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Tuesday, January 23, 2007

Doubting and self-doubting

To amplify on a point made by Calvindude, we need to distinguish between doubt and self-doubt. Take the stereotypical case of a young man, raised in the faith, who suffers a crisis of faith when he goes to college.

Has he lost his faith in God? Not necessarily. Rather, he may have lost his faith in his childhood authority-figures.

Or, to look at the same phenomenon from another angle, this may be a loss of self-confidence. He is suddenly seized with the question of whether what he always believed is simply the result of social conditioning.

Does he believe this for himself, or was he, in effect, programmed to believe this as a result of his religious upbringing?

Did he ever believe in God and Scripture? Or did he believe in what other people believed? Did he believe in the pastor or his parents as a surrogate for believing in God?

He believed in God because they believed in God, and he believed in them. So did he really believe in God?

Questioning one’s faith in this sense is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, it can be a good thing. It can be a mark of maturation.

It’s like teenage rebellion. A little teenage rebellion is a good thing. It’s important for teenagers to acquire a measure of emotional and intellectual independence. That’s part of growing up.

But lifelong rebellion is a mark of immaturity and arrested development. When Loftus says that “when it comes to being inside the bubble of science, education, and rational thought, I'll go with that everytime, since the alternatives are superstitious, and because science has accomplished so much,” all he’s done is to transfer his childish faith from one set of authority-figures to another set 0f authority figures. Instead of the pastor giving him a pat on the head, it’s Fr. Dawkins or Padre Dennett.

Loftus has merely exchanged one form of peer pressure for another. An adult on the outside, but a child on the inside.

As I’ve also said, many times before, there’s no intellectual virtue in doctrinaire scepticism. Indeed, Victor Reppert has an excellent quote on that attitude:

***QUOTE***

J. R. Lucas, a distinguished Oxford philosopher who was a student during this period, has described the prevailing mindset of that era as follows:

“The philosophical climate in which I grew up in Oxford was one of extreme aridity. The ability not to be convinced was the most powerful part of a young Philosopher’s armory: a competent tutor could disbelieve any proposition, no matter how true it was, and the more sophisticated could not even understand the meaning of what was being asserted. In consequence, concern was concentrated on the basic questions of epistemology almost to the exclusion of other questions of larger import but less easy to argue in black and white terms. The undergraduate who wanted to write essays on the meaning of existence was told to confine himself to the logical grammar of ‘is,’ and was not even allowed to ask what truth was, or how one ought to live one’s life.”

http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2007/01/deleted-passage-from-chronicles-of.html#comments

***END-QUOTE***

Doctrinaire scepticism is just another form of pseudo-intellectualism.

10 comments:

  1. At the end of reading this post, I am still sitting and scratching my head: if the young man in question says, "I don't know if I still believe that God exists," it seems to exclude the possibility that he does believe that. Even more so if the young man says, "I don't believe that God exists anymore."

    The only situation you seem to be describing is someone who says, "I still believe, but I doubt sometimes."

    If the person doubts all of these things (Scripture, authority figures, the Bible's versions of history and biology), I don't see how you can claim that he has a "saving faith".

    And I don't see how people are supposed to know if they have "too much" doubt -- in other words, how do they know that they have a saving faith? Do they? Does any Christian?

    Or is it not part of doubt itself that one doubts one's own salvation?

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  2. ****The ability not to be convinced was the most powerful part of a young Philosopher’s armory: a competent tutor could disbelieve any proposition, no matter how true it was…****

    A bit off topic, but how can someone disbelieve a proposition? Can a person choose to believe or disbelieve a proposition? For example, can you somehow choose to believe the proposition about yourself: "I was raised by a herd of elephants"? Unless you were actually raised by a herd of elephants, it seems like it would be impossible to choose to believe that proposition.

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  3. Anonymous said:

    "If the person doubts all of these things (Scripture, authority figures, the Bible's versions of history and biology), I don't see how you can claim that he has a 'saving faith'."

    I didn't claim he has saving faith. Read more carefully.

    I'm describing an individual who suffers a crisis of faith or lapse of faith.

    Whether he has saving faith depends on where he goes from there. Does he overcome his crisis?

    Some do, some don't.

    "And I don't see how people are supposed to know if they have 'too much' doubt -- in other words, how do they know that they have a saving faith? Do they? Does any Christian?"

    That's an interesting question, for which there's no uniform answer, since it's person-variable.

    Some believers have a very effortless and equitable faith.

    Some are more uncertain to begin with, but become more certain over time, while others suffer a steady erosion of faith.

    The walk of faith is a winnowing process. Not everyone who begins the race ends the race. And not everyone who ends the race began the race. Some runners drop out while others join in.

    "Or is it not part of doubt itself that one doubts one's own salvation?"

    To doubt one's own salvation is not damnable. Saving faith does not entail the belief in one's own salvation. That's a bonus point.

    It is possible to enjoy the assurance of salvation, but the assurance of salvation is not a condition of salvation.

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  4. curious said...

