Atheism or bust

JC: I would disagree with your claim about evidence though. You may or may not know anything about me, so you may have no direct evidence as to whether or not I'm prone to lying or delusion, but you can still discount my claim to being in a spaceship.

SH: For some reason you’re very enamored with your alien abduction scenario. We’re been over this ground several times now. You’re merely repeating yourself without advancing the argument.

JC: But regardless, it looks like you now agree that you don't have to know what did happen to know what didn't happent.

SH: I never said otherwise as a general proposition. You’ve chosen to disregard the explicit context of my remarks for diversionary purposes.

And it’s irrelevant to the case at hand. We have a number of independent reasons for discounting an alien abduction.

But the contributors to The Empty Tomb are not on the same position vis-à-vis the Resurrection.

JC: Obviously Carrier presents evidences for the stolen body or survival hypothesis, so you should have no objection to what he's doing in principle.

SH: (see below)

JC: Wrong again. Carrier presents a lot of evidence. He talks about Jewish law, and how movement of a body is certainly consistent with that. He shows that grave robbery was clearly a problem in that time period, particularly for people that were considered holy. He talked about motive. He talked about opportunity. He talked about how his explanations explained the data. You certainly don't find his arguments persuasive, but to say that there is no evidence is flat out wrong.

SH: Evidence for what? The problem is that Carrier’s alternative is far more specific than the evidence he adduces in support of his alternative.

For one thing, just compare the claims in the body of the text (ET, 455-51) with the supporting evidence in the footnotes (365-66).

Carrier almost never gives any dates for his primary sources or their geographical provenance. Nor does he give us any direct quotes from the primary sources. Instead, the reader is simply referred to some obscure reference work. So how is the average reader in any position to sift his “evidence”?

Let’s take some particular examples. He refers the Nazareth decree. But consider some of what he has to say about the decree in an article he did on the subject:

“In the late 19th century there were only two major market centers for all antiquities recovered in Palestine: Jerusalem and Nazareth. Thus, Zulueta makes the plausible conjecture that the slab was recovered either in Samaria or Decapolis and either purchased in or shipped out of the nearest possible place, which would be Nazareth. Indeed, Zulueta also observes that the text uses the plural form "gods" which would have been offensive to Jews, making the most likely origin the Hellenized district of Decapolis. In line with this is the constant emphasis in the decree of the cult of the dead, even as being on par with the religious worship of gods, a choice of words and phrases that would not have been much approved by Jews, no matter how much it might have been true, but would have made perfect sense in a community of Greeks…When we examine the Nazareth Inscription, this is what we see going on: Roman law is being promulgated among Greeks.”

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/nazarethlaw.html

And again: “To tie this to Christianity requires piling dozens of conjectures onto scores of speculations, and the rejection of a good supply of contrary indications and evidence, and none of this is either necessary or reasonable.”

So by Carrier’s own lights, while the Nazareth decree documents the phenomenon of necromantic grave-robbery among the Greco-Roman heathen, it would be fallacious to extrapolate from that to the situation in Jerusalem.

Likewise, in his aforesaid article, but not, tellingly, in his chapter in The Empty Tomb, he quotes the text of the Nazareth decree. But there’s nothing in the text about the use of “holy” relics in divination or witchcraft.

And his literary allusions to the use of holy relics in necromancy is apparently limited to Greco-Roman sources, not Jewish sources. So what, exactly, does this have to do with a Jewish cemetery in Jerusalem, which was not a “Hellenized” district of the Roman Empire?

Again, the business about “crucifixion nails and the blood of criminals” comes from Roman writers—Statius and Horace.

This is how Carrier manipulates “evidence.” He creates evidence through innuendo. By combining things that are disparate in time, place or culture—as if these originally went together.

The irony is that guys like Curry pride themselves on being critical thinkers, but they bring no critical judgment to bear on the mix-and-match methodology of someone like Richard Carrier.

And what about his chapter on Jewish law? That chapter presents an argument for the wrong tomb theory, in point-blank contradiction to his chapter on stolen body theory.

So his “evidence” in chapter 9, if probative, would be evidence that he mishandles the evidence in chapter 10. Or, if you prefer, his “evidence” in chapter 10, if probative, would be evidence that he mishandles the evidence in chapter 9.

According to chapter 9, the body was not properly secured and monitored. According to chapter 10, the body was properly secured and monitored.

If chapter 9 is true, it falsifies chapter 10. If chapter 10 is true, it falsifies chapter 9. Take your pick.

Yes, the contributors to the Empty Tomb amass an impressive amount of evidence—to disprove each other’s alternative theories.

