accept, were full of fallacies, and that, if certainty were indeed discoverable in mathematics, it would be in a field of mathematics, with more solid foundations than those that had hitherto been thought secure. But as the work proceeded, I was continually reminded of the fable about the elephant and the tortoise. Having constructed an elephant upon which the mathematical world could rest, I found the elephant tottering, and proceeded to construct a tortoise to keep the elephant from falling. But the tortoise was no more secure than the elephant, and after some twenty years of very arduous toil, I came to the conclusion that there was nothing more that I could do in the way of making mathematical knowledge indubitable.” –Bertrand Russell, Portraits of Memory, 1956, pp.54-55.
And again:
“The splendid certainty which I had always hoped to find in mathematics was lost in a bewildering maze.” –Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development, 1975, p. 157.
Likewise, logic, mathematics, and the uniformity of natural law cannot be derived from observation without large metaphysical assumptions (e.g. that the mind was made to comprehend the created order). To quote one Reformed thinker in discussing David Hume:
"Contiguity association has to do with outer impressions and metaphysics, and resemblance association with inner impressions and mathematics. Because impressions continually conjoin, we believe in a necessary cause, i.e., that water is wet and that fire will burn. Continual repetition of experienced impressions leads to the conclusion of necessity, but the necessity is in the mind, not in the outside world. Mathematics deals with resemblances within the mind and is thus valid unless it claims to be valid for an outside world. Contiguity association rests on a conclusion from the order and relationship of impressions, but any order can occur, so that there is at best a probability concept available, not a law concerning outside reality." -R.J. Rushdoony, The One and the Many, 1978, p. 294.
Now, I know that most atheist philosophers would reject Hume's view of reality. However, they have no warrant to do so.
Once it has been shown that everyone has to make major metaphysical assumptions, on what basis can an atheist/skeptic/know-it-all say that he is a "free-thinker", "rational", and "in accord with Reason"? I believe that this was the rational-mystical dialectic that Dusman was referring to.
How can anyone know (i.e. warranted true belief) anything unless he knows for certain those basic things (i.e. logic, mathematics, uniformity, etc.) upon which everything else is based?
The only way of knowing the certainty of these universal, timeless, abstract truths is for there to exist a Being who is universal, timeless, and from which these truths originate from, and this Being must REVEAL that these things are indeed true.
At least one (and probably more) atheist philosopher has recognized the “God” conclusion:
“Whereas the quarrel about universals and ontogeny had its meaning and significance within the context of medieval Christian culture, it is an intellectual scandal that some philosophers of mathematics can still discuss whether whole numbers exist or not…No, there are no preordained, predetermined mathematical ‘truths’ that just lie out or up there. Evolutionary thinking teaches us otherwise.” –Yehuda Rav, Math Worlds, 1993, pp. 81, 100.
Thus, the atheist is left with the absurd belief that necessary truth ‘evolves’!!! Of course this is self-refuting. The above philosopher is obviously suppressing the truth of God’s existence and authority over his life. It is only through belief and repentance to God and His risen Christ that man can escape the futility of his sinful life and receive the forgiveness of sin.
A few more quotes you can think upon:
ReplyDeleteDemocritus, the founder of materialism (atomism actually):
“We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss…atoms and Void (alone) exist in reality…We know nothing accurately in reality, but (only) as it changes according to the bodily condition, and the constitution of those things that flow upon (the body) and impinge upon it…Man is a universe in little (Microcosm).” –Democritus, Fragments 117, 9, and 34.
[Anyone sense a bit of self-refutation?]
“Christianity teaches not only that everything that is was created out of nothing but also that everything would sink back into nothingness the moment God were to withdraw His all-sustaining creative power. This is why Nietzche’s or Sartre’s “man without God” moves in a meaningless void which he vainly and desperately tries to populate with the still born creatures of his own whims and fancies. And since in Chritianity, as in no other religion, man’s existence is absolutely grounded in God, the atrophy of faith in God must of necessity lead to the most horrible experience of the abyss of annihilation and nothingness.” –Kurt Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt, 1960, p. 155.
