daniel morgan said...
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I suppose you're invoking the Anthropic Principle?__A few considerations:_1) We don't know if our universe is the only one or not. We simply don't know, either way. There is no evidence for or against it. IF a great number, or infinite number, of other universes exist, with different fundamental forces (and thus no life), ours is not "special" -- no "money has changed hands"._2) We don't know what precedes the first ability of physics to peer into the past for our own universe. The singularity may be the result of prior contractions and expansions, whether or not this particular universe will ever have a "big crunch". The cyclic universe is actually reviving amongst academic cosmologists, esp Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok, who have a nice FAQ on the subject. This doesn't invoke other universes, simply other possible configurations of our own. That is, if our universe has cycled through an enormous number of configurations, it is only reasonable to expect one of those to be like ours._3) Given all other constants are set as they are, altering one of them is catastrophic for the potential of life. However, physicists will readily admit that changing these constants in ratios is completely beyond our ability to predict the consequences of. That is, if we tweak G by a certain amount, and we tweak the property of the strong nuclear force as well in some way, and of EM, and of the weak nuclear force...no one knows what ratios would still give a universe with the properties necessary for life. No one knows.__In that sense, the "money changing hands" argument is largely predicated upon that which we do not know:_i) how many universes there are_ii) how many cycles our universe has gone through_iii) how many configurations of the forces of our own universe would still result in life.
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Notice what Danny is reduced to in order to evade the anthropic principle:
i) He appeals to the purely hypothetical possibility of a megaverse. But if, by his own admission, there’s no evidence for it or against it, then it’s unverifiable as well as unfalsifiable.
Isn’t that a textbook definition of pseudoscience?
How does his appeal differ from Russell’s indetectible teapot orbiting Mars? Or the abstract possibility that our universe came into being 5 minutes ago, complete with fake memories of the past? Or the Gossean conjecture that God planted fake fossils in the geological strata?
ii) And how does invoking the MWI relieve the problem rather than exacerbate the problem? Instead of accounting for a universe, we must now account for a multiverse. Not only does it merely push the original problem back a step, but it literally multiplies the original problem.
iii) Physicalism promotes its position by appeal to Occam’s razor: monism is simpler than dualism.
But what about the ontological prodigality of the megaverse—which makes dualism positively bashful by comparison.
Daniel's distantly plausible science is eqally valid to your lack of proof for intelligent design, which is not justified by evidence for non-accidental occurrence, regardless of what any of you on either side think to the contrary.
ReplyDeleteYou have to distinguish betwwen "intelligent intent" and "natural bias" or the extra entity isn't justified... period.
Island,
ReplyDeleteI think you’ve said something that resonates in some way, but I’m still not completely sure what you mean by this. Care to expound? What “extra entity” are you referring to?
Steve,
ReplyDeletePaul Manata and Calvindude spill a lot of ink arguging that only Christianity "accounts" for logic. What do you have to say about this?
:::YAWN!!!:::
ReplyDeleteSorry, whenever I see Manata's name I get tired...he tends to ramble on without saying much.
The 3rd anonymous said:
ReplyDelete---
Sorry, whenever I see Manata's name I get tired...he tends to ramble on without saying much.
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Sorta like you.
The 2nd Anonymous said:
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Paul Manata and Calvindude spill a lot of ink arguging that only Christianity "accounts" for logic. What do you have to say about this?
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I'd like to point out to Mr./Ms./Mrs. Anonymous that it would be relatively easy to refute this notion if you were to, oh I don't know, provide an atheistic accounting for logic.
But for some reason, especially among the internet atheists, no one bothers to try.... The most I've gotten is the claim that an atheist could do so; yet nothing goes beyond that. There's always vague reference to other philosophies out there (while the atheist "accidentally" forgets to account for the fact that these other philosophies contradict his own elsewhere).
Case in point, the Witmer talk Daniel Morgan linked to (which I'm currently responding to on my blog). Witmer says that one can always fall back to Platonism and say one does not need to account for logic; yet doing so is utterly destructive to a materialistic worldview as Platonism holds to the primacy of the immaterial "forms" over the material instances of those forms (i.e. physical objects). Likewise, Daniel also uses Platonism as a crutch despite the fact that he is not a Platonist in anything except for avoiding coming up with an accounting for logic....
If you have to hold to self-refuting philosophy, I'm going to continue to point out that that's what you're doing.
The Christian worldview, on the other hand, which A) does not rely on materialism and B) has an objective, transcendent object (God), actually can account for logic in a meaningful manner.
