Talking animals

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John W. Loftus said:

My brief comments on the debate can be found here.


You see, it doesn't do presuppositionalists any good to say atheists don't have an objective standard for moral truth when we question whether that which they presuppose has any better objective standard for knowledge and truth. What Barker's analogy was getting at was the Euthyphro dilemma And the Euthyphro dilemma puts an end to this presuppositionalist nonsense. So I say to presuppositionalists, solve that dilemma before we go any further.

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There are a couple of basic problems with this objection:

1.Loftus acts as if Christians had either never even heard of the Euthyphro dilemma before, or if they had, are speechless to deal with it.

But many of us are familiar with the dilemma, and we’ve already addressed it. I addressed it a long time ago in my critique of Bertrand Russell, and Frame has also engaged that objection.

http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/1993Euthyphro.htm

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2004/04/why-im-not-bertrand-russell.html

2.Even if the Euthyphro dilemma were unanswerable, that would not be an argument for secular ethics, but only an argument against Christian ethics.

Stalemate—not checkmate for the unbeliever.

Continuing with Loftus:

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I also thought Barker did a fine job when he asked why Manata believes a snake talked. Barker suggested that the principle of induction stands as overwhelming evidence against the story told in Genesis 3, as well as other Biblical claims. For none of us have experienced a snake that really talks. The only reason Manata believes a snake talked was because "someone told a story." Manata uses that "story" to count as evidence against all of our inductive conclusions about snakes, rather than letteing his own inductive conclusions about snakes to count as evidence against the reliability of the story in Genesis 3, and that's just strange and muddled thinking. Does Manata believe any similar "stories" told today just because someone tells them? Barker told a story with tongue-in-cheek about a cat that spoke Spanish to him. Such a story goes against what the principle of induction tells us can happen, and so Manata inconsistently said he didn't believe it. Of course he doesn't. But he won't apply that same clear thinking to the story about a snake that talked. Snakes do not have vocal chords, nor the other things needed to talk!

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This raises quite a few issues:

1.As I and others have pointed out, secularism is unable to ground the principle of induction.

http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/induction.html
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/cartwrig/Papers/NoGodNoLaws.pdf
http://www.frame-poythress.org/poythress_articles/2003Why.htm

Hence, it would be a simple matter for Manata to convert the Barker/Loftus objection into just so much grist for the TAG mill, this time using induction as his point of departure.

2.Barker/Loftus also act as if the absence of evidence were positive evidence against the existence of something. But that’s a non-sequitur.

Just as nonevidence isn’t evidence for anything, neither is nonevidence evidence against anything.

There are times when the argument from silence has some probative value if we have a reasonable expectation of evidence, but one must make a case for the argument from silence in any given deployment.

Both Barker and Loftus are committing what one writer dubbed “the fallacy of negative proof,” D. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (Harper & Row 1970), 47-48.

3.Most of our knowledge of the world is based on testimony. The fact that Manata believes in the possibility of a talking snake because he read about one in a reliable source is hardly an argument against his belief in talking snakes.

4.Loftus likes to remind us that he used to be a Christian—a Christian with several seminary degrees.

When did he stumble upon the discovery that snakes lack vocal chords? Did he used to believe in Gen 3 because he didn’t know this fact about ophidian physiology?

5.Why did the author of Gen 3 believe in talking snakes? Is it because, unlike Barker or Loftus, the author had a personal experience with talking snakes?

Whatever date Loftus or Barker assign to Genesis, the author and his audience had no more experience of talking snakes than we do. So modernity is not the differential factor.

There are superstitious ancient writers as well as sceptical ancient writers; superstitions modern writers as well as sceptical modern writers.

6.Barker and Loftus apparently presume a uniform, acontextual criterion for judging the credibility of “stories.”

But they don’t explain or justify why we should apply the same abstract criterion without regard to time, place or circumstance.

For example, suppose we have several reported sightings of a Yeti rummaging through the dumpster in the back lot of the local Wal-Mart. And suppose we also have several reported sightings of a Yeti in the Himalayas.

Should we treat all these sightings as equally credible or incredible? Obviously not. The circumstances make quite a difference.

In the one case, witnesses claim to have seen a large, undiscovered animal in its natural habitat, and—what is more—a largely unexplored habitat.