“Ultimately, the given of a philosophy, the presupposition of a viewpoint, is the total world of that philosophy. A philosophy beginning with the ontological Trinity is a philosophy which is by presupposition inclusive of all that the triune God is and does. Similarly, a philosophy whose given or presupposition is the autonomous mind of man finds itself either with no God and world but only the mind of man, or else with a God and world which are merely aspects of the mind of man. The given is the total world of any philosophy and its comprehending order. Modern philosophy having begun with Descarte’s autonomous consciousness has been driven to reducing reality to that autonomous consciousness.” –R.J. Rushdoony, The One and the Many, 1978, p. 284.
“I am more sure of God’s existence than I am of my own!” –Francis Schaeffer
Amen, brother Schaeffer!
Apolonio,
ReplyDeleteI responded here.
Saint and Sinner, I agree with most of your quotes, but not your interpretation of what follows from them.
ReplyDeleteCreated or not, logic under your position is still more than a mere concept. It becomes something which is independent and requires a general source. Like the "all morality comes from God" argument, the "it flows from how God thinks" response gives you the alternatives of your god thinking without logic and then defining it, or being subject to logic as we all are. (The former I suggest is self-contradictory.) My key point however is that logical laws (and other laws) do not "exist" as real things do, and instead are a description of how real or conceptual things operate based on their existing form. Non-logical activity by a thing is to contradict its very nature or definition.
For example, you could say that your god created all Xs so that if A happens to one of them, it will do B. A happening to an X will not make it do C, because that would mean that the X is not an X, or it would mean the impossibility of things having properties; but properties are apparent. What your god could do is change the nature of the X so that it does C. Or the Xs could be created/defined with a god-override property, so that they do D or F or Z if that's your god's desire, thereby avoiding contradiction. Irregularity would likewise be the changing of the nature of things, not logic itself. Point is that logic isn't something that can exist any less or differently than it does now, because it isn't real. It's a linguistic tool. (So the solution to the question of whether an omnipotent being can create a rock so heavy that it cannot move it, is yes, so long as the being gave up its omnipotence in the process. And that's fine, since omnipotence is a property, and thus has logical (read: definitional) constraints. A being cannot be both omnipotent and not omnipotent at the same time, which the existence of the rock would otherwise require.)
Likewise, logic, mathematics, and the uniformity of natural law cannot be derived from observation without large metaphysical assumptions (e.g. that the mind was made to comprehend the created order)
I would say only the third requires metaphysical assumptions, but that they all of course cannot be seen without a mind capable of understanding or noticing them. (No need for it to be designed for that purpose.)
Once it has been shown that everyone has to make major metaphysical assumptions, on what basis can an atheist/skeptic/know-it-all say that he is a "free-thinker", "rational", and "in accord with Reason"? I believe that this was the rational-mystical dialectic that Dusman was referring to.
Why limit this to atheists et al? Assuming god does not get you past making those major metaphysical assumptions, or being any more in accord with reason. Either you assume from the start that a universal timeless being exists and is revealing you these truths, (not reason-based) or its existence and statements must be derived from the same uncertain faculties that an atheist uses. Again, I would not say that I "know" uniformity. I would accept Descartes' cogito ergo sum and say I know no more, but that I must accept more, and yes this necessity is conceived in my mind, how else could it be? Although it is not possible to base one's world-view entirely on concrete and complete knowledge, I do not see how this fact works against the aim of basing one's views on reason to the greatest possible extent.
People can't be expected to add caveats to every statement they make. We all have to assume more than we can know with certainty, but we don't say to each other "I know Joe, in so far as it is possible to be certain Joe actually exists" or "I know how to cook, assuming reality exists of course", and very few people say "thank God, assuming I'm correct in my belief that there is a god."