So I merely ask, why should I give up something that does explain this problem right now for a system that even its adherents admit can only possibly explain this problem at some future date when we know more about the universe?
As with most other issues, I side with Manata and Calvin Dude on the theistic grounding of abstract objects.
ReplyDeleteCalvindude,
ReplyDeleteI’m the second anonymous, and I did NOT mean to suggest that atheism has a better answer. I, in fact, do not believe this. I would, however, be interested in knowing what can possibly constitute a full accounting for logic, when, as everyone knows, logic will have to be used in the effort. You don’t have to be an atheist to think logic can’t be accounted for without invoking a tautology. Talk of “accounting for logic” seems to be a category mistake.
I’m probably misconstruing your conception of the act of “accounting” for something. That is why I asked for clarification in my last post.
calvindude...
ReplyDeleteYou're so logical.
Pray for the day that you can cause heretics to be killed, just like your namesake.
What “extra entity” are you referring to?
ReplyDeleteThe extra entity is "intelligence" that's alleged without proof to be involved in the "design". You have to prove that this factor is actually at play, or the default position, if given that we're not here by accident, is because there is some "natural bias" in favor of our existence, not "intelligent intent".
A set of blueprints for humans found hanging from the drawing board of a very old alien spaceship would suffice, but simply accepting evidence that we're not here by chance does not justify the assumption.
The 2nd Anonymous (I just like the way that sounds) said:
ReplyDelete---
I would, however, be interested in knowing what can possibly constitute a full accounting for logic, when, as everyone knows, logic will have to be used in the effort.
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This is why when I look at this specific issue, I start with the question: What does logic require in order to be universal? In other words, I use the internal critique on logic itself (you use the axioms of logic as logic's presuppositions and examine from there what logic requiers in order to be valid).
For instance, can logic merely be assumed without having some kind of grounding? Not if logic is valid. As I demonstrated with Daniel Morgan (on both my blog and his--I don't have time to get the links at the moment, but if you do a search on both of our blogs you can probably find our discussion):
1. One law of logic is the invalidity of circular argumentation.
2. If one assumes that logic "just is" valid, one is using a circular argument.
3. 2 violates 1.
4. Therefore, 2 is not logical.
Thus, if we assert that logic "just is" valid then we are accepting logic on illogical grounds, and as such we are arguing that there is something illogical that precedes logic. As such, logically speaking, not all arguments must be logical! There must, in fact, be some kind of arguments that are not logical that still, somehow, forms logic.
On the other hand, one can attempt to ground logic in something else. Objectivists (the Ayn Rand kind) ground it in existence (existence of what? Existence itself! Even though existence isn't a "thing" and therefore cannot "exist" but instead is a descriptive lable of a thing....). Certain linguistics philosophers ground logic in language only. Others consider it to be a mental function.
The problem with all of these is that whatever you ground logic in is going to set the scope of logic. If you say logic is linguistic, then logic is invalid outside of language. As such, it cannot describe the real world. If it's a mental function, again logic would be limited to the mind only, not to physical reality. If, on the other hand, it's linked to the existence of some thing, then logic is only valid insofar as the scope of the existent object.
I follow this last approach. I ground logic in the nature of God. Since God is, in His nature, universal and transendent, so is logic. Therefore, logic is itself objective, universal, and transcendent. It is not relative to the mind that thinks up logic, nor is it relative to a specific object within the universe, nor even to the universe itself--logic transcends the universe because God transcends the universe.
As such, I have a reason to use universal logic. The atheist (especially those who limit logic to mental or linguistic capacities) have no universal logic. And those who would seek to argue that logic "just is" (as Morgan tried with the Platonist argument) use a self-refuted logic.
"And those who would seek to argue that logic "just is" (as Morgan tried with the Platonist argument) use a self-refuted logic."
ReplyDeleteI'm not a philosopher, but if I recall correctly:
In Platonism, the unchanging/ideal realm is the realm of *forms* (plural). As such, one needs a transcendent mind to bring the particulars in relation to one another in order to solve the problem of the one and the many. Atheistic materialism is by definition reductionistic (reducing everything to many and flux), and thus, it cannot solve the problem of the one and the many. Therefore, atheism is by definition irrational.
(To those philosophers out there: please correct me if I'm wrong. I endeavor to learn more about this topic.)