    "A bit off topic, but how can someone disbelieve a proposition? Can a person choose to believe or disbelieve a proposition? For example, can you somehow choose to believe the proposition about yourself: "I was raised by a herd of elephants"? Unless you were actually raised by a herd of elephants, it seems like it would be impossible to choose to believe that proposition."

    You're missing the element of sarcasm. Lucas isn't talking about people who actually doubt these things, but people to affect a state of doubt. Who pretend to doubt the obvious as if that were a mark of intellectual sophistication.

    Lucas is being deliberately ironic in his description.

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  5. Steve,

    Thanks for the reply. Perhaps I did miss Lucas’ element of sarcasm. I am, however, still curious with regards to the question: Can a person choose to believe or disbelieve a proposition?

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  6. curious said:
    Steve,

    Thanks for the reply. Perhaps I did miss Lucas’ element of sarcasm. I am, however, still curious with regards to the question: Can a person choose to believe or disbelieve a proposition?

    *************************

    Short answer: we lack direct control over what we believe.

    However, we can do things which may, though not necessarily, cultivate, bolster, or undermine a belief.

    If I expose myself to certain evidence or contrary evidence or read one side of the argument. That sort of thing.

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  7. Curious asked:
    ---
    Can a person choose to believe or disbelieve a proposition?
    ---

    This depends a great deal on what you mean by the above. Tossing out the questionable aspect of "choice", psychology and common sense teach us that people believe something without good reason all the time. Someone may wish something is true, and eventually they believe it is true; or vice versa (they may wish something is false that is actually true).

    Furthermore, Scripture teaches the same thing regarding the existence of God. Romans 1, for instance, states that the unbelievers have clear knowledge of God's attributes that they supress in unrighteousness. They don't want it to be true, therefore they refuse to believe it.

    So I would say that yes, it is indeed possible for someone to convince himself of the truth value of a proposition without having a proper justification for that belief.

    Does this mean they "choose" to believe something? It depends on how one defines "choice." If by "choose" you mean that someone desires something to be true and therefore convinces himself that it is true; yes, it is by choice. But if a choice is instead picking an option based on what you already believe to be true, then the change happens before the choice (you could not actually choose to believe something you in reality doubted; you would first have to convince yourself and then choose it in such a scenario).

    So it depends on how you are defining choice here. And I would also point out there are some other ways of defining a choice than the two I mentioned here. Perhaps you could tell us which definition you had in mind? :-)

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  8. calvindude said,

    ****Perhaps you could tell us which definition you had in mind? :-)****

    The definition of choice I had in mind is: deciding, as a direct act of the will, that a proposition is true.

    Steve seems to be saying that we lack direct control over what we believe but that we can examine evidence which may or may not persuade us that a proposition is true. What we believe in this scenario seems to be not directly an act of the will but rather a function of whether the evidence is persuasive.

    You (calvindude) seem to be saying that we can directly will to believe something to be true, i.e., "someone may wish something is true, and eventually they believe it is true."

    So I guess my question is: Is believing that a proposition is true a result of whether I am passively persuaded by the evidence (not a direct act of the will) or whether I actively "wish" that the proposition is true regardless of the persuasiveness of the evidence (a direct act of the will)?

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  9. Curious said:
    ---
    So I guess my question is: Is believing that a proposition is true a result of whether I am passively persuaded by the evidence (not a direct act of the will) or whether I actively "wish" that the proposition is true regardless of the persuasiveness of the evidence (a direct act of the will)?
    ---

    Firstly, I would point out that there is a difference between "wishing" something is true and "choosing to believe" something is true, although there are some areas of overlap (this is why I asked which definition of choice you were using).

    Under your definition of choice ("deciding, as a direct act of the will, that a proposition is true") I would say that yes, it is possible to choose to believe; but I do think that your definition of "choice" there is very loose and not technically helpful. After all, if I weigh evidence for a proposition (say, "It's 10 miles from my house to the nearest McDonalds") and discover that all evidence I can find is consistent with the proposition, then I am still making a choice (under your definition) in deciding to belief that proposition. My mind is still actively engaged in the process. But I do not think this was how you originally meant to phrase the question.

    Perhaps you mean that a choice is something that is completely contained within the will, without any outside influence; in other words, you make your decision without weighing evidence. In this case, the decision would be completely arbitrary. And then I would answer: No, you cannot make an arbitrary choice to believe certain principles.

    This does not mean you will always know the reasons why you believe the way you do. There are certain beliefs that are simply grounded in your nature (both in the spiritual sense and in the physical make-up of your being). These may be difficult to explain, but they are not arbitrary (since your existence is not an arbitrary existence). Indeed, if your decisions are arbitrary, this is a mark of insanity.

    So, taking it to the idea of believing in God, you cannot by will alone (apart from any reasons outside the will) change your mind on the existence of God, other than the possible exception of someone who is insane. But what you can do is have a desire that God either exist or not exist, and then interpret evidence in light of your desire to the extent that you pursuade yourself to change your views.

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  10. calvindude,

    Thanks for your time.

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