The only way of knowing the certainty of these universal, timeless, abstract truths is for there to exist a Being who is universal, timeless, and from which these truths originate from, and this Being must REVEAL that these things are indeed true.
But that requires you to also be certain that such a being exists, which you cannot (rationally) be.
Deuc,
ReplyDeleteFirst, thank you for the non-confrontational conversation. Second, I have chosen to answer your points in a certain order to make my point.
“It becomes something which is independent and requires a general source. Like the "all morality comes from God" argument, the "it flows from how God thinks" response gives you the alternatives of your god thinking without logic and then defining it, or being subject to logic as we all are.”
Like most atheists discussing this topic, you commit the “either/or” fallacy. You assert that either Platonism is true (in which case something is above God) or Okhamism is true (in which case God can arbitrarily do anything He wants). However, Scripture presents a third option: God is the source of all these things (i.e. morality, logic) without arbitrarily creating these things since they are part of God’s unchanging, timeless nature which He Himself cannot change. In somewhat philosophical language, St. Paul says that “God cannot deny himself”. His mind IS that Platonic reality. I don’t know how else to explain it. If you do a search on this blog for ‘Euthyphro Dilemma’, then you’ll find it explained there. I believe that most Reformed philosophers and theologians take this position, and most atheists have simply been using this old argument without paying any attention to the replies.
“(So the solution to the question of whether an omnipotent being can create a rock so heavy that it cannot move it, is yes, so long as the being gave up its omnipotence in the process…)”
Of course, this is a straw-man version of omnipotence. The Scriptural definition is that God can do anything that He pleases except for those things which would require God to “deny Himself”.
“Point is that logic isn't something that can exist any less or differently than it does now, because it isn't real.”
I recognize that they are abstract truths in which man’s mind must think. However, the point is that, while these necessary truths exist in man’s mind (i.e. phenomena), they don’t necessarily have to exist outside the mind in the real world of things in themselves (i.e. noumena). I believe that just about every major philosopher from Hume and Kant to Sartre has recognized this to be an epistemic problem. Please correct me if I’m wrong.
“I would say only the third requires metaphysical assumptions, but that they all of course cannot be seen without a mind capable of understanding or noticing them. (No need for it to be designed for that purpose.)”
Well, then you’re going against the conclusion of just about everyone who has ever studied the philosophy of mathematics (including Bertrand Russell cited above). Mathematics cannot be consistent unless one presupposes infinite sets which, in turn, presuppose an actual infinity. To do this presupposes a Platonic reality, and this is why most philosophers of mathematics have become Constructivists (in order to avoid the “God” conclusion).
Concerning design, how do you know that the phenomena corresponds to what’s really out there, the noumena? If you are nothing more than the result of a non-teleological process, Darwinism, then all you’re going to have are non-teleological thoughts. Put in another way, if you are the result of random mutations whose corresponding phenotype nature selects for its survival-value, and not truth-value, then your thoughts only have survival value and not necessarily any truth value whatsoever. To quote Bertrand Russell:
“Organic life, we are told, has developed gradually from the protozoon to the philosopher, and this development, we are assured, is indubitably an advance. Unfortunately it is the philosopher, not the protozoon, who gives us this assurance.”
—Bertrand Russell
J.B.S. Haldane and even Charles Darwin himself have said similar things. The way I see it, Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism presents serious problems that completely undermine naturalism in terms of epistemology.
“Again, I would not say that I "know" uniformity. I would accept Descartes' cogito ergo sum and say I know no more, but that I must accept more, and yes this necessity is conceived in my mind, how else could it be?”
Actually (and if you’re a philosopher you probably already know this), Descartes was wrong. It doesn’t follow that “I think, therefore I am”, but rather, “ ‘I’ think, therefore ‘I’ think” (notice the ‘I’ instead of just I). All “you” can know is that “your” thoughts exist. You can’t even know that you are the “you” who is doing the thinking. Starting with yourself and your “free-thought” is a springboard to nowhere.