"This is why when I look at this specific issue, I start with the question: What does logic require in order to be universal? In other words, I use the internal critique on logic itself (you use the axioms of logic as logic's presuppositions and examine from there what logic requiers in order to be valid)."
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Using logic to critique itself? Isn’t it impossible for logic to fail an internal critique? I mean, asking me to put logic to the test is the same as asking me to put my existence to the test. I don’t demonstrate to myself that I exist, nor do I “demonstrate” that logic is true. What I am stating here is not controversial. It goes back at least as far as Aristotle. Two valued logic is already in play when you ask “what logic requires to be valid” and that renders the question incoherent, it seems to me.
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For instance, can logic merely be assumed without having some kind of grounding? Not if logic is valid. As I demonstrated with Daniel Morgan (on both my blog and his--I don't have time to get the links at the moment, but if you do a search on both of our blogs you can probably find our discussion):
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One doesn’t have the luxury of “assuming” logic. That suggests that there is a possible alternative and there just plain isn’t. One does not “ground” logic by asking what criteria are available to establish logic’s validity; again, 2 valued logic is already in full bloom at the asking of such a question.
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1. One law of logic is the invalidity of circular argumentation.
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I disagree. Tautology is not invalid. It is used in mathematics all the time. Assuming what one claims to be arguing for IS invalid, but since I don’t pretend to argue for logic any more than I debate myself about whether I actually exist, I’m not engaging in that kind of circularity.
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2. If one assumes that logic "just is" valid, one is using a circular argument.
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See last comment.
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3. 2 violates 1.
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Again, it is impossible to ASSUME logic is true as though there is some conceivable alternative. There is no other vantage point but what logic itself provides.
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4. Therefore, 2 is not logical.
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I’d say 2 is impossible.
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Thus, if we assert that logic "just is" valid then we are accepting logic on illogical grounds, and as such we are arguing that there is something illogical that precedes logic. As such, logically speaking, not all arguments must be logical! There must, in fact, be some kind of arguments that are not logical that still, somehow, forms logic.
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“There must, in fact be some kind of arguments that are not logical that still, somehow, forms logic”
Arguments that are not logical? Are you serious? Have you simply been careless with your wording? You claim atheists are self-refuting and as an alternative you appeal to something illogical grounding logic and expect anyone to be satisfied? This statement is begging for clarification.
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On the other hand, one can attempt to ground logic in something else. Objectivists (the Ayn Rand kind) ground it in existence (existence of what? Existence itself! Even though existence isn't a "thing" and therefore cannot "exist" but instead is a descriptive lable of a thing....). Certain linguistics philosophers ground logic in language only. Others consider it to be a mental function.
The problem with all of these is that whatever you ground logic in is going to set the scope of logic. If you say logic is linguistic, then logic is invalid outside of language. As such, it cannot describe the real world. If it's a mental function, again logic would be limited to the mind only, not to physical reality. If, on the other hand, it's linked to the existence of some thing, then logic is only valid insofar as the scope of the existent object.
I follow this last approach. I ground logic in the nature of God. Since God is, in His nature, universal and transendent, so is logic. Therefore, logic is itself objective, universal, and transcendent. It is not relative to the mind that thinks up logic, nor is it relative to a specific object within the universe, nor even to the universe itself--logic transcends the universe because God transcends the universe.
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I’d say logic is grounded in information processing, not in language defined simply as the symbols we write or the words we say. Information processing is a term that covers essentially every aspect of sentience and, therefore has the widest possible scope.
Belief in God and universals is just fine by me and it may ground logic for you in a subjective sense, but you’ve not demonstrated that logic needs to be universal so that I’d be obliged to regard it as necessarily true. You’ve merely assumed what you wish to prove—namely, that only God grounds logic. You’ve also no shown what Universal logic IS. How is it different than “garden variety” logic. So far all I’m seeing you say here is something along the lines of “universal logic is better because it is universal”. Where is the argument as opposed to appeals that would only convince someone who shares your metaphysical investments?
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As such, I have a reason to use universal logic. The atheist (especially those who limit logic to mental or linguistic capacities) have no universal logic. And those who would seek to argue that logic "just is" (as Morgan tried with the Platonist argument) use a self-refuted logic.
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I don’t see anything approaching even a partial accounting for logic in your remarks. You introduced the notion of “universal logic” that so far as I can tell has a usage that is identical in every respect to the logic. You then presume that you can use something other than logic to prove logic is valid. At least that is how it sounds. If this IS the move you intend to make than you disqualify yourself from a RATONAL discussion before the discussion can even begin.