JC: You should support such claims if you are going to make them. I don't believe what you are saying is true at least for Carrier. Carrier has made the point repeatedly that he doesn't discard the miraculous explanation out of hand a priori. He doesn't believe that miracles can't be known historically. I believe he made this point in his debate with Licona and also has written about it.

1.Carrier expressly says, “we have no good evidence that any form of supernaturalism is true” (ibid. 364) and refers the reader to his “forthcoming book Sense & Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism,” 367, n.36.

In addition, he explicitly states that:

“So long as there are plausible natural explanations available, the resurrection story cannot be used as evidence of a supernatural event” (370).

So his presumption of methological naturalism is all-controlling, and that, in turn, is grounded in his metaphysical naturalism.

2.My remarks were never restricted to Carrier.

3.Even if, in his subsequent debate with Licona, Carrier said something different, it wouldn’t be the first time or last time that he’s changed his mind. He’s a study in intellectual instability.

And keep in mind that this sort of throwaway disclaimer is a purely tactical.

To avoid the charge of blind dogmatism, especially in public debate, Carrier might well say that he doesn’t dismiss the miraculous explanation out of hand, but in actual practice he will go out of his way to champion any naturalistic explanation, however implausible or at odds with another naturalistic explanation, in preference to a supernatural explanation.

4.Is it just a coincidence that all the contributors offer naturalistic alternatives to the account of the empty tomb and Easter appearances?

JC: They disagree in some cases because history is the most inexact of the sciences and probability is the best they can do. There are a number of possible explanations for the data and we will probably never be certain of the facts. Skeptics are comfortable with that state of affairs. So what if we aren't sure? Christians of course are not comfortable with this fact and want the evidence to give them a certain conclusion about what happened. Perhaps you are projecting your need for a confident conclusion about what really happened on to me and to other skeptics. We're OK with the fact that we aren't certain.

SH:

1.That’s completely phony. The contributors to The Empty Tomb are totally intolerant of the supernatural. This is clearly out of bounds where their secular comfort zone is concerned.

2.It is also quite misleading to suggest that history is more dubious than the hard sciences.

While, in principle, chemistry may be more certain than history, yet for most of us, our knowledge of chemistry and other hard sciences is dependent on scientific testimony. So it’s equivalent to history.

And if you try to counter by contending that chemical reactions are repeatable in a way that historical events are not, this only pushes the uncertainty back a step, for only a chemist is in a position to reproduce the experiment and only a chemist is competent to observe the process or interpret the results. And I dare say that no chemist has ever tried to reproduce every experiment in the literature. And even a specialist in one field of science is dependent on scientific testimony in a field outside his particular area of expertise. So we’re still back to scientific testimony, which is equivalent to historical testimony.

3.I’d add that Christians don’t regard Bible history as mere history, but as inspired history.

JC: No. You are the one that has put the resurrection on one side of the fence, then argued that the other contradictory opinions cancel each other out.

I have not put "swoon theory" on one side of the fence and argued that everyone else is wrong because they disagree amongst themselves. This is what you have done. You are doing exactly what Roman Catholics do.

You have also put the miraculous explanation on one side of the fence and asserted that everyone else is wrong (swoon, twin, myth, legend, survival).

SH:

1.The fact that mutually exclusive theories cancel each other out has nothing to do with which side of the fence they are on.

That, rather, is a logical relation generated by their respective claims and implications.

2.What you have done is to stake out a noncommittal position on naturalistic explanations. You’ve done this for purely tactical reasons. You play it safe by refusing to affirm any particular alternative. That way you can’t be cornered.

But your game of leapfrog comes at a cost. If you yourself don’t’ think that there’s enough evidence to side with one alternative over another, then why should anyone else take the alternatives seriously?

3.Once again, the only reason for offering alternative explanations is if you think there’s a need for an alternative explanation in the first place. And that goes back to your presumptive metaphysical naturalism, just like the contributors to The Empty Tomb.

4.What about the Catholic argument?

i) It is correct for a Roman Catholic apologist to say that mutually exclusive Protestant traditions cannot all be true. So, to that extent, I agree with the analogy.

ii) That, however, is not an argument for the Catholic rule of faith—for a variety of reasons I’ve given elsewhere.

iii) Moreover, the Protestant case against Catholicism is not based on compiling a set of mutually exclusive arguments against Rome.

a) For one thing, Protestants share certain arguments in common.

b) For another thing, to the extent that one tradition uses an argument at odds with another tradition, a Protestant apologist would not bundle both arguments together as counting against the claims of Rome.

An Anabaptist is not going to combine a distinctively Anabaptist argument with a distinctively Presbyterian argument in his critique of Romanism.

5.Opposing the Resurrection (as one explanation) to a string of miscellaneous and mutually exclusive alternatives is asymmetrical with opposing the many to the one. There is nothing incoherent about opposing one unified position to many contradictory alternatives whereas it is quite incoherent to do the same thing in reverse.