If your starting point, your worldview axiom, is the assumption that the highest thing in the universe is the finite human mind, then you have no warrant to believe in these universals since they require omnipresence, timelessness, omnipotence over the universe, and omniscience to know that they are true. Thus, in order to know theses things, either you have to a.) be that Being or b.) you have to receive REVELATION of these matters from that Being.
“Either you assume from the start that a universal timeless being exists and is revealing you these truths, (not reason-based) or its existence and statements must be derived from the same uncertain faculties that an atheist uses.”
Yes, but the Christian presupposition doesn’t become *vicious* circular reasoning. To the naturalist, however, he is left without guidance like a boat out in the middle of an endless sea with neither position nor direction.
“But that requires you to also be certain that such a being exists, which you cannot (rationally) be.”
That’s why we’re called *Presuppositionalists*. We presuppose the existence of the God revealed in Scripture. However, with TAG, we can show that it is only on the Christian presupposition of the Trinity as revealed in Scripture that warranted true belief is possible.
Naturalism (and for that matter, all non-Christian worldviews) are epistemologically self-destructive because a.) through internal critique they undermine the possibility of knowledge and b.) through external critique, they have no way of knowing (again, warranted true belief) the existence of universals outside the mind. Revealed theism is the only internally and externally coherent worldview, and only on the presupposition that it is true can we have warrant to believe anything (other than the existence of our own thinking, of course).
If you’d like to read something more thorough and very clear, I’d suggest you’d read a section (part II. Epistemological Nihilism) of Russell Manion’s paper, The Other Side: Metaphysics and Meaning:
http://home.earthlink.net/~gbl111/other.htm
How do I know God exists? *Because without Him, I could know nothing.* To deny Him is to suppress the truth within us that we are His creatures, and the only way to escape this folly is to believe in Him and His risen Christ and repent. He is there, and He is not silent.
First, thank you for the non-confrontational conversation.
ReplyDeleteThankyou, I'll try to keep it up, but unfortunately I don't have much time to spare, and some of what I write may seem, or be, blunt or critical.
You assert that either Platonism is true (in which case something is above God) or Okhamism is true (in which case God can arbitrarily do anything He wants).
I'm not trying to say something is "above God", simply different and independent; not real. I accept the notion that it might be necessary for a god to imbue us with the ideas of logic or morality, or existence etc. But the idea that abstracts need a source, is something I cannot fathom; to me it lacks the tiniest shred of need or reason to hang it on. I know you said you thought logic wasn't actually created, but the effect is the same, and given what logic is makes it seem totally unnecessary.
It was also not my intent to suggest that dilemma, it was a side point, but mainly because of the way you describe it. Let me first say that my view of the status of logic is different than my view of the status of morals. Logic is, to rephrase what I said previously, definitional: the inherent consequences of things and ideas being what they are. Morality is not definitional, it has some premises which it rests on. By definition your god would be doing/have constructed the good, logical, etc. thing, but the question is one of capability, not will or what have it. Apart from the constant/perfect nature of your god, could it have caused a different logic? I don't mean the different forms of it we see, but the ideas, and the answer must be no. Not just because your god is the source, but to be different one logic would have to be flawed, contradicting itself. Thus, not possible. (Unlike morality there isn't a choice to be subject to logic, only to act logically.)
If you do a search on this blog for "Euthyphro Dilemma", then you'll find it explained there. I believe that most Reformed philosophers and theologians take this position, and most atheists have simply been using this old argument without paying any attention to the replies.
I searched, and found primarily references back to earlier posts, but what I did find did not satisfy me.
The hopefully simpler way I would phrase the dilemma is that either morality is based on meaningful principles, or it isn't.
(a) If the morality provided by your god is not based on such principles, then although not necessary arbitrary, (since there could hypothetically be other unprincipled reasons) it, well... isn't based on meaningful principles, which in my opinion more or less undermines the point of it. Ie. I don't think something can simply be good or bad, without any basis for that position.