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Thanks for the discussion,
Anon2
The second sentence in the last paragragh of my last post is supposed to read:
ReplyDelete"You introduced the notion of “universal logic” that so far as I can tell has a usage that is identical in every respect to the logic that I and even atheists use"
anon2
Anon2 really beat me to the punch. I started to post the following yesterday, but Blogger was down, so now that I have the chance, presto, anon2 stole my thunder. At any rate, I'd rather be a little redundant b/c there were a few things I wanted to point out that anon2 didn't:
ReplyDeleteCD,
I know you've put a lot of effort into attempting to convince me, but you're still falling short of doing so, that you can, or must, "account for" logic.
There must, in fact, be some kind of arguments that are not logical that still, somehow, forms logic.
What? Where does such stuff come from, CD? How does this follow? From what?
You know I like you personally, I just honestly have no clue what you're saying when you say such things, and, to steal a line from Prof. Witmer's presentation, I don't think you do either...
You have so many tautologies in that particular example that it makes my head spin.
BTW, your claim:
circular argument = invalid = saying "logic just is valid"
is false. I'll get to why in a moment.
Let's get something out of the way before we beat this dead horse further:
For instance, can logic merely be assumed without having some kind of grounding? Not if logic is valid.
We both agree that logic is valid. Are you saying you "reason your way there", from the starting point of "God exists", without presupposing the proposition? That seems to be exactly what you imply, but it makes no sense at all.
If you are saying logic isn't allowed as a presupposition (i - vii below), and you state, "God exists, and I know that logic is valid because..." anything you say afterwards will assume what it intends to prove -- you will attempt to use logical argumentation to "justify logic itself". CalvinDude, this is silly.
The whole argument is silly.
i) By a strict presuppositionalist argument, worldviews cannot inject/import presuppositions into each other, yes?
ii) My worldview is informed by many different aspects of my experience and knowledge. My presuppositions are supposed to be "foundational" things which cannot be reduced in any meaningful sense beyond itself.
iii) Logic is valid.
iv) I can justify (iii) in a few different ways, including the self-evident nature of "A is A". Also, logic is incorrigible.
v) My worldview, my presuppositions, are contented with rational justification.
vi) Going "beyond" logic to some "this is why logic is valid" is a dream world that you live in. It is not my world view. You are attempting to inject your presupposition into my worldview -- that I must go "beyond" logic. In my worldview, you make no sense.
vii) I have not been inconsistent. That is all you can critique me on. You cannot tell me what I have to hold as a presupposition (that is, unless we are suddenly allowed to do "external critiques?). The buck stops here.
Also, tautologies are true by definition. Circular arguments are not necessarily false. They simply don't take you anywhere (kind of like this whole exposition). If logic isn't true, then we self-refute; and if logic needs something else to be true, then we beg the question of "truth" and how it is established.
Circular argumentation is also not a "law of logic" per se. You misspoke when you claimed that.
These:
i) identity
ii) contradiction
iii) excluded middle
are the standard "laws of logic" that I know of. Can you point me to some other reference if I'm wrong?
So, you need to go back to these three and start over. But, please don't. Please give up this terrible argument.
S&S,
ReplyDelete***First, let's agree to keep the two discussions at hand separate -- whether logic can be/must be "grounded/accounted for"; versus whether or not the metaphysics/ontology of logic [which require assuming the validity of logic to explore] can be ably looked at through the lens of physicalism vs Platonism***
What I asked CD, and am not advocating, is how it is contradictory to my own worldview if I say that I have a conditional ontology:
i) everything in the universe
ii) abstract universals
I wanted to see if this is incoherent of self-refuting:
Physicalism is sufficient to describe anything involving, or supervening upon matter/energy, and anything that cannot be observed.
"T"ruth, and logic, are not physical, cannot be observed, and do not supervene upon matter/energy.
Therefore, they fall outside of the scope and intent of a "pure" physicalism.
Now, as I've already explained at some length here and elsewhere (see this compilation of links in my comments section, last comment) I am not actually advocating pure Platonism.
This whole allegation of "Daniel is now a Platonist!" started over one comment I left at CD's site, and I'll paste the crux of it b/c I've been repeating it ever since:
I was reading over the Platonic solution to universals (which seems to be the whole thing we’re discussing in a broad sense), and I find it interesting that one of the definitions of a universal is that we cannot come into contact with them in any meaningful way — they exist outside of space and time (the only existence they have inside of space and time is our conception thereof, in our minds).