JC: In that case you have to deal with the fact that all of the alternative explanations will be arrayed against you.

SH: The “fact” that all the other explanations are arranged against me is not something I under an obligation to deal with unless the other explanations enjoy some degree of evidentiary merit.

Do I really have to “deal” with “Jesus as a space alien” alternative? Do I really have to deal with “Jesus’ identical twin”?

JC: If you don't like that, then you need to stop saying that your interpretation of the facts is definitely right and everyone else is wrong.

SH: This is self-refuting relativistic rubbish which treats all explanations (excepting, conveniently enough, supernatural explanations) as epistemically on a par.

JC: Since a 10 year reunion only happens once in a lifetime if I were to consider that it happened yesterday with no evidence (this represents the term in Bayes' Theorem that I'm calling the "initial probability") the presumption would be against it. Later terms start introducing evidence. Perhaps you told me you went. This is not something people typically lie about and we know that people do go to high school reuinions occasionally. You would plug this in to Bayes' Theorem and conclude that it did happen with about a 98% probability. But you are exactly right. The initial probability value would be very low.

SH: Notice how Curry ducks the question of whether I would need to furnish “extraordinary” evidence that I attended the “extraordinary” (i.e. rare, indeed—unique) event my high school reunion.

JC: So if I were to tell you that I flew in a spaceship because God had some purpose for it, this would dramatically increase the initial probability value? I don't think so.

SH: The reason you’re so enamored of your space ship comparison is because it’s absurd, and you’re attempting tar the Resurrection with your silly comparison.

God doesn’t perform ridiculous stunts.

Once again, all your illustration illustrates is the fact that you never understood the theology of miracles.

JC: If the resurrection wasn't extraordinary then it wouldn't be evidence of anything.

SH: Now you’re being disingenuous. I explained exactly what I meant.

But I thank you for being disingenuous. It’s a backhanded admission that your own position is indefensible.

JC: If people died and came back to life all the time nobody would care that Christ came back to life. It is by virtue of the extraordinary nature of the resurrection that people believe subsequent claims about Christianity (such as belief that faith in Jesus saves, etc).

SH: You are once again confounding the nature of the evidence with the nature of the event.

This was a question of evidence. What kind of evidence do you need to establish that someone is dead? Ordinary or extraordinary evidence? What kind of evidence do you need to establish that someone is alive? Ordinary or extraordinary evidence?

In the case of the Resurrection, we have, as I said before, and which you chose to ignore, an extraordinary event consisting in an extraordinary relation between two ordinary events: life and death. While the relation is extraordinary, the relata are ordinary. And we only need ordinary evidence to establish the respective relata.

JC: Suppose you haven't looked in to the miraculous claims reported of St. Genevieve, or Sabbatai Sevi, or Benny Hinn, or Herodotus claim that the Temple of Delphi defended itself with technicolored armaments. How about Marian apparitions, Mary in the clouds, Mary in the toast? Healings by Kathryn Kuhlman, healings by Joseph Smith, healings by Pat Robertson. Aren't you normally suspicious of such claims? I think you are. You should be. Why make an exception for Christianity? Why not approach it the way you would every other miraculous claim?

SH:

1.Cute, but you’re changing the subject. You made a categorical statement: I should be initially sceptical about “any” miraculous claim.

You then act as if, unless I take an all-or-nothing position, I’m being inconsistent. Either I’m sceptical of everything or nothing.

2.What I’ve said all along is that there’s a difference between the evidence for the general framework of the miraculous and/or paranormal, and the evidence for any particular claim thereof, which I why I judge these on a case-by-case basis.

3.I’ve also covered some of this ground in my review of The Empty Tomb.

4.There’s a difference between belief, unbelief, and disbelief.

In some cases I reserve judgment (unbelief) because I don’t know enough about the particular claim to render an informed judgment.

In other cases I disbelieve the claim because I do know enough, and what I know is pretty damning.

5.Apropos 4, there is also a distinction between evidence, inevidence, and contrary evidence.

6.There are also questions concerning the quality of the evidence, as well as the nature of the claim. A miracle isn’t just a weird event.

7. I don’t claim that Christians have a monopoly on the supernatural. There are evil spirits as well as God and the heavenly court.

But not every miracle is an attestation of doctrine.

JC: All of the naturalistic alternatives, though mutually exlusive, have one thing in common. They do not require a supernatural explanation. So the combined impact of them counts against the supernatural explanation. That is why they are grouped as they are. This is perfectly reasonable.

SH:

1.The “combined impact” of “mutually exclusive naturalistic alternatives” counts against the supernatural explanation?

A contradiction doesn’t count for or against anything since a contradiction is consistent with anything.