Or, (b) it is based on such principles. At which point I would expect the issues to become the extent of human ability to understand those principles and whether it matters if we can't understand them fully.
Now there is another possibility, that somehow those principles link in with your god's actions and therefore become dependent on them. Not merely that we would not know them without the god, or that your god thought them up to begin with. But support of this possibility would be difficult and unlikely to convince, in that it would require actual examples of the connection to god's actions. Arguably it would need a link for every aspect of morality, so as to not effectively concede the point; that god is not essential to morality. (I'm interested to hear any counter-points on this.)
Of course, this is a straw-man version of omnipotence.
Well no, because I didn't set it aflame. I don't believe it, but was putting it out as what I believe to be the only consistent way of solving it. I don't think it impacts negatively on omnipotence at all.
The Scriptural definition is that God can do anything that He pleases except for those things which would require God to "deny Himself".
Isn't that the same thing? Wouldn't giving up omnipotence be "denying himself" or do you think he can make that kind of rock?
Please correct me if I'm wrong.
No, I think I agree, not sure.
Mathematics cannot be consistent unless one presupposes infinite sets which, in turn, presuppose an actual infinity. To do this presupposes a Platonic reality,
I don't understand how that contradicts my point or why infinity needs a god. And further, I suspect that your sentence might not convey the same meaning and implications as what Russell and others meant, specifically whether it relates to consistency or proof.
Put in another way, if you are the result of random mutations whose corresponding phenotype nature selects for its survival-value, and not truth-value, then your thoughts only have survival value and not necessarily any truth value whatsoever.
False, to be true your statement would require that nature be perfectly efficient in adapting traits to survival. Evolution easily (and effectively must) produces characteristics which have uses beyond want is needed for survival. Our brains are not so directly defined by our dna etc. as to be constrained by them. And in any event, survival-value thought would encompass quite a lot, and what survival requires has itself changed for us.
The way I see it, Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism presents serious problems that completely undermine naturalism in terms of epistemology.
I wanted to look in to that, but there was too much unnecessary verbiage and overhead for me to bother with it.
It doesn't follow that "I think, therefore I am", but rather, " 'I' think, therefore 'I' think" (notice the 'I' instead of just I). All "you" can know is that "your" thoughts exist. You can't even know that you are the "you" who is doing the thinking.
Sorry, must disagree again. I get your point that the thoughts I think I'm thinking might not actually be mine, but even then someone (me) has to be in order to witness it.
If your starting point, your worldview axiom, is the assumption that the highest thing in the universe is the finite human mind, then you have no warrant to believe in these universals since they require omnipresence, timelessness, omnipotence over the universe, and omniscience to know that they are true.
I wouldn't try to rank the human minds, doesn't work from worldview. Belief requires knowledge? I don't think so. Reason, necessity or evidence are quite sufficient in my view. And as always, you still need to know your god exists. But...
That's why we're called *Presuppositionalists*.
I hadn't been at this site long enough to notice, and it makes pointless much of what I've written here. The notion has some intellectual merit, but it doesn't make you any more correct and I can't see how it would help in arguments. (In fact I think it might hinder internal reflection.) Self-consistency is not everything, and is difficult if not impossible re: interventionist religions. Parts of what I've read also make it seem like an invitation to assume almost anything as evidence for a god when objectively it is not.
Yes, but the Christian presupposition doesn't become *vicious* circular reasoning.
You still have to presuppose the accuracy of scripture It's interesting to note that the Wikipedia page for Presuppositionalist claims that the concept's primary founder considers all worldviews circular and the page follows this up with "So when considering worldviews, the concern must not be for vicious (or "small") circularity, but for internal coherence ("large circularity"). " Obviously I do think atheism is self-consistent.
To the naturalist, however, he is left without guidance like a boat out in the middle of an endless sea with neither position nor direction.
Doesn't really bother us, we just start mapping the stars and the sun.