In the other case, witnesses claim to have seen a large, undiscovered animal in an artificial and densely populated habitat.

Now, you may reasonably conclude that the evidence is insufficient in either case. But clearly the attendant circumstances make a difference in how we weigh the respective reports.

Likewise, if a neighbor tells me that he saw a broomstick levitate and smash into his kitchen window, then my initial reaction will be one of polite disbelief—assuming that I have nothing else to go on.

If, however, his home is reputed to be a haunted house, with a high rate of turnover because a series of former homeowners say they were drive out of the house by the same paranormal phenomena, then I’ll judge my neighbor’s report quite differently.

If, of course, you’re a doctrinaire unbeliever like Loftus or Barker, then no amount of eyewitness testimony would ever shake your dogmatic scepticism.

7.Likewise, Gen 3 isn’t describing an every-day event. Rather, the account is situated in a set of circumstances which no longer exist. In a garden specially prepared by God for the first human couple. In a garden populated by animals specially created by God. In a time and place before the Fall. Before the Flood.

Loftus and Barker would, of course, reject the preternatural underpinnings of the “story.”

But we need to judge the “story” by its narrative outlook, and not deem the “story” to be false by straining it through an extraneous filtering device like atheism or materialism. That’s an exercise in prejudice. The narrative was never meant to make sense from a secular viewpoint.

8.We also need to discuss the identity of the serpent. What are the exegetical options?

i) The serpent could be an articulate, intelligent creature, just like human beings are articulate, intelligent creatures.

The fact that you and I have never encountered a talking snake is due to the curse (3:14). We’re on the wrong side of history.

On this interpretation, Loftus and Barker are guilty of an anachronistic reading of the text.

ii) The serpent could be a fallen angel. It is called a “snake” because the Hebrew word is a pun. As one commentator explains:

“A more directly sinister nuance may be seen in Heb. Nahas if it is to be connected with the verb nahas, ‘to practice divination, observe signs’ (Gen 30:27; 44:5,15; Lev 19:26; Deut 18:10). This verb appears eleven times in the OT, always in the Piel. The related noun nahas means ‘divination’ (Num 23:23; 24:1),” V. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 1:187.

a) This interpretation is attractive in several respects. It’s consonant with Pentateuchal usage. It resonates with certain intertextual motifs.

b) It has the irony of an accursed creature which is the source of our primal parents’ accursed state. It brings a curse upon Adam and Eve.

c) Note the parallel with the Balaam cycle, in which the false prophet attempts to hex Israel. Note Israel’s lapse into apostasy, like Adam and Eve before her.

If a reptile were in view we’d expect it to be classified with the creepy crawlers rather than the beasts of the field.

d) The syntax of 3:1 is ambiguous: it could either be partitive or comparative. If partitive, then the serpent is set in contrast to the animal kingdom. Cf. EBC 1:50.

e) It fits with the complex allusions to Gen 2-3 in Ezk 28.

iii) It could be a case of metamorphosis, in which an angel assumes a reptilian form.

a) At least on one interpretation, we have other cases of metamorphosis in the Pentateuch (e.g. Gen 3:14; Exod 4:3; 7:15).

b) The Pentateuch is studded with angelophanies. Indeed, we have a couple of angelophanies in the very account of the Fall. Cf. 3:8,24.

c) Angels can assume corporeal form (Gen 18).

d) On a traditional reading, Gen 6:1-4 is alluding to fallen angels.

iv) Or it could be a case of animal possession (cf. Mt 8:30-32). Its ability to speak and reason would be due to the incubus, not the host.

9.On a related note, we might consider Num 22. Two comments are in order:

i) The donkey’s capacity for speech is specifically attributed to divine agency (v8).

ii) The scene is meant to be incongruous and highly ironic. Balaam is a professional seer who is blind to the angel while his donkey, which would ordinarily be a dumb animal, is made more clairvoyant than he!

For a fine analysis, cf. I. Duguid, Numbers: God’s Presence in the Wilderness (Crossway Books 2006), chap. 27.

For an unbeliever, all of this is worse than silly. But it’s only silly because the existence and the presence of God is not a living reality for him.

I’d add that, for a believer, naturalistic evolution is every bit as “magical” and counterintuitive as anything in the Bible.