Let us say for a moment that I am willing to accept the Platonic metaphysical explanation for logic. Let us say that I suspect that anything I can observe, or come into contact with, is physical, or supervenes on the physical. [physicalism]
Have I contradicted myself? So long as I separate the physicalism framework, which I contend and admit does not incorporate Platonic universals, from the other, and say that both are true, and do not contradict, how can you show me that they do?
Physicalism and Platonism seem compatible, since physicalism holds that everything it describes is (in theory) observable, or its effects are, and can be directly or indirectly contacted, and exist within space and time, while Platonism describes (only) those things which fit none of these categories...can I not accept that both are the best description of things that fall into their own frameworks?
Note that I am not saying that everything is but a reflection of some abstract form, but I'm saying, "Can we put logic in the same category as these forms -- abstract and transcendent, while putting everything else in the framework of physicalism?"
CalvinDude made a response to this, but I think he'd agree, in retrospect, that he didn't really address the hypothetical outlined above. He hit pure Platonism, as a sufficient metaphysic in itself, and not the conditional I outlined.
Keep in mind this is all hypothetical, in an attempt to discuss the necessary contradiction between presuppositions, for one who wishes to abandon a "pure physicalism" and accomodate "conditional physicalism" and "single-condition Platonism".
It is obvious that logic doesn't instantiate itself as a "physical copy" of anything [same with the number 2, right?]. I might liken the existence of logic within our universe to the fundamental forces, woven into and inextricable from the cosmos, not in any particular place or time. But, given that logic is a Platonic object, it exists in a trasncendent way such that it is true "in all possible worlds".
Now, all hypotheticals aside, no one here should be under the impression that I am trying to "cheat". I'm trying to take a serious look at physicalism, and consider the metaphysics/ontology of logic.
As I explained (at some length) in the last comment, and anon2, the metaphyics/ontology of logic bear absolutely no threat or help to the truth-value and presuppositional status of logic. In order to even begin to look at the metaphysics/ontology, we have to assume the truth of logic, and employ it (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) in our probing of how/why logic exists. The fact that it does it not under scrutiny.
Now, S&S, to your comment:
As such, one needs a transcendent mind to bring the particulars in relation to one another in order to solve the problem of the one and the many.
With respect to logic, can you qualify this statement? Can you show me how a transcendent mind brings "particulars of logic"? Are there "particulars of logic"? Are there "universals of logic"? Or is there just logic?
How is logic instantiated?
Where "redness" is instantiated as all red objects in the cosmos, and I could (possibly) see a point here, in what way do we face this same one/many with respect to logic?
With respect to logic and ontology, I've plugged the same reference about three or four times now, and it's freely available as a .pdf download, and it's just about seven pages of material to read. However, no one has yet replied to it:
Logic and Ontology, sections 6-8, pp139-146 (link)
This reference explores a few modes of metaphysical/ontological existence for logic, and the sections 6-8 specifically look at "conceptual natural realism" and a "conceptual intensional realism", neither of which presuppose a transcendent mind of any sort.
***I would really like to stick to the conversation that CD and anon2 and I are having first, but perhaps this can be discussed as well, but let's all try to stick to topics and get through them one comment at a time; when this topic continues, can we address the above reference in the discussion? I'll gladly cut & paste swaths of it.***
DM,
ReplyDelete1. Sorry. I haven't been following your debate with CalvinDude. I thought that you appealed to an actual Platonic realm of forms in order to solve the logic problem.
2. I'm not very schooled in philosophy, and so, I can't really answer your questions.
As all reason and sanity are lost to a sea of bla bla bla...
ReplyDeleteIt appears everyone is too busy slinging mud back and forth, like a bunch of children, on the other threads to come here and have a serious talk.
ReplyDeleteI hear repeated (until my ears bleed) that atheists don't want substantive debate, and that we don't actually have arguments, or worthwhile ones.
At least I've offered something. CalvinDude seems to be the only person interested in this.
Island,
If you don't like the dialogue, why don't you either: i) leave and not come back to comment; ii) provide something to get the thread onto a topic you do want to discuss?
S&S,
1) I hope it's clear that I don't think there's a problem, per se. I think there is a sort of mystery surrounding metaphysics in general, for all persons (theist/atheist/etc), and I offered to try to fill in gaps in our understanding as best I could, using a hypothetical.
2) I've never taken the first philosophy/theology course, and don't